


OLUFEMI OLUNIYI



Reconciliation *in* Northern Nigeria

the Space for Public Apology

Foreword by:

Dr. Chris Shu'aibu Abashiya, MFR

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One conclusion from this compelling book is the need for a word of apology from the key perpetrator: the United Kingdom in general, England more particularly, for intruding and messing up the lives of other peoples. President Clinton had the courage to do so in 1993 on the centenary of the US Marine military coup in Hawaii – it did some good. Do PM Theresa May and successors have the same moral courage? England would have nothing to lose if it chooses to grow together with maltreated Northern Nigeria.

Johan Galtung, PhD Mathematics (1956), PhD Sociology (1957)

dr hc mult,

Founder and currently Rector, TRANSCEND Peace University,

Visiting Professor, 2013–2014

International Islamic University, Malaysia

Founder of TRANSCEND International

Using religion to divide the people is counter-productive in the long run.

Dr. Walter Carrington

US Ambassador to Nigeria, 1993–1997

Apology is strongly supported by and strongly recommended by the Qur'an.

Ish-aq Akintola,

Prof of Islamic Eschatology

Lagos State University, Ojo

Director, Muslim Rights Concern, Lagos

Nigeria, like every society confronted with a turbulent past of violence, must come to terms with its past in a spirit of candour and courage, through its own internal process of truth telling, healing and reconciliation.

His Excellency, José Ramos-Horta

President of East Timor (2007–2012)

Nobel Peace Prize Laureate (1996)

Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for

Guinea-Bissau (2013–2014)

Chair, High Level Independent Panel UN Peace Operations (2014–2015)

The book is a must read.

Justice Fiona Mwale

High Court of Malawi

Lilongwe, Malawi

This book presents a critical perspective on colonial roots and post-colonial nurturing of Muslim-Christian violence in Northern Nigeria. It is a product of competent analysis of records, publications and decisions by colonial and post-colonial governments which sowed and nurtured conflicts among religious groups. It is a valuable book for scholars, politicians, policy makers and religious leaders.

Etannibi Alemika

Professor of Criminology
University of Jos
Nigeria

I am astonished by the depth and breadth of the analysis of events and facts that are tantamount to sowing the seed for Muslim-Christian confrontations in Northern Nigeria. Dr. Oluniyi puts the blame squarely at the doorstep of the British colonial administration, as well as the post-colonial perpetrators of violence. The author sees the way forward in public acknowledgment of these injustices and makes a strong case for some sort of public apology to ensure a peaceful future based on mutual respect for each other's religion. Any serious study of nationalism, politics and various religious identities cannot ignore this book.

Archbishop M. Kehinde Stephen

Archbishop of Ibadan
Methodist Church Nigeria

This is a book by one of Africa's leading peace researchers. In this balanced and comprehensive analysis of Muslim-Christian violence and inequality during colonial and post-colonial Northern Nigeria, Dr. Olufemi Oluniyi defines constructive public apology and dialogue and inspires all those who hope to reduce violence in this world.

Dr. Olga Vorkunova

Russian Academy of Sciences
Moscow
Russian Federation

This work is a contribution to the on-going debate and discussions about national harmony and how best Christians and Muslims can make a positive contribution to national development and stability. This book should be read by students of both religion and politics in Nigeria.

Most Rev. Dr. Matthew Hassan KUKAH

Catholic Bishop of Sokoto
Sokoto, Nigeria

Dr. Oluniyi's book on Northern Nigeria has many important lessons for Nigeria, West Africa and the rest of the world. Drawing on extensive analysis of the Northern Nigerian case the author insists that we look at the root causes of violence rather than just the presenting problems. The conclusion is clear. We will not be able to overcome current extremist violence in Africa or the Middle East unless there is willingness on the part of former colonial powers to acknowledge their complicity in its sources, make apology and work out ways of building mutuality across boundaries of difference. I commend it to anyone seeking to understand the origins of contemporary violence.

Professor Kevin P Clements, Chair and Director

The National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
University of Otago, New Zealand

Dr. Oluniyi confronts Nigeria's painful legacy of religious violence and how this legacy has continued to warp and wreck the national landscape. Through a creative and lucid option for public apology, he offers a luminous vision of buoyancy, hope and confidence in the future. The book is a must read for Nigerians and scholars of the post-colonial cultures.

Professor Bolade Olagoke,

Department of Criminal Justice and Social Science
Waynesburg University, USA

Dr. Olufemi Oluniyi's needed book corrects a well-worn negative myth about missionaries, offers a new way to understand the religious conflict in Nigeria, and articulates guidelines for moving beyond conflict to reconciliation.

Dr. Robert Parham

Executive Director
Baptist Center for Ethics|EthicsDaily.com
Nashville, TN 37215

Olufemi Oluniyi touches the deeper layers of the conflict in Northern Nigeria: the preferential treatment by the British colonial regime of Islam and the discriminatory treatment of indigenous Christians. To resolve the conflicts in the North, religious dialogue is not enough. He urges the building of bridges to the past. Both Great Britain and the Muslim community should apologize for sowing the seeds of the conflict. This recipe can be part of the solution when it also addresses the Christian support of the British Empire and when all the Nigerian religious leaders join, here and now, in the building of bridges to the future and help to construct a secure, affluent and bright country in which nobody is exposed anymore to the terrorism of poverty.

Prof Luc Reychler

Emeritus Professor of International Relations
Faculty of Social Sciences
Former Director
Center for Peace Research and Strategic Studies
University of Leuven, Belgium

In this scholarly study, Dr. Olufemi Oluniyi offers a sobering but constructive reading of the recent history of Northern Nigeria. In the face of violent conflict and social unrest, often fuelled by religious differences, he seeks a way forward through a strategy of acknowledgement, public apology and reconciliation. Rooted in his own experience, historical research and theological convictions, this work deserves our attention.

David Fergusson

Professor of Divinity and Principal of New College
University of Edinburgh, Scotland

Olufemi's book contributes to a better understanding of the past and present situation in Nigeria. More importantly, the author is modestly sowing positive seeds for a better harvest of peace and security in giant Nigeria.

Prof Laeed Zaghlami

Faculty of Information and Communication
Algiers University Mai, Algiers
Algeria

The critical insights of this important book should be an inspiration for all good willing people in Nigeria to achieve a framework for a peaceful living together in mutual respect and justice in this century. In Central Europe we had, among others, a thirty years religious war (1618–1648) which was a power struggle between Catholic Habsburg (Vienna) and Protestant Sweden that resulted in thousands of deaths, misery, diseases and poverty of the people

and in the occupation of foreign territory (e.g. of North-eastern Germany by Sweden until 1815) and in more richness and luxury of the winners. Religion was then used to legitimate power and violence. We need a new vision and mission to concentrate anywhere on the peace message of our religions and help them to get a positive impact for living together in peace. Dr. Olufemi Oluniyi and his balanced and well-researched book may contribute to such a needed change in perception and action that is needed anywhere.

Prof Hans Günter Brauch (rtd)

Free University of Berlin
Chair, Peace Research and European Security Studies (AFES-PRESS)
Mosbach, Germany

Dr. Oluniyi concludes his book with a positive outlook, where the local, national and planetary threats are raising awareness of the injustices committed in the past by colonial powers. This paves the way for those who have used religion to terrorise, torment and kill people to apologise and forge with others, a future of peaceful co-existence.

Prof Ursula Oswald Spring

Centre for Regional Multidisciplinary Research
National Autonomous University of Mexico
Cuernavaca, Mexico

Decent people everywhere, throughout time, have struggled with man's inhumanity to man and the resultant pain, grief and injustices caused. Some dedicate their lives to finding solutions to a perennial problem that has been exacerbated in recent times by the excesses of colonialism, capitalism and religion – each feeding off the other in the competitive quest for dominance, wealth and power. In this often-sordid pursuit, many, many wrongs have been committed 'in the name of God' and in the name of 'progress'. Arguably, Nigeria is the classic example of where destructive projects, policies and religious philosophies have been foisted on a people largely unprepared for the consequences – and the result, as Dr. Olufemi articulates so cogently in this intriguing and inspiring book, is the need for some methodical, reconciliation-based social, religious and political approaches to the challenges facing Nigeria today.

This book is a bold statement for peace in Northern Nigeria.

Dr. Stephen Manning

Integrity Ireland / CheckPoint Press Publishing
Republic of Ireland

Born on 31 January 1948, Olufemi Olayinka

Oluniyi hails from Ponyan, Yagba, in Kogi West Senatorial District. He earned the B.Th. degree from SIM/ECWA Theological Seminary Igbaja, 1975. He was a Henry Miller scholar at University of Edinburgh, for the MTh degree 1988–1989, and a Queen's Cross scholar for the Ph.D. degree at the University of Aberdeen, 1991–1995, with a thesis in public theology and advocacy journalism. He edited his name from Henry Olufemi Awoniyi to Olufemi Olayinka Oluniyi in December 2005.



His pastoral credentials, (license, 1978) and (ordination, 1981) and service started with his role as non-stipendiary Associate Minister in 2nd ECWA Church, Zaria, from 1976–1983. With a minimum trace of denominational hangover, Rev Oluniyi was Minister of Zion Baptist Church, Minna, at the request of the latter in its formative years, 1990–1991, while teaching in the Nigeria State College of Education, Minna. He was the non-stipendiary Minister of ECWA Church, Bodija-Express, Ibadan, from 1999–2002, and ECWA Victory Arena, Ajah, Lagos, from 2011–2014.

Other work experience includes teaching in public secondary schools in the defunct North Central State. During his stint on staff of the Great Commission Movement of Nigeria, the Nigerian ministry of Campus Crusade for Christ International, 1979–1981, he directed the phenomenal and peaceful “I found it” Campaign in Zaria and Kaduna metropolis simultaneously in June 1980. Thereafter, he lectured in the Niger State College of Education, Minna, beginning in 1983, including headship of Christian Religious Studies Department from 1987–1989. While in the service of the College, he received invitation for Visiting Research Professorship at the Catholic University of America, Washington D.C., 1996. He left as Senior Lecturer in the same year. He worked as Research and Programme Officer at the Centre for Applied Religion and Education, Ibadan, 1997–1999, during which he received invitation for Visiting Professorship, Graduate School of Humanities, University of Cape Town, South Africa, in 1999. He was Dean for Academic Affairs, West Africa Theological Seminary, Lagos, from 2002–2005, and Editorial Board Chairman of *National Mirror* newspapers, in Lagos, from 2006–2009.

An advocate of freedom of expression, Dr. Oluniyi submitted Memorandum No. 46 to the Constitution Drafting Committee February, 1976, calling for a constitutional provision for private ownership and operation of radio and television stations in Nigeria. Similarly an advocate of transparency, his series of articles in *Today's Challenge* monthly magazine in 1983, resulted in litigation on libel in 1984. Despite the initial miscarriage of justice at the High

Court of Justice, Calabar, the Supreme Court of Nigeria justified his articles in a landmark unanimous judgement delivered on 15 July 1994.

His participation in civil society activism includes his role as (1) Regional Representative for Europe, Association of Nigerians Abroad (ANA) from 1995–1997; (2) member, Register of Researchers, Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, Belfast, from 1996–1999; (3) Assistant Secretary, Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN); CAN being the agglomeration of the churches in Nigeria), Oyo State; (4) Lead Researcher, National Integrity System Study commissioned by Transparency International (TI), 2002. He resigned in protest against perceived disparity between transparency on air and transparency on ground. (5) He chairs the Africa Peace Research and Education Association (AFPREA), (6) serves on the Governing Council, International Peace Research Association and (7) contributes occasionally to *TRANSCEND* Media Service Weekly Digest.

He currently provides intellectual leadership and administrative direction at the Centre for Values and Social Change, Lagos, which he founded in 2008. His remit includes responsibility for the success of the maiden edition of The All Africa Annual Undergraduate Peace Essay Contest (TAAAUPEC) in 2018.

He is listed in the *Who is Who in Nigeria* (Lagos: Achievers Publications), 2012.

RECONCILIATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

THE SPACE FOR PUBLIC APOLOGY

Rev. Olufemi Olayinka Oluniyi, PhD



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DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to four categories of people. The number of people on this page is unconventional in the publishing industry. However, the publisher allowed it because to erase 'thank you' is to be less than human

First, it is dedicated to the memories of two people who believed in my future: late Prof Aaron T. Gana of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and later founding Vice-Chancellor of Bingham University, and late Rev. Fred Adeyanju of 2nd ECWA Church, Sabon-Gari, Zaria.

The second category consists of four teachers of mine. They are Rev. Herb Klem and Miss Joyce Flint both at SIM/ECWA Theological Seminary, Igbaja, in the earlier 1970s. The latter are Prof Duncan B. Forrester and Prof Andrew F. Walls both of New College, University of Edinburgh.

Thirdly, this dedication extends to late Mr. Eric Wood of Stonehaven, Scotland, and Pa Modupe Oduyoye. Each of them was characterised by unusual kindness to me when I studied in Scotland, and when I lived in Ibadan respectively. Oduyoye's kindness is on-going.

Lastly, this dedication extends to the Henry Miller Trustees, New College, University of Edinburgh, for the Henry Miller Scholarship, 1988, Queen's Cross Church, Aberdeen, for the Queen's Cross Scholarship, 1991, Boscombe Baptist Church, Bournemouth, England, and Fetteresso Parish Church, Stonehaven, Scotland, for their prayer support for my family during my student days in Scotland.

You will know the truth, and the
truth will set you free. Jn. 8: 32 (CSB)

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I met Stephanie Thiel, a PhD student in Political Psychology and Peace Journalism at the University of Konstanz, Germany, during the 2010 International Peace Research Conference, Sydney Australia, and asked if she would read a manuscript for me after the conference. She did read it and passed it. I asked her to read it again, watching for anger in my manuscript. Instead, she noted some issues I did not address adequately. Her comment sparked off this book. She is currently a Research Associate at the University of Giessen, Germany, as well as a Visiting Lecturer at the International Graduate School, Zittau, also in Germany.

This book would have remained a mirage were it not for Journal Storage (JSTOR); a digital library based in New York, for helping the academic community use digital technologies to advance research. As at August 2015, more than 8,000 institutions in more than 160 countries have access to JSTOR. Although most access is by subscription, JSTOR authorities leave their archive open and free 24/7 to African unaffiliated researchers. Readers will discover that JSTOR is my greatest source of data for this book. I am indeed very grateful.

I am grateful to the following overseas libraries that provided me with digital copies of very rare materials.

1. Universal Library, University of Toronto, Canada, made available A. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*, (London: George. Philip & Son), 1892, and J. Page, *Samuel Crowther: The Slave Boy Who Became Bishop of the Niger* 3rd edition, (New York: Fleming. H. Revell Company) n.d.
2. The National Library of Australia provided a digital copy of the posthumously published Samuel Crowther, *Experiences with*

Heathens and Mohammedans in West Africa (London: Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge), 1892, including the two photographs of the bishop used in Chapter Two and Chapter Four respectively.

3. The Cadbury Research Library: Special Collections, University of Birmingham and the Church Mission Society, Watlington Road, Oxford OX4 6BZ, for the photographs of Miss Ethel Miller and Dr. Walter Miller, which are displayed in Chapter Two and Chapter Four respectively.
4. The University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign Library made freely available online digital copies of the annual reports on Northern Nigeria submitted to the two Houses of Parliament, from 1900–1913.
5. Amy Congdon, Asst. Rights Coordinator, InterVarsity Press, Westmont, Illinois, USA, forwarded to me a digital copy of page 642 in Madryk, J. *Operation World* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press), 2010

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I am equally grateful to Prof. Julius Adekunle of Monmouth University, NJ, USA, for a complimentary copy of his book, *Politics and Society in Nigeria's Middle Belt: Borgu and the Emergence of a Political Identity*, (Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc), 2004. Three images are used under Wikipedia Creative Commons terms (1) the map of Northern Nigeria on the backcover and in Chapter One by Alaminalpha, (2) the map of the Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th century by Panoninan and (3) President Goodluck Jonathan by Flickr.com. The sketch of the original provinces of Northern Protectorate was with the assistance of Mr. Saviour Henry. Permission by Culture Custodian for the use of Premier Ahmadu Bello's image in Chapter Three is highly appreciated. Sadly, much as I tried repeatedly to reach the Talented Gifted Black People at tgbp.wordpress.com for

permission to use Dr. Edward Blyden's photograph, there was no response. Therefore, the image is used with the highest regard to the copyright holders. Efforts at reaching the holders will resume with future editions.

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo (29 January 2010), Chief Olu Falae (29 July 2010) and Prof Is-haq Akintola (22 October 2014) graciously granted me interviews on the dates indicated. They are displayed as Appendix I, II and IV respectively.

Richard Solomon and Biliyaminu Mohammed crafted the map on migration in Chapter Two while Biliyaminu Mohammed cropped the two charts in Chapter Three and drew the relational diagram at the end of the same chapter. Engr. Martins Obadiah Buba plotted the two graphs in Chapter Five while Oluwasanmi Oluniyi, my son, plotted the first chart in the same chapter.

Elizabeth Abbah and her amiable colleagues at the National Museum Library, Onikan, Lagos, deserve commendation. Because of incessant electricity outage, they often relied on their mobile phone accessories in order to look in the stacks for materials I requested.

His Eminence, John Cardinal Onaiyekan, was as gracious as usual to read the manuscript, despite his full schedule. Prof Johan Galtung read the manuscript and contributed an incisive blurb. Prof S. Etanibi Alemika, and Prof E. Bolade Olagoke, Waynesburg University, USA read the drafts with helpful suggestions. His Eminence Archbishop Kehinde Stephen, Methodist Archbishop of Ibadan read the manuscript with helpful suggestions. Dr. Chris Abashiya wrote the Foreword with words of encouragement while I was on the go.

Areson Solomon and Moses Amadi took turns to proofread sections of the first version of the manuscript while Elder Femi Owa and Dr. Kunle Dare proofread the latter version. Nevertheless, I tinkered with it thereafter thereby opening the manuscript up to worms to re-enter. Therefore, typo errors should be debited to my account, not theirs.

I assumed the pastoral leadership of ECWA Victory Arena, Ajah, Lagos, while the work on this book was well under way. This church deserves a special mention for their understanding and support from the onset. As one can imagine, many of the members could not articulate my working topic not because of inability but largely

because the focus of the study kept on shifting since I had to go to wherever the evidence led. They were, however, convinced that *Daddy*, as they fondly call me, will come up with something worth saying loud and clear at the end of the day.

There were assortments of assistance to me from other innumerable people in the course of data collection and writing. I categorise them into four roughly, and I pick a representative in each group to thank in the hope that all those who have helped me will find themselves in one or two categories, and thereby claim the acknowledgement for themselves.

1. Hon. Peter Jiya, Abuja, for arranging for my accommodation when I was in the throes of data gathering in February 2013.
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5. Carolann Young of Initial Typesetting Service who did more than typeset.

My expression of appreciation to my wife, Grace Eyiunmi Oluniyi, on this page, for her role in the book project, is an understatement.

Rev. Olufemi Oluniyi, PhD

Founder/Executive Director
Centre for Values and Social Change
Lagos, Nigeria

FOREWORD

In this book, Dr. Olufemi Oluniyi takes a fresh look at Muslim-Christian violence which has become synonymous with the name of Northern Nigeria. It is fresh in the sense that he takes a historical approach to the problem, dating back to the founding of Northern Nigeria. This approach inevitably brings to the fore the culpability of the colonial government for the institutionalisation of inequality and for pursuing policies which are tantamount to planting the seeds of religious violence for post-independence fruitage and harvest. By highlighting the role of the colonial administration, he is by no means suggesting that post-independence perpetrators of violence are less culpable for their crimes against humanity. Rather, the highlight is meant to raise awareness of what was really going on, despite official cover-up.

With the aid of maps, charts, graphs and other illustrations, the author lifts the book from the realms of platitudes to that of a firm-level empirical study. Furthermore, he evinces a pulsating engagement with his readers in argumentation, particularly in a dialogic manner.

Dr. Oluniyi brings to the open a topic which some of the current analysts evade, but which was the underlying animating factor behind the hyperactive official involvement in religious matters during the Babangida years: the huge demographic changes in the Middle Belt from 1900 to the early 1980s. Another issue which the author addresses pin-pointedly is the state of Christian-Muslim dialogue, past and present. With thoroughgoing analysis, he concludes that the era of the shambolic had begun since 1978 or thereabout. Hence, his suggestions of what must be done to reclaim genuine dialogue should not be glossed over.

The concluding chapter is ground-breaking. With a combination of ample data and graphs, the author delves into the history, proven

efficacy, and the legacy of public apology globally. He then goes on to expose the public apology deficit in the religion sector. This is novel. The preferment of public apology where the deficit occurs in the religion sector in this clime is equally novel. The probable objections to public apology, on the one hand, and the prospects which are fed by the author's optimism, on the other hand, are discussed. The novelty is unmistakable and commendable.

Former colonies, with a history of ethno-religious manipulation, will do well to examine this book for probable parallels and lessons that can still be learnt for minimising the fruitage and harvest of colonially induced violence. In the same vein, the onus is on socially aware and peace-imbued citizens and organisations in the old colonial metropolitans to have a look at this book to determine probable areas for public apology, as a means of forging new beginnings with hitherto alienated peoples, in pursuit of global peace.

Obviously, the topic of this book is country-specific. Nevertheless, it cannot be successfully denied that the relevance of the subject matter is global partly because 1) peace is fast becoming an endangered species globally and 2) because nowhere on the planet earth is totally immune from religion-related tension. Having read the manuscript and reflected on its potential for contribution to peace locally, regionally and globally, I whole-heartedly recommend this book for global readership.

Chris Shu'aibu Abashiya

B.A. (Hons.); M.Soc.Sci.; Ph.D.; MFR

Principal author of the book,

Christianity and Islam:

A Plea for Understanding and Tolerance

(Bukuru: African Christian Textbooks), 2009

INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is a West African country sharing land border with Benin Republic in the west, Chad and Cameroon in the east, Niger Republic to the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. A geo-political entity, Nigeria was carved out of existing chiefdoms, quasi-republics, kingdoms, spent dynasties and declining empires by British imperialism from what was then loosely referred to as Western Sudan. A specimen for imperialist experiment, Nigeria was coupled and configured in different regions for different purposes, from 1861 to 1914, in order to forestall a common national cause and collective objectives. Home to 500 ethnic groups with geographical identification or homelands, with as many as 500 languages, Nigeria is easily the most populous country in Africa; it accounts for one in every five Africans. A differentiated and multi-religious society, Nigeria is currently Africa's strongest economy.

While Nigeria is undoubtedly the pulsating livewire of the West African sub-region, nevertheless, Northern Nigeria¹ has been a habitation of religion-related violence, which has stunted its development, for much of the last quarter of the 20th century; and just when image makers were busy rebranding the nation with a new slogan, "Good people, Great nation", following the restoration of democracy in 1999, Boko Haram² leapt from its closet onto the national stage with fury in 2002, fire in 2007, and firestorm in 2009.

1 The territory (1) Northern Protectorate, (2) Northern Nigeria, (3) Northern Region, (4) Northern States, (5) the Far North and the Middle Belt and (6) the Middle Belt and the Far North are coterminous. The phrases are used interchangeably in this book with the context of each particular usage determining which of the phrase is preferable for the particular context.

2 The word *Boko*, a Hausa adulteration of the English word, "book" and *haram* the Hausa word for forbidden together mean aversion to Western education. Boko Haram, the terrorist organisation, was reportedly an apprentice of Al

Admittedly, it is hard to place a finger on a period of absolute calm in northern Nigerian history. There is, however, a sense in which one can speak more accurately of the history of religion-related violence in the region in the past two centuries because records are more accessible than earlier periods. More precisely, the records of what have happened in the 20th century in the region is even better kept, hence the imperative to focus more closely at the phenomenon especially during the British colonial era which began on the first day of that century and ended 60 years later.

It is widely recognised, whether in Iceland in northern Europe or in the Kalahari Desert in Southern Africa, that central to government duty is maintenance of social equilibrium whereby a dynamic working balance exists among the various sectors of society, such as the economy, politics, religion and intra-sectors. Conversely, a policy of partiality to any unit breeds imbalance and dysfunction in the whole system, which if it is not checked does lead to violence in the sector and indeed in the wider society. There are high visibility examples even in contemporary history.

The British colonial regime which imposed itself on the peoples of Northern Nigeria believed albeit erroneously that it was an exemption to the foregoing axiom, especially in the religion sector. Specifically, it formulated, justified and practiced a policy of official backing for Islam in the colony, whereas it was duty bound to uphold equilibrium among the faiths. This book looks at the policy as cause and effect of fruitage of violence in the post-colonial era. This is not to suggest that the colonial regime can be rightly blamed for the entire religion-related conundrum in Northern Nigeria in the past three decades: certain local interests in violence did take a life of theirs. The vivid analogy of ploughing, sowing and fruitage is used in this book for conveying the process of the phenomenon of what has been going on.

Solutions have been mediated through. Chief among the efforts is Christian-Muslim dialogue, but the process itself has undergone abuse to the extent that the process is currently in a state of the shambolic.

Qaeda and the Taliban in its formative stages; however, its allegiance is reported to have shifted to the Islamic Group (ISIS/ISIL /Daesh) in January 2015 thereby becoming the largest ISIS affiliate globally.

Strangely, as the data in the book corroborates, public apology is a strange sound in the religion sector in Northern Nigeria. Whether it is because of absent mindedness, myopia or conscious evasion that there is no trace of if so far in the hustle and bustle of negotiations, the public apology method – a shared value – for resolving deep-seated conflicts is herein canvassed. Not only is it time-honoured globally for forging new beginnings with renewed hope for mutual advantage for parties emerging from conflict, this book promotes public apology because reconciliation and peace in Northern Nigeria holds promise for not just the region in particular, but for Nigeria generally, as well as the global village.

Chapter One, “Colonial Ploughing for Violence”, examines the Proclamation document by which the British Crown took over the administration of Northern Nigeria, the extent of the territory, the military manner of occupation even though there was a more cost effective alternative. The key ideas of the theory and practice of Lugard’s controversial Indirect Rule are laid bare, noting that governance in Northern Nigeria was founded on fraud. Considerable space is allocated to the major features of Indirect Rule, namely (1) cultivation of *masu sarauta*, (2) inequitable judiciary and (3) the imposition of apartheid education and the inherent institutionalisation of inequality that these portend are exposed.

It is shown that the major administrative policies were considered ill-advised by an array of critics from (1) within the administration itself, (2) the colonial office which oversaw the operation of the Northern government, (3) colonial officers in Southern Nigeria, (4) the merchant class in Southern Nigeria and (5) Christian missionaries in Southern Nigeria. To the extent that the administrative policies were formulated to institutionalise inequality, to the same extent is the British Government for whom the colonial government in Northern Nigeria was a surrogate is liable to apology for the shameful administration in the colony.

With Chapter One as Ploughing, Chapter Two, “Sowing Colonial Seeds of Inequality, Intolerance,” and Division continues the trend with a special focus on how the colonial authorities sowed the seeds of inequality and intolerance in the religion sector of the northern society. A reconstruction of the pre-colonial religious map of Northern Nigeria is followed by an examination of the key ideas

which informed the formulation of the colonial policy of partiality. This procedure further exposes the demographic, historical, philosophical and racist fault lines on which the official policy of support for Islam was based. In the same vein, Lugard's recline on Dr. Edward Blyden³ for his policy on religion collapses on close examination. Not least is the *defensor fidei* argument advanced by a contemporary historian in support of Lugard's religion policy; precisely, the argument is shown to lack historical integrity.

The chapter provides evidence, in different parts of the colony, of sowing seeds of intolerance between Muslims and traditionalists, with a potential for future conflicts. In its pursuit of backing Islam and keeping the other religions at bay especially the Christian missionary advance, the colonial regime enacted six scandalous edicts – six seeds of violence, and several measures aimed at ensuring that indigenous Christians will not be able to participate in the life of the community on an equal footing with Muslims. Lastly, the chapter addresses the perennial friction between British colonial officers and Christian missionaries in Northern Nigeria. Chapter Two, the longest chapter ends with the observation that the seeds of religion-related violence sown in the colonial era and the harvest of religion-related violence of the post-independence era are a matter of cause-effect, and that the British Government cannot just rinse its hands of the inhumanity but must take responsibility for wrongdoing.

Chapter Three, "Post-Colonial Fruitage of Fertiliser Application and Violence", unveils the harvest of violence, the seeds of which the colonial administration sowed. Nevertheless, it is misleading to suggest that the colonial government was the total cause of the violence that ensued in post-colonial Northern Nigeria. This point is crucial because lasting peace does not sit comfortably with falsehood.

3 Because of his consuming passion for African unity against Western exploitation and degradation, and his positive assessment of religion as a veritable rallying point, he, a Presbyterian raked as many positive points of common cause in Islam for Christian consideration, in the hope of reciprocity on the part of the Muslims. Presumably he was ultra-selective in where he looked and what he saw in order to speak so glowingly about Islam; otherwise his expression of disappointment with Islam in his more mature years was in contradiction of his earlier rating of Islam.

The policies that Premier Ahmadu Bello pursued, and the overt and covert ways associated with General Ibrahim Babangida, the military dictator of the mid-1980s did much to nurture to fruitage Muslim-Christian violence in Northern Nigeria. Their respective means and approaches are compared and contrasted as there is a major difference between the two political actors. Given that the English word “religion” from the Latin word “religare” means “to bind together”,⁴ harnessing religion against its inner logic and away from its social capital to narrow, selfish and short-sighted centripetal causes, whether up-front or by remote control, is *ipso facto* storage of cataclysmic energies for implosion within the religion sector itself and devastating centrifugal discharge on the wider society, when the equation changes. It is a matter of time.

Stated differently, when political leaders divide the people along religious lines – thereby sowing wind – a harvest of whirlwind follows, just as night follows day. In concrete terms, therefore, it is the negative centripetal use of religion in the colonial and post-colonial eras that has been manifesting in Muslim-Christian orgies of violence in Northern Nigeria since 1987.

“harnessing religion against its inner logic and away from its social capital to narrow, selfish and short-sighted centripetal causes, whether up-front or by remote control, is *ipso facto* storage of cataclysmic energies for implosion within the religion sector itself and devastating centrifugal discharge on the wider society”

The fear of domination, which governs the relations among the various ethnic communities in Northern Nigeria, and indeed Nigeria as a whole, exists also in the religion sector especially between the Muslim and the Christian communities, to a point that the question on religion was deleted from the census questionnaire in the 1990 census exercise, when it dawned on the authorities that the Christian population in Nigeria had overtaken the Muslim population at about 1983–1984. The matter is broached with two diagrams

4 I am indebted to Prof Bolade Olagoke for this etymological enrichment.

as it cannot go away, if Nigeria is to feel at home and be respected among nations wherein facts and figures matter.

The ploughing and sowing during the colonial era as well as the nurturing during the post-colonial era bore fruit by March 1987 when violence between Muslims and Christians exploded. Counting the number of casualties, the maimed and the mangled, vandalised houses, churches, mosques, cars, hotels and prisons set ablaze has been a daunting task. Nevertheless the count by Shehu Sani up to 2006 is impressive, thereby constituting the data for the last chart in the chapter.

Admittedly, the dust has settled in some districts since 1987, and progress has been recorded in efforts at reconciling the two faith communities. Nevertheless, violence continues in tandem with conventional diplomacy cum huge financial outlay for image laundering, to convince the international community that religion-related violence in Nigeria is not as rabid as to warrant crying wolf.

So, what is the current situation in Northern Nigeria? The annual report published in January 2016 by The Open Doors, an independent UK-based observer organisation, is a good conversation starter, as the picture it paints is explicit enough.

First, Nigeria not only has the highest number of killings of Christians globally, “there were more recorded killings of Christians due to their faith in northern Nigeria in 2015 than in the rest of the world put together: 4028 out of a worldwide total of 7100 reported deaths”⁵ Secondly, Nigeria has the second highest number, 198, of “churches [that were] attacked, damaged, bombed, looted, destroyed, burned down, closed or confiscated for faith-related reasons”⁶ in 2015. Not an accident, these incidents occurred on the heels of 2014, when hundreds of teenage school girls were abducted from their hostels at night in Chibok. If this picture jolts, it may be because agenda-setting media cameras pan the Middle East in such a way as if to consciously obscure what is happening in the religion sector elsewhere. That is why a loss of one life in Mosul, Aleppo, or

5 The Open Doors Report, 2016 “Freedom of Religion and the Persecution of Christians”, in <http://www.opendoorsuk.org>, 6, (accessed on 23 January 2016)

6 *ibid.*, 8

“First, Nigeria not only has the highest number of killings of Christians globally, “there were more recorded killings of Christians due to their faith in northern Nigeria in 2015 than in the rest of the world put together: 4028 out of a worldwide total of 7100 reported deaths”⁵ Secondly, Nigeria has the second highest number, 198, of “churches [that were] attacked, damaged, bombed, looted, destroyed, burned down, closed or confiscated for faith-related reasons”⁶ in 2015. Not an accident, these incidents occurred on the heels of 2014, when hundreds of teenage school girls were abducted from their hostels at night in Chibok.”

Yemen is news while the loss of over 4000 lives to sectarian violence in northern Nigeria is a fleeting flash in the pan.

Chapter Four, “Dialogue Is not Enough”, traces the history of Christian-Muslim dialogue, from its cradle in Yorubaland in south-west Nigeria – with a glimpse of its pioneers – to its current state of a global phenomenon. The ensuing analysis covers (1) the era of the spontaneous, (2) the era of reflection and (3) the era of the shambolic, showing the contribution of the first two stages and the abuse of the system in the current stage of the shambolic in Nigeria.

While suggestions are proffered for rescuing Christian-Muslim dialogue from its present shambolic state, there is the caveat that all the resolution eggs should not be kept in the dialogue basket, because dialogue can lead to public apology just as public apology can constitute the take off point for dialogue. This caveat functions as an appetiser for the concluding chapter.

The concluding chapter; Chapter Five, “Public Apology for Reconciliation”, is where all the roads lead. The chapter is that important because of a priority reason: there is no record or trace of the public apology method for resolving Muslim-Christian violence in Northern Nigeria or violence involving Muslims and adherents of other faiths anywhere, whereas there are compelling arguments why the *status quo ante* is unsustainable.

The chapter unfolds with (1) public apology definition, (2) sources of materials for the chapter and (3) a global history of the public

apology method going back to a thousand years. (4) Selected issues, in living memory, across the continents, in which public apology has been found efficacious are presented including the Australian government apology to the aboriginal Australians for the Stolen Generation, the Japanese government apology to South Korea for the Comfort Women, British government apology to Kenya for colonial brutality, President Bill Clinton formal apology to African-Americans for the inhumanity of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's apology on his knees for the Holocaust, President Olusegun Obasanjo's apology to Nigerians for the excesses of military rule, the compensation to the Maya people of Belize and the apology by the governments of Rwanda, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo for sexual violence against their citizens at a time of conflict. Not being a bland sorry, (5) the thirteen forms that public apology has taken are laid bare.

Having laid out the factual concerns above, the chapter delves into (6) theoretical presentation of public apology. The objections to the public apology method are examined and faulted.

The next in the sequence is (7) an analysis of the public apology actors in the religion sector, with particular reference to the two religions that are implicated in the violence in Northern Nigeria. It yields a discovery of an apology deficit in the Muslim community.

Six probable reasons for the deficit are (8) examined and faulted. Borrowing a leaf from South Africa, I (9) articulate an onus and offer supporting arguments why Nigerians, and indeed the human family, should expect an apology revolution to begin in the northern parts of Nigeria – and the precedent is not far-fetched. Precisely, it is common knowledge that both the apartheid authorities and the African National Congress (ANC) employed violence in their struggle for supremacy in South Africa. Nevertheless, the apartheid establishment accepted that its wrongdoing weighed heavier than that of the ANC, hence the historic admission of greater wrong which brought peace in South Africa. Therefore what is being advocated here is not extraordinary – if the will is there.

The book shows the nexus of manipulation of religion for roles against its inner logic and its social capital on the one hand and the harvest of violence sooner or later on the other. In Northern Nigeria, the leaders sowed wind; and the people harvested whirlwind.

Nevertheless, the book ends on a note of optimism based on the efficacy of public apology – a shared value – a shared interest – and a shared responsibility. Furthermore, this book provides facts, figures, dates, to make the case that Northern Nigeria is not an exception to the rule whereby public apology holds promise for reconciliation. And the incentive is consummate – just as southwest Nigeria bequeathed Christian-Muslim dialogue to the world, so also Northern Nigeria can launch a public apology revolution with a domino effect on the global Muslim community, with a significant peace quotient for world peace.

Finally, herein comes the unveiling of the overriding objective of this book – which perhaps should have been the first thing to unpack for the reader. As it will become evident to the reader, this book is written to conform to academic conventions, but the objective transcends the mechanics of social ethics and peace studies. In circulation and readership, it is not to be circumscribed by the academe. Rather, it consciously veers into the wider habitation of genuine efforts for peace, thereby crossing the boundary of proposal into the realm of advocacy.

COLONIAL PLOUGHING FOR VIOLENCE

Inequality, hand in hand with religion-related violence, is not new in Northern Nigeria. In fact, pre-colonial Northern Nigeria provides ample evidence of it. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the colonial era marks the beginning of a new era of inequality, whereas laying the structures of inequality is tantamount to ploughing for violence.

This chapter outlines (1) the colonial proclamation of the Northern Protectorate, (2) the mode of occupation of the vast territory, and (3) the institution of Indirect Rule as the soil of inequality in which the seeds of religious violence were meant to germinate and flourish for a future of violence in Northern Nigeria.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

Proclamation

This proclamation is to all to whom it concerns.

That everyone may hear and know that from now and henceforth the Niger Company consisted of European Gentlemen who had charge of the Niger. Men of high family and position all consisted of white men in the whole regions. They are the instrument of peace even from their origin. They are warriors over Kings, Chiefs and subject of black man.

That all people may hear this Proclamation and follow or obey its contents [:] they are the men to arrest evil doers to judge and imprison the condemned and also to punish the public disturber of peace to put down the greatest of wilful[l] murder also

the indulgences of slave treatment and they are the rewarder to all public feelings over the affairs of the people and also of other affair of any kind [.] Be it known and fully understood that the Queen [.] the Great Queen [.] of the white men had sent the Niger Company to begin the works done by them and also to govern [.] During their own sway they were also found to be truthful men during their time of Government [.]

But from now the Queen of the white men has forbidden the Niger Company from occupying the position of Government of the Niger and of multiplying soldiers in waging wars over countries of the Niger and of judging native palavers among the inhabitants of the Niger any more from this time and henceforth and forever[.] The Niger Company [is] to buy produce and also to sell off their goods. This is their work now in the Niger territories. But now and henceforth the great Queen of the White men has selected her new men and send them now to this part of the world [.] to the Niger lands to multiply peace and to put stop to all Evil doers [.] to multiply soldiers to put final stop to the manipulation of slavery and of liquor traffic among the natives and also to punish all evil doers and to institute peace among several misunderstanding of the people and also to facilitate all things among the People. The Queen has sent a noble person among her people with a flag to change the former, to put up her own [.] And also the Niger Company has invented a new flag known as a trader's flag.

The Queen of the White men agreed to all the plans laid down by the Niger Company and the various Kings and Chiefs of the Niger land and gradually the Queen will fulfil all of them and they also should fulfil theirs to the Queen and Her Representative[.]

Should anyone violate the contents of the Proclamation[.] the Queen or Her Representative Governor will inflict punishment knowing that the Queen has claimed all the land of the Company[.] When acting as a Government [, all have become the property of the Queen [.] Only the trading houses is now the property of the Niger Company [.]

That all may know [.] the name of the Queen's messenger is Lugard [.] He is the warrior of all white men of all Department of the Queen in the Niger. The Queen sent him to fulfil all her orders [.] to institute judgement among the black and white under his Government of ruling.

In as much[,] Lugard I am the messenger [of] the Queen I made the Proclamation and sent it to all their subjects and to all great Kings that they may hear and know the contents of this Proclamation[.]

Should any one wish to have conversation with me [,] let him send his messenger. For all the territories have been divided into three Parts [:] from Nupe [:] Yorubas as far as to River Niger; and as far as Ida [.] As far as to Jebba is under the control of Mr. Wallace [.] Mr. Wallace has left Niger Company and has now taken on himself the burden of the Government under Governor Lugard [.]

This is the end of the Proclamation [.]

May God save the Queen [.]¹

With these words, Frederick Lugard, a mercenary turned colonial administrator and panjandrum,² launched the Northern Protectorate into the British Empire orbit, at Lokoja, on 1st January

1 Being the text of the English translation of the proclamation of the Northern Protectorate at Lokoja, on 1 January 1900; the Arabic text and this original English translation are displayed side by side in Arewa House museum, Kaduna.

2 Born in India 1858, raised in Worcester and educated in Rossall School and the Royal Military College at Sandhurst, Lugard fought in the Afghan War, Sudan campaign, and the Third Burmese War. He was de-kitted in the rank of Captain. Thereafter, he was in the service of the British settlers in Nyasaland against Arab slave traders, in 1888, and later in the service of the Imperial British East Africa Company. He was the commandant (rising to the rank of Colonel) of the Royal Niger Company militia from 1894–1897. Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of the Colonies appointed him Brigadier-General in 1897 to raise the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), a mercenary outfit under the Colonial Office.


See M. Perham, “Introduction,” in L. Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (5th edition) (London: Frank Cass) 1965, xxxi; W. Geary, “Nigeria under British Rule”, London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. 1965, 203; see Wikipedia, “Frederick Lugard, 1st Baron Lugard,” in http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frederick_Lugard_1st_Baron_Lugard (accessed 23 June 2013); J. Ade-Ajayi, *A Patriot to the Core: Bishop Ajayi Crowther* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2000), 174; M. Perham, *Lugard: Years of Authority 1898–1906* (London: Collins, 1960) 3.

Born of a chaplain father and a missionary mother, both serving in India, Frederick Lugard was an agnostic – a believer in the idea that ultimate reality (God) is unknown and probably unknowable; see S. Graham, *Government and Mission Education in Northern Nigeria 1900–1919* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1966), 132.

1900. In a letter to the Sultan of Sokoto, dated 1 January 1900 and translated into Hausa, Lugard dispatched an abridged copy of the Proclamation to the latter.³ The letter was necessitated partly by the overdue annual subsidy that the Royal Niger Company paid to the Sultan, more so since there was a transfer of sovereignty.⁴ In due course, Lugard found an excuse not to pay the subsidy.

EARLIEST PROVINCES

Fig. 1



For the avoidance of doubt, Northern Nigeria in January 1900 comprised of (1) Kabba Province, (2) Ilorin Province and (3) Borgu Province, hitherto known as Military Province. First of all, Kabba Province integrated the southern flank of the defunct Nupe Empire, (Afemai district and Akoko in the present day Edo State, Akoko in

3 For the text of Sultan's copy, see Colonial Reports – Annual No. 409 Northern Nigeria Report for 1902, 23, 99, in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Colonial+Annual+Report%2C+1902%2C+Northern+Nigeria> (accessed on 24 August 2015)

4 Geary, "Nigeria under British Rule", 213

the present day Ondo State, Ikole in the present day Ekiti State, and Owe, Ijumu, Bunu, Yagba and Agbaja in the present Kogi West Senatorial District). Following the triumphant entry of Bida by the Royal Niger Company forces in 1898 and the incremental liberation of the southern flank of Nupe Empire through 1899 the liberated territory was reconstituted into Kabba Province.

Secondly, Ilorin Emirate which was subdued by the Royal Niger Company in 1898 was converted to Ilorin Province. It covered some outlying settlements of the defunct Nupe Empire south of River Niger, such as Patigi.

Thirdly, Borguland which hitherto Lugard designated as Military Province from 1898–1899⁵ was reconstituted into Borgu Province.

Fourthly, The British government paid the sum of £865,000 to the Royal Niger Company for Ilorin and Kabba provinces (the land and the people) and the company property. In addition, it awarded the company dubious rights to half of all mining revenue in the Northern Nigeria in view, for 99 years beginning from 1900.⁶

It is essential to highlight some significant facts concerning the foundation provinces. First, whereas Ilorin and Kabba were occupied by forces of the Royal Niger Company, Borgu was not conquered. Rather, Borgu was an independent traditionalist state for much of its known history which goes back a thousand years. Its integration into Northern Nigeria began as a series of trade treaties which began with the race to Nikki between the British and the French in 1894.⁷ It culminated in the Anglo-French Treaty of 14 June 1898 by which Borguland was partitioned into two: French Borgu and British Borgu. Thereafter, for fear that the French might encroach on British Borgu, Lugard poured troops into British Borgu and named it Military Province in 1898 in readiness for a possible showdown with the French. It was renamed Borgu Province following the proclamation in January 1900.

5 Geary, 202–203

6 *ibid.*, 213; “Temple, C. “Northern Nigeria.” in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Aug., 1912), 150, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1778461> (accessed 30 September 2013)”

7 F. Lugard, “An Expedition to Borgu, on the Niger” in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Sep., 1895), 221–223, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1774247> (accessed on 18 March 2013)

Secondly, there was Muslim presence in Ilorin Province but less so in Kabba Province and virtually non-existent in Borguland at the onset of colonial rule. In fact, the pre-colonial Borgu were a people for whom opposition to Islam was their mission in history.⁸ Admittedly, although they were conquered by the Songhai Empire in the 16th century,⁹ they decisively refused to convert to Islam as expected of people overpowered by an Islamic army. Furthermore, when at the zenith of his power Sultan Bello of the Sokoto Caliphate invaded Borgu, not only was he robustly rebuffed, he retreated in frustration finally in 1820, calling Borgu people devils¹⁰ and admitting to his army that Mohammed, the prophet of Islam, was not in support of the jihadist invasion of Borguland.¹¹ In brief, while Lugard's letter to the Sultan of Sokoto might have been of some significance to Ilorin and Kabba provinces, because the Emir of Ilorin and the Etsu Nupe were vassals of Sokoto, it may not have been little more than a useless piece of paper from the standpoint of the leaders of Borguland.

Thirdly, from the expectation of the Selbourne Committee in the British Parliament that recommended the annexation of Northern Nigeria, the immediate goal was commercial occupation of the territory which the Royal Niger Company had subdued, and which the British crown had bought and paid for. It was to be occupied, with a relatively credible administration as it existed in the Southern Protectorate, as a microcosm of what British rule could showcase in the new protectorate. This expectation led to thoughts of a Lagos-Borgu railway line in the deliberations of the Selbourne Committee in 1898.¹²

8 cf. J. Adekunle, "On Oral Tradition and History: Studies on Nigerian Borgu," *Anthropos*, Bd. 89, H. 4. /6. (1994), 546, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40463023> (accessed: 23 July 2011)

9 Adekunle, 106–107

10 *ibid.*, 63

11 Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*, 144

12 G. Uzoigwe, "The Niger Committee of 1898: Lord Selborne's Report," in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 4. No. 3 (December 1968), 467–472, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856767> (accessed on 16 October 2013)

NORTHERN PROTECTORATE IN VIEW

The ultimate objective to extend the occupation to the current Nigerian northern boundary is well known, from the fact that the Colonial Office had commissioned Lugard to raise the West African Frontier Force as earlier as 1897.¹³

How large was the ultimate Northern Nigeria? Mockler-Ferryman who had travelled up the Niger in 1892 estimated the territory to be “almost twice the area of the mother country.”¹⁴ Months after the successful occupation of most of the territory in 1903, Lugard spoke of Northern Nigeria as “these people, with their widely differing standards of development, are scattered over a territory of one-third of India, equally diverse in its geographical characteristics.”¹⁵ Writing in 1910, his second year as Governor of Northern Nigeria, Hesketh Bell¹⁶ declared:

Northern Nigeria comprises within its boundaries an area of more than 250,000 square miles, and is consequently about as large as France and Belgium combined. The average width of the country from east to west is about 6000 miles, while it would take a man, doing on horseback the ordinary journey of 20 miles a day, at least three weeks to travel from any point on the southern boundary to the border line on the north.¹⁷

13 S. Ukpabi, “The Origins of the West African Frontier Force,” in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 3, No. 3, December 1966, 486, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856709> (accessed on 7 October 2013); F. Lugard, “Northern Nigeria” in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 1904, 6, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1775735> (accessed on 4 October 2013)


14 A. Mockler-Ferryman, “British Nigeria,” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jan., 1902, 164, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/715272> (accessed on 16 May 2013)

15 *ibid.*, 9

16 Governor Bell was the third ruler of Northern Nigeria, from 1909–1912.

17 H. Bell, “Recent Progress in Northern Nigeria,” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 10, No. 10 (July 1911), 378, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/714737> (accessed on 17 March 2013)

Fig. 2
MAP OF NORTHERN NIGERIA¹⁸



OCCUPATION OF PROTECTORATE

Commercial mode of penetration and occupation of the new protectorate was the expectation of the Selborne Committee which recommended the creation of the Northern Protectorate¹⁹ and in

18 Wikipedia, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Northernnigeria.png>; The 1903 map of Northern Nigeria is provided in F. Lugard, "Northern Nigeria" in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan., 1904), 27, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1775735> (accessed on 4 October 20) and in Colonial Reports – "Annual No. 516 Northern Nigeria Report for 1905–1906." Supra, in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espu=2&rie=UTF-8#q=Colonial+Annual+Report%2C+1905-1906%2C+Northern+Nigeria>, 131–145, (accessed 24 August 2015)

19 For the full text of Lord Selborne Report, see G. Uzoigwe, "The Niger Committee of 1898: Lord Selborne's Report," in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 4. No. 3 (December 1968), 467–472, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856767> (accessed on 16 October 2013)

the Colonial Office.²⁰ The expectation of the Colonial Office is discounted in this discourse because of the Office's tendency, however, of speaking from two ends of the mouth.²¹ Similarly, the expectation of (1) the Selborne Committee was shared by (2) colonial officers of the Southern Protectorate, (3) the merchant class in Lagos, (4) western missionary organisations in the Southern Protectorate, and the (5) educated Africans, all of whom are hereafter collectively referred to as stakeholders were eager for high volume of trade, especially as it held promise against the burden of slave trade that was rampant in the Northern Protectorate.²² Furthermore, expectation was high that Lugard would set up his capital in Kano, the emporium of Hausaland since approximately 1820, which by 1900 was 11 miles parameter, with walls of 30 to 50 feet high and 40 feet thick at the base.²³

20 I. Nicolson, *The Administration of Nigeria: 1900–1960: Men, Methods, and Myths* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 152

21 Chamberlain's caution which dovetailed with those of the other stakeholders herein from 1900 contrasts with his evidently hawkish urgency for the role of WAFF from 1897 to 1899; see Ukpabi, 494ff; J. Boer, *Missionary Messengers of Liberation in a Colonial Context: A Case Study of the Sudan United Mission* (Amsterdam: Ropodi, 1979), 57, 72; A. Barnes, "Evangelization Where It Is Not Wanted: Colonial Administrators and Missionaries in Northern Nigeria during the First Third of the Twentieth Century," in *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 25, Fasc. 4 (Nov., 1995), 412–415, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1581862> (accessed on 4 August 2011)

22 J. Flint, "Mary Kingsley – A Reassessment," in *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1963), 96–97, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/179615> (accessed 18 October 2013); J. Flint, "Morel and Morality in West African History: A Review Article," in *Affairs of West Africa* by E. D. Morel; "West Africa under Colonial Rule," by Michael Crowther Reviewed by: John E. Flint in *Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue Canadienne des Etudes Africaines*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn, 1969), 637, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/483912> (accessed on 30 October 2013); Wikipedia, "E. D. Morel," in http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/E._D._Morel (accessed on 30 October 2013); it should be pointed out, however, that as passionate as Morel's argument against the military option was, his indefinite time-frame for elimination of raw slave trade was rather nebulous. Furthermore, by downplaying the evil of domestic slavery he pushed his plea into the realm of platitudes. See E. Morel, "Nigeria," *Affairs of West Africa* (London: Heinemann), 1902, 95–109 *supra*

23 F. Lugard, "Northern Nigeria" in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 1904, 20, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1775735> (accessed on 4 October 2013); Rev. Charles Robinson while in Kano for some months in 1895 estimated the walls to be "15 miles in circumference" see, C. Robinson, "Hausaland" in

The logic for proposing Kano for the capital of the protectorate was not far-fetched, although it was not systematised.²⁴ It may be restated as follows. First of all, (1) Kano was an established centre of commerce and influence, with many routes to numerous centres of commerce in West Africa. Therefore, it was logically the place to introduce cash economy and inject much capital to the city in order to boost its overall economy. (2) Introduction of money would have replaced trade by barter with less hassle, and with a domino effect on the rest of the protectorate. As such, riding on the crest of commerce into the protectorate would have earned the colonial administration acceptance sooner than later. (3) The injection of capital into the local economy and the resultant new opportunities would have impacted negatively on annual slave-raiding and consequently rendered the slave trade less attractive. (4) Legislation against the slave trade would have been a popular follow-up and development in due course. Similarly, (5) “with reference to railway construction [,] the Committee are unanimously of opinion that the great trunk line *must be one from Kano down*”,²⁵ rather than ending in Kano as it later did. As such, new paid jobs would have induced rebellion in domestic slavery, more so, since a British officer could not return a runaway slave to his former master. (6) As the railway route and stations would have been a no-man’s-land, opportunities for missionary activities would have been less worrisome. (7) With Kano, the Hausa heartland transformed into an enhanced centre of influence, the inference was that the Hausaman would have been empowered to throw off the Fulani yoke, with positive implications for hundreds of traditionalist polities in the protectorate who had been subjected to annual raids and human rights abuses for a century, more so since Sokoto was at its lowest ebb in a hundred

The Geographical Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Sep., 1896), 203, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1774181> (accessed on 16 October 2013). But since Lugard’s figure was based on actual survey, his is accurate.

24 I. Nicolson, *The Administration of Nigeria 1900–1960: Men, Methods, and Myths* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), 129ff

25 Uzoigwe, “The Niger Committee of 1898: Lord Selborne’s Report,” 471 – emphasis mine

years, owing to internal division as a result of oppression and tyranny.²⁶

Lugard realised the centrality of the foregoing considerations only in hindsight, as his 1902 Annual Report shows. After going over his effort at combatting the slave trade and noting that “though of course the buying and selling of slaves still goes on illicitly to a large extent,”²⁷ and his effort at bringing silver coins into circulation in the Far North cities, he emphasised the centrality of Kano as follows: “so soon as British currency becomes thoroughly understood and accepted at Kano, I anticipate that it will rapidly become popularised throughout the whole Protectorate.”²⁸ This is the point that stakeholders, from the parliamentary Selborne Committee to the others in the Southern Protectorate, had made all along.

Most significant perhaps is Lugard’s wife assessment in 1905:

“The wishes of Government and of the country, if they had to be condensed into one phrase of instruction to the High Commissioner, would perhaps best have been rendered by the words, ‘Go slow!’”²⁹

Undoubtedly, Lugard had more than sufficient opportunities from January 1900 to February 1903 to convey the wishes of the British people to a business-loving Kano metropolis: (1) seat of Government; (2) injection of capital; (3) origin of the Great Trunk Railway, (4) gravitation of support from the other states; Katsina and Zaria, (5) adequate military cover; (6) withering of the power

26 C. Temple, “Northern Nigeria,” 155; R. Adeleye of the Department of History, University of Ibadan does not share the view that Sokoto Caliphate was as weak as claimed here; see R. Adeleye, “The Dilemma of the Wazir: The Place of the Risalat Al-Wazir’la-‘ilmWa’l-Tadabbur in the History of the Conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate” in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. IV. No. 2 June 1968, 287

27 Colonial Reports – Annual No. 409 Northern Nigeria Report for 1902, 71
28 *ibid.*, 71

29 F. Shaw, *A Tropical Dependency*, (London: James Nisbet Co. 1905) 419; R. Adeleye, “The Mahdist Triumph and British Revenge in Northern Nigeria: Satiru 1906.” in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (June 1972), 204, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856944> (accessed on 19 July 2015)

of Sokoto; (7) etc. The conveyance would have been irresistible to the authorities of the business-loving Kano metropolis. Sadly, this author is not aware of any effort on Lugard's part to establish contact with Kano. All he wanted was war medals.

“The wishes of Government and of the country, if they had to be condensed into one phrase of instruction to the High Commissioner, would perhaps best have been rendered by the words, ‘Go slow!’²³”

MILITARY OCCUPATION

Despite widespread anticipation for commercial penetration of Northern Nigeria outlined above, Lugard did not “go slow.” Rather, he was bent on military occupation of the Protectorate, whereas his major reason cannot be separated from his mercenary mentality.³⁰ For this reason, he (1) foreclosed a peaceful option when he made his so-called “conciliatory overtures to Sokoto” in 1900 whereas the overtures resulted only in a letter, in which he said that “between us there was nothing but war.”³¹ Other excuses for the military option includes (2) the complaint that officers in the Colonial Office knew little of the terrain he encountered; (3) he surrounded himself with young military officers who wanted action; and (4) Lugard's dislike for Lagos. All of the above amount to a red herring as the following evidence shows.

Foreclosure of a Peaceful Option

First of all, Lugard created the impression that the Sultan of Sokoto wanted nothing but war, but an analysis of the scenario suggests differently. (1) Lugard wrote a letter dated 1 January 1900 and

30 As the Head of Government – a civilian regime – he was to assume a civilian title and not a military rank but because of his mercenary mentality, he assumed military ranks even though those titles are questionable, as examined in the course of this chapter.

31 Lugard, “Northern Nigeria,” 11

dispatched presumably immediately. (2) There is, however, no mention in Lugard's account of when the Sultan was served with the letter. (3) The Sultan's letter eventually arrived "around May 1902."³² Additional facts elsewhere in the Annual Report under examination include the following: (4) "I am compelled to attribute this misunderstanding [which prompted a bellicose reply from the Sultan] to the translation."³³ (5) A subsequent letter from the Sultan was

couched in more courteous terms (in consequence of the conciliatory efforts- of the Emir of Nupe), in reply to one I sent to the Sultan informing him of the reasons for which I had deposed the Emir of Bau[c]hi.

Secondly, while it might have been difficult to ascertain the date the Sultan received Lugard's letter dated 1 January 1900, there should be no controversy whatsoever over the date the much-awaited Sultan's reply reached the Office of the High Commissioner – Lugard's own office – in Zungeru, given the battery of secretaries or officers at the Office of the High Commissioner.³⁴ By the nebulous "around May 1902," Lugard is economical with what truly transpired; it is a desperate ploy for opting for war.

Thirdly, the fact that the annexation of Northern Nigeria took the British at least three years, February 1897–1899 inclusive, to plan, is it fair and realistic to expect the Sultan to dispatch a knee-jack reply to Lugard – a total stranger – the following morning, without consultation with whoever? In fairness, the Sultan may have heard the name Frederick Lugard since 1894 when, as a mercenary of the Royal Niger Company the latter successfully negotiated with the

“there should be no controversy whatsoever over the date the much-awaited Sultan's reply reached the Office of the High Commissioner – Lugard's own office – in Zungeru,”

32 Colonial Reports – “Annual No. 409 Northern Nigeria Report for 1902,” 101

33 *ibid.*, 24

34 To maintain that it was not possible to be specific on the date the letter was received in the Office is dereliction of duty to the *n*th power.

authorities of Borguland, a territory that has been off-limit to the Sokoto Caliphate for 80 years, and he may have heard of him as the commandant of the West African Frontier Force. But these two impressions may not have commended Lugard to the Sultan as anything more than the antics of a mercenary. Despite the defence of the Sultan's delay in responding to Lugard, it has to be stressed that neither the Sokoto Caliphate the internal coloniser and Britain the external colonialist has any inalienable claim to the territory other than on the basis of 'might is right.'

Fourthly, according to Lugard's personal conviction, poor translation of his letter dated 1 January 1900 must have been partly responsible for the Sultan's bellicose reply. Fifthly, going by Lugard's testimony, subsequent correspondence from the Sultan was less bellicose than his first letter, suggesting that there was room for negotiation between the two parties. Lugard's disposition to the military option partly explains his choice of the expensive and wasteful military occupation. It is conceded though that Lugard let Attahiru I know of his approach to Sokoto from Kano and made certain terms of peace but just how genuine the conditions were is debatable.

Sixthly, as the occupation unfolded, it is interesting to note, that (1) the expedition against the Emir of Yola which gulped so much of the 1900 take-off grant resulted in a flight by the Emir rather than a fight.³⁵ (2) Zaria received Lugard with pomp and ceremony.³⁶ (3) As for Katsina, "the emir had sent me friendly messages, and we found that he had prepared his own house for our reception."³⁷ This friendliness on the part of these two major Hausa cities is not surprising given the century long resistance by Zaria and Katsina against Sokoto-Fulani rule. Fourthly, the much dreaded 'destroyer' Emir of Kontagora fled,³⁸ just as the Emir of Bida fled.³⁹

Clearly, Kano was the apple of the eye of the British Parliament, because of the prospects of Kano being both the commercial and the

35 Geary, *Nigeria*, 215

36 Lugard, "Northern Nigeria," 25

37 *ibid.*, 25

38 Colonial Reports – Annual No. 409 Northern Nigeria Report for 1902, 45; Emirs of Yola and Bauchi respectively fled, 10, 6.

39 *ibid.*, 215

political capital, especially with a railway running from Kano southwards as it was originally conceived. Regrettably, as stated earlier on, none of the above was communicated either directly or indirectly to Kano authorities, whereas it would have made much sense to court Kano's cooperation against Sokoto which the other Hausa cities, Zaria and Katsina were prepared to do. Indeed, Kano authorities would have jumped at the idea with maximum support for Lugard rather than engage him in battle; more so because Kano does not cherish drawn-out war because of its negative impact on trade. It was precisely consideration for protection of business that Kano gave in to the jihadists prematurely a century earlier.⁴⁰ But because Lugard was determined on a military occupation of Kano. Therefore, when Emir Aliu was on a visit to Sokoto to pay homage to Sultan I who was enthroned in October 1902, and when the House of Commons went on recess having been assured on 9 December that Kano was not going to be attacked⁴¹ Kano was bombarded and subdued on 3 February 1903. Lugard knew that the worst he could get from the Parliament for attacking Kano was verbal lashing as the Parliament would not order a reversal of his victory. (4) When Emir Aliu of Kano encountered Lugard's troops on his way back from Sokoto, he fled northwards to Gobir country, disguised as a salt merchant, rather than engage in a 'fight to finish'.⁴² In brief, Lugard's invasion of Kano was unnecessary and most wasteful.

Lastly, Sultan Attahiru I migrated, rather than go for a bloodbath, on the approach of Lugard's troops early 1903.⁴³ It was an obvious option against war. Not surprisingly, the Waziri of Sokoto acted on what for want of a better label is identified herein as Option Three,⁴⁴ rather than bloodshed.

40 J. Bourdon, "The Fulani Emirates of Northern Nigeria," in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 6 (Dec., 1904) 643, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1776255> (accessed on 28 December 2013)

41 Geary, Nigeria, 215; Lugard withheld information from the Secretary of the Colonies to the extent that the latter misled the Parliament on Lugard's intention.

42 Colonial Reports – "Annual No. 409 Northern Nigeria Report for 1902," 33; Geary, Nigeria, 22

43 Lugard, "Northern Nigeria", 24; cf. R. Adeleye, "The Dilemma of the Wazir

44 For a fuller comment, see Chapter Four.

The Ignorance Argument

Lugard's second reason for military entry is the red herring that "neither the foreign officers nor the colonial office had any experience of Central African conditions and administrations".⁴⁵ His line on the Colonial Office is partly true that both Lugard and the Foreign Office were, to a large extent, ignorant of the territory. Furthermore, the recruitment of officers by the Colonial Office for colonial assignment was "somewhat at haphazard".⁴⁶ It is understandable that some officers in the Colonial Office were not experts on Northern Nigeria, nevertheless, the missionaries, such as Bishop S. Ajayi Crowther's men, who had been in Northern Nigeria since the 1850s, were not as ignorant. They were experienced in negotiating successfully with peoples – leaders and ordinary folks – of diverse cultures – and of carrying out their mandates peacefully in diverse locations. Lugard had no use for their expertise, for reasons that are examined in greater detail in Chapter Two.

Over Ambitious Young Officers

Thirdly, Lugard's militarist mentality was shared by the young military officers – all of whom were fellow ex-mercenaries – with whom he surrounded himself such as Ruxton, Gowers, Larrymore, Temple, Wallace, Burdon, Hewby, Cargill, and Festing.⁴⁷ Eager for 'a show',⁴⁸ their behaviour was such that,

As soon as these officers came too near for each community's peace of mind, in the state of war between town and town which then existed, there was bound to be trouble. Each officer in turn reported an 'attack without provocation' and each commander found himself compelled to 'find' and 'inflict serious losses' on 'the enemy'. For Lugard, anything was 'defiance' or 'insult' enough. 'These people used poisoned arrows – an obvious offence against the code of chivalry – and are a constant

⁴⁵ Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 607

⁴⁶ *ibid.*, 607

⁴⁷ R. Heussler, *The British in Northern Nigeria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 21; Resident Cargill was a doctor.

⁴⁸ Nicolson, 129

source of trouble, firing at canoes proceeding up the river, and defying authority in the dense forest and undergrowth which cover their country.”⁴⁹

The palpable impunity with which Lugard’s troops armed with Maxims, 2.95-inch guns, storming party, etc. for sanguinary battles against communities armed with hoes, bows, axes and spears made Barrister William Geary, a Lagos-based British legal practitioner, 1900–1913, to ask:

When the combatants are a few hundred unarmed and undisciplined Africans, as opposed to the might of the British Empire, can it be qualified as a conquest? Besides ‘conquest’ does not among civilised nations confer the right to confiscate private property.⁵⁰

Dislike for Lagos Colony and Yoruba Protectorate

Lastly, Lugard’s mercenary mentality placed him at odds with the liberality of the Lagos Colony which by 1900 was in some ways in advance of England. By the 1880s, Lagos had mercantile and nationalist newspapers following the missionary bilingual newspaper that started circulation in Abeokuta in 1859. As Nicolson put it,

At the beginning of the century, before Lagos was joined up to any larger unit, there was a form of civic commercial government which was up to date with the best public health practice, and even ahead of Britain, in some respects, in the way of active Government interest in education, health, railway construction, and forward planning of economic projects. Lagos was the civil capital, the seat of both government and commerce; there was money to spend, and Lagos was an obvious and proper place to spend it.⁵¹

49 *ibid.*, 129

50 W. Geary, “Land Tenure and Legislation in British West Africa,” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 12, No. 47 (Apr., 1913), 244, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/715884> (accessed on 21 August 2015)

51 Nicolson, 64

Basically, Lugard did not want to be seen as imitating the administrative structure and style of his neighbouring protectorate – Lagos.⁵² Rather, he wished to make a name for himself by giving his administration a life of its own. This explains why although he publicly revelled in comparing the British and the French systems of colonial rule, he nevertheless privately envied the French for not tolerating newspaper publishing in their African colonies.⁵³

Indeed, Lugard had little difficulty establishing control in the early months of 1900 over Muri and Loko on the lower Niger as well as Benue, Lokoja, and Ilorin which had been subdued by the defunct Royal Niger Company. Thereafter, there was deceleration owing to the negative impact of the Ashanti War, but “the troops returned at the end of the year.”⁵⁴ In brief, 1900–1902 witnessed expeditions against Kontagora, Nupe, Yola, Bauchi, Bornu, Zaria, and chiefdoms that allegedly interfered with the erection of telegraph or obstruction to traders.⁵⁵ By 1903, Lugard’s troops had overrun the Northern Protectorate.

In effect, his military approach cost him a third of his annual budget throughout his tenure⁵⁶ and a recurring deficit year after year. In contrast, the Lagos Colony which he so despised ran a surplus budget year after year.

Dr. Y. Bala Usman, a Marxist-inspired history lecturer at Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, attempts an explanation of Lugard’s chronic deficit budgeting: that the sharing of the customs proceeds favoured the Southern Protectorate with adverse impact on the Northern Protectorate.⁵⁷ One can safely assume that Dr. Usman did not read the Selborne Committee recommended formula for custom revenue sharing, on page 4 of the report – 16 months before the

52 *ibid.*, 71; additionally, Lugard did not like Lagosians and their lifestyle, *ibid.*, 207–208; in turn Lagos newspapers called him names

53 Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 80

54 Lugard, “Northern Nigeria” 11

55 *ibid.*, 11

56 P. Girouard, “The Development of Northern Nigeria,” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 7, No. 28 (Jul., 1908), 336, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/714628> (accessed on 15 May 2013)

57 Y. Usman, *The Misrepresentation of Nigeria*, 2nd edition (Zaria: Centre for Democratic Development Research and Training), 2005, 23–24

proclamation of January 1900 – and that if he read it, he chose the ignoble path of ignoring the clear evidence against his position. With the Northern Protectorate in mind, the committee recommended “that the customs receipts must be divided according to the budget requirements of the [Protectorates]”⁵⁸ For the avoidance of doubt, another way of saying that the richer Southern Protectorate would be obliged to aid the poorer Northern Protectorate.”⁵⁹

INDIRECT RULE AS PLOUGHING FOR VIOLENCE: PERSONAL IMPACT ON IMPERSONAL STRUCTURE

It is beyond dispute to assert that Frederick Lugard’s personal inclination and interest had a bearing, directly and indirectly, on the quality of his administration and those of his successors. Given Frederick Lugard’s foundational and pivotal role in Indirect Rule, it is important to plumb Lugard’s personal morality as a window on the quality, ethics, of the structures he imposed.⁶⁰

FOUNDATION OF BRAGGADOCIO AND FRAUD

First of all, the title, “High Commissioner” was weighed in deceit because the title is reserved for British ambassadors to British colonies and dominions within the British Empire. Based on his conduct, Lugard’s job description was anything but that of an ambassador. As it unfolded, Lugard came to wage war, conquer, depose, rule by proclamation, levy taxes, impose inequitable court system usurped one of the functions of the Supreme Court, and massacre (in Satiru, March 1906 and Hadeija, May 1906).⁶¹ Among other things, Lugard refused to set up a secretariat but instead ran Northern Protectorate like a family estate, refused to introduce western education and barred Christian missions

58 Uzoigwe, 469

59 cf. *ibid.*, 476

60 Morality refers to personal actions or character; ethics refers to actions by groups, structures, and systems.

61 In contrast, MacGregor in the Lagos Protectorate beat his chest at the end of his tenure, “I have not shed a drop of blood in Africa”. See Nicolson, 155

from building schools and contributing to the educational, cultural and socio-economic advancement of Northern Nigeria, promoted Islam and turned the people against themselves based on ethnicity.

Are the values implied in the aforementioned what British ambassadors are commissioned to promote? In Northern Nigeria, firstly, the title vis-à-vis the role was an exhibition of incongruity.

Secondly, was Lugard ever a Major-General? For the avoidance of doubt, (1) Lugard was discharged from the British Army in the rank of Captain. (2) He maintained his rank when he signed the treaty with the leaders of Borgu at Nikki on 10 November 1894. (3) He was appointed Brigadier General by Joseph Chamberlain in February 1897 to raise the mercenary West African Frontier Force (WAFF). (4) A civilian, he introduced himself as Colonel Lugard in his Proclamation of 1st January 1900.

Is a rank, Colonel or Brigadier-General, earned in a militia equivalent of the rank by the name in the British Army? When, where and by whose authority was he – a civilian – promoted to the rank of Major-General which enabled him to sign his first annual report to the Colonial Office at the end of the first year? Who or what demoted Lugard to the rank of Brigadier-General by 31 March 1901?

The foregoing is not nit-picking because had a Nigerian soldier or mandarin in the colonial service of Northern Nigeria attempted such a roller coaster ride, the colonial hierarchy would have lashed the 'wretched African' with a cord of negative adjectives and ensured that the name of the poor soul was stigmatised beyond four generations. However, Lugard got away with the impunity without a rebuke from any quarters perhaps because he was a Lord in English society.

Thirdly, Lugard's choice of Arabic as the language of proclamation is intriguing because Arabic was not spoken in any city, town, village or street in Northern Nigeria by 1900. Instead, Hausa was the language of communication in its aboriginal homeland in the Far North and a *lingua franca* in much of the Middle Belt.⁶² It could be argued

62 Admittedly, Lugard sent a letter, translated into Hausa and dated 1st January 1900, to the Sultan of Sokoto notifying him of the change of administration. However, no annual report to the Parliament contains a verbatim copy of the Proclamation of 1 January 1900, that made Northern Nigeria part of the British Empire, presumably because of the prevailing attitude in the corridors of power, that Northern Nigeria was better left to renegades.

without much substance, that Arabic was the language of the courts in Muslim emirates, but Muslim emirates were by no means the sole intended recipients of and stakeholders in the Proclamation. Besides, the pre-colonial Fulani ruling class had “almost entirely discarded their own language, which is looked on as a rather shameful badge of connection with the despised herdsman.”⁶³ Even communication between emirs and outsiders such as Bishop Ajayi Crowther, in the 1880s, was in Hausa.⁶⁴ Had the Proclamation been made in Hausa, the probability of some kind of interaction could have taken place.

Most importantly, the fact that Lugard translated his letter to the Sultan of Sokoto into Hausa whereas the sultan’s palace was presumably a beehive of Arabic speakers-scholars vindicates the argument herein against the foolhardiness of proclamation in Arabic.

Indeed an announcement to a people in a language nobody spoke and which does not lend itself to mass translation is tantamount to preaching to birds. The translation of the Proclamation into English was expectedly for a file in the Colonial Office in London as it had nothing to do with the peoples of Northern Nigeria. As events unfolded, it is doubtful whether Lugard was interested in anybody understanding his proclamation. This is unfeeling and a show of braggadocio whereas lack of unfeeling *cum* braggadocio in this case is indicative of the callous mindedness which shaped governance in Northern Nigeria from the onset.

Fourthly, Lugard introduced himself as “Governor” even though the Colonial Office knew him as High Commissioner, as his letter of appointment must have stated. Similarly, in his letter to the Sultan of Sokoto dated 18 march 1901, he introduced himself to the Sultan as Governor Lugard,⁶⁵ whereas he was not appointed Governor until 1905. This is a case of impersonation widely known as an act of pretence to be another person for the purpose of entertainment or fraud. In the context of 1900–1903, any thought of entertainment

63 Bourdon, 642

64 See Etsu Maliki’s letter to Bishop Crowther in Chapter Two.

65 Colonial Reports – “Annual No. 377 Northern Nigeria Report for 1901,” 100, in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espu=2&ie=UTF-8#q=colonial+annual+reports%2C+northern+Nigeria%2C+1901> (16 September 2015)

between Lugard and the Sultan of Sokoto must have been a huge joke. Therefore, since entertainment is ruled out, it was a case of fraud.

A Travesty of Annual Reports

First, I. Nicolson, a former British colonial officer in Southern Nigeria, asserts that Lugard displayed his name as “Major-General Sir F. Lugard, K. C. M. G., C.B., D.S.O.” in his 1900 Annual Report submitted to the Secretary of the Colonies.⁶⁶ Curiously, there is another Annual Report No.346 for the year 1900–1901 covering 1st January 1900 and the first three months of 1901, whereas there was an Annual Report for 1901.⁶⁷

The question is, what happened to the 1900 Annual Report submitted to the Secretary of the Colonies, which bore the signature of “Major-General” and which Nicolson sighted and cited in the course of his research in the 1960s?⁶⁸ Why was a copy of the same document not suitable for submission to the two Houses of Parliament? What warranted the composition of report, No. 346, covering 1st January 1900 to 31 March 1901 for the two Houses of Parliament since there was a standing 1900 Annual Report in the Colonial Office, and a prospective 1901 Annual Report No. 377⁶⁹ in a matter of months? Was it for the purpose of misleading the Parliament especially as members were likely to raise questions over the disbursement of the take-off Parliamentary Grant-in-Aid for 1900, given the ambivalence of the British Government prior to 1895, to colonise more territories in West Africa?⁷⁰ Or was it to

66 Nicolson, 128

67 Colonial Reports—“Annual No. 346 Northern Nigeria Report for 1900–1901” in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Colonial+Annual+Report%2C+1902%2C+Northern+Nigeria> (accessed on 24 August 2015)

68 cf. Nicolson, 128

69 Colonial Reports – “Annual No. 377 Northern Nigeria Report for 1901,”

70 Even though Joseph Chamberlain the Colonial Secretary was eager for the extension of British rule over Northern Nigeria, Prime Minister Salisbury was ambivalent largely because (1) “British military resources were often stretched beyond the margin of safety”, and partly because (2) the Labour Party maintained the argument that the imperialist acquisitive spirit was more antagonistic to the interests of the

“What warranted the composition of report, No. 346,
covering 1st January 1900 to 31 March 1901”

disguise the diversion of a chunk of the Parliamentary Grant-in-Aid, which was meant for the commercial occupation and administration of the original and peaceful provinces – Ilorin, Kabba and Borgu – to a military expenditure for a military expedition against the Emir of Yola? Lugard’s submission of three annual reports for two years to two separate departments of the same government has the trappings of fraud and a cover up.

Secondly, Lugard did not as much as devote a paragraph, in his annual reports of 1900-1901 No. 346 and 1901 No. 377 respectively, to the unauthorised diversion of approximately a third of his Parliamentary Grant for 1900 to military expenditure for pursuing the Emir of Yola. Instead of rendering account of his stewardship, he harped on the mantra of the South African Boer War and the Gold Coast Ashanti War as the cause of the considerable drain on men and material resources in the protectorate,⁷¹ as the protectorate had to contribute men to the two campaigns. More telling is the strange devotion of approximately 30 pages to events that occurred in 1903 and maps that were drawn in 1903 in the 1902 Annual Report No. 409.

Thirdly, there is evidence that document-related fraud was rampant with Lugard. For example, Lugard issued a *Political Memoranda*, a so-called manual for the guidance of his officers, whereas the document was little more than “three hundred odd pages of close print ... amidst a forest of impossible instructions for its custodians, the ordinary principles of civilized government and of justice become grotesquely distorted and reversed.”⁷² It is no surprise therefore that

Lugard went to some lengths to conceal from the Colonial Office the existence of these memoranda, prohibiting their

colonised peoples than those of Britain and that (3) the material development of at least the latter colonies was more for the benefit of capitalist profiteers than for Britain and the colonised peoples. Labour’s criticism did not cease with the Proclamation of January 1900. See Ukpabi, 493; Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 608

71 Lugard, “Northern Nigeria”, 10; Colonial Reports – Annual No. 346, *supra*

72 Nicolson, 135

removal from the territory, and later having them printed in England without the Office's knowledge. When the Colonial Office got wind of them, and insisted upon seeing a copy, Lugard was markedly hesitant about sending one, and finally sent the revised, printed version, not the originals.⁷³

Furthermore, "in the first 'confidential' edition of Lugard's *Political Memoranda* (1906),⁷⁴

Although these were never made public, and copies are hard to find, much of their content (slightly diluted) is reproduced in his published writings, particularly in the chapter on 'West African Administration' in *The Empire and the Century*, in *The Dual Mandate*, and in the annual reports. The printed and bound edition of 1906 bears two dates – 'February 12, 1905, Revised September 1906' – the latter date being two months after Lugard's resignation – under Lugard's own name."⁷⁵

The fourth problem is the roller coaster of ranks from Captain on 10 November 1894 to (1) Brigadier-General (in February 1897) down to (3) Colonel (1st January 1900) up to (4) Major-General (December 1900) and down to (5) Brigadier-General (March 1901)

Fifthly, apart from falsification of documents, he used other mercenary tactics to mislead the parliament on his plan to attack Kano early 1903, knowing that an attack on Kano was something most stakeholders would have opposed given the universal expectation that the commercial emporium was going to be the capital of the Northern Protectorate. As Geary narrates it,

It was, however, not known to the Colonial Office, whether it was designedly concealed, and on 9th December 1902 the Secretary of State informed the House of Commons that no expedition was contemplated against Kano.⁷⁶

73 *ibid.*, 135

74 *ibid.*, 135

75 *ibid.*, 135fn. 2

76 Geary, *Nigeria*, 217

Knowing that the Parliament had been misled, and that the House went on Christmas recess, “the expedition was hurriedly set forth”⁷⁷ from Zaria on 29 January 1902, and “arrived 6 February, and before Parliament met again, Kano had been taken.”⁷⁸ This is in contrast to Governor Ralph Moore of Southern Nigeria who followed due process thereby having to “wait for several years before he obtained permission to undertake the Aro [Chukwu] expedition.”⁷⁹ Armed with the Maxim, 2.95-inch gun and the storming party, it is as if Lugard was self-assured that he could get away with unauthorised wars so long as he emerged victorious.

The point in all the above is to submit that governance in Northern Nigeria was founded on fraud and personal braggadocio.

INDIRECT RULE IN THEORY

There is no universally accepted definition of Indirect Rule as it unfolded in the Northern Protectorate.⁸⁰ Hence, it is herein preferably defined as the colonial system of government by which colonial authorities empower existing potentates with local structures and traditions to exercise authority over their people with colonial officers ensuring compliance, for the achievement of the colonial objective.⁸¹ Ordinarily, an arrangement which empowers the chiefs and utilises peoples’ traditions seems benevolent enough and capable of delivering mutual benefits for the governed and the British. When

77 *ibid.*, 217

78 *ibid.*, 217

79 M. Crowder, 1987, review of *The Colonial Office and Nigeria 1898–1914*, by J. Garland, in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1987), 326, in <http://www.jstor.org/stable/219854> (accessed on 6 November 2015)

80 Perham, “Some Problems of Indirect Rule in Africa” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 34, No. 135 Apr., 1935), 4, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/717145> (accessed on 13 October 2013)

81 cf. Girouard, 333; Z. Matthews, “An African View of Indirect Rule in Africa.” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 36, No. 145 (October 1939) 433, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/717941> (accessed 14 May 2013); D. Cameron, *The Meaning of Indirect Rule: The Principles of Native Administration and their Application* (Lagos: Government Printer), n.d. cf. M. Perham *ibid.*, 4

examined critically, however, it shows that there is more than what meets the eye.⁸²

First of all, in the words of Margery Perham, Lugard's biographer, Lugard's "system was founded upon his belief, which in later years he never substantially changed, that African society was fundamentally and, so, permanently different from European".⁸³ Accordingly, investments in western education as well as in political and judicial institutions are not merely tantamount to a wasteful venture; they amount to an injurious imposition on the 'native' ways.⁸⁴ It is no wonder then why implicit in Lugard's instructions contained in his *Political Memorandum*⁸⁵ is the presumption that the African cannot rise above his native heritage; and should any attempt be made to embark on any programme to the contrary, the rate of his progress would be so slow as to take 'forever' to flourish.

“Lugard's “system was founded upon his belief,
which in later years he never substantially changed, that
African society was fundamentally and, so, permanently
different from European”

In the light of the foregoing condescending position, Indirect Rule is, secondly, a pretext for justifying British imperialism while creating the impression that the British were simply colonizing “less advanced peoples” in order to facilitate their advance towards civilization,⁸⁶ whereas what is meant by civilization is nothing more than Euro-ethnocentrism with a mechanism for keeping the African in a permanently disadvantageous position.

82 cf. W. Newman, “Frederick Lugard and the Policy of Indirect Rule in British Colonial Africa,” in [http://m.voices .yahoo.com/Frederick-lugard-policy-indirect-rule-in-3900060.html](http://m.voices.yahoo.com/Frederick-lugard-policy-indirect-rule-in-3900060.html) (accessed 31 May 2012)

83 Perham, “Introduction” xliv; there is more on Lugard's view of the nature of the African in Chapter Two.

84 See I. Okonjo, *British Administration in Nigeria 1900–1950: A Nigerian View* (New York: Nok Publishers, 1974), 38–40

85 This is the administrative manual Lugard issued to his officers.

86 *ibid*; cf. E. Gilbert and J. Reynolds *Africa in World History: From Prehistory to the Present*, 2nd edition (Upper Saddle River: Pearson, 2008 cited in Newman *ibid*).

Thirdly, Lugard's view of the African, echoed by his wife, is an echo of (1) the view publicized by frustrated Arabs for centuries as some kind of psychological compensation for their failure to penetrate the forest regions of Africa,⁸⁷ and (2) Social Darwinism, a social theory of human progress that finds analogy in Charles Darwin's biology of the survival of the fittest, which was dominant in major European universities in the 19th century, and which was used to (a) justify racism, imperialism, and unbridled capitalism on the one hand, and to (b) stigmatise compassion and social responsibility, on the other hand. Despite its prevailing influence in the period and through the early part of the 20th century, many observers identify Social Darwinism as the root cause of German militarism and the rise of Nazism. It, however, suffered a major setback with the outbreak of World War I and World War II despite its populist appeal.

Social Darwinism, however, went into decline following the contradictory outbreak of the two world wars within the first 40 years of the 20th century⁸⁸ and especially following studies in anthropology which recognises the role of culture in human development. Sociobiology, a synthesis of biology and culture, did arise to shore up support for whatever was left of Social Darwinism, but critics insist that sociobiology is an old wine in a new bottle, thereby equally fallen into disrepute because it downplays the role of culture in human society while justifying nevertheless somehow poverty and inequality. Organisations that have arisen in the second half of the 20th century⁸⁹ to confront the excesses of Darwinism and its offshoots include Creation Moments, Discovery Institute and the International Society for Christian Apologetics, etc. The claims and counterclaims, rebuttals and rejoinders are set to continue. John Templeton Foundation, West Conshohocken, PA, the Center of Theological Inquiry, Princeton, NJ, and others are committed to providing opportunities for scholars in both camps to engage the public at large.

“sociobiology is an old wine in a new bottle”

87 More on this point in Chapter Two

88 cf. C. Cleaver, “Traces of Social Darwinism in Contemporary America,” in *The Christian Scholar*, Vol. 44, No. 4, (Winter, 1961), 341, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41177252> (accessed on 28 May 2013)

89 See R. Bannister, “Social Darwinism,” in <http://encanta.msn.com>, 2000

James Currie, a colonial officer in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 1899–1914, was concerned for the “widespread emphasis on the importance of preserving as much as, possible indigenous African life and custom,”⁹⁰ because he saw in it a plea for “a new African feudalism”,⁹¹ a veiled “system that is conceived to preserve [the African] as a picturesque antiquity”⁹² and a calculation to make him more dependent on the white man, whereas he yearns for the kind of education that will “enable him take his place in the world’s economic struggle on equal terms with the white man.”⁹³

Thirdly, Indirect Rule focuses on one institution, i.e. chieftaincy and more specifically emirship, whereas no society can survive, let alone thrive, on one institution. The imperative for the institutions of checks and balances can therefore not be over-emphasized.⁹⁴ It is crucial to account for the interests and roles of other stakeholders such as the (1) youths, (2) the educated elite,⁹⁵ (3) the trading companies, (4) the nationalist press in southern Nigeria which envisioned independence from colonial rule for the whole country, (5) Western missionaries with their interest in proselytization, education, medical services and socio-cultural advancement, (6)

“it is a plea for “a new African feudalism” and a veiled
“system that is conceived to preserve [the African] as a
picturesque antiquity”

90 J. Currie, “Present-Day Difficulties of a Young Officer in the Tropics,” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 32, No. 126 (Jan., 1933), 33, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/716690> (accessed on 20 August 2013)

91 *ibid.*, 33

92 *ibid.*, 33; cf. B. Azikiwe, “How Shall We Educate the African”, in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 33, No. 131 (Apr., 1934), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/716969> (accessed on 14 May 2013)

93 *ibid.*, 33

94 cf. Matthews, 435

95 A. Murray, “Education under Indirect Rule,” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 34, No. 136 (Jul., 1935, p. 227–268 at p. 229, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/716819> (accessed 14 May 2013); R. Rattray, “Present Tendencies of African Colonial Government,” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 33, No. 130 (Jan., 1934), 26, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/717109> (accessed 29 August 2013)

supporters of Western missionaries in their home countries, (7) colonial officers in the southern protectorate, (8) the British Press and the (9) progressive social forces in Britain, especially the Labour Party Research Department, whose interest lay in accountability and probity of the colonial regime.

Fourthly, though the system goes by the name Indirect Rule, in concrete terms or in its unfolding, it is not indirect as the following from *Political Memorandum* stipulates,

It is of course the duty of the Administrative Officer to advise a Native Authority to make any order which may be lawful under the Native Authority Ordinance, if he considers that it is in the interests of the people that the order should be made; and if his advice is neglected he may then, under the Ordinance, order the Native Authority to make the required order.⁹⁶

Charles Temple, one of the architects of Indirect Rule, is emphatic on the point that, “the Resident, of course, has a great ‘influence’ over the Emir. He tenders the advice of the Government, and that advice must be taken.”⁹⁷ And should anyone mistake Temple’s revelation for a slip of the pen, Temple goes on to explain that,

The position of an Emir has, since the occupation, changed on one all-important feature. He is no longer subject to the influence of the public opinion of others of his kind, nor has he to trim his sails and to modify his actions accordingly. He is surely seated on his throne by a power operating from afar and quite outside all local influence. The Resident in charge of the Province takes the place of the influence of public opinion as controlling force over the Emir’s actions to keep him on the right track.⁹⁸

This is not Indirect Rule but Selective Bludgeoning. Nevertheless, the colonial terminology is retained in this discourse, for the sake of accountable language.

⁹⁶ Lugard, *Political Memorandum*, 15

⁹⁷ C. Temple, *Native Races and the Rulers*, 2nd Edition, (London: Frank Cass, 1968), 65

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 67

Fifthly, the Indirect Rule concept presupposes that the policy makers in the Colonial Office and the officers on ground are knowledgeable whereas, as noted earlier, they were not as knowledgeable of the terrain and the people as they thought they were. To compound the problem, recruitment was haphazard.⁹⁹ This situation is against the background of the general apathy to West Africa as the

“backyard of the Empire. The Coast was long a place to which ne’er-do—wells were shipped off to die of drink of malaria ... Men of the right kind are half ashamed to take positions on the West Coast, and men of the wrong kind are an obstacle to improvement.”¹⁰⁰

Imposition of Indirect Rule, therefore, was little more than a case of the blind leading the blind. Writing in 1936, as it turned out, Walter Crocker a participant-observer until 1933 disclosed:

Too many Administrative Officers (excepting those who have been appointed within the last five years or so) are ignorant of even the neighbouring West African colonies and would be quite unable to pass an elementary examination of the history or the political problems of the British Empire as a whole or in part. Even senior officers of twenty years’ service, like Residents, have no notion of organization and working of the Colonial Office.¹⁰¹

Writing six years before Crocker released his book, Bronislaw Malinowski, widely regarded as the most notable social anthropologist of his day, noted,

99 Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 607

100 A. Upward, “The Province of Kabba, Northern Nigeria”, in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 2 No. 7 (April., 1903), 259, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/715166> (accessed on 15 September 2013)

101 W. Crocker, *Nigeria: A Critique of British Colonial Rule*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1936), 228. Walter Crocker, an Australian, was a Resident in Benue Province and Niger Province in the 1930s. He was the Political Officer responsible for the construction of Kaduna-Minna Railway. He resigned in 1933, following a severe bout of malaria.

As far as I understand, the best which has been given to the prospective administrator up to the present has been but a smattering in all these subjects [social anthropology, European economics, law, sociology, mechanisms of contact and cultural diffusion, questions of education, language, and religion]. One or two colonising powers, notably Belgium and Holland, have, for some time, been given a full four years' course especially concerned with the teaching of colonial affairs; but in Great Britain only one year is devoted to an all-round course of which the special and most important subject, anthropology, occupies about a one-tenth, if not less.¹⁰²

Given the dynamism of structures and traditions, it is expected that dynamic ethnography rather than static anthropology would prevail in their approach to the people.

Lastly, it is universally accepted that maintenance of social equilibrium is a central duty of government. This duty embraces issues such as religion, ethnicity, the gap between the rich and the poor, etc. On each count, Indirect Rule, in so far as it consciously harbours inequality, is an instrument of social injustice and oppression which the oppressed are justified to overthrow. With the sketch herein, an examination of Indirect Rule in its outworking follows.

INDIRECT RULE IN PRACTICE

Indirect Rule had many features. The following features are outlined to show how it was a deliberate ploughing for a future of violence in Northern Nigeria. They are the (1) cultivation of *masu sarauta*; (2) jaundiced judiciary (3) imposition of apartheid education, and (4) official backing for Islam. Official backing for Islam is considered in greater detail in Chapter Two. Before delving into these issues, it is perhaps important to highlight an underline a particular leadership style in the formative years of colonial rule – the issue of converting Northern Nigeria into a personal estate.

102 B. Malinowski, "The Rationalisation of Anthropology and Administration," in *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* Vol. 3, No. (Oct 1930), 20, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1155193> (accessed on 26 July 2013)

CRONYISM AND ITS COUSINS

It was established earlier that prior to his appointment as High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, (1) Lugard was a Brigadier-General in Joseph Chamberlain's mercenary West African Frontier Force. (2) Furthermore, he introduced himself to the Sultan of Sokoto as Colonel Lugard on 1st January 1900. It was also established that (3) Lugard submitted his 1900 Annual Report to the Colonial Office wherein he signed as a Major-General. (3) It is equally evident that he signed his subsequent submissions to the two Houses of Parliament as a Brigadier-General. Yet, the summersault-promotion-summersault of the first year in office is telegraph. The point is that Lugard ran Northern Nigeria like a personal estate, as the following evidence corroborates.

It will be recalled, firstly, that Northern Nigeria in Lugard's day was comparable to France and Belgium combined in land mass. Nevertheless, Lugard refused to set up a Secretariat throughout his first tenure – 1900–1906. This explains why some observers chose to call him a “born centralizer.”¹⁰³

Secondly, consistent with the foregoing is his appointment of his mercenary friend William Wallace¹⁰⁴ as Deputy High Commissioner. Admittedly, it is difficult to fault Lugard's choice of Wallace as Deputy High Commissioner because the criteria for selection are not available for scrutiny. In other words, it is difficult to determine who was most suitable among William Wallace, Arthur Festing, Upton Ruxton, John Bourdon, Felix Bygn-Hall, and Featherstone Cargill, who were fellow mercenaries either in the Royal Nigeria Company or the West African Frontier Force or both, based on the profiles available.¹⁰⁵ His known friendship with Wallace might have been the critical factor in his choice of Deputy High Commissioner. Furthermore, Wallace spear-headed the first expedition in the history of the Protectorate: the push against the Emir of Yola beginning in August 1900.

103 Perham, “Introduction,” xxxvi

104 Both Lugard and Wallace were mercenaries in the Royal Niger Company militia.

105 See Heussler, xiii^{ff} for brief profiles on the officers.

Thirdly, more telling is Flora Shaw's role as the unofficial propagandist to the British press,¹⁰⁶ Flora Shaw being Lugard's girlfriend who he later married in 1902. It could be argued that her consultancy fee would have been cost-effective given her personal relationship with the helmsman. On the other hand, her consultancy fee had the trapping of a revolving door through which Lugard enriched himself. Following their marriage in 1902, she lived with her husband in Zungeru and Lokoja for five months and returned to England where she was able to devote more time to propaganda.¹⁰⁷ It remains to be said that such an arrangement between Frederick and Flora in public space, both before and in marriage, is a near perfect environment for impunity.

Fourthly, Lugard later brought in his sibling as a Resident II officer. Admittedly, offering his brother employment in the Northern Nigerian civil service was not a bad thing in itself. After all, recruitment into the service was on equal opportunity basis – for the British – but not for Southern Nigerians as it will become evident in Chapter Two. What raises an eyebrow in this case is the deployment of the sibling to the seat of Chief Clerk in the Office of the High Commissioner in 1903,¹⁰⁸ thereby not reporting to any officer except his elder brother. This arrangement was perfect for insulating Frederick Lugard from prying eyes.

Lastly, Lugard had always made it clear that “I have always personally preferred mission work among Pagans to that among Mohammedans, which may involve political difficulties.”¹⁰⁹ For this reason, his personal whim became official policy. In effect, missionary presence and work was banned in populations with high

106 A. Nwabughuogu, “The Role of Propaganda in the Development of Indirect Rule in Nigeria, 1890–1929,” in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 144, No. 1 (1981) 80ff, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/218114> (accessed on 1 October 2013)

107 For a glimpse at Lady Lugard's exploits, see Nicolson, 165–169.

108 Nicolson, 147

109 Colonial Reports—Annual No. 516 Northern Nigeria Report for 1905–1906,” 118, in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&respv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Colonial+Annual+Report%2C+1905-1906%2C+Northern+Nigeria> (accessed 24 August 2015)

Muslim presence, especially in the Far North of the protectorate. In his 1905–1906 annual report, however, Lugard avers:

The Hausa Mission [of the Church Missionary Society], hitherto stationed in the Ghirku district, 40 miles south of Zaria, transferred its headquarters to the latter city in March, 1905, with my consent, on the invitation of the Emir, and they have it in contemplation to open a mission next year at Kano, with the consent of the Emir and chiefs, and also perhaps at Kontagora, where the Emir seems quite anxious to allow them to come.¹¹⁰

Dr. Walter Miller relocated his work to Zaria city, a city with major Muslim population, against policy but with Lugard's consent. In the same report he disclosed the invitation for missionary presence and enterprise in Muslim-majority communities, such as Kano and Kontagora. However, Lugard was not to be involved in the rest as they were to follow due process: 1) evidence of invitation by an Emir and 2) approval by the Resident. In reality, the Residents blocked invitations by the Emirs either by putting the word of rejection in the latter's mouth and when that was not forthcoming, the Resident's rejection was conveyed up-front.¹¹¹

Why was Dr. Miller's relocation to Zaria city with Lugard's consent (read intervention) whereas the cases of all the other missionaries in the CMS and the other missions were subjected to their respective Resident's approval? His explanation was that he could not overrule an agreement between the Emir and Dr. Miller when the Hausa Party visited Zaria on their way to Kano in 1900. This explanation is, however, a ruse because in 1914, Lugard had no trepidation abrogating an existing treaty between the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the British Colony of Lagos on the one hand, and Egba chief which in effect recognised Egbaland as an independent states on 18 January 1893, the treaty having been based on exchanges between Egba leaders and Queen Victoria from 1848 to 1849.¹¹² Therefore, Lugard could easily have dismissed an arrangement between Emir

110 *ibid.*, 118

111 For more on this phenomenon, see Chapter Two.

112 Ade-Ajayi, 130; Queen Victoria was a much higher authority than Lugard himself.

Mohamadu who he deposed or Emir Dan Sidi who he installed¹¹³ on the one hand, and what he considered an inconsequential missionary, if he had chosen to dismiss the arrangement. Policy is policy; it is not a matter of personal preference. Therefore, the concession to Miller was a case of nepotism and a subversion of a policy he laid down for others to follow.

Miller made a number of strategic suggestions to Lugard especially in the formulation of education policy but Lugard had little use for them. Furthermore, although the two men had mutual respect for each other, it is perhaps important to stress the fact that the two of them were diametrically opposed on two key issues: (1) Indirect Rule and (2) the Hausa-Fulani question. While Lugard was committed to Indirect Rule, Miller was committed to direct rule. Similarly, while Lugard was a Fulani fanatic, Miller never accepted justification for anybody to sustain the Fulani man on the back of the Hausa man.¹¹⁴

In the light of the above, certain conclusions follow. First, the entrenchment of Flora and Lugard's sibling in the corridors of power, not only was governance in Northern Nigeria a matter of Lugard's personal estate; it doubled as a family racket. Secondly, considering the Flora, Michael, Wallace and Miller's factors, cronyism and its corrosive cousins such as nepotism were alive and kicking in Northern Nigeria. Thirdly, and most importantly cronyism and its cousins are not 'Made in Nigeria' commodities; they were constitutive of and foundational to colonial governance in Northern Nigeria.

“cronyism and its cousins are not 'Made in Nigeria' commodities; they were constitutive of and foundational to colonial governance in Northern Nigeria.”

113 Colonial Reports—“Annual No. 409 Northern Nigeria Report for 1902,” 15, in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&respv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Colonial+Annual+Report%2C+1902%2C+Northern+Nigeria> (accessed on 24 August 2015)

114 cf. E. Ayande, “The Missionary Factor in Northern Nigeria, 1870–1918,” in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. III, No. 3, December 1966, 513

CULTIVATION OF MASU SARAUTA

Indirect Rule was predicated on what Lord and Lady Lugard regarded as two interrelated axioms: (1) the Nigerian population can be divided into three, (a) the Fulani, (b) the Hausa, and (c) the rest; and (2) “there are races which are born to conquer and others to persist in conquest.”¹¹⁵ It is worthy of note, however, that MacGregor and Moor, Lugard’s southern counterparts, roundly condemned the pernicious beliefs.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, nothing could dissuade Lugard from erecting the superstructure of his administration on the pernicious pillars. In particular, it translates into using the pre-colonial ruling class known as emirs and their surrogates otherwise known as *masu sarauta*, understood to mean those who rule or the predestined ruling class. It is the same group that has roots in the Islamic jihad of the 19th century as well as their surrogates all over the Far North and the Middle Belt. Accordingly, he lost no time in institutionalising their status.

First of all, he reserved first class status for the Sultan of Sokoto, Emir of Gwandu,¹¹⁷ the Shehu of Borno and the emirs of Kano (for Kano’s sheer size), Katsina (as compensation for not resisting Lugard’s troops in 1903). Second class went to so-called lesser emirs such as the Emir of Bauchi, Katagun, Hadeija, Lapai and some non-Muslim potentates in traditionalist polities such as the King of Argungu (southwest of Sokoto), and the kings of Kaiama¹¹⁸ and Bussa in Borgu. The third and fourth classes were reserved for Fulani district heads¹¹⁹ and some traditionalist chiefs. Furthermore, these ranks were monetised with *masu sarauta* of the first class receiving salaries far in excess of their equivalents in the southern protectorate.¹²⁰

115 See Nicolson, 168, cf. Lugard, *A Tropical Dependency*, 335, 336, 380, 407; Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 68, 198, 210

116 *ibid.*, 106–107

117 Gwandu was the eastern capital of the Sokoto Caliphate. Sokoto was the capital of the western capital as well as the overall capital of the empire. Sokoto lost virtually all the western flank to the French. Therefore, it had to find its relevance in the eastern flank.

118 as compensation for saving Lugard’s life during his expedition to Borgu in 1894

119 imposed on many traditionalist peoples

120 P. Logams, “Traditional and Colonial Forces and the Emergence of the

Fig. 3

RANKING OF NIGERIAN PEOPLES		
Colonial Dogma		Refutation
Fulani	Nigerian population can be divided into three. The light-skin Fulani are on the highest rung of the evolutionary ladder in social organisation and intellectual development. They are destined to and capable of ruling the rest. The Hausa are next to Fulani on the ladder. They are rulers to a lesser extent. The Negro stock of the savannah and the forest regions are low level pagans	Colonial dogma based partly on (1) resuscitation of the erroneous perception of the African by Middle Ages frustrated Arab slave raiders who failed to penetrate the forest regions of Africa and partly on (2) Social Darwinism. The views held by (1) the 15th century Portuguese in Warri and Benin, (2) Queen Victoria, in her exchange of letters and gifts with Abeokuta chiefs in the 1840s (3) Thomas Bowen, the first Southern Baptist Convention missionary in Yorubaland, 1849–1856 (4) Dr. Walter Miller, an English missionary contemporary of Lugard in Hausaland, William MacGreggor and Ralph Moor, Lugard's colleagues in Southern Nigeria debunk the ranking of Nigerian peoples by the colonial Northern Nigeria government. See Chapter Two for more on Bowen. The “destined to rule” dogma and the doctrine of evolution-Social Darwinism are mutually exclusive. They collide head-on. Colonial ranking has no basis in social equilibrium, human dignity, human rights, freedom, natural justice and social justice.
Hausa	The more southerly the people the more of idolaters, naked natives, sorcerers, robbers, drunkards, cunning thieves and cannibals Introduction of western education and institutions in Northern Nigeria is wasteful	
The Rest		

Kaduna Mafia.” in B. Takaya and S. Tyoden (eds) in *The Kaduna Mafia: A Study of the Rise, Development and Consolidation of the Nigerian Rower Elite*, (Jos: Jos University Press, 1987), 49–50

It should be noted that the sultan himself “had publicly refused to accept a salary from the British colonial administration”¹²¹ preferring to depend on the *zakat* and *sadaqa*. Just how long the sultan and his successors resisted the salary is a different matter. Besides, there were assorted and poorly defined sums of money, under the rubric of establishment charges that Lugard packaged and approved for the sultan totalling 83.3% of the salary.¹²² Whether the sultan and his successors publicly rejected the package is another matter. Besides, the structure of the treasuries that emerged in Northern Nigeria especially after the unequal amalgamation suggests that a sultan of Sokoto cannot be a poor man.¹²³

Secondly, not only did Lugard exercise power through these high chiefs, he fraudulently restored them to their pre-colonial positions of dominance. In fact, influential ones were effectively placed above the law.¹²⁴ Crocker, cites some examples while in Niger Province,

Another regrettable feature [of Indirect Rule] was the manner in which the system worked to bolster up effete and corrupt chiefs at the expense of their people. As late as 1932, thirty years after our subjugation of the country, it was found amongst the Gwari chiefdoms that forcible seizure of girls for the harems of chiefs (Kuta and Guni), continuous and heavy taxations of both goods and money from the commoners, embezzlement of tax, arbitrary imprisonment and other persecutions, forced labour on a scale whereby in some cases half the able-bodied male population were conscripted to work in construction camps for the benefit of the chief and against the will of the conscripted, and possibly even ‘palace’ murders, were the order in some of the Gwari chiefdoms. Some of these things, as at Kuta, had been going on unbeknownst to the D.O.s, for nine years at a distance of only a few hundred yards from the Divisional Headquarters.

At about the same time serious scandals were brought to light in the Bida Emirate, and a year or so previous they were brought to light in the Sultanate of Sokoto. The tenacity shown by those

121 R. Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*, Evanston: North-western University Press, 1997), 74

122 cf. Logams, 50

123 Newbury, 261

124 Nicolson, 139

in power in Northern Nigeria in refusing to remove higher chiefs was remarkable. It required spectacular criminality to induce Kaduna to move against them, to such a degree had Indirect Rule been perverted into a policy for conserving these petty autocracies, the argument running that a native would sooner suffer injustice from a native authority than justice from an alien.¹²⁵

Thirdly, there was persistent keeping away of Native Authority books from audit,¹²⁶ for the first 32 consecutive years¹²⁷ – more than 50% of the period of colonial rule. By so doing, the colonial government created honey pots for the emirs. This arrangement helps explain why native authorities were able to make a substantial donation to the British World War I effort.¹²⁸ Bearing in mind Temple's disclosure of Residents' prerogative to bludgeon the emirs in their respective provinces, the so-called substantial donation to the war effort has the trapping of coercion for diverting considerable amounts of money from the Native treasuries under the rubric of donation to the war effort. This explains the stiff resistance by the Residents against calls for reforms immediate after the war, since the reforms would have exposed the sordidness of the Residents vis-a-vis the Native Treasury especially from 1914–1919. How many years of the remaining 28 years of colonial rule were the Native Authority accounts submitted for audit, is a separate question.

The lack of transparency at the centre went viral especially in the Provinces, since there was “no system of storing or archiving old documents – periodical burnings being the accepted method for keeping their bulk manageable.”¹²⁹ In fairness, an attempt was made in the late 1920s, but suddenly there was fire in the regional

“there was persistent keeping away of Native Authority books from audit”

125 Crocker, 217

126 The Native Authority was a tier of government created by the colonial regime. It was the regime's badge of honour. See Geary, “Nigeria”, 228

127 Crocker, 133

128 C. Newbury, “Accounting for Power in Northern Nigeria.” in *Journal of African History*, Vol. 45, No. 2, (2004), 227, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4100467> (accessed on 28 September 2014)

129 Crocker, 141

Secretariat in Kaduna,¹³⁰ presumably as the audit season approached. In brief and in hindsight, it stands to reason to suggest that the spate of fires in Accounts Departments throughout the length and breadth of Nigeria in the 1980s had a precedent in the Kaduna Secretariat of colonial Northern Nigeria.

Fourthly, in order to further entrench the position and prestige of *masu sarauta*, the Native Court system was established for them to preside over, “so long as they loyally accepted British suzerainty.”¹³¹ It was a system whereby customary laws and the Muslim sharia law were administered but which

expressly denied the [non-Muslims] subject to the jurisdiction of courts set up thereunder any right of legal representation – however serious the charge and whatever penalty might be prescribed by law, and further denied the right of appeals to a court presided over by a British judge or political officer.¹³²

Furthermore,

their [emir] powers, naturally, varied in proportion to their status and efficiency. In the organised Emirates they were Omniscient, even up to awarding the death penalty, while on the other hand the inchoate Village Courts of certain Pagan tribes might be limited to powers of three months’ imprisonment.¹³³

The fifth feature of ploughing for violence a là *masu sarauta*, was created in 1922 when the colonial authorities established the Northern Advisory Council of Chiefs with membership drawn exclusively from the *masu sarauta*. They were all Muslims whereas their decisions were binding on the whole of Northern Nigeria. A handful of non-Muslim chiefs were added to their number in 1931 but owing to their minority status, they were unable to overturn the agenda of the *masu sarauta*. Islamisation of the Far North and the Middle

130 *ibid.*, 141

131 Okonjo, 7

132 *ibid.*, 47

133 Crocker, 228

Belt was further entrenched when the Northern Advisory Council of Chiefs was converted to a lopsided legislative Northern House of Chiefs to make laws for Northern Nigeria from 1931–1945.

In this connection, the Northern Advisory Council and the Northern House of Chiefs were sited in Sokoto under the nose of the Sultan of Sokoto, and not in Kaduna the regional capital since 1922, in order to intimidate non-Muslim minority members and future aspirants to these institutions. The House of Assembly was transferred to Kaduna only in 1950/51. Whether before or after 1950/51, all the laws that were enacted were pro-Islam, the plan being to cast an image of Islamic identity for Northern Nigeria.¹³⁴

Lastly, the Northern Nigerian government established Katsina College¹³⁵ on 5 March 1921 in order to groom young Muslims from *masu sarauta* emirate stables in Western education to enable them administer the country in their generation. It was a self-fulfilled prophecy when “many of the fifty students admitted to Katsina College were to occupy the highest offices of government in the North and Nigeria in the year between 1947 and 1966.”¹³⁶ The Katsina College pattern was repeated in the formation of the first northern cabinet in 1952, and the revised cabinet of 1955 when a Christian was made a cabinet minister and four Christians out of 20 cabinet members in 1960, following persistent protest from non-Muslim communities. It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that delegates from the emirate stables in the National Assembly in Lagos voted against the motion, when in 1953–1954 the motion was moved for Nigeria’s independence from Britain.

Gamji

So far, the term, *masu sarauta*, has been used for the clique that the British favoured and wish to groom for perpetuation of inequality and oppression. It is the term critics and the gullible used. There is

134 Logams, 50

135 It went by the name College but it was nothing more than a glorified post-primary school.

136 Logams, 51

however an alias or an intra *masu sarauta* code – *gamji* – by which the *masu sarauta* distinguished themselves.

What is *gamji*? Etymologically, *gamji* is

a tree in N[orthern] Nigeria, mostly in Hausaland, which grows either by rising from the base of another tree (e.g. the Baobab and the Locust-bean tree), or even from the branching point of the bole. It grows fifty feet or so in height and generally right around and right into its host as though it were part of it.¹³⁷

Biologically, it is a parasite that cannot stand on its own but relies on others for its existence and development. Socio-politically, it is the clique which depends on the fortunes of the peoples, and rides on the crest of the destiny of the non-Muslim peoples of the Far North and the Middle Belt. Indeed, the act of *gamji* growing itself round its host tree is comparable to the action of a python wrapping itself round its prey before constriction. Whether in the case of a tree or an animal, a prey does not prosper under the grasp of a *gamji*. Perhaps the most important point to note herein is the fact that a *gamji* can turn to a parasitoid, thereby actually squeezing out the life of its host. Socio-politically, this has been the experience of (1) the non-Muslims in the Far North and (2) the huge number of traditionalist peoples in the Middle Belt throughout the Protectorate. More precisely, the colonial apparatus reinforced inequality in a double-bind fashion on the non-Muslim population.

In brief, colonial rule in Northern Nigeria was characterised by the institutionalisation of *masu sarauta*, whereas in as far as the institutionalisation is *ipso facto* the entrenchment of inequality, and whereas inequality breeds violence, the entrenchment of *masu sarauta* throughout the colonial era was effectively ploughing for a future of violence in Northern Nigeria.¹³⁸

137 Crocker, 106

138 cf. Nicolson, 163; Lugard, *A Tropical Dependency*, 335; 308; 407; Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 198

INEQUITABLE JUDICIARY

While the credibility and effectiveness of a government can be measured by using different indices, central to the credibility of a judicial system is the question of equality before the law – the issue of whether the rich and the poor, the strong and the weak, the majority and the minority are treated equally under the law. Why? Because no society or nation can endure indefinitely under inequality before the law! So important is this point that Crocker declares,

As the facts are, and as the facts have been, the question of the administration of justice is incomparably more important to the vast majority of natives than the question of Chiefs and councils and the territorial limitations of Chiefs and councils – that is to say, than what the practice of Indirect Rule is ordinarily concerned with.¹³⁹

The objective of this section is to determine to what extent the colonial administration observed this cardinal principle in the system designed and imposed on the Northern Protectorate from 1903–1913 before the northern and southern protectorates were amalgamated.

Native Court

In the judicial system designed and imposed on the protectorate, provision was made for three hierarchies of courts namely: the Native Courts at the lowest rung, the Provincial Courts, and the Supreme Court at the apex. The Native Court consisted in four stages from the village level to the paramount chief's level, in which traditional legal ideas and procedures, which are not repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience by colonial whims, were applicable. As such, only disputes in which the two parties are Africans can be entertained by the native court. At this level, the paramount ruler had full and unlimited jurisdiction to adjudicate in all civil and criminal matters, without appeal, except in the case of death penalty, in which case the political officer is empowered to review.

139 Crocker, 228

In theory, cognisance of and respect for traditional legal ideas and procedures is commendable in so far as the objective is to preserve the good elements in the systems. In practice, however, they varied widely so much so that to allow them to function autonomously is to leave a wide flank for abuse of privilege and miscarriage of justice. In fact, the people were subjected, across the emirates, to the Muslim Sharia law regardless of the religions of the litigants.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, when dealing with criminal cases, only “the testimony of male Muslim witnesses” were admitted. And when the privilege of a witness is granted a woman, the testimonies of two women are equated to the testimony of one man. And in the adjudication of compensation, Christians and traditionalists were granted only “half or one fifteenth of the amount a Muslim could expect.”¹⁴¹ Furthermore, as a rule, women are precluded from the bench just as the citizenry are precluded from legal representation.

Lastly, the question of challenging any policy or act of government was not within the purview of the court. The objective was to restore the emirs to their pre-colonial positions of dominance, and to be seen to be so by the commoners.¹⁴²

Provincial Court

The Provincial Court was empowered to adjudicate between litigants in whom at least one party is not African. In the perceived interest of justice,

The personnel of these courts were to be drawn from the ranks of the Resident in charge of the province, other Residents, district or assistant district officers, and all other executive officers of the province who have been duly appointed to be justices of the peace.¹⁴³

Unlike the native courts, the provincial courts were to administer the common law, but they were not required to follow strict English

140 Hanrinishfeger, 43

141 *ibid.*, 43

142 *cf.* Okonjo, 47

143 *ibid.*, 48

law procedure. And to make it less ‘technical’, Lugard appointed military officers as political officers. Even though the Colonial Office was in favour of well qualified civilians for the job of political officers, Lugard believed that justice is incorporated into the structure of discipline and military command.¹⁴⁴ Hence men with military background were preferable to Lugard. Furthermore, private legal practitioners had no right of audience before them. Since the presidents of the courts who doubled as Residents of their respective provinces did not necessarily have legal credentials, the decisions of the provincial courts were to be commonsensical rather than legally supportable rulings.¹⁴⁵

Is a measure of common sense a requirement in the administration of Nigeria? The answer is not only in the affirmative for Senator Ben Murray-Bruce of Bayelsa East Senatorial District; he has been advocating a Common Sense Revolution since his election in 2015. But what he advocates is different from the Lugard’s excessive whimsicality as a foundation of a legal system.

Supreme Court of Northern Nigeria (1903(?)–1913

Fig. 4

PERFORMANCE CHART	
Type of case	Number of cases heard
Civil	1
Criminal	0
Total	1
- The only civil case that came before the Supreme Court was prepared in England and therefore heard in Northern Nigeria. - A minimum of more than 1 murder-related execution was carried out per week for 14 years without a thought for the Supreme Court. - None of the various criminal matters made it into statistics. - After drawing his salary for years for doing nothing, whereas he could not offer any moral justification for its continuance, the Chief Judge resigned.	

144 Nicolson, 132; cf. Geary, Nigeria, 241

145 Okonjo, 48

Lastly, as mentioned earlier, there was the Supreme Court of Northern Nigeria which was to be a superior court of record, headed by a Chief Judge and other judges appointed by the High Commissioner. Despite its bogus name, the Supreme Court, (1) was modelled after the High Court of Justice in England, (2) its jurisdiction was limited to the townships and cantonments in the Protectorate, (3) although private legal practitioners had access to it, they were barred from cases referred from provincial courts. Lastly, the Supreme Court of Northern Nigeria could not challenge the actions of the executive arm of government as it was the case in other colonies, including Southern Nigeria.¹⁴⁶

The inherent double standard and the ensuing inequality it bred in the Provincial Courts and the so-called Supreme Court of the Northern Protectorate is further exposed as Crocker narrates the escapade of a European contractor believed to be a Romanian Jew posing as an Irishman.

His record was well known to the responsible authorities, including a blackmail of a peculiarly cruel and sordid nature. Nevertheless he was given a contract and put in a position of employing several hundred illiterate labourers. His treatment of them was such that they eventually rioted and he just escaped with his life. A series of civil cases were opened against him by (or rather on behalf of) the labourers both in the Supreme Court ... and in the Old Provincial Court, but in every case he produced lists of the labourers' names with amounts against them purporting to have been paid on certain dates, and, in testimony of the payment, a thumb print (an ink smudge), to determine the authenticity of which there was no means at the disposal of the Court. The 'evidence led,' which the Governor says must be the only consideration in judicial causes, was such that he always won. As far as I know [,] this man lost not a single case. Officials, even the Kaduna Secretariat, became frightened of him. For eighteen months after the riot cases cropped up, and I myself spent a considerable amount of spare time in trying to work up a case for this or that group of labourers, but never with success. The European escaped, the labourers

146 cf. *ibid.*, 49

lost their money and the only positive action on the part of Government was a ferocious censure of several pages ...¹⁴⁷

In terms of actual performance, “the Northern Region Supreme Court tried no criminal cases in the whole of its existence 1900–14, and only one civil case”¹⁴⁸ because appeals by-passed the Supreme Court to the High Commissioner’s office where he had the final say. As Geary notes:

The striking instance of this limited jurisdiction is that on the average 100 persons were tried for murder annually in Northern Nigeria, whereof three-quarters were executed. None of these came before the Supreme Court.¹⁴⁹

The only case that came before the so-called Supreme Court was a civil action of ejection by Government against London and Kano (L&K) Trading Company of which Barrister Geary was defence counsel. He started by lobbying Colonial Office to the effect that the case will proceed to hearing at the Supreme Court.¹⁵⁰ The defendants won the case.

In due course, following representations to the Colonial Office by a Law Society in England at the instance of some West African lawyers, Donald Cameron, the Governor of Nigeria imposed a Judicial Reform on the system which effectively (1) limited the powers of the Native Courts, (2) abolished the Provincial Courts, (3) extended the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court whose name was changed to High Court from which appeals may lie from certain Native Courts and (4) admitted legal practitioners to practise before the inferior and superior branches of the High Court. This reform came to effect in April 1934.¹⁵¹

A direct consequence of the reform is illustrated by the life of Ahmadu Bello, the first and only Premier of Northern Nigeria. A charismatic man with a rising profile and a descendant of Usman

147 Crocker, 233

148 Nicolson, 141

149 Geary, Nigeria, 241

150 Geary, Nigeria, 241; also alluded to in Geary, “Land Tenure,” 244

151 Crocker, 76

dan Fodio, he contested the vacant seat of Sultan but lost to his rival. Envious of Bello's rising profile in Sokoto Native Authority, the Sultan of the day, his former rival to the throne transferred him to faraway Gusau in order to keep him away from spotlight. The unintended however happened. The existence of the railway line further bolstered young Ahmadu Bello's profile.

In 1943, he became implicated in corruption; the Sultan's court convicted him and sentenced him to a one-year prison term. Rather than acquiesce, he made a direct appeal to the provincial court in Zaria, with the help of Bode Thomas, a Lagos-based Christian lawyer, with a review in his favour. It was a precedent for a direct descendant of Usman dan Fodio to appeal the judgement of the Sultan's court to a British so-called infidel court.¹⁵² It is this overturn of the Sultan's sharia court judgement by a British court that launched Ahmadu Bello into an unstoppable career to the highest political office in Northern Nigeria.

Why was Frederick Lugard not keen on instituting a credible judiciary? After all, the lack-of-adequate staff red herring that was raised in respect of the other sectors was not resorted to, on the judiciary. First, the pivotal reason cannot be separated from his pessimistic view of the African, coupled with his mercenary view of justice. Hence, the issue of justice was not high on the agenda of the regime. Nonsensically, he did not want a situation whereby "two professional liars [would] argue on opposite sides and try to confuse the mind of the Judge",¹⁵³ thereby puzzling the African mind.

However, Lugard's gratuitous protection of the northern mind from confusion is a direct contradiction of the supposed state of bodily, mental, and psychological development of the northerner over his southern neighbours. Since legal representation was a reality in the Southern Nigeria court system, northern courts should be more conducive for legal representation, since the people were supposedly more naturally, mentally and socially developed than the supposed cannibals south of the northern border. This contradiction

152 Loimeier, 106–107

153 L. Lugard, "Education and Race Relations," in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 32, No. 126 (Jan., 1933), 8, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/716687> (accessed on 18 August 2013)

exposes the colonial overlords of manipulating the legal system for ploughing Northern Nigeria for violence in the post-colonial era.

“two professional liars [would] argue on opposite sides and try to confuse the mind of the Judge”

APARTHEID EDUCATION SYSTEM

As a matter of historical accuracy, Christian missions – not the Roman Empire – taught Europe to read and write. It is equally a matter of historical accuracy to state that no Christian mission in the 19th century came to Africa solely with the aim of saving only the souls of the people among whom they bore witness, without regard to the medical and educational needs as well as the socio-economic advancement of their converts, because they could not justify such a narrow interpretation of their mission, in the light of their calling. Chapter Two will unpack more of missionary activities in southern Nigeria by the third quarter of the 19th century.

Indeed, educational and medical services typically top the list of mission ministries; and the history of Europe, attests to this. In fact, Europe could not have reached the take-off point from where it leaped ahead of the rest of the world without the contribution of Christian missions. With particular reference to education, the pattern was similar in many parts of Africa.

In Northern Nigeria, there was a relentless drive to contribute a veritable quota to the development of the colony. A comparison, in the chart below, of the educational services provided by colonial governments in the other British colonies in West Africa, on the one hand, and the missions on the other, provide a hint of the rationale for their quest.

By the early 1900, there were no government schools in the Gambia. Rather, there were six schools in all – all run by Christian missions.¹⁵⁴ In Sierra Leone, there were 108 primary schools, five

154 Graham, 3

secondary schools, and a university (Fourah Bay College) – all run by the Christian missions, and a community secondary school run by government.¹⁵⁵ In Gold Coast (Ghana) the missions ran 131 schools with “many other mission classes which had less than twenty pupils.”¹⁵⁶ Government’s involvement in education resulted in seven schools. In the Lagos Colony, and the Yoruba Protectorate there were mission schools and a government technical college but all the schools in the Southern Protectorate were run by missions except the Eyamba in Calabar, which integrated primary and technical training run jointly by government, local chiefs, and the merchants.¹⁵⁷

Were the Christian missions justified in their clamour for opportunity to contribute to the spiritual, educational, cultural, social and economic development of their host communities more so since they were community servants? Based on the background and the pattern above, Christian missionary societies were not unreasonable in their clamour for opportunity to contribute to the educational development of the territory. Sadly, it was to be their experience that the government was not willing to provide education and was only keen to stand in the way of the missions from contributing their veritable quota to the best of their ability.

Two schools existed in the emirates – one in Bida, in Nupe country and one in Zaria in Hausaland. The first was an outcome of the spadework done by Bishop Crowther in the second half of the 19th century, when he visited the Nupe leader repeatedly urging him to adopt Western education for his people. The Etsu did not see the point at that time.¹⁵⁸ If he had seen the point, a school in Bida could have been established to give the Nupe a head start north of the Niger, at least three decades before the colonial era. It is perhaps important to clarify that although Bida was in the Northern Protectorate; ecclesiastically however, it was part of the Niger Mission (diocese) which became quite active in Onitsha and its environs as from 1885.

155 *ibid.*, 3

156 *ibid.*, 3

157 *ibid.*, 5

158 After prodding the Nupe leader for more than a decade without success, Bishop Crowther turned his attention to the Igbo in Onitsha. The Igbo grabbed Western education hands and feet, and have not looked back since then.

Fig. 5
A COMPARISON OF MISSION SCHOOLS AND
GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS BY 1905

COLONY	MISSIONS	GOVERNMENT
Gambia	6	0
Sierra Leone	108 primary schools 5 secondary schools 1 university. In 1876, Fourah Bay College in affiliation with University of Durham, England, became a degree awarding institution.	0 1 secondary school 0
Gold Coast	131 plus many schools with less than 20 children	7 primary schools
Southern Protectorate of Nigeria	Many; exact figure not available at press time.	1 integrated primary-technical school jointly by government and merchants in Calabar
Northern Nigeria	2 primary schools	0

It is important to rescue the fact that Crowther went as far as establish a training institute, the Preparandi Institution, in Lokoja which was by 1890 part of the Nupe Empire, for the training of evangelists and school teachers. In fact, it was

“quite on a College plan, with tutor’s residences, dormitories, classrooms, and a printing room ... [in the hope that] ... such a centre of spiritual and educational activity will influence to an untold extent the future of the West Coast of Africa.”¹⁵⁹

159 J. Page, Samuel Crowther: *The Slave Boy Who Became Bishop of the Niger* 3rd edition. (New York: Fleming. H. Revell Company, n.d.) p. 146; Sadly, the training school which was established at a cost of £15,000 in 1890 was closed down by the Royal Niger Company by 1895 and converted to an army

The second school in Zaria, Hausaland, was a concession to Dr. Walter Miller in his personal recognition before Lugar formulated a hard-and-fast rule on where missions could or not build a school. Thereafter, the issue of whether Christian missions could build schools became a matter of political football between the Residents and the emirs with the Residents using the emirs as a pretext for why the missions should not be permitted, using different tactics for each proposal brought by the missionaries.¹⁶⁰

For example, having experimented with a school in Zaria, Dr. Walter Miller, the CMS missionary in the city, recommended to government that a man who enrolls a child in school and keeps him there should be granted tax concession.¹⁶¹ Next, he experimented with an adult school and found it feasible. It is noteworthy that the Gospel of John and the Gospel of Mark translated into Hausa by Miller were the textbooks since there was no Hausa literature in *boko*.¹⁶² In fact, the Emir of Zaria took night lessons secretly from one of Miller's pupils, and having attained a level of proficiency in reading Hausa in *boko*,¹⁶³ he suddenly presented himself to Miller for assessment. His certification was pace-setting and a sensation of sorts in his emirate.¹⁶⁴ The other Provincial Residents, however, refused to send Muslim adults to Miller's school in Zaria on the ground that those sent to Zaria could switch allegiance to the Emir of Zaria. A school for the sons of the emirs was proposed, and although the pilot project in Zaria was successful, the Resident of

barrack by Lugard as Commandant of RNC mercenary force. A full scoop of the racist motivation for closing down the institution cum Lugard conversion of the property to an army barrack deserves more space than this paragraph can accommodate.

160 Graham, 54, 56

161 *ibid.*, 33

162 *ibid.*, 37

163 This is the Hausa pronunciation or adulteration of the English word "book." It refers generally to the Roman script, and specifically to Western education. It is the erroneous connotation that has been heightened to become contemporary Boko Haram.

164 *ibid.*, 50; it is an irony that a century after the Emir of Zaria took secret lessons at night in order to acquire education in *boko*, Boko Haram is terrorising Northern Nigeria specifically, and the entire country generally for promoting education in *boko*.

Sokoto countered the move on the ground that the Sultan of Sokoto and the Emir of Gwandu would lose prestige for sending their sons to a lesser emirate such as Zaria for education.¹⁶⁵ In order to be seen to fall in line, the Emir of Kano and the rest found polite excuses not to patronise the school.¹⁶⁶ There was a proposal to site the school at Kano but the view that true education cannot flourish in Kano because of the commercial atmosphere of the city prevailed.¹⁶⁷ In all, it was the considered and prevailing view of the administration that the education of the Muslim was of importance and so long as it was not feasible, consideration for that of the non-Muslim could not be a priority.¹⁶⁸

Of course, there was the ominous issue of teaching Christian doctrines to Muslim choice students.¹⁶⁹ In all of the above, it is instructive to note that the Residents spoke for the emirs¹⁷⁰ as they were kept apart from one another, and therefore could not contradict the wishes of their respective Residents.

A compromise seemed likely by 1906 when Lugard suddenly became favourably disposed to missionary pleas.¹⁷¹ Unknown to the latter, however, Lugard had submitted his letter of resignation in order to resume in Hong Kong as Governor. Rather than approving Miller's proposal, he delayed approval thereby passing the recommendation to his successor, Percy Girouard, who as it turned out considered his railway project more important than the so-called mission palaver.

In 1908, Hanns Vischer, a Swiss national and former CMS missionary who for two years before he resigned, gave up his Swiss citizenship in order to take up an appointment with the colonial administration, was commissioned to study the educational programme of several colonies and recommend to the governor who was supposedly inclined to grant education to the 'natives'.¹⁷² It should

165 *ibid.*, 53

166 *ibid.*, 52; it will be recalled that Zaria was hardly in the good books of Sokoto since the mid-19th century.

167 *ibid.*, 58

168 *ibid.*, 29, cf. Crocker, 215

169 *ibid.*, 26, 41

170 For examples, see 52, 53, and 56.

171 *ibid.*, 45, 46

172 The government reluctantly set up an Education Department. This not because it was genuinely interested in promoting education in the protectorate; rather

be noted that the reason for considering establishing a Department of Education was because of the prospect of amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates. Since there was a vibrant Department of Education in the South, something has to be done in the North even if it was only a facade.

The study tour which took Visser to Egypt, Sudan, Southern Nigeria and Gold Coast ended with recommendations and a subsequent policy which may be summarised as follows:¹⁷³ (1) that an educational system be established, parallel to the political policy of the administration; (2) that government schools should be confined to Muslim districts; (3) that Christian missions be “free to extend their work proselytization among the adults without building schools among non-Moslems”;¹⁷⁴ and (4) that “extension of government schools to non-Moslem areas was to be considered after the successful establishment of Moslem schools.”¹⁷⁵ It is noteworthy that whereas the provision of education with public funds globally is a tool for the promotion of equal opportunity for all, the British colonial policy on education was formulated to institutionalise inequality within the colony: the emirates versus the chiefdoms; *masu sarauta* versus the commoners; Muslims versus non-Muslims.

An experimental school was proposed for Kano in 1910. However, since qualified indigenous teachers were not available and whereas the government did not want to employ Nigerians of Southern Protectorate origin for fear they might upset the applecart, Hanns Visser emerged as the sole advertiser, applicant, interviewer, interviewee, employer, employee, teacher and reporter to Government. He alone was the inchoate Department of Education. To forestall a still-born system, Visser had to start with teacher training programme in 1909 for commencement of the elementary school in 1910.

By 1912, when the government pilot education system was two years in operation, there were two types of elementary schools: “one

there was the prospect of amalgamation with the Southern Protectorate, whereas an appearance of an existing Education Department at the time of the amalgamation would improve the image of the northern government, at least to outsiders.

173 Graham, 74–75

174 *ibid.*, 74

175 *ibid.*, 74

was for chiefs' sons and the other for apprentices or anyone who could pay for his materials."¹⁷⁶ With the pupils drawn from various emirates, the school for the chiefs' sons catered for the emirs' sons' retinue and their wives as the age of the pupils ranged from 5 to 26.¹⁷⁷ The ages of pupils of the other elementary school range from 6 to 40.¹⁷⁸

Not only were the children of the chiefs segregated from those of the commoners, the syllabi were different. While the syllabus for 'the others' consisted in lessons on the 3Rs and hygiene, that of the chiefs' sons consisted in lessons in reading, writing, measurement of areas, and calculation of profit and loss, freehand drawing and nature study. Worse still, "the majority of the pupils [of the others] would not pass to the primary school."¹⁷⁹ What Prof A. Murray says on this development is instructive,

If the native is to be considered as always an inferior being, always to be governed by an alien race, his status and his education for that status will be different from what they would be if he is looked on as capable of an independent political future in the modern world. Yet it is very strange that advocates of 'indirect rule' who should presumably be most keen on the education of the Native as a potential citizen often favour an educational policy which would fit in better with a desire to leave the backward people in their own backwardness. It favours educating the chiefs and leaving the rest of the people to the simple arts and crafts of the tribe.¹⁸⁰

In his amalgamation report, Lugard reviewed the education situation in the Northern Protectorate as follows,

towards the close of 1913 I was able to create two new schools (at Sokoto and Katsena), so that when Amalgamation took place there were, in all, three Government schools, with an average

¹⁷⁶ *ibid.*, 87

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*, 82; Frederick Lugard's figure is 6 to 60, as cited in Lugard, *Report on the Amalgamation of Nigeria*, 148

¹⁷⁸ *ibid.*, 87

¹⁷⁹ *ibid.*, 87

¹⁸⁰ Murray, 234

attendance of 345 pupils, all in the Moslem area. Meanwhile, many different missions had arrived ... they had opened altogether 43 schools ... and were almost entirely confined to the non-Moslem districts. No financial assistance had been given to these schools.¹⁸¹

In 1914, the Nasarawa pattern of schools commenced by Vischer had been replicated in Sokoto and Katsina with Zaria, Birni Kebbi, Bida, Ilorin, Argungu, and Borno. Similarly, non-Muslim communities in Yola, Muri, Bassa, Kabba, Ilorin, and Niger had asked for government schools.¹⁸² This is, of course, the official line. What actually happened was quite different as Prof H. Heussler reveals:

resistance to European education was so strong at first that emirs sent the son of slaves to school pretending that these were their own offspring, and the original school for the sons of chiefs in Kano had to be closed. It was replaced by elementary schools in major towns, these being filled by a process of dragooning, with each district head being required to produce so many boys. Katsina College, started on Gowers's initiative, was still being stoutly resisted by some chiefs in the 1930s.¹⁸³

As one might expect, the standards of the teachers left much to be desired. Consequently,

all the mallams [teachers] went to Kano during the holidays for either refresher courses or further tuition, and during the term they received instruction after school hours from the local Superintendents. Some of them kept only just ahead of their pupils, and on an average, the mallams showed more aptitude for reading, arithmetic and hygiene than for writing, drawing, geography and general knowledge.¹⁸⁴

181 *ibid.*, 148–149

182 *ibid.*, 148

183 Heussler, 120; although it was at the initiative of Gower, it is not clear to me whether it was also as a result of prompting by Governor Hugh Clifford in Lagos.

184 *ibid.*, 151

The pattern of segregated school system along class and religious lines were established for the children of potentates and the influential went to the higher levels where they translated into provincial schools, rural schools and technical schools.¹⁸⁵ At the secondary school level, initially, one school was established in Katsina for the children of the chiefs, one in Bauchi for the children of Koranic teachers, one in Toro, on the plateau, for the animist children and one in Omu, in Ilorin Province for Christians.¹⁸⁶ After World War II, it became less defensible to deny access to the school system reserved for the chiefs. There was nonetheless a provision that children of the non-ruling class might be admitted, as long as they did not insist on competing for jobs that are traditionally reserved for children of the powerful.¹⁸⁷

Meanwhile, the missions made do with what they were able to wring from the education policy, albeit with increasing restrictions as the years unfolded.¹⁸⁸ By 1917, the number of schools established and run by the missions had increased from 42 in 1914 to 122.¹⁸⁹

Frederick Lugard returned from Hong Kong to Nigeria not as Governor of the Northern Protectorate but as Governor-General of Nigeria by 1914. His control of the Northern Provinces as it was then called was less direct. In particular, he could not reverse the contribution of the missions to the educational emancipation of the people. At best, he could retard the rate of the number of schools springing up. His former loyalist Residents had all been promoted to higher grades and with greater clout for more. Given his distrust of mission liberal education because of its emancipatory potential, he recommended the Tuskegee Institute educational model for the missions to pursue.¹⁹⁰

What was Tuskegee Institute? Tuskegee Negro Normal Institute was an institution established in 1888 to cater for the educational advancement of African-Americans. While it taught academic

185 Lugard, *Report on the Amalgamation*, 153–155

186 Takaya and Tyoden, 35

187 *ibid.*, 35

188 *ibid.*, Chapter VII

189 Lugard, *Report on the Amalgamation*, 157

190 Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 83

subjects, its emphasis was on practical education such as “farming, carpentry, brick making, shoemaking, printing and cabinetmaking.”¹⁹¹

While the need for technical education in Africa in early 20th century and since then cannot be overemphasised, leading African-American leaders of thought were the most critical of the model for African-Americans, and by implication for Africans. A major criticism was that it is “impossible to limit the aspirations and endeavours of an entire race within the confines of the industrial education program.”¹⁹²

Referring to comparable policies in African colonies generally, Ben Azikiwe concurs, “but the modern state – if the various colonies in Africa ever dream of their capability to develop into sovereign states – is a mosaic of all the professions and vocations.”¹⁹³ The second criticism, which is not less fundamental, is the racist way Tuskegee Institute was funded, to become a sustainable institution. Precisely, white racist businessmen from the American South, such as Andrew Carnegie, Seth Low and Collis Huntington, who had previously opposed African-American’s educational advancement, supported the Institute on condition that its graduates would accept African-American inferior economic and social status. In other words, graduates of Tuskegee Institute were not to compete with the whites.¹⁹⁴ This racist undertone, which was diametrically opposed to the missionary calling in the non-Muslim districts of the Protectorate, is what the missions could smell a mile away – and they rejected it.

After all is said and done, firstly, a summary of the educational achievement of the government of Northern Nigeria by 1927, almost half way through the colonial period, provides a clear picture:

Of the roughly two thousand boys who were in (had been through?) government schools as of 1926, less than half had made it beyond Standard I. Only eighty-four, or about four

191 J. Simkin, “Tuskegee Institute,” in Spartacus Educational, <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAtuskegee.html> (accessed on 30 August 2013)

192 *ibid.*

193 Azikiwe, 149

194 *ibid.*

percent, had made it up to Standard V, while only twenty-six, or about 1.5 per cent, had reached Standard VI.¹⁹⁵

Secondly, “of those who reach the sixth in Government schools not one, I am told by officers of the Department, is a Hausa, but all are foreigners (i.e., Southerners).”¹⁹⁶ It is interesting to note that Lt. Governor Palmer, a Cambridge University trained lawyer, did not dispute Fraser’s figures, whereas his acquiescence raises the question: apart from (1) barring Christian boys from admission, (2) barring boys from traditionalist territories from admission, (3) barring the children of commoners from Hausaland, what academic qualification was used in the selection of entrants to Katsina College from 1921–1926 if by 1926, no Hausa had reached Standard VI in any government school in Northern Nigeria?

“of those who reach the sixth in Government schools not one, I am told by officers of the Department, is a Hausa, but all are foreigners (i.e., Southerners).”

Thirdly, Fraser knew of no system of elementary and primary education so expensive. For example,

In the Gold Coast Colony, each student in a government school cost the government 124 shillings per year. In Nigeria’s Southern Province, each cost seventy. In England itself, each student cost the government 250 shillings a year, while in Northern Nigeria, each student cost a staggering 726 shillings.¹⁹⁷

195 A. Barnes, “Some Fire behind the Smoke”: The Fraser Report and Its Aftermath in Colonial Northern Nigeria,” in *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines*, Vol.31, No. 2 (1997), 205, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/486179> (accessed on 28 October 2014). This is contained in a report by A. Fraser, Principal of Achimota College, Gold Coast, a respected authority, in colonial circles, on the subject of Africans’ education, who was commissioned by Governor Thomson in Lagos to study the education policy and performance of the government of Northern Nigeria.

196 *ibid.*, 205

197 *ibid.*, 205

In perspective, the cost of training 10 pupils in Southern Nigeria was not enough for the training of 1 pupil from the emirate stables in Northern Nigeria. In the light of this, if there is a noun to encapsulate the underlying dynamics of the situation in Northern Nigeria, its synonym has to be impunity.

Why was the colonial regime so opposed to the educational advancement of the people of the Protectorate? And why did the colonial regime practice apartheid education when it eventually allowed building of public schools? Neither can be separated from the racism which permeated the whole colonial administrative fabric. Since education is an equal opportunity provider, and whereas the region wanted to promote the erroneous superiority of Europeans to Africans, education had to be controlled strictly, thereby delaying its emancipatory impact. As in other issues, the Christian missionaries of liberation, as Jan Boer calls them, had to be frustrated if not effectively halted.

What are the implications of the spirited denial of western education to the people of Northern Nigeria, especially in the first half of colonial rule? Each analyst is likely to come up with a different list, depending on the objective of the particular analyst. However, one implication that cannot be successfully ignored is the precedent which the colonial record may have laid for Boko Haram's current rampaging in the region. Obviously, there are differences between the earlier 20th century phenomenon and the current 21st century orchestration, such as the identity of the actors, their specific motivations, as well as their instruments and methods. Nevertheless, the aims, objectives and effects of their respective exploits are strikingly similar.

Fig. 6

RESISTANCE TO WESTERN EDUCATION IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

DIFFERENCES		
actor	colonial government – constituted authority	Hoko Haram – illegitimate authority
source	foreign	internal with local collaborators and foreign facilitators such as al Qaeda, Taliban, and the Islamic Group

period	early 20 th century	early 21 st century
motivation	racial bigotry	religious extremism
instrument	law	violence
method	denial of <i>boko</i> to the people; opposition to Christian missions that were willing, ready, and historically tested to deliver	destruction of what is already on ground by bombing schools, churches, shops, mosques, bus stations, police stations, army barracks, prisons, markets, communities, etc;
SIMILARITIES		
propoganda	Boko is harmful	Boko is haram
action	spirited opposition to introduction of western education; in 1913, a school in Kataerigi was pulled down on the order of the Resident ¹⁹⁸	spirited opposition to continuation of western education
aim	cultivation of illiteracy-ignorance as a weapon of social control; deceleration of development in order to prolong exploitation	cultivation of illiteracy-ignorance as a weapon of social control; deceleration of development in order to prolong exploitation
latent or unstated objective	dehumanisation; self-fulfilled prophecy for a circular argument	dehumanisation
effect	the two actors produce the same effect: imbalance in the polity and instability in the body politik	

198 Graham, 125; Graham describes it blandly as a “CMS building” but the community confirms it as a CMS school. The impact of the demolition on the Kataerigi community and the community’s mature and creative response to the demolition of the school is instructive.

ASSESSMENT

More than two decades after Frederick Lugard's demise, his *Dual Mandate* was reprinted in 1968 with a fresh Introduction by Perham, his renowned biographer. Her conclusion may be summarised in two parts: (1) a review of criticism of Lugard and (2) justification of Indirect Rule. Given the fact that her reflection occurred more than two decades after Lugard's demise, it is worth examining carefully below.

CRITICISM FROM WITHIN

Margery Perham notes:

The tendency today, not only among African writers, but many American experts upon Africa, is to condemn British administration of this period, especially indirect rule, as a deliberate and subtle attempt to retain power by suppressing African progress and unity.¹⁹⁹

Condemnation of British rule in Northern Nigeria has never been the exclusive preserve of truculent Africans and loud Americans: voices from the British society were perhaps the loudest. These include participant-observers within the administration itself, independent observers, and progressive social forces, such as the Labour Research Department.²⁰⁰

“Condemnation of British rule in Northern Nigeria has never been the exclusive preserve of truculent Africans and loud Americans”

For example, first there was no unanimity of opinion in the Lugard's ruling council on how Northern Nigeria should be governed. Nothing was fated as how the territory was to be ruled; the wielders of power had the opportunity for the common good, if the

199 Perham, "Introduction," xlviii

200 Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 594 608ff

will was there. Writing in 1934, four years after he was shipped out of Northern Nigeria to Gambia, Palmer disclosed that,

Up to about the year 1910–1911, two distinct schools of thought existed in Northern Nigeria. There were those who wished to retain the old Hausa dynasties, and there were those who had faith that the ruling Fulani would make good and the Governor (Sir F. Lugard) held the balance. It was the concrete results of accumulated experience which ultimately justified the pro-Fulani school headed by the late Sir John Burdon, Mr. C. L. Temple and others, a fact to which I can bear the most impartial testimony, since I was myself responsible for several experiments in restoring Hausas, and was even described by the late Sir Percy Girouard in a personal letter as being the ‘chief opponent of Fulani Rule’ in 1909.²⁰¹

Secondly, in 1927, there was the joint protest by some British administrators in Borguland, against the colonial policy that the administrators were to administer. They warned of the long-term consequence both for the administration and the people.²⁰²

Thirdly, several references have been made to Crocker earlier in this chapter. He saw in Indirect Rule a pretext for oppression. He noted that by 1919,

The plight of the Pagans thus became more or less overlooked, and the twist given to the theory and practice of Indirect Rule by a dreary series of Lieutenant-Governors – a theological formula to be discussed only by the hierarchs, a Delphic mystery beyond the understanding of all but a handful of oracular seniors (some of them had acquired the monopolist mentality of the Medicine

201 R. Palmer, “Some Observations on Capt. R. S. Rattray’s Paper, ‘Present Tendencies of African Colonial Government’”, in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 33, No. 130 (Jan., 1934), 39, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/717110>, (accessed on 29 August 2013); Palmer was a Resident in Katsina, Kano, and Adamawa. He was the 8th successor of Frederick Lugard, 1925–1930. He was deployed to Gambia thereafter.

202 More under Borguland in Chapter Two

Man) – turned it into a pro-Fulani and pro-Moslem creed of a fervour and singleness unseen since dan Fodio's days.²⁰³

Writing towards the end of his first year of duty, 1931, Crocker observed that,

Indirect Rule will become a mischievous policy unless steps are taken within the next few years to build up a strong village administration. All that is good in native rule and economics and culture is from and in the villages. This bolstering up of chiefs (who now enjoy a security that was unknown before our coming) can be safe if a 'democracy' or some such equivalent to an effective restraining public opinion can be built up in the villages." A concentrated drive in this direction is (as I see it) the first need in native policy here to-day.²⁰⁴

After Crocker's resignation, he regretted that the idea of Indirect Rule had been

elaborated into an occult science ... Indirect Rule degenerated firstly into a systematic glorification of a number of able but unscrupulous careerists, secondly into the practice of preserving at all cost the status of and power of the families of the hereditary Emirs and chiefs, and thirdly into and undue preoccupation with Islam and the Emirates to the neglect of the Pagan peoples.²⁰⁵

As if he was bitter, Crocker lamented that "the elaborate façade of indirect rule ... is much ado about nothing – a cardboard and plaster packed up by the careerists."²⁰⁶

Fourthly, in 1968, Nicolson another colonial officer in Nigeria was emphatic that the main root system of Nigeria's problem is to be found in Lugardian years. Indeed, he was at pains to show that

Lugard's most crucial and characteristic decisions in the North worked against future amalgamation, and that his later

203 Crocker, 109

204 *ibid.*, 218

205 *ibid.*, 215

206 *ibid.*, 222

decisions as amalgamator were aimed at the destruction of his predecessor's [southern governor's] achievements in establishing a rational and modern system of administration. In the North, there was his choice of conquest rather than peaceful penetration, followed by the decision to keep the institution of Fulani rule, while replacing each ruler by a creature of his own; there was the decision to impose direct taxation; the decision to keep out of the North the influence of missionaries, lawyers, traders, and civil administrators from other territories; the decision not to establish a capital in a commercial centre; there was a whole series of decisions to avoid contact and co-operation with the South, and to concentrate all power in one pair of hands.²⁰⁷

Lugard summarises his excuses for placing a wedge between the north and the south as follows:

It would be manifestly unjust to place the Mohammedan Emirates of the North and the mining interests of the Bauchi Plateau under a council sitting on the coast, to which they could have no representation. The only alternative is that the Legislative Council of the Colony shall in the future limit its sphere to the guidance and control of the Legislature of the Colony.²⁰⁸

It is ironical that he deemed it unjust merging the administration of the Northern Protectorate and the Southern Protectorate on the ground that the North will not be represented in the Lagos legislature. While orchestrating the potential speck in the amalgamation, he refused to address the log in his own eyes whereby the same Bauchi Plateau (a euphemism for the traditionalist peoples of the Middle Belt)²⁰⁹ was placed under Northern House of Chiefs in Sokoto with an all-Muslim representation. Furthermore, there was

207 Nicolson, 304; cf. Okonjo, 52

208 "Administration and Progress in Nigeria," in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 13, No. 51 (Apr., 1914), 307, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/715304> (accessed on 15 May 2013); see 308–309 for a verbatim copy of the proclamation of the amalgamation on 3 January 1914

209 M. Adamu, *The Hausa Factor in West African History*, (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello Press, 1978) Chapter Two

no obstacle in Lugard's way from expanding the Lagos Legislature to cater for all the stakeholders of the new nation.

Fifthly, more recently, Harold Smith, an Oxford University trained participant-observer colonial officer in the last decade of colonial rule, bore out his mind on BEN Television, on 21 August 2007, saying that he needed to clear his conscience before he died. He averred as follows,

Our agenda was to completely exploit Africa. Nigeria was my duty post. When we assessed Nigeria, this was what we found in the southern region; strength, intelligence, determination to succeed, well established history, complex but focused life style, great hope and aspirations ... the East is good in business and technology, the west is good in administration and commerce, law and medicine, but it was a pity we planned our agenda to give power 'at all cost' to the northerner. They seemed to be submissive and silly of a kind. Our mission was accomplished by destroying the opposition at all fronts. The West led in the fight for the independence, and was punished for asking for freedom."²¹⁰

After bemoaning atrocities, such as the accelerated promotions of northerners both in the military and the civil service, to justify their false superiority over the south, and so as to make everything work against the south,²¹¹ the colonial machine used every rule in the book to weaken genuine opposition. Smith lamented, "the British really let Nigeria down. When I see Nigerian[s] being accused of

210 T. Egbe, "Mr. Harold Smith CONFESSION: THE DESTRUCTION OF NIGERIA!!" in <https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/NigerianWorldForum/conversations/topics/81651>, 5 January 2011, (16 April 2016); <http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/nvnews/84487/1/nigerias-seven-secrets-and-the-inevitability-of-a-.html> (16 April 2016); O. Olagbaiye, "Legendary Harold Smith Speaks about Nigeria 'hidden Agenda – An Excerpt" in <http://community.vanguardngr.com/profiles/blogs/legendary-harold-smith-speaks> 28 February 2011 (16 April 2014); efforts to secure a transcript of Jide Iyaniwura's interview with Smith from BEN Television, 25 Ashley Road, 2B – 2C Berol Court, Tottenham Hale, London, N17 9LJ, Tel: +44 208 808 8800, info@bentelevision.com, has proved abortive.

211 Although the claim cannot be denied outright, the extent of it is open to question.

fraud and from what I saw on the streets of Lagos; the British were worst fraudsters.”²¹²

Sadly, Smith got his figures wrong on population census and the date of his arrival in Nigeria; and his critics seized upon that slip of tongue to almost skin him alive.²¹³ It is significant that Smith’s critics do not challenge him on the core submission – British abiding sabotage of genuine Nigerian national unity and development.

It is perhaps more intriguing to note that none of his critics commented on a corroborating confession, by no less a figure than Premier Ahmadu Bello of Northern Region – interestingly in his autobiography in 1962. Introducing the formation of the main political party in the Northern Region of the day, the Northern People’s Congress, Premier Bello disclosed:

You will see that we were never militant ‘nationalists’ as some were [such as southern intellectuals, politicians, trade unions, newspapers, students, entrepreneurs, and progressives]. We were sure that in God’s good time we would get the power. The British had promised this frequently and we were content to rest on these promises.²¹⁴

There is the argument that sabotage of unity of colonised people is the goal of colonial rule, as if to justify what may be termed the colonial *status quo*. This reasoning is a good example of circular argument, for lack of a better term: that is what colonial administrations do; therefore, one should not expect any better.

The fact, however, is that there is no colonial rule which is identical with any other. In other words, no colonial rule is fated. No colonial rule has to take a particular line of action or a particular set

“When I see Nigerian[s] being accused of fraud and from what I saw on the streets of Lagos; the British were worst fraudsters.”

212 *ibid.*, Egbe

213 Brimah, ” Debunked: The Harold Smith Nigeria Census Lies,” <http://saharareporters.com/interview/debunked-harold-smith-nigeria-census-lies> (16 April 2014)

214 Bello, 86

of policies. A good example is the difference between colonial rule in Southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria. Each charted separate directions. Lugard and his successors were not fated to take a particular set of policies.

That is why William MacGregor of Lagos Colony and Yoruba Protectorate, a medical doctor, malaria research funder, mathematician, Greek New Testament daily reader, teetotaler, and non-smoker from Scotland, could beat his chest at the end of his tenure, "I have not shed a drop of blood in Africa".²¹⁵

There were alternatives, as envisioned by the Seaborne Committee, and as other dynamics dictated. This is why criticisms from British sources including participant observers of colonial rule, missionaries, the Labour Party Research Department, etc., are so important.

Nothing perhaps illustrates the diversity of colonial administration more than the study Governor Thompson commissioned in 1927 to study the educational programme of Northern Nigeria. For a better result, he picked a colonial officer from a colony outside Nigeria. In his report, Fraser levelled five charges against the educational programme of Northern Nigeria, charges that were not successfully debunked by Richmond Palmer, the Lt. Governor in Kaduna. As summarised by Barnes,

- The education system was seeking to spread Islam, [an educational system] which Fraser associated with a backward intellectual obscurantism;
- the education officers in the North were ill-trained incompetents;
- the education system in the North was inefficient and expensive;
- the education department in the North was actively inhibiting the spread of mission schools;
- the inhibition of the spread of mission schools was having a pernicious impact on the development of the non-Muslim (pagan) population of the region.

215 See Nicolson, 155

It is clear from the foregoing that the British colonial authorities had promised repeatedly to hand power to the northern group – even before politicians from the emirate stables formed a political party to contest the national elections of the 1950s in preparation for national independence. This was sequel to the gerrymandering and the allocation of federal constituencies disproportionately to ensure the victory of the Northern People's Congress in the pre-independence elections. Clearly the credit for the introduction of parliamentary government in Nigeria, which the British take proudly, is self-devaluing.

CLOSING CORROBORATION

Apart from the criticism from within the colonial regime itself, it is pertinent to recall other criticisms of the manner of occupation including specifically Barrister Geary's damning question.

For the avoidance of doubt, the government in London shares in the culpability for the policy of denial of Western education in Northern Nigeria, for the following reasons. (1) The colonial government acted on behalf of the government in London, therefore there is no way the government in London can wash its hands of the policy of denial of Western education to the people. (2) The denial of Western education and the cultivation of illiteracy and ignorance was not a flash in the pan. It was enforced rigorously for years. (3) Both the executive arm of government through the Colonial Office, and the two Houses of Parliament were well aware of what was going on. In fact, the government in London was over-informed since there were two separate reports to the two Houses of Parliament – No. 346 and No. 377 – on the period covering 1st January 1901 to 31st March 1901. (4) The fact that the policy of denial went on for years may be interpreted as indifference on the part of the government in London, given the fact that it could 'hire and fire' at short notice, as the following examples illustrate.

First, when in 1904, "Lugard proposed to the Colonial Office that he be allowed to import Indian clerks and artisans together with their families from India and Ceylon ... a shocked Colonial Office

peremptorily squashed”²¹⁶ the nonsense. Secondly, it is perhaps important to state that Lugard did not leave Northern Nigeria by choice; rather, he was recalled from following the Satiru savagery of 10 March 1906 and Hadeija massacre two months later.²¹⁷ Coupled with simmering sectarian agitations in Bauchi, Gombe and Adamawa and the prospect of extermination²¹⁸ were Lugard to be retained, he was hastily deployed to Hong Kong. It was obvious to the authorities in London that British pride could not co-exist comfortably with the chaos that was likely to break loose vis-à-vis the nascent regime. Indeed, the government in London had the wherewithal to act, but it was indifferent to the policy of denial of Western education and of standing in the way of Christian missions from contributing their quotas. In brief, the extent of its culpability is, however, proportional to the extent of its indifference.

And it was just as well that Lugard was moved out of the way from Northern Nigeria by 1906, even if for no reason other than his opposition to the extension of the Lagos railway to Kano.²¹⁹ Indeed, so strong was his determination to have a minimum of dealings with the Southern Protectorate that he contemplated importation of “a whole ship-load”²²⁰ of donkeys from Argentina to solve the transport problem of his Protectorate; but the idea was not sellable.

216 Okonjo, 29–30, 344; there was available manpower in Southern Nigeria to fill the vacancies in Northern Nigeria, but Lugard preferred to squander money to import Indians because of his aversion for the people of the South, even though the surplus of the southern budget helped to run his squandermania. In this particular instance, the Colonial Office requested the Southern Governor to help Lugard with his recruitment need in order to prevent colossal wastage of limited resources.

217 Adeleye, “The Mahdist Triumph ...,” *supra*; Colonial Reports – “Annual No. 516 Northern Nigeria Report for 1905–1906,” in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Colonial+Annual+Report%2C+1905-1906%2C+Northern+Nigeria>, *supra*, (accessed 24 August 2015)

218 The word, genocide, was not in use earlier than 1944; see Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 12th Edition, but the practice is not new.

219 For his myopic arguments, see Colonial Reports – “Annual No. 409 Northern Nigeria Report for 1902,” 58–59

220 *ibid.*, 57

“he contemplated importation of “a whole ship-load” of donkeys from Argentina to solve the transport problem of his Protectorate;”

According to him in his 1902 Annual Report,

The Lagos railway, moreover, would be in competition with the Nigeria steamer transport on the Niger, and this would compel it to so reduce its carrying freights southwards ... In my view, a light line from the Niger to Zaria could deal adequately with the existing traffic ...

ONUS FOR PUBLIC APOLOGY

Margery Perham justifies British record in Nigeria on the ground that colonising nations “enjoy power and tend to cling to it,”²²¹ suggesting that in as much as Britain is not an exception, it is not responsible for any particular blame. To all intents and purposes, however, it is what for want of a better term is herein called the classical argument. It is the sleight of hand that converts a historical fact to a moral or ethical necessity.

As argued earlier on, there is no colonial rule that is fated: each charted its separate direction and adopted particular sets of policies. The huge difference between colonial rule in Southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria illustrates this crucial point.

Therefore, rather than justify hideous historical injustices, sectors in British differentiated society have moved beyond this classical argument by adopting public apology as a means of moving beyond an intractable legacy. Public apology has worked in the case of the slave trade and apartheid. In conclusion, the effects of colonial rule in Northern Nigeria, especially of ploughing the field for socio-political and economic violence, await public apology.

221 Perham, “Introduction,” xlviii

SOWING COLONIAL SEEDS OF INEQUALITY, INTOLERANCE AND DIVISION

Chapter One brings to the fore some of the policies and programmes of inequality by which the colonial authorities ploughed the ground from 1900–1960, for violence in post-colonial Northern Nigeria. The present chapter continues the trend, with a special focus on how the colonial authorities sowed the seeds of inequality and intolerance in the religion sector of northern society.

The first section of this chapter is (1) a reconstruction of the religious map of pre-colonial Northern Nigeria, (2) a reconstruction of the distribution of non-Muslims in the colony in the earliest years of colonial rule based on the annual reports of the colonial government to the government in London, and (3) and a digression to one of the traditionalist polities to sense the compulsion to which they were sentenced then and even currently in the 21st century.

Secondly, considerable space is allotted to the biological, historical, philosophical, racial and structural assumptions, on which the colonial policy of partiality in favour of Islam is based. They are examined and faulted.

Thirdly, the focus shifts to Dr. Edward Blyden who was an influential African writer at the turn of the 19th century. Lugard relied on Blyden's view on Islam as a pretext for the formulation of colonial policy on religion. Blyden's views are examined especially of how he built a case and eroded it thereby exposing the fault line in colonial religious policy.

Fourthly, Dr. Chinedu Ubah's *defensor fidei* argument, which justifies the exclusion of Christian missionaries from certain areas

in Northern Nigeria, thereby aiding and abetting intolerance and hatred of Christian presence and enterprise, is highlighted for an ex-rayed for its strength or otherwise.

The fifth task in this chapter is to exhibit the seeds of Muslim-Traditionalist tension sown in small traditionalist communities such as Karekare and major traditionalist communities such as Borgu. This display is important because the remote cause of Muslim-Traditionalist tension is routinely glossed over in the scheme of things.

Sixthly, considerable space is allotted to the evidence of the seeds of Muslim-Christian violence for post-colonial fruitage. They consist of (1) six edicts, (2) persecution of indigenous Christians and (3) an unjustifiable attempt at placing additional visa restrictions on Christian missionaries in Northern Nigeria.

Lastly, an attempt is made at unravelling the recurring decimal in the cat and mouse unease which existed between British colonial officers and Christian missionaries throughout the 60-year colonial rule.

RELIGIOUS MAP OF PRE-COLONIAL NORTHERN NIGERIA

Colonial rule was established in Northern Nigeria based on certain beliefs: (1) that the Fulani jihad rulers had considerable capacity for organisation in the area of administration; (2) that Islam was social cement for political unity, and (3) that these two apparent assets were worthy of harnessing for colonial administration. Evidence is adduced to show that these beliefs were based on guesswork¹ on the part of the colonial authorities, and that what they considered to be an asset was the extreme oppression that had prowled in Northern Nigeria for 100 years, and that the campaign of considerable capacity and Islam as social cement is part of the red herring pursuit for making the jihad apparatus a junior partner in colonial rule. One way to do this is to go over the pre-1900 map of Northern Nigeria below, to see the religious demographics in the region during the Sokoto Caliphate era.


There are several bogus maps of the Sokoto Caliphate. The one that is closest to reality except Jibrilla Gaini's territory that is not included

1 Heussler, 13, 19, 25

and therefore adopted below appears in three colours. First, the pink colour represents the areas where the caliphate exercised authority. It should be noted, however, that not everybody in the pink area was a Muslim. Rather, it represents the area where the rulers were Muslims. Dan Fodio's formula that any territory where a Muslim is a ruler is a Muslim country, regardless of the composition of the population has functioned as an effective propaganda.² Secondly, the surrounding grey colour are the traditionalist areas which the caliphate could not overpower, such as Borgu and the territories coinciding with the old Kwararafa confederacy. In this category are traditionalist polities that were overpowered temporarily, such as Kebbi, but which regained their independence for as long as half a century before the advent of British colonial rule. The green area is the old Borno Kingdom which regained its independence in the last decade before colonial rule.

In his autobiography released in 1962, four years before his assassination, Premier Ahmadu Bello, the Sarka of Sokoto, summarised a succinct history of imposition, despotism, and resistance that characterised much of what later became Northern Nigeria.

Fig. 7
PRE-1900 SOKOTO CALIPHATE



² Dan Fodio's formula has no basis in fairness; rather, it is rooted in aggression and undue advantage.

According to him,

The main difficulties of the Eastern Empire were revolts by the suppressed peoples of Gobir and Zamfara who had been brought under Sokoto, but other revolts broke out at intervals all over the Empire. All these took much time and energy and patience to suppress and in spite of all efforts were constantly breaking out again and again. Much trouble came from the old Hausa rulers who had taken refuge in Damagaram which is now part of the Republic of the Niger.³

As broached in Chapter One, by Eastern Empire is meant that part of the Sokoto Caliphate, with capital in Gwandu, which fell to the British. Much of the Western Empire fell to the French although the capital of the Western Empire, Sokoto, fell to the British. Premier Bello speaks of (1) revolts by the suppressed peoples of Gobir and Zamfara, (2) other revolts which “broke out at intervals” all over the empire. And as if to stress how severe this phenomenon was, he speaks of (3) revolts “constantly breaking out again and again.” In particular, much trouble came from the old Hausa rulers.

The Sardauna could not have been more accurate! Indeed, there was no time when the people of Northern Nigeria acquiesced to jihad or Islam the way that the colonial revisionists wanted the whole world to believe. Furthermore, it is important to clarify from the onset that although each revolt had a political, economic, social and cultural dimension to it, it fundamentally was a revolt against religious imposition. Below are pieces of evidence for the turmoil in the religion sector, and not the order that the colonialists argue was on ground for them to build on and extend to traditionalist polities.

GOBIR

It is important to state that Gobir was the plural polity against which the jihad led by dan Fodio was launched on 21 February 1804, after the king of Gobir announced that (1) no one should be forced to become a Muslim; (2) no man should be made to wear a

3 Bello, 16

turban; and (3) no woman should be made to cover her head with a cloth.⁴ It is noteworthy that what King Nafata of plural Gobir did in 1803 was more or less a model for Mustafa Ataturk of the Muslim-majority Turkey on 3 March 1924, when he secularised the state and de-Islamised the Turkish society with “equality of the sexes; prohibition of the use of the Islamic veil in public places; prohibition of the fez and the turban; ban on beards for public officials; adoption of the Latin alphabet in place of Arabic; the Gregorian calendar year instead of the Hegira; of Sunday as a public holiday; of the metric system, etc.”⁵ In comparison, Nafata did not go as far as Ataturk. In contrast, Nafata got a jihad from dan Fodio while the Turks justified and still tenaciously defend the values that Ataturk espoused.

Gobir did suffer a defeat in the hands of dan Fodio’s army but Gobir did not accept imposition of Islam as successive Gobir kings died in battle fighting against imposition of Islamic rule over the pluralist people. Pieces of evidence of struggle against imposition of Islam include Henry Barth’s reference to the on-going struggle between the “independent” Gobir and the Fulani during his exploratory tour of the northern territories in the mid-19th century.⁶ Others include the evidence by Charles Temple, a foundation Resident of Sokoto.⁷ In fact, the location and design of Sokoto city in 1808 was with a view to anticipated attacks from the direction of Gobir as the Sardauna informs:

It was in 1808 that Bello, not yet the ruler but his father’s lieutenant, decided to build a capital at Sokoto on neutral ground.

4 M. Waldman, “The Fulani Jihad: A Reassessment,” in *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1965), 346, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/180172> (accessed on 14 July 2011)

5 See S. Samir, “The Desperate Dream of the Islamic Caliphate: Most Muslims Look upon the Proclamation of a Caliphate as Preposterous,” in http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/the_desperate_dream_of_the_islamic_caliphate (accessed 22 July 2014). It is doubtful whether Ataturk had any knowledge of Nafata; nevertheless, it is clear by their actions that they shared the same values.

6 H. Barth, “A General Historical Description of the State of the Human Society in Northern Central Africa” in *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London*, Vol. 30, 1860, 120

7 C. Temple, *Northern Nigerian Tribes and Emirates* 2nd Edition (London: Frank Cass, 1965), 550

The site is a good one. The town is built on a low ridge which ends in an abrupt bluff above the Sokoto River. Though still wide here, the channel is confined between low hills and is thus narrowed, the swampy edges are not as extensive as elsewhere and it is obviously a good site for a ford. On the other hand, the steep slopes give a strong defensive position from the north and it was from the north that the young kingdom had most reason to expect attack.⁸

The failure of jihad in Gobir is further attested to by the fact that the Sokoto powers-that-be did not succeed in establishing an emirate on Gobir soil,⁹ even though there were emirates in places as far away as Adamawa. Sutton identifies the terrain as a factor that has been speculated for Sokoto's failure to found an emirate on Gobir soil.¹⁰ While terrain might have been a factor, Gobir's quest for self-determination seems to have been the critical factor. It should not be forgotten that Gobir defended its independence against imposition of Islam by Borno since the 13th century AD¹¹ and against imposition from Sokoto throughout the 19th century as attested to by Temple. Furthermore, Major L. Burdon, a founding Resident of Sokoto Province was surprised that "Gobir, against which the jihad originated, has never been conquered at all."¹²

On the lighter side, since Bourdon, a native speaker of English language could combine "never" and "at all" to make his point, speakers of English as a second language, such as this author, may be pardoned for suggesting that Bourdon's statement is a double emphasis that the Gobir did not bow to Islam from Sokoto before

8 Bello, 12

9 J. Sutton, "Towards a Less Orthodox History of Hausaland," in *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1979), 193, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/181513> (accessed: 29 August 2011)

10 *ibid.*, 193–194

11 See C. Meek, *A Sudanese People: An Ethnographic Study of the Jukun-speaking Peoples of Nigeria*, (New York: Negro Universities Press), 1969, 73

12 Bourdon, 644 ; if it is confusing that both Temple and Burdon are introduced as founding Residents of Sokoto, it is because the rate of transfer of Residents in the early years of colonial rule was such that both of them and indeed others qualified to be so introduced.

the British intervention of 1903. Therefore, the cartographers are right to keep Gobir out of the Sokoto Caliphate map.

BORGU

Sokoto Caliphate did not score victory over Borguland, much as they tried. “For years did the fulas of Sokotu and Gandu attempt to conquer the country desisting, however, in the firm belief that the blessing of their prophet was not with them in fighting against this strange people.”¹³ That was in 1820. The jihadists made two attempts but failed both times. As stated in Chapter One, so frustrated was he that Sultan Bello described Borgu people as “devils and of stubborn nature.”¹⁴

They were known for defensive warfare and so their neighbours, Kebbi, Hausa, Nupe, Yoruba etc., were careful not to invade Borgu. They assisted Oyo against the jihadists in 1830 and lost when they stepped out of their terrain which they could defend almost with eyes closed – but they did not lose to the jihadists on their home soil. So the cartographers are also right to have left Borguland out of the caliphate map.

ZAMFARA

Premier Bello lists Zamfara as one of the sources of Sokoto Caliphate troubles. Indeed, Zamfara’s case could not have been anything but intriguing, because although Kano is generally acknowledged to have been in contact with Islam since the 14th century, studies show that even by the end of the 18th century to the beginning of the 19th century when the jihad began, “in Zamfara,

“So frustrated was he that Sultan Bello described Gobir people as “devils and of stubborn nature”. ”

13 Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*, 144

14 cited in J. Adekunle, *Politics and Society in Nigeria's Middle Belt: Borgu and the Emergence of a Political Economy* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2004), 63

the majority of the people to whom Usuman [dan Fodio] preached ‘... had not smelt the scent of Islam’.¹⁵ While Waldman stresses the ignorance of the majority of the people of Zamfara, Mahdi Adamu stresses the point in his authoritative *The Hausa Factor in West African History* that “Zamfara had the highest concentration of non-Muslims.”¹⁶

“Zamfara had the highest concentration of non-Muslims.”

It should be emphasised that Zamfara’s resistance to Islam is not just a phenomenon of bygone centuries. Perhaps nobody sensed the palpability of resentment to Sokoto’s domination in Zamfara than Ahmadu Bello as a young civil servant in Gusau. Precisely, the accusation of embezzlement levelled against him, a Sokoto prince, that led to his conviction might have passed lightly, were it not for the fact that he was a Sokoto prince and a Sokoto title holder. Finally, it can be safely stated that it is this age-old resistance and embarrassment to the epicentre of Sokoto Caliphate, given Zamfara’s proximity to Sokoto, that sharia champions sought the earliest opportunity to impose sharia on Zamfara at the onset of the Fourth Republic. The general impression created by the actors is that the people of Zamfara were desperately sharia-hungry. However, the truth of the matter is that sharia was imposed on a recalcitrant people.

Another point made by Bello is that “much trouble came from the old Hausa rulers who had taken refuge in Damagaram which is now part of the Republic of the Niger”.¹⁷ Adamu elaborates as follows:

Between 1804 and 1810 all the Hausa states were overrun by the forces of the Sokoto Jihad led mainly by the Fulani people. Only three managed to survive, and did so with major bruises: Kebbi, Katsina, Daura, and [Zaria] lost their capitals and more than half of their pre-1804 territories, but because their ruling houses remained intact, and the capitals transferred (Kebbi to Argungu, Katsina to Maradi, and Zazzau to Abuja [present day

15 Waldman, 344

16 Adamu, 9

17 Bello, 16

Suleja] they continued to menace the successor kingdoms (styled *amirates* or *emirates*) throughout the nineteenth century.¹⁸

KEBBI

Kebbi's case is least understood, it seems. It is therefore imperative to state the fact that the rice-growing and fishing community of Argungu, sixty miles south-west of Sokoto, was not a part and parcel of the Sokoto Empire for 82% out of the history of the caliphate. This came about because when Birni Kebbi, the Kebbi capital, fell to the jihadists in 1805 and Gwandu village was converted to a jihadist headquarter in 1806, Kebbi's resistance moved to Argungu and continued until when an ambush claimed their leader in 1831. Argungu therefore paid tribute to the jihadists from 1831–1849 when Argungu marshalled enough force to throw off the Fulani from their back and extricated themselves from the caliphate right to the advent of British colonial rule.¹⁹ In other words, Kebbi had been an independent state for more than half a century by the time the British entered Sokoto in 1903. Indeed, to be doubly sure that nothing will tie Kebbi to Sokoto, it is noteworthy that Kebbi would have fallen to the French had it not been for a last minute move by the British to annex Argungu. This is why the Sardauna describes Argungu as “our neighbours and traditional enemies.”²⁰

18 Adamu, 14

19 S. Balogun, “The Place of Argungu in Gwandu History” in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* Vol. 7, No. 3 (December 1974), 407, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41857029> (accessed on 28 December 2013); P. Harris, The Fishermen (Sokoto Province, Nigeria) in *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great and Ireland*, Vol. 72, No. 1/2 (1942), supra, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2844454> (accessed on 28 December 2013); M. Smith, “Kebbi and Hausa Stratification,” in *The British Journal of Sociology* Vol. 12, No. 1 (Mar., 1961), 55, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/588016> (accessed on 28 December 2013)

20 see Bello, 52; Bourdon, 644

KANO, KATSINA AND ZARIA

Initially, Kano gave in to the Sokoto invasion, not for reason of weakness but being “desirous of peace for the sake of trade, settled down very quickly.”²¹ As for Katsina, the ruling house remained intact and transferred its capital to Maradi which is in present-day Niger Republic. Just as the ruling house in Katsina transferred to Maradi, so did the ruling house in Zaria moved to Abuja.²² From these two locations, trouble erupted for Sokoto from time to time throughout the 100 years that the jihad empire lasted. Burdon compares Katsina’s resistance to Sokoto with that of Troy of old.²³

With specific reference to Katsina and Zaria, it is important to note that these two Hausa cities did not resist British occupation; as it was their expectation that cooperation with the colonialist would at least deliver them from the clutches of the Sokoto jihad regime. Similarly, they were the Hausa communities that invited missionary presence early in the colonial era. Since there was no love lost between Zaria and Sokoto, Zaria broke ranks with Sokoto to request for missionary presence in 1900 and again in 1902. Zaria succeeded before Frederick Lugard rolled out his rigid policy of restricting Christian presence to the traditionalist areas.²⁴ Kontagora, Katsina and Kano followed in 1905 and 1906 respectively but H. Richmond Palmer, the Acting Resident of Katsina blocked the Katsina chance, and blocked it in Kano, as reported in Chapter One, when he was Acting Resident of Kano Province.²⁵ Kontagora’s application perished in a file in Zungeru.

21 Bourdon, 643

22 Abuja referred to herein should not be confused with Abuja, Nigeria’s current federal capital. Abuja whither the Emir of Zaria fled is currently Suleja in Niger State.

23 *ibid.*, 644

24 Lugard approved the Zaria application as a personal favour because of his respect for Dr. Miller who was to head the station.

25 Palmer was “the most adamant opponent on any missionary presence in the Muslim territories” of Northern Nigeria; A. Barnes, “Religious Insults”: Christian Critique of Islam and the Government in Colonial Northern Nigeria,” in *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 34, Fasc. ½ Feb. – May, 2004), 67, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1581481> (accessed on 22 March 2013)

ADAMAWA AND OTHERS

Apart from the constant attacks from Hausaland, there were serious uprisings from other parts of the Caliphate. First of all, there was the Hayatu Mahdist in Fombina, beginning in 1883, which the Caliphate could not curb until the advent of the British.²⁶ Secondly, Jibrilla Gaini

established an imamate at Bormi in the upper Gongola River, a territory which he carved out from the Emirate of Gombe. In 1888, he defeated the combined forces of Gombe, Bauchi, Katagun, Missau and Hadeija, making himself the dominant power in the Bauchi Gombe region.²⁷

Jibrilla Gaini was not defeated by British forces until 1902.

Thirdly, Talata Mafara, a stone throw as it were from Sokoto, with the assistance of Anka challenged the authority of the Sultan of Sokoto in 1892.²⁸ This particular challenge from within the metropolitan emirate of Sokoto was assisted notably by Zamfara.²⁹ Fourthly, the Sultan's orders were ignored during the Kano civil war and fifthly, his calls to neighbouring emirates to intervene were ignored.³⁰

It will be recalled that the jihad army stormed Bornu in 1808 but by the rise of Rabih, who sought to restore Borno to its former self beginning in 1893, Borno ceased to be an integral part of the Sokoto Caliphate after 1893.³¹ Therefore, once again the cartographers did the right thing by excluding Borno from the map.

26 K. Chafe, "Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination," in *Paideuma*, Bd. 40, The Sokoto Caliphate and the European Powers 1890–1907 (1994), 107, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4031678> (accessed on 14 November 2013)

27 *ibid.*, 107

28 *ibid.*, 107

29 *ibid.*, 107

30 *ibid.*, 107

31 Wikipedia, "Borno's Lord (1893–1900)" in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabih_az-Zubayr#Borno.27s_Lord_.281893.E2.80.931900.29 (accessed on 22 September 2014)

AT THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE

Lastly, at the advance of the British army in 1903, Sultan Mohammadu Attahiru I who ascended the throne on 13 October 1902, abdicated that throne and fled eastward. While some commentators attribute the migration to fear of a superior army, there was apparently a far more significant contributory factor to the flight. Precisely, it was the fatalistic belief in a prophecy attributed to dan Fodio in 1803, a year before he launched his jihad that his Empire was going to last for 100 years – no more – no less. As Premier Bello, the proud bearer of the jihad legacy put it,

Another matter which caught the imagination was that the incident which actually started the Shehu Usuman dan Fodio on the Fulani wars took place in 1803. A prophecy was made known [in 1803] that the Fulani Empire would last for one hundred years. No one then was greatly surprised when its end came on the grazing ground outside Sokoto almost exactly one hundred years later.³²

From a fatalistic perspective, Sultan Attahiru I who ascended the throne four months earlier, and his palace notables, were well aware that the end had come, and that a fight with the British was not only an exercise in futility, it was an unnecessary wastage of human and non-human resources.

“A prophecy was made known {in 1803} that the Fulani Empire would last for one hundred years.”

SUMMARY

The Muslim population did not outnumber the non-Muslim population in pre-colonial Northern Nigeria. The colonialists crafted an

32 Bello, 19; this is virtually verbatim from Lugard's rendering of the history; see Colonial Reports – Annual No. 409 Northern Nigeria Report for 1902, 19. Lugard submitted his report late, December 1903; therefore, he was able to comment on events of 1903 in the 1902 report.

image of a Muslim North in order to (1) find justification for salvaging something out of the 19th century oppression in Northern Nigeria to use as a junior partner in its task of social control and exploitation.

NON-MUSLIM POPULATION IN THE EARLY COLONIAL ERA

So far, the discourse on the religious map of pre-colonial Northern Nigeria is based on materials from several sources. It is interesting that the materials do not differ radically from what obtains in official sources.

1900–1901

For example, in his 1900–1901 Annual Report, Lugard spoke of (1) “the large pagan town of Limu (near Ghierko)”,³³ (2) the “sub-emirate of Nassarawa and Keffi and “the neighbouring pagan tribes,”³⁴ (3) “the greater part of the Protectorate with which we are in touch [and which] is occupied by pagan tribes”³⁵ and (4) “the belt of pagan tribes which occupy the country all along the Niger.”³⁶ In 1901, Lugard noted that (5) the “Gwari and Bassa tribes who inhabit this district [Wushishi] are at best pagan”³⁷ and that (6) the province of Nupe (Bida) had “turbulent pagan tribes.”³⁸

1902

In 1902 Lugard spoke of (7) Bauchi as an area that “is peopled by

33 Colonial Reports – Annual No. 346 Northern Nigeria Report for 1900–1901, 5

34 *ibid.*, 12

35 *ibid.*, 16

36 *ibid.*, 18

37 Colonial Reports – Annual No. 377 Northern Nigeria Report for 1901 in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=colonial+annual+reports%2C+northern+Nigeria%2C+1901,5>, (accessed on 16 September 2015)

38 *ibid.*, 7

wild pagan tribes,”³⁹ and that (8) Adamawa was “with the exception of the capital (Yola) and of a few minor settlements, the greater part of this Province is occupied by lawless pagan tribes.”⁴⁰ Concerning Hausaland, (9) it is intriguing to hear pro-Fulani and anti-Hausa Lugard concede as follows:

The Fulani never thoroughly conquered the country, and succeeded only in gaining the submission of the great towns in the plains where their horsemen were effective. The pagan tribes in the hills and broken country and even in large areas of the plains maintained their independence. They were constantly raided for slaves, and retaliated by attacking caravans and frequently carried the war up to the gates of the Fulani walled towns.⁴¹

(10) Muri – “There are a large number of lawless pagan tribes.”⁴²
(11) Bassa – “the province of Bassa is said to be full of rubber forests, and other valuable products, but it is inhabited by some half dozen or more extremely truculent pagan tribes.”⁴³ Given the fact that jihadists were not welcome in Kebbi, and that Fulani were being spotted in Argungu—Kebbi’s capital, in 1903 Lugard was enthused to report that, (12) “seeing that Argungu has been at war with the Fulani more or less for the last 100 years, such a thing as the advent of Sokoto people to Argungu was unheard of.”⁴⁴

1903

In 1903, Lugard documented (13) “the pagan tribes on the borders

39 Colonial Reports – Annual No. 409 Northern Nigeria Report for 1902 in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&respv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Colonial+Annual+Report%2C+1902%2C+Northern+Nigeria,6>, (accessed on 24 August 2015)

40 *ibid.*, 10

41 *ibid.*, 19

42 *ibid.*, 46

43 *ibid.*, 47

44 *ibid.*, 68

between Sokoto and Kano,”⁴⁵ and (14) “the pagans at Ibi”.⁴⁶ In 1904, (15) Lugard was more specific on some areas he had observed earlier. For example,

Muri comprises some eight nominally Moslem centres (in which, however, the system of taxation was never developed to the extent of the Hausa States) and a great number of pagan tribes, including the remnant of the formerly powerful Juk [un] Empire. The conditions of Zaria approximate to those of Kano, except that Zaria includes many very populous pagan tribes. Nassarawa, Bauchi, and Yola have Moslem centres, but like Muri include very many independent communities. Kontagora and Kabba are almost depopulated by the raids of former days. Bassa is wholly pagan, and for the most part is still unexplored; while Borgu (also pagan) owns but a small and poor population.⁴⁷

In Bornu, were (16) “the pagan centres of N’guru, Fika, and Bedde,”⁴⁸ while (17) “in the South and West are belts of country [which] were independent or practically independent pagans.”⁴⁹

1905

In 1905–1906, it became clear that (18) “Sokoto is divided into Sokoto proper and Zamfara, which latter is chiefly inhabited by Pagan Hausas or Habes.”⁵⁰ Having reviewed the history and impact of the jihad on Katsina, Lugard asserted that (19) “to this day

45 Colonial Reports – Annual No. 437 Northern Nigeria Report for 1903, in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espu=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Colonial+Annual+Report%2C+1902%2C+Northern+Nigeria,7>, (accessed on 24 August 2015)

46 *ibid.*, 18

47 Colonial Reports – Annual No. 476 Northern Nigeria Report for 1904 in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espu=2&ie=UTF-8#q=colonial+annual+reports%2C+northern+Nigeria%2C+1904-5>, 16 (accessed on 16 September 2015)

48 *ibid.*, 19

49 *ibid.*, 25

50 Colonial Reports – Annual No. 516 Northern Nigeria Report for 1905–1906, 10

[Katsina] remains more Habe than Fulani. The Emirate [Katsina] is composed largely of Pagans.”⁵¹

(20) Kano Province – “the population is Fulani and Hausa, partly Mohammedan and partly pagan.”⁵² At this point, it is perhaps important to bring up two observations on Kano. First, Rev Charles Robinson observed during his residency in Kano for some months for Hausa language proficiency in 1895⁵³ that only a third of Kano was Muslim.⁵⁴ Prof Ayandele noted this figure with skepticism, with Abdalla Adamu of Bayero University, Kano, quoting him approvingly.⁵⁵ Sadly, while their reaction succeeds in creating an impression, the impression is subject to demystification as follows: (a) the reaction has no syllogistic attribute or content; hence (b) their reaction, though impressionistic, does not constitute a firm-level objection to Robinson’s proposition. A valid rebuttal in the context in which they express their dislike for Robinson’s claim is an alternative figure. Since they fail to provide an alternative figure, other than the claim that Islam has a long history in Kano and the bland presumption that longevity necessarily translates into large followership, the impression they create has no syllogistic value. In other words, Robinson’s assertion that one-thirds of Kano was Muslim stands.

The second observation is that of Lugard on gaining entry to Kano in 1903. In his first annual report after gaining entry into Kano, in 1903, Lugard had to concede what other stakeholders who had wished for a peaceful occupation knew all along,

The Fulani rule, in fact, had never ... been fully accepted, even in the Kano Province, the very heart of Hausa-land, and the

51 *ibid.*, 25

52 *ibid.*, 26

53 F. Taylor, “Hausa and the Late Canon C. H. Robinson (1861–1925),” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 26, No. 102 (Jan., 1927), 145–146, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/17283> (14 May 2013)

54 E. Ayandele, “The Missionary Factor”, 508

55 A. Adamu, “Education and the Christian Missionary Activities in Kasar Kano,” in <http://kanoonline.com/jmqsl/index.php/component/content/article/38-education/77-education-and-the-christian-missionary-activities-in-kasar-kano> (accessed 29 February 2012)

Emir stated that the peasantry had always been truculent and rebellious, and that it had been necessary for the Emirs to tour round their country annually, with all their forces, to ensure the payment of taxes.

With reference to Zaria Province, (21) “the Pagan areas ... form so large a part of this province.”⁵⁶ (22) The combined “sphere of these two Emirates [Bauchi and Gombe] is peopled by a great diversity of Pagan tribes”⁵⁷ and that in Ilorin Province (23) “the spread of Islam over the Pagan tribes is progressing very rapidly”⁵⁸ suggesting that prior to British incursion, Ilorin Province was largely non-Muslim. The references go on.

With specific reference to Hausaland, the rapid conversion of Hausa people to Islam began with the colonial incursion to Hausaland in the early 20th century. And it occurred not exactly for the reasons that the colonial masters had hoped for. Rather, the Hausa viewed Islam as an alternative civilisation, albeit it is the one British rulers preferred – and it was good for lower taxes and outright tax evasion. Admittedly, Salamone’s figures for the rate of conversion seem to invite caution; nonetheless, his date on the origin of the rapid growth of Islam in Hausaland has a solid basis. He declares,

The rapid spread of Islam in Hausaland, from 5 percent of the population in 1900 to 80 percent in 1950, resulted from the British policy favouring Islam. After the British conquest, Islam was no longer viewed by the Hausa as the religion on the Fulani. Rather they viewed it as an alternative civilization, useful in opposition to western influence, and one honoured by British policy.⁵⁹

56 *ibid.*, 34

57 *ibid.*, 37

58 *ibid.*, 49; it is pertinent to highlight the report on the spread of Islam among traditionalist populations as if approvingly.

59 F. Salamone, “Early Expatriate Society in Northern Nigeria: Contributions to a Refinement of a Theory of Pluralism,” in *African Studies Review*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Sep., 1978), 44, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/563660> (accessed on 28 March 2013)

A DIGRESSION TO CHIBOK

This digression is to enable observers to sense the struggles that non-Muslim polities had with Islam in the past and currently. Specifically, this digression is to suggest that some relationships have changed only in form from the 19th century but not in substance. In the second decade of the 21st century, jihad has taken the form of militarised marauding Fulani herdsmen attacks on benevolent host communities. In the case of Chibok, it is an abduction of hundreds of female teenage high school students in their hostels at night in April 2014 for sale in slave markets, thereby sending shock waves round the globe.

But first, who are the Chibok? First of all, Acting Governor Wallace in his Annual Report of 1906–1907 described the Chibok as “a small tribe of savages”⁶⁰ but his other observations in the same report contradict this assertion on the identity of the people. For example, Wallace noted that “works of bygone writers show that they have defied Bornu armies for generations.”⁶¹ Nevertheless, this report on earlier observations is a half-truth. Precisely, the word “successfully” which rightly qualifies the word “defies” and which presents a better picture of what bygone writers were trying to portray of the Chibok people is missing from Wallace’ observation. In other words, (1) the Bornu Empire could not subdue Chibok for as long as the former lasted. (2) When Borno fell in 1808 to the rival and rising Sokoto Empire in 1808, the latter could not subdue Chibok until Bornu regained its independence in 1893. (3) Bornu Empire did not rein in Chibok after it re-established itself.

Secondly, Wallace spoke of (1) “their extraordinary network of impenetrable tunnels.”⁶² The same thing applies to their “natural water supply, deep down in the centre of the hill.”⁶³ Of particular

60 Colonial Reports – “Annual No. 551 Northern Nigeria for 1906–1907” in <https://www.google.com.ng/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&respv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Colonial+Reports%2C+Northern+Nigeria%2C+1906-7> (27 October 2015) 12; Hausa call the Chibok Chibik; the Hausa adulteration, Chibik, gained adoption for official reports.

61 *ibid.*, 37

62 *ibid.*, 37

63 *ibid.*, 37

interest is Wallace's observation that (3) "the hillsmen had unlimited food and sufficient water to last probably until the rains."⁶⁴ Governor Wallace made more interesting observations of their military strategies noting that under certain conditions, "no force could have removed them."⁶⁵

Certain deductions are justifiable from the foregoing observations of the Chibok. (1) The people of Chibok were efficient in food production, preservation and water conservation – they had unlimited food and sufficient natural water. In other words, the people of Chibok were neither beggarly nor fit the familiar narratives of hunger and similar images of Africa in mainstream Western media. (2) Given the fact that they were not subdued by Islamic empires and armies of diverse formations, based on their own resources, here are a people who cherished, practiced and defended the principle of self-determination, the bedrock, bellwether and pride of Western democracies. They are comparable to the Borgu and the Karekare mentioned elsewhere in this Chapter who did not engage in aggression. But predatory empires which thought they could make minced meat of Chibok learnt their lessons the hard way. (3) While people with these characteristics in the Western hemisphere are celebrated, a people with the same characteristics in Africa are labelled savages by the British colonial hierarchy, fit only for smashing with the Maxims, 2.95-inch guns and the storming party. (4) Given what Wallace knew of Chibok defence strategies, a brazen snatch of one female teenage student by jihadist marauders from the bosom of Chibok before 1900 – let alone 276 in 2014 could not have happened. It occurred after a century of their being integrated into the Commonwealth of Nigeria.

It needs to be highlighted that despite its centuries of resistance to Islam, Chibok converted to Christianity in less than two decades of contact with the latter, and eventually became a Christian-majority community. Therefore, the carting away of hundreds of teenage girls in April 2014 has the trappings of a calculated infliction of as much

64 *ibid.*, 37

65 *ibid.*, 37; Wallace was familiar with the Northeast of Nigeria having led the expedition against the Emir of Yola in 1901 and thereafter rampaged the region northwards as far as Bornu, just as Lugard was familiar with Borguland, beginning with his mercenary expedition to Niki in 1894.

pain as possible on the Chibok community for no reason other than the fact that Chibok rejected Islam decisively for centuries but embraced Christianity on contact. In particular, the Church of the Brethren Mission, a pacifist mission from North America found welcome among the Chibok with educational institutions and medical facilities. It therefore stands to reason to suggest that the attack on Chibok must have been on the drawing board for some time – but there was no jihadist formation to bell the cat until Boko Haram, with effrontery of fireball proportion, stepped in to carry out the attack in 2014.

Still on the religious question vis-à-vis the history of Chibok, a point should perhaps be made on the religious composition of what has since become known as the ‘Chibok girls.’ Precisely, the majority of the girls are from Christian homes. This piece of information is consciously left out of news reporting and analysis of the Chibok crisis by some agenda-setting media outlets, based on a false notion of journalistic objectivity, whereas the historic abduction and the journalistic burden have the effect of a double bind on the pains of the parents of those girls.

The same journalism philosophy focuses on the Middle East and obscures the fact that “there were more recorded killings of Christians due to their faith in northern Nigeria in 2015 than in the rest of the world put together: 4,028 out of a worldwide total of 7100 reported deaths.” Similarly, Nigeria had the second largest number, 198, of “churches [that were] attacked, damaged, bombed, looted, destroyed, burned down, closed or confiscated for faith-related reasons” in 2015.⁶⁶

“This piece of information is consciously left out of news reporting and analysis of the Chibok crisis by some agenda-setting media outlets, based on a false notion of journalistic objectivity, whereas the historic abduction and the journalistic burden have the effect of a double bind on the pains of the parents of those girls.”

66 (1) The Open Doors Report, 2016, Freedom of Religion and the Persecution of Christians, 22 January 2016, 6, <http://www.opendoorsuk.org>, (accessed on 23 January 2016); (2) *ibid.*, 8

“there were more recorded killings of Christians due to their faith in northern Nigeria in 2015 than in the rest of the world put together: 4,028 out of a worldwide total of 7100 reported deaths.” Similarly, Nigeria had the second largest number, 198, of “churches [that were] attacked, damaged, bombed, looted, destroyed, burned down, closed or confiscated for faith-related reasons” in 2015.”

Back to the point at issue, for a ‘tribe’ with geographical identification to (1) resist successfully an empire, (2) have extraordinary network of impenetrable tunnels, (3) and the natural water supply, deep down in the centre of the hill, (4) with unlimited food and sufficient water and (5) and a defensive strategy whereby no force could have removed them is a strong evidence of organisation. It is also an axiom that (6) organisation presupposes law and order. In other words, the so-called wild tribes were not vacuous societies; rather (7) they were polities that were ruled by law and order.

Admittedly, the operational law and order in the so-called “wild”, “turbulent”, “lawless” and “savage” communities was not identical with that of England. But the operational law and order in Scotland is not identical with that of England either. In fact, so different are the two systems that each had to be recognised in its own right and accommodated to function independently of the other in order to launch the United Kingdom (of England and Scotland) in 1707. It is for this reason that the celebrated English Common Law which was exported to and imposed on British colonies and dominions globally is still null and void in Scotland in the 21st century.

“Admittedly, the operational law and order in the so-called “wild”, “turbulent”, “lawless” and “savage” communities was not identical with that of England. But the operational law and order in Scotland is not identical with that of England either.”

In conclusion, the ‘lawless pagan’ contradiction is Lugard’s jaundiced assessment of the organisational capacity of traditionalist peoples. He had to go racist because (1) it is cheap to do so, at least it helps to (2) disguise his analytical deficiency, (3) to justify colonial

subjugation of those societies and (4) to find an excuse for placing traditionalist polities under Muslim prefects. In any case, those so-called wild, turbulent, and lawless polities rightly and successfully rejected political imposition of tyranny on a religious platform.

Secondly, as stated earlier on, each uprising against Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th century had a political, economic, social and religious dimension – expressed militarily. It is an example of the dialectic between the instinct of the oppressor to lord it over his fellows and the inalienable quest and struggle for freedom on the part of the oppressed. An admixture of forcible conversion, imposition and oppression on the part of the jihadists was trailed by rebellion on the part of the people so oppressed. One thing is clear from all this: the instability in the region throughout the 100-year jihadist rule in Northern Nigeria, points to the numerical strength of the non-Muslim peoples.

“One thing is clear from all this: the instability in the region throughout the 100-year jihadist rule in Northern Nigeria, points to the numerical strength of the non-Muslim peoples.”

Lastly, what could possibly have been the ratio of non-Muslims to Muslims in the region before 1900? This is obviously tenuous. However, it is assumed that the preponderance of non-Muslims in the middle and southern areas of the protectorate is incontestable. Furthermore, although exact figures are not available, Lugard's assessment at the end of his first tenure, 1906, provides a good conversation starter:

Though probably at least half the population even in the northern states is Pagan and the great majority of even those who call themselves Moslems are in no way imbued with either the tenets or the fanaticism of Islam.⁶⁷

67 Colonial Reports – Annual No. 516 Northern Nigeria Report for 1905–1906, 16; Lugard's “northern states” is the same as his “these northern states,” or “Northern Hausa states,” in the document under reference, 13, 16, 63 is referred to in this book as the Far North where there is a concentration of Hausa and Muslims.

“probably at least half the population even in the northern states is Pagan”

In plainer language, the number of non-Muslims in the Northern Protectorate was higher than the number of Muslims in the region before the advent of British colonial rule.

BASELESS SUPPORT FOR ISLAM

Lugard avers “it has sometimes been alleged that the Governments of the Sudan and Nigeria favour Mohamedanism. The attitude which British Governments have endeavoured to assume is that of strict neutrality, impartiality, and tolerance in all religious matters.”⁶⁸ He expatiates elsewhere as follows,

Both the Arabs in the east and the Fulanis in the west are Mohammedans, and by supporting their rule we unavoidably encourage the spread of Islam, which from the purely administrative point of view has the disadvantage of being subject to waves of fanaticism, bounded by no political frontiers. In Nigeria it has been the rule that their power should not be re-established over tribes which had made good their independence, or imposed upon those who had successfully resisted domination.⁶⁹

While Lugard’s sweeping claim might have been partially true in some parts of Sudan and Nigeria, it is a smokescreen for disguising what was really going on in Northern Nigeria: (1) the making of the *masu sarauta*; (2) the inequitable judiciary, and (3) the lopsided policy on education which favoured the Muslims. To debunk the foregoing sweeping claims to neutrality, additional evidence from the religion sector itself is provided to expose colonial government approach to the sector, and to further show the sowing of the seeds of intolerance and violence in the sector.

68 Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 594

69 *ibid.*, 210

Lugard goes to great lengths to philosophise on religions, in order to formulate his agenda-setting policy on religion: (1) the nature of the African is inferior to that of the European, (2) the ranking of Islam, Christianity, and the primal religions on a scale to justify colonial government support for Islam. These three pillars of Lugard's policy are crucial and are treated accordingly, in what follows.

Space is provided to expatiate on (3) the Blyden factor, which contributed to the tenacity in Lugard's belief in (1) and (2).

THE ALLEGED INFERIOR NATURE OF THE AFRICAN

Fig. 8

Ranking of Races		
Colonial Dogma		Refutation
Europeans	Europeans are superior to Africans	Colonial dogma was a direct transfer of Social Darwinism to governance.
	Acceptance to teach this dogma to host communities and converts was made a prerequisite for permission to Christian missions to open stations	Christian missionaries rightly resisted the compulsion to teach the erroneous doctrine of European superiority to their host communities and converts.
Africans		Adolf Hitler launched World War II based on an unequivocal belief in Social Darwinism in German interest.
		Social Darwinism was a victim of itself in World War II as the war ended in (1) a crushing defeat for Germany and (2) suicide for Hitler.
		Post-war efforts at resuscitating Social Darwinism have not been without stiff dissent from within the scientific and other communities.

Even in his retirement, Lugard still maintained the following view of the African:

In character and temperament the typical African of this race-type is a happy, thriftless, excitable person, lacking in self-control, discipline, and foresight, naturally courageous and naturally courteous and polite, full of personal vanity, with little sense of veracity, fond of music and 'loving weapons as orient loves jewelry'. His thoughts are concentrated on the events and feeling of the moment, and he suffers little from apprehension for the future or grief for the past. 'His mind', says Sir C. Eliot 'is far nearer to the animal world than that of the European or Asiatic, and exhibit something of the animal's placidity and want of desire to rise beyond the state he has reached', – in proof of which he cites the lack of decency in the disposal of the dead, the state of complete nudity common to one or other, or to both sexes among so many tribes, the general (though not universal) absence of any feelings for art (other than music), and the nomadic habits of so large a section of the race.

Through the ages the African has evolved no organized religious creed, and though some tribes appear to believe in a deity, the religious sense seldom rises above pantheistic animism, and seems more often to take the form of a vague dread of the supernatural.⁷⁰

Furthermore, as far as Lugard was concerned, the African "lacks [the] power of organization, and is conspicuously deficient in the management and control, alike of men or of business. He has the courage of the fighting animal – an instinct rather than a moral virtue"⁷¹ and "his lack of apprehension and inability to visualize the future."⁷² Interestingly, this view was expressed as recently as 1922.

ABUSE BY IGNORANT MIDDLE-AGES ARABS

As broached in Chapter One, much of what passes as a description

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, 69; see 570; 579; 581; 616 for other derogatory descriptions.

⁷¹ *ibid.*, 69

⁷² *ibid.*, 70

of the essence of the African was the echo of frustration of Arabs who failed to penetrate the forest regions of West and Central Africa. Ignorant of the people of the forest regions, the Arabs conjured up all kinds of negative images of the enigmatic African. Sadly, many Europeans, who came increasingly to Africa since the 15th century, willfully perpetuated this extant Arab fable in spite of better knowledge, which Europeans possessed.⁷³ This view survived until the 20th century, expressed severally in the writings of some colonial Residents.

“what passes as a description of the essence of the African was the expression of frustration of Arabs who failed to penetrate the forest regions of West and Central Africa”

UNCRITICAL ACCOMODATION TO PREVAILING SLURS

Lugard unwittingly exposes his credulity in the charges of “lacking in self-control, discipline, and foresight” and “with little sense of veracity.” They are charges based on “race-type.” These are common racist slurs in his generation. He used them to be seen to be current and relevant, thereby warming himself into the mainstream of the European society of the day.

SUBSCRIPTION TO SOCIAL DARWINISM

Lugard's view of the African, as earlier noted, is an echo of Social Darwinism, a social theory of human progress that finds analogy in Charles Darwin's biology of ‘the survival of the fittest’, which was dominant in major European universities in the 19th century, and which was used on the one hand to justify racism, imperialism, and unbridled capitalism and conversely to stigmatise compassion and social responsibility on the other hand. For example, Lugard's charge

73 cf. Nicolson, 166; G. Akinola, “The Arabs in Africa: Reflections on the Historiography of a Forgotten Imperialism,” in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* Vol. XII, No. 1 and 2, 1986–1987, 10, 12

that “the nomadic habits of so large a section of the race” and that of “through the ages the African has evolved no organized religious creed” are meant to suggest the stage at which Africans are on the ladder of development.

As broached in Chapter One, despite the prevailing influence of Social Darwinism in the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century, it suffered a major setback with the outbreak of World War I which many observers see as the root cause of German militarism and the rise of Nazism. It went into decline following the contradictory outbreak of the two world wars within the first 40 years of the 20th century⁷⁴ and especially following studies in anthropology, which highlight the role of culture in human development. Sociobiology, a synthesis of biology and culture, did rise to shore up support for whatever was left of Social Darwinism, but critics insist that sociobiology is a variant of Social Darwinism, thereby equally fallen into disrepute because it downplays the role of culture in human society while justifying poverty and warfare.⁷⁵

Since the idea of the typical African or tribe is a recurring thought in the writings of colonial officers,⁷⁶ it is perhaps better clarified that what Lugard employed so many paragraphs to describe is the essence of what he calls the typical African. On this point, it is safe to point out that there is no empirical evidence anywhere, past and present, to show that there is a difference between the fundamental building blocks of the personality of the typical African – whatever that means – from that of the typical European – whatever that implies.

JUXTAPOSITION WITH THOMAS BOWEN

Lugard’s credulity is further exposed by juxtaposing his view of the African with that of Thomas Bowen, an American who came to Nigeria as a Southern Baptist missionary in 1849. Bowen is a good

74 cf. C. Cleaver, “Traces of Social Darwinism in Contemporary America” in *The Christian Scholar*, Vol. 44, No. 4, (Winter, 1961), 341, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41177252> (accessed on 28 May 2013)

75 See Bannister, “Social Darwinism,”

76 Lugard, Temple, Crocker, etc, *supra*.

choice of comparison and contrast because both Lugard and Bowen had comparable military background in the British Army and the American Army respectively.

“there is no empirical evidence anywhere, past and present, to show that there is a difference between the fundamental building blocks of the personality of the typical African – whatever that means – from that of the typical European – whatever that implies”

Bowen was a Captain in the American Army just as Lugard was a Captain in the British Army. He was the son of a successful father “who was able to provide his son with the best education of the day.”⁷⁷ Having joined the army, he took part in action in Georgia and fought with decorations in the war in which Texas was snatched from Mexico. On leaving the army, he converted to faith in Jesus Christ, and later became a missionary with a passion to preach the gospel from Liberia to Abyssinia (Ethiopia).

Like many outsiders, past and present, who have never been to Africa, and who view Black Africa as some jungle of hungry people with short tails, living on tree tops, Bowen’s perception of Africa and Africans was not highly informed as exposed by his unrealistic ambition to preach the gospel from West Africa to East Africa in two years. But when he arrived in Badagry, he discovered that he could not advance beyond Abeokuta, because of the Ijaiye war, one of those wasteful Yoruba wars of the 19th century. He then proceeded to Abeokuta where all the western missionaries in what is present-day Nigeria, except the Presbyterians who followed Mary Slessor to Calabar region, were clustered. Bowen quickly recognized the opportunity in the delay to proceed on his ambitious missionary journey. He therefore settled down to live among the people, observed their ways, and began to gain understanding and correct many earlier impressions based on the Arab jackal syndrome, and in his own case, shaped by the slave trade and his observation of

77 Ayandele, “Introduction to the Second Edition,” x

African-Americans in his country. Living among the Yoruba brought him to a point of radical opposition to the racist views of alleged organic inferiority of the African being propagated by high profile contemporaries of his such as Richard Buxton, the British Consul to the Niger Delta, eminent writers such as J. C. Nott and G. R. Gliddon in America, Robert Knox in Britain, Count de Gobineau in France, Carl Gustavus Gaius in Germany, and the Anthropological Institute in London.⁷⁸

On the other hand, Lugard's view of the African was most probably formed initially, just like anybody else would, before he ever set his foot on Africa. What is important is that he never substantially varied his view of the African society,⁷⁹ even when there was sufficient evidence to the contrary. In what follows, evidence is provided from Bowen's experience in living among Africans. His observations address the same concerns that Lugard highlighted in his observations of the African.

First of all, contrary to the racist slurs by Lugard, using his experiences in Yorubaland as a point of reference, Bowen observed in 1856, two years before Frederick Lugard was born and six decades before Lugard published his *Dual Mandate*, that "very often there is both an abstract and a concrete noun for the same verbal root [in Yoruba language]. The existence and constant use of terms for the expression of thought, are certainly good evidence that the people think."⁸⁰ Furthermore,

There are various other indications of the fact that the people are not deficient in intellect. One of these we find in their

78 See Ayandele, "Introduction," xxxiii–xxxiv

79 Perham, "Introduction," xlv

80 T. Bowen, *Adventures and Missionary Labours in several Countries in the Interior of Africa from 1849–1856*, 2nd Edition, (London: Frank Cass, 1968), 280; in fairness to Lugard, he was so impressed by the Yoruba as to make an exception of them in his early contact with them; see F. Lugard, "An Expedition to Borgu, on the Niger" in *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Sep., 1895), 221–223, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1774247> (accessed on 18 March 2013) but his view dovetailed with that of his wife who made no such distinction among Africans. With particular reference to Nigerians, they are either (1) Fulani, (2) Hausa, or (3) others, whereas according to her, the closer one is to the coast, the more cannibals one encounters.

government and laws. The highest excellence of the best governments among white people consists in constitutional checks or limits to prevent abuses of power. Strange as it may seem, the [Yoruba] had studied out this balance of power and reduced it to practice, long before our fathers settled in America – before the barons of England had extorted the great charter from King John. The pure and correct theism, which rises far above the superstitions of the people, is another proof of their mental soundness. Even their idolatry, while it is substantially the same as that of Assyria, Greece and Rome, has not been loaded with such puerile fancies and debasing dogmas as were common at Corinth and Athens. These points will be further noticed under the heads of government and religion.⁸¹

For this reason,

Laws are made in each town by the chief and his counselors, but sometimes they call a public meeting of the people. Neither the king, nor any governor or chief in the country, is arbitrary or above law. The ruler can do nothing without the assent of his council, and the ruler and council together cannot violate the ancient traditional laws of the country. Whatever despotic acts may be witnessed in Africa, they are all performed according to ‘the common law’ of the land, the origin of which is lost in the immeasurable depths of antiquity.⁸²

Secondly, Bowen notes that “no one can live among the people and speak their language without being convinced that they have a good share of sober common sense. They are shrewd observers of character and motives.”⁸³ He notes that the Yoruba deal much in proverbs, and that those of the Yoruba “are among the most remarkable proverbs in the world.”⁸⁴ Generally,

They are designed to convey moral truth. They constitute, in fact, the moral science of the nation, and being widely known

81 *ibid.*, 281

82 *ibid.*, 318

83 *ibid.*, 281

84 *ibid.*, 284

and often quoted, have doubtless and a powerful effect in forming and preserving the character of the people.⁸⁵

Thirdly,

I am not sure that the Negroes are more covetous than other people, though they are less careful to hide the love of dishonest gain. If they swindle and lie, there are thousands in our own country who are guilty of the same practices. If fair dealing is one of the last things learned by the converts in the missions, honesty, both in everyday life, and in religious controversies, is one of the rarer virtues among too many members and teachers in the churches of civilized countries. It has not been many years since a noble bishop declared that 'he knew nothing of moral obligation,' in the use of certain revenues of the church. Custom was his authority for transactions which appeared to some members of Parliament and many Englishmen like swindling, and custom is the plea for the African when he cheats you in buying and selling. He will not steal but he will defraud to the utmost of his power.⁸⁶

Even though the mainstream of Bowen's thought in the foregoing is clear, his reach for the hendiadys "swindle and lie" invites some teasing out. First of all the setting of his pronouncement is in the local market square. Secondly, what he categorises as swindling and lying is viewed by the locals as hard bargaining. Thirdly, the difference in his categorisation with a moral tone and the descriptive activity by the local actors is explained by the fact that in western markets, goods are labelled with their prices whereas in an illiterate society, prices in local markets are not marked; rather, prices are subject to negotiation. Hence it was more or less inevitable that a westerner entering the African market in 1850 would be frustrated to the level of name calling, whereas what put westerners off is the asking price which they did not recognise as asking price.

For Africans who are not new to the system, the first price is the asking price which an intending buyer usually ignores and proposes

85 *ibid.*, 288

86 *ibid.*, 287

and an alternative. What goes on until a deal is done is akin to convocation of a mini stock exchange. The goings-on in a typical market day in at least West Africa and the practice in a typical western market day in the West is exemplified below.

Fig. 9

PRICING CULTURE IN AFRICAN MARKET SQUARE FROM A MISSIONARY PERSPECTIVE		
Agent	Western Missionary	African seller
Goods	Price tag expected	Price tag not an issue
Pricing	Fixed	Negotiable; convocation of a mini-stock exchange
Operational perception	Morality	Pragmatism
Option for dissatisfied intending buyers	Move on	Move on

Has anything changed between the 19th century and the 21st century? The rate and level of literacy has improved dramatically but just as it was in 1850, so it is in 2016 with no indication of a radical change to the bargaining culture in the village market square soon. Therefore, to minimise frustration, an intending buyer can make a quick enquiry concerning (1) the asking price, (2) the likely price and (3) the real price, before entering a market. By so doing, frustration can be converted into a learning process, and even fun.

Fourthly, Bowen continues,

There is generally a strong current of public opinion against vice and in favor of executing the laws. Hence they are remarkably free from adultery and theft, which we might presuppose would be very common. Although the women do not marry till they are eighteen or twenty years of age, I have never known a case of

an illegitimate child. The law and public opinion are too strongly set in favor of virtue to allow the frequent occurrence of such things in [Yorubaland]. It is very remarkable, that although there have been thousands of loads of goods and cowries for the missionaries, delivered to native carriers, to be conveyed from the coast to Abeokuta, Ijaiye, Ibadan, and other places, within the last ten years, yet scarcely one load has been robbed or stolen.⁸⁷

On the economic activities of the people, which are governed by the laws of supply and demand, Bowen noted that,

The Yorubas and other tribes of Central Africa are far from being a lazy people. In the farming season, they are always up and off to their work by daylight. Their daily markets are well stocked with all the necessities of life. Wavers and some others who work within doors are seldom idle, but farmers usually rest in the heat of the day. In the dry season, when there is little farm work, we can hire any number of people to labour for reduced wages, and we can employ them to carry our loads from station to station on very moderate terms. It is true, that there are many days in the year the people are comparatively idle, but this is not from unwillingness to labour. If they had a profitable market there would be more demand for labor, and more would be performed, but we cannot expect men who have plenty of food, &c., to perform extra labor in producing extra supplies which they can neither use nor sell. If direct trade were opened with Sudan, every man in the whole country would soon be in motion trying to make something which he could sell, to enable him to buy something.⁸⁸

Contrary to his intention to preach from West Africa to Ethiopia, Thomas Bowen did not advance beyond Yorubaland. Hence, his observation of Africans was confined largely to Yorubaland. Nevertheless, he took time to observe other “Central African” nationals as well. For example, using glass-making technology as a measure of civilisation, his observation of the Nupe in Ilorin led him to the conclusion that the Nupe are “more civilised [than the Yoruba], and have superior skill in the arts. They are said to be the only people in

⁸⁷ *ibid.*, 286

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, 285

Sudan who still retain the art of manufacturing glass.”⁸⁹ Furthermore, of the people east of Nupe, a territory that fits the description of the western frontiers of the old Kwararafa confederation, Bowen was unequivocal: these people “are far from being barbarians.”⁹⁰

FLORA LUGARD – AN IGNORAMUS

At this juncture, it is perhaps helpful to bring Flora Lugard’s propagandist view of the peoples of Southern Nigeria – a view of sorcerers, idolaters, robbers, drunkards and cannibal pagans, as one approaches the coast.⁹¹ In order to place Flora Lugard’s view in perspective, it is necessary to bear in mind Palmer’s clarification on the mode and process of travelling from England to Northern Nigeria in 1902 vis-à-vis Southern Nigeria,

Many Nigerians have forgotten or never knew that the old way to Northern Nigeria (The Northern Province of Nigeria) led through a place called Forcados at the mouth, or one of the mouths, of the Niger. Forcados was just a mangrove mud flat-cleared of its mangroves-which had been replaced by a Niger Company factory. By arrangement with the Niger Company the Government of Northern Nigeria used Forcados as a kind of advanced base. It was there that the river steamer for Lokoja met the ocean liners of Elder Dempster & Co. of Liverpool, and took off all passengers bound for Northern Nigeria.

From Forcados to Lokoja by river steamer was about three days’ steaming.⁹²

In all probability, therefore, Mrs. Lugard entered Northern Nigeria

89 Bowen, 199

90 *ibid.*, 199; given Bowen’s rating of the Nupe in the mid-19th century, he would have been keenly disappointed to discover later that Etsu Maliki failed to see a future in Western education for the Nupe, which Bishop Crowther was urging him to embrace for his people.

91 Shaw, 334; cf. Nicolson, 163; Lugard, *A Tropical Dependency*, 335; 308; 407, Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 68, 198

92 R. Palmer, “Arriving in Northern Nigeria (About 35 Years Ago),” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 41, No. 163 (Apr., 1942), 108, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/717683> (accessed on 13 January 2015)

through Forcados, Onitsha, Idah, Lokoja and finally to Zungeru. She left Zungeru or Lokoja five months later and proceeded through the same route to Forcados and back to England. In other words, she did not spend a day in Southern Nigeria. Precisely, her journalistic account of Southern Nigeria was not based on first-hand knowledge, since she had not visited Southern Nigeria by 1905 when she published her view.

In contrast is that of Thomas Bowen who lived among the people for eight years before putting pen to paper. Besides, Flora Lugard's view of the African, the unrevised concoctions of pre-15th century Arab slavers who could not penetrate the forest regions of West and Central, is quite different from those of the Portuguese who came to Benin Kingdom in the 16th century. First, not only were they impressed by the people and government in Benin, Portugal established diplomatic relations with Benin Kingdom. Secondly, in the 1840s, before Flora Lugard was born, Queen Victoria, the head of the British Empire, exchanged letters with the chiefs of Abeokuta⁹³ whereas the tone of Queen Victoria's letters did not suggest correspondence with cannibal pagans but with equals. Thirdly, unlike the way the African was bullied to believe in the alleged superiority of European during the colonial era, pre-colonial Africans looked down on the European.⁹⁴ Lastly, Christian missionaries to West Africa, however, proclaimed and maintained the equality of the two. None of the above meant anything to Mrs. Flora Lugard, as she was committed to her view of the wretched African, which is nothing other than a product and an exhibit of bigotry.

Ayandele stresses Bowen's literary achievement in comparison with those of contemporaneous English missionaries in Yorubaland, such as Henry Townsend, C. Gollmer, John Mullin, J. Chausse and John Wood among others.⁹⁵ His point is not surprising, however,

93 Ade-Ajayi, 130

94 Bowen, 126, 79, 156; see also M. Park, *Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa* (London: 1799, 123; H. Barth, *Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa* 2nd Edition, Vol. III (London: 1857; Longmans, 1966), 361; R. Lander and J. Lander, *Journal of An Expedition to Explore the course and Termination of the Niger* (London: 1932), 11, cited in Ayandele, "New Introduction" in Bowen, xxviii–xxx

95 Ayandele, "Introduction," ix–x

because American missionaries to Yorubaland in the 19th century were generally more educated than their English counterparts. Similarly, Scottish missionaries serving in the Oil Rivers Protectorate were more educated than their English colleagues. In particular, the Church of Scotland accepted for foreign missionary service candidates with not less than a Master of Arts (MA) degree whereas the Church of England prerequisite was not as high.

Fig. 10
A TALE OF TWO ARMY CAPTAINS ON THE NATURE
OF THE AFRICAN

PERSONALITIES	FREDERICK LUGARD	THOMAS BOWEN
rank attained in the army	Captain in the British Army	Captain in the American Army
Track pursued after discharge	Mercenary	Missionary
Use of military experience in Nigeria	attacked Yola, Kontagora, Bida, Kano, and Sokoto in that order	Defence of Abeokuta from attack Helped to end the Dahomey-Egba wars
View of the nature of the African	comparable to that of animals does not understand what the future portends no interest in advancement	The people can think in the abstract. They operate a system of checks and balances. They are no strangers to moral norms. Their economic activities were governed by the laws of supply and demand.
When view was expressed	views formed and fated before 1885	View formed and dynamic since 1849
Legacy	1. Lugard House, Kaduna 2. Lugard Avenue, Ikoyi, Lagos	Bowen University, Iwo, Oyo State, Nigeria

SUMMARY

Lugard's theory of the inferior nature of the African, a major pillar for his policy of official favouritism for Islam, was founded on racist slurs, outright abuse, and the ignorance of Arabs of the 15th century and addiction to Social Darwinism.

While abundant evidence was tendered from Thomas Bowen to debunk both the racist slurs and the Arab ignorance of by-gone ages, the globally attested self-undoing of Social Darwinism at the end of World War II exposes the nudity of the system, as it cannot deliver a just and lasting religious policy - colonial and post-colonial for Northern Nigeria.

BASELESS RANKING OF RELIGIONS

In order to justify its policy of partiality towards Islam, the colonial government found it necessary to rank the religions in Northern Nigeria, as a result of which the following dogmas were conjured: (1) Islam is a religion which has abolished the gross form of pagan superstition and barbarous practice, and added to the dignity, self-respect, and self-control of its adherents,⁹⁶ (2) Islam is compatible with and has assimilated elements of African culture,⁹⁷ (3) "originating in the tropics, it is essentially a code and a religion of the tropics, which has never made headway in the temperate zones, just as Christianity has been the religion of the temperate climates."⁹⁸

The following chart encapsulates the fallacies and the corresponding refutations.

⁹⁶ Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 78

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 77

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 77

Fig. 11

Ranking of Religions		
Colonial Dogma		Refutation
Christianity	Christianity is the most fully developed religion in Northern Nigeria.	There is no historical, demographic, philosophical, or structural basis for the ranking of religions by the Northern Nigeria colonial government. It is not within the remit of government to rank religions. because the government lacks the tool for it. It is the duty of government to guarantee religious freedom and the right to change one's religion individually or in association with others.
	Islam is more developed than primal religions but not as developed as Christianity.	
	Christianity is the religion of the temperate regions of the world.	
	Islam is the religion of the tropics.	
	Fanaticism in Islam and the African natural temperament are compatible and complimentary.	
Islam	Islam is a good tool for social control or repression; Christianity is not suitable for the same purpose.	
	Therefore, the government should promote the spread of Islam.	
Primordial Religions	Conversely, government should frustrate the spread of Christianity	

The foregoing fallacies are x-rayed in greater detail in the following ten pages.

ENDEMIC SLAVERY IN ISLAM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

In order to have a firm grasp of the wrongness of official ranking of religions, in Northern Nigeria it is important, first, to retrieve the weight of evidence provided earlier in this chapter on the rejection of Islamic rule in different parts of Northern Nigeria, prior to 1900, as a body of evidence against Lugard’s romanticising of Islam.

In a rush to pay tribute to Islamic record in northern Nigeria, Lugard must have forgotten or have been downright dishonest about slavery which outlived him in Northern Nigeria. In particular, Lugard's Slavery Proclamation of 1901 stipulated that any child born to slaves after 1901 was born free legally. However, he issued a memo to his Residents clarifying that selling of domestic slaves was not illegal so long as the slaves were not meant to be trafficked beyond Northern Nigeria⁹⁹ because he wanted the 'gentry', the ruling class, alias masu sarauta, to retain their domestic slaves.¹⁰⁰

In fact, Lugard was still able to argue 32 years after his Slavery Proclamation of 1901 that in countries where

slavery has existed as an integral part of the structure of society[;] it is obvious that a decree of compulsory emancipation would result in social chaos. Masters who had acquired their slaves under the pre-existing secular law and religious sanction could not without injustice be deprived of their legal property and reduced to poverty.¹⁰¹

Slavery was finally legislated against in 1936,¹⁰² as Lugard had neither the courage nor commitment to confront it when he was High Commissioner (1900–1904), Governor (1905–1906), Governor (1912–1913), and Governor-General of Nigeria (1914–1919) respectively.

CREDIT FOR ABOLITION OF HUMAN SACRIFICE?

Lugard makes much of Islam abolishing barbaric practices in 19th

99 C. Ubah, "Suppression of the Slave Trade in the Northern Emirates" in *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1991), 450, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/182663> (accessed on 28 March 2013)

100 Nicolson, 162

101 L. Lugard, "Slavery in all its Forms" in *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan., 1933), 11, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1155697> (accessed on 26 July 2013)

102 I. Jumare, "The Late Treatment of Slavery in Sokoto: Background and Consequences of the 1936 Proclamation," in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1994), 303–322, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/221027> (accessed on 28 December 2013)

century Black Africa,¹⁰³ an example being human sacrifice. However, if Islam hastens to claim the credit as Lugard claims, it must hastily claim responsibility for introducing a variant of what it suppressed in Africa to the global village in the 21st century. In particular, the Islamic State group (ISIL/ISIS/Daesh) has repeatedly dramatised the slaughtering of Western journalists and aid workers in Syria and Iraq before video cameras for global audience. Additionally, it is common knowledge that decapitation has not been frontally confronted in Saudi Arabia even as the 21st century unfolds.

With specific reference to Nigeria, Islam is under obligation to accept responsibility for the introduction of the quadripartite barbarity of suicide bombing – the new demon which integrates (1) self-annihilation, (2) mass murder of an indeterminate number of innocent others, (3) maiming of an indeterminate number of unsuspecting passers-by, and (4) wanton destruction of an indeterminate amount of property – all on the altar of religious orthodoxy or extremism as the case may be.¹⁰⁴

AN IRONY OF COMPATIBILITY

On the so-called compatibility of Islam and African culture, there is much in it which some Muslim scholars such as Prof T. Gbadamosi, Department of History, University of Lagos, would agree with.¹⁰⁵ As Dr. Gabriel Akinola, Department of History, University of Ibadan notes, however,

It is ironic that the same people that claim that Islam is ‘African’ because it tolerates such practices as polygamy are often the

103 Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 78

104 *Jama'at uAhliS Sunna Lidda' AwatiW al-Jihad* (Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad), widely known as Boko Haram holds the patent for suicide bombing in Nigeria

105 T. Gbadamosi, *The Growth of Islam among the Yoruba 1841–1908* (London: Longman, 1978), 13–14; Prof Gbadamosi's view is noteworthy because of his journey in faith. Raised as a Muslim, he converted to Christianity in high school and so active was he that he contested and won the position of Secretary of the Student Christian Movement (SCM) in his undergraduate days at the University College, Ibadan. Thereafter, he reverted to Islam in his postgraduate days.

most vehement in their opposition to any accommodation in the practice of Islam with African customary practices on the basis that the latter are incompatible with Islamic doctrines and rituals. What these writers are saying in effect is that Islam on the African continent cannot be indigenized in any fundamental sense as has been done in places like Iran and India.¹⁰⁶

BORI, PRAISE SINGING, DANCING ET AL

As perceptive as Akinola is in his foregoing analysis, his analysis addresses only one aspect of the irony because there is a two-tier window to the African customary practices vis-à-vis Sharia in Hausaland. For example, firstly, when Katsina State adopted the sharia legal system, some traditional Hausa customs that have flourished for centuries such as “praise-singing, drumming, group dancing, and singing”;¹⁰⁷ “beating of drum, blowing flute”¹⁰⁸ were proscribed. Nevertheless,

It is no secret that when these elites gather among themselves, pleasurable exceptions are permitted: at a housewarming for a prominent alhaji’s new residence in Daura, for instance, none of the highly placed guests objected to the praise singer’s high-volume accolades. In fact, they encouraged him by handing over the customary acknowledgement in cash.¹⁰⁹

It is all about pomp and prestige! When it comes to poor people, however, the law strains out the gnat and swallows the camel;¹¹⁰ but when it concerns the rich and powerful, the camel passes through the needle’s eye without a scratch.

Indeed, there is a two-tier window on the Hausa *bori* cult. At one window, *bori* specialists are denigrated in Hausaland. At another

106 Akinola, 12

107 W. Miles, “Shari’a as De-Africanization: Evidence from Hausaland,” in *Africa Today*, Vol. 50, No. 1 Spring-Summer, 2003), 51, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4187551> (accessed on 16 October 2013)

108 *ibid.*, 63

109 Miles, 67

110 cf. Mt. 23:24

window, “all emirs support the *bori* cult, according to members, because they help their towns to grow.”¹¹¹ Umar Danfulani who has done a considerable amount of work on the *bori* phenomenon adds that “this sweeping statement will definitely not be accepted by a majority of Muslims, in Northern Nigeria ... [but] during the period 1804 to 1944, the *bori* cult was practiced in the premises of the Emir’s palace in Abuja [currently Suleja in Niger State].”¹¹² In fairness to the Emir of Abuja on the one hand and the majority of Muslims in Northern Nigeria, on the other hand, it is helpful to clarify the point that the Emir of Abuja of 1944 was of the line of the ruling house of Zaria that migrated to Abuja in the 19th century because of his rejection of jihad, which demanded Hausa kings to renounce certain Hausa religious practices including *bori*, which the jihadists regarded as incompatible with Islam. Hence, *bori* would have been a part and parcel of the Zaria-Abuja palace paraphernalia as recent as 1944. Nevertheless, it is incumbent on those emirs who condemn *bori* by day and consult *bori* by night to speak for themselves.

Frank Salamone documents the *bori* tenacity in Yauri area in the 1970s, as clients came from Sokoto, Ibadan, Warri, Abeokuta, etc.¹¹³ In fact, the irony veers into another dimension as

marginalized and denigrated in their native Hausaland, *bori* specialists have become valued, and consequently prosperous experts in exorcism in Saudi Arabia, which has lost its own indigenous mastery over disruptive spirits.¹¹⁴

And just as there is a two-tier approach to *bori* in Hausaland, so is there a two-tier approach to it in Saudi Arabia. Officially, it is banned. At the black market, it serves the high and low. But “if they find you practicing *bori*, they will catch you.”¹¹⁵

111 U. Danfulani, “Factors Contributing to the Survival of the Bori Cult in Northern Nigeria,” in *Numen*, Vol. 46, Fasc. 4 (1999), 439, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3270434> (accessed on 28 March 2013)

112 *ibid.*, 439

113 S. Salamone, “Religion as Play: a Friendly ‘Witchdoctor’,” in *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 7, Fasc. 3 (1975), 205, 207, <http://nigeriaworld.com/columnist/ajayi/1594768> (accessed on 16 April 2013)

114 Miles, 68

115 *ibid.*, 68

“marginalized and denigrated in their native Hausaland, bori specialists have become valued, and consequently prosperous experts in exorcism in Saudi Arabia, which has lost its own indigenous mastery over disruptive spirits.”

ALLEGED TROPICO-TEMPERATE CENTRICISM

Lugard's popular apothegm, “originating in the tropics, [Islam] is essentially a code and a religion of the tropics, which has never made headway in the temperate zones, just as Christianity has been the religion of the temperate climates”, although pernicious was nonetheless an apotheosis for colonial policy. As a pillar of major a policy, it is just fair that it is examined.

First, it is common knowledge, despite how Lugard portrays it, that both Christianity and Islam are Abraham-related and tropical in origin. The fact that each developed over the centuries along particular geographical routes is partly circumstantial.

Secondly, it is no longer breaking news that Islam is set to take over Europe which Lugard idolises. In particular, with the rise of the Enlightenment from the mid-18th century with (1) the exaltation of reason over against revelation, (2) the worship of modernity over and against tradition and the past, (3) the subjugation of community consciousness and community to the autonomous individual self, (4) the diminishing of religious conviction, (5) the invitation to secularism to take over religious space by the mid-19th century, (6) the sanguine endorsement of contraception by the Protestant churches in the 1930s, (7) the near contempt for Pope Paul VI's *Humanae Vitae* by Catholic bishops in the 1960s, and (8) the over 50 million Muslims in Europe – even before the migrant-refugee deluge (mostly Syrian (49%), Afghans (21%), and Iraqi (8%) in 2015–2016) – Europe has entered into what Prof Luis Franceschi, Dean of Law School, Strathmore University, Kenya, calls an irreversible gear in its demographic change, thereby forcing Franceschi to predict as follows:

Since 2006, Europe's absolute population was not declining thanks to immigration. This changed in 2014, and for the first

time in history, Europe's population declined in spite of massive immigration.

Since the 90s, Islamic immigration to Europe accounts for 85 per cent of its absolute growth. By 2013, natural migration into Europe accounted for 95 per cent of the total population change.

In France, the average family had 1.9 children in 2013, while Islamic immigrants had an average of 7.1 children per family. In Southern France there are now more mosques than churches. In larger cities, there are already more Muslim children than non-Muslim children below the age of 15. By 2027 one in five French will be Muslim, and by 2050 France will be an Islamic Republic.

France's traditional and historical ties to secularism and *liberté* will change, for as population shrinks so does culture.

In Britain, the Muslim population has experienced a 30-fold increase in the last 40 years. In the Netherlands and Belgium, 60 per cent of the new born are Muslim. In 10 years, half the population will be Muslim.¹¹⁶

Although Franceschi's i-reversibility claim is tenuous, and although migrants tend to adjust to the ethos of their host communities, the thrust of his analysis has substance. It is interesting to note that London elected its first Muslim mayor barely a month after his prediction.

As to whether Christianity has a future in the tropics, it is equally no longer breaking news that the centre of gravity of world Christianity has shifted from the temperate regions of the northern hemisphere to the southern continents (the tropics inclusive) where the majority of Christians in the 21st century live.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, based on the realisation that Asia was Christianity's continent of

116 L. Franceschi, "Letter to ISIS: Forget violence - the fertile will inherit the earth; *the world is not as Christian as you think*", in <http://www.mercatornet.com/demography/view/letter-to-isis-forget-violence-the-fertile-will-inherit-the-earth/17865> (accessed on 6 April 2016)

117 cf. K. Bediako, "The Emergence of World Christianity and the Remaking of Theology", Public Lecture at Calvin College, 2007, in (accessed on 8 April 2016)r

the first millennium, Europe the continent of the second millennium and Africa the emerging continent of the third millennium, there is a rising hope that the social and cultural significance of religious belief and religious communities, which in past millennia had been marginalised may gain appreciation thereby positioning the African Christian factor for impacting the emerging world order in the third millennium.¹¹⁸

It is interesting to note that both processes that lead to (1) a greater presence of Islam in Europe and (2) of Africa becoming a habitation of Christianity in the 21st century began in the 18th century before Frederick Lugard came to Northern Nigeria and outlived him. Sadly, because of his worldview was so circumscribed and beclouded by racial bigotry, he could not see what was unfolding in the religious sectors of both the tropics and the temperate regions of the world.

With particular reference to Nigeria where one in every five Africans live, Christianity became the majority religion around 1983–1984.¹¹⁹

SCIENCE, SCIENTISM AND RELIGION

There is no attempt at this point to undertake a thoroughgoing critique of science. It is, however, necessary to distinguish between science, the study of the natural world based on facts leaned through observations, and experiments, and scientism an ideology which arrogates to science what science does not attribute to itself. This is a necessary stepping stone for looking at Lugard's agnostic standpoint vis-à-vis religion, which he subordinated to science in the ordering of human affairs, and his farcical ranking of religion.

First, on the criticism that religion is a human condition that wobbles on faith, science is just as much a human enterprise which

118 cf. K. Bediako, "Africa and Christianity on the Threshold of the Third Millennium: The Religious Dimension" in *African Affairs: the journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 99, NO. 395, April 2000, 303–323, <http://www.africabib.org/http.php?RID=202504085> (accessed on 10 April 2016)

119 See Chapter Three, "A Christian-majority Nation,"

is rooted in faith. Kenneth Miller, a professor of biology at Brown University, USA, clarifies the point as follows. It is

a faith that all scientists share, whether they are religious in the conventional sense or not. Science is built upon a faith that the world is understandable, and that there is a logic to reality that the human mind can explore and comprehend. It also holds, as an article of scientific faith, that such exploration is worth the trouble, because knowledge is always to be preferred to ignorance.¹²⁰

Secondly, there is the familiar line that there are contradictions in religion. To this, Miller cannot be more categorical.

It is true, of course, that organised religions do not point to a single coherent view of the nature of God. But to reject God because of the admitted self-contradictions and logical failings of organised religion would be like rejecting physics because of the inherent contradictions in quantum theory and general relativity. Science, all of science, is necessarily incomplete – that is, in fact, the reason why so many of us find science to be such an invigoration and fulfilling calling. Why, then, should we be surprised that religion is incomplete and contradictory as well? We do not abandon science because our human efforts to approach the great truths of nature are occasionally hampered by error, greed, dishonesty and even fraud. Why then should we declare faith a ‘delusion’ because belief in God is subject to exactly the same failings?¹²¹

Thirdly, to Prof Miller’s observation of contradiction in physics may be added the point that there is no love lost between real numbers and irrational numbers in mathematics.

Fourthly, science’s limitation is further exposed by its lack of any tool for proving or disproving the existence of the soul. For example, the numerous experiments carried out in the early 20th century by Duncan MacDougall, a Massachusetts physician led some to conclude that the soul does not exist because it has no

120 K. Miller, “Of Course Not” in *Does Science Make Belief in God Obsolete?* (West Conshohocken: John Templeton Foundation) n.d., 40

121 *ibid.*, 4

weight. Some of his contemporaries pointed him to the flaws of his experiments and the conclusions thereof. Richard Gunderman, a radiologist and the Chancellor's Professor of Medicine, Liberal Arts, and Philanthropy, Indiana University had cause to restate the critics' argument recently, to demonstrate the fact that physicality is not a requirement for realness. In brief, to dismiss the human soul because it has no weight is to dismiss the existence of ideas because they have no weight. In fact, not only do ideas not have weight, they have no shape, size, location, colour or velocity. That is why the idea of 10 is not ten times the idea of 1.¹²² Indeed, one can go as far as affirm that the scientist who will prove or disprove the existence of the soul based on currently known scientific tools is not yet born.

Fifthly, the declaration of Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the pride and rallying point of humanity is well-known: "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." Nevertheless, this most valued Article globally is not arrived at scientifically because science lacks the tool for measuring the worth of the human person. Precisely, the motive and bases of the Article are thoroughgoing ideological-religious.

Given that the limitation of science is laid bare above, it is perhaps necessary to expose a major that persists in the practice of science. In 1830, mathematician Charles Babbage decried the "'hoaxing' (making up results, but wanting the hoax at some stage to be discovered), 'forging' (fabricating research outcomes), 'trimming' (manipulating data) and 'cooking'" that was rampant in his day. There is ample evidence of the same thing in the 21st century, as the following shows: (1) Anesthesiologist Scott Reuben, faked at least 21 papers on his research on analgesia therapy between 2000 and 2008;¹²³ (2) In 2011, Prof Marc Hauser was booted out Harvard

122 R. Gunderman, "Can natural science prove or disprove the soul? Materialists will be disappointed.", <http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/can-natural-science-prove-or-disprove-the-soul/18348> (accessed on 9 July 2016)

123 I. Freckelton, "Research fraud: the temptation to lie; *and the challenges of regulation*", <http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/research-fraud-the-temptation-to-lie/18391> (accessed on 21 July 2016); D. O'leary, "Fake reviews, sure

University for falsifying important research data;¹²⁴ (3) Japanese scientist Haruko Obokata claimed to have triggered stem cell abilities in regular body cells; (4) in 2015, Anna Ahimastos, of the Baker IDI Heart and Diabetes Institute in Melbourne fabricated research on blood pressure medications published in two international journals; in the same year, (5) biomedical scientist Doug Pyou-Han at Iowa State University, was sentenced to 57 months' imprisonment for fabricating and falsifying data in HIV vaccine trials; (6) in April 2016, Bruce Murdoch, a former University of Queensland professor, pleaded guilty to 17 intellectual fraud-related charges.¹²⁵ Furthermore, (7) in the Netherlands, over 70 articles by social psychologist Diederik Stapel were retracted; (8) an analysis of "the 2,047 retractions listed in PubMed as of May 2012 found that 67.4% were attributable to misconduct, including fraud or suspected fraud (43.4%), duplicate publication (14.2%) and plagiarism (9.8%)" ; (9) "a 2012 survey by the British Medical Journal of more than 2,700 researchers found that 13% admitted knowledge of colleagues 'inappropriately adjusting, excluding, altering or fabricating data' for the purpose of publication".¹²⁶ These samples show that depravity in science has its immoral equivalents in sharp business practices, coldblooded policing, ruthless politics, wilful miscarriage of justice, and the works of lying prophets. They all drink from the same well.

It is recalled that Lugard was an agnostic, a person who does not have a definite belief about whether God exists or not.¹²⁷ In the light of the analysis in the preceding paragraphs, one cannot agree more with Richard Dawkins, one of the most outspoken champions of atheism in the 20th century, in his categorisation of agnosticism as intellectual cowardice for sitting on the fence on the God question.¹²⁸

– but fake science journals", <http://www.mercatornet.com/connecting/view/fake-reviews-sure-but-fake-science-journals/17247> (accessed on 9 December 2015)

124 M. Cook, "Are Americans anti-science?: no, they just don't like arrogant, undemocratic scientists", http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/are_americans_anti_science (accessed 5 November 2011)

125 Freckelton, op. cit. for (3)–(6)

126 *ibid.*, (7)–(9)

127 Merriam-Webster Dictionary

128 Wikipedia, "Agnosticism," in <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agnosticism> (18 July 2015)

Similarly, one appreciates Pope Benedict XVI's unveiling of the self-contradiction in agnosticism affirming the power of reason to know scientific truth while simultaneously precluding reasoning from religion and ethics. In the light of agnosticism's self-inflicted censorship, is Lugard in a position to rank the religions in Northern Nigeria? The answer is no, because having precluded the Transcendence, he cannot pontificate on the ranking of routes to the unknown and probably unknowable.

Undoubtedly, science and religion are different dimensions of the human condition. Nevertheless, from the perspective of human dignity and human wellbeing, the two areas of human endeavour need not be made enemies because as Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks wrote, "science takes things apart to see how they work. Religion puts things together to see what they mean."¹²⁹ Religion and science are not incompatible; scientism which Lugard venerates as it were, in order to justify partiality in discharge of public duty, is the problem.

LACK OF EQUIPMENT

That government, at every level whether national, regional or local, is a public institution is an axiom. Equally axiomatic is the widely held view that maintenance of social equilibrium, which integrates the guarantee of the right to religion, is the core duty of government. It is rather superfluous to argue that government, as an impersonal structure is non-confessional and unable to endorse any particular religion among the rest in society. As a non-confessional entity, therefore, it lacks the equipment for ranking the religions. In other words, what the colonial government did in Northern Nigeria was a farce.

For example, a ruler is suitable for measuring the size of an object. To use the same ruler to measure the weight of the same object is to engage in a farce because the size and the weight of an object, although are properties of the same object, are nevertheless two different dimensions that respond to different natural measuring devices.

129 Cited approvingly in D. Goodman, "Of Astrophysics and Atheism: Why We Need Religion in the Space Age" in http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/of_astrophysics_and_atheism (accessed on 25 July 2014)

So far, there is no known government property for plumbing and ranking religions of citizens or subjects, as the colonial government farcically did in Northern Nigeria.

SUMMARY

The ranking of the various religions as a way of finding a basis for official partiality towards Islam is a debacle because (1) Islam ostensibly abolished barbarity in African society in the 19th century whereas it introduced a quadripartite variant in the 21st century, (2) the so-called compatibility of Islam with elements of African culture is a ruse because indigenization in any fundamental sense is opposed so strenuously. Besides, extremists speak from both ends of the mouth thereby declaring un-Islamic, wholesome and innocuous African traditional practices such as group dancing, drumming, flute blowing. (3) the claim that Christianity cannot prosper in the tropics is easily faulted on the ground that the centre of gravity of Christianity globally has shifted to the south where the tropics form a large part. As an agnostic, (4) Lugard takes on an impossible task of ranking religions, because he forfeits the standpoint to do so and (5) it is not the duty of government to rank religions but to guarantee their functioning.

In brief, the colonial policy of official favouritism towards Islam cannot prosper because the pillars on which the policy is based cannot stand.

THE BLYDEN FACTOR

Why did Lugard consider himself informed by expert opinion in the formulation of religious policy in Northern Nigeria? What informed his tenacity spirited partiality towards Islam in Northern Nigeria? Lugard was influenced by the writings of Edward Blyden¹³⁰ whom

130 Edward Wilmot Blyden was one of the most influential African writers of the late 19th century and early 20th century. Born in St Thomas (currently US Virgin Islands) to liberated slaves of Igbo extraction, a Presbyterian missionary minister detected his potential and persuaded him to train as a Christian minister,

he quoted severally. It is, therefore, in order to expose Blyden's salient beliefs.

FULANI AND TRIBALISM

According to Blyden, "the tendency of Islam is everywhere to bring about union between homogeneous races. This will be its effect in Africa"¹³¹ The use of Islam to bring many ethnic groups into subjection is beyond dispute; the jihad beginning in 1804 being an example. The real question is whether Islam has overcome tribal cleavages and whether it has been an instrument of genuine unity among Africans, especially south of the Sahara. For example, Hausa kings were deposed beginning in 1804, and were replaced by Fulani rulers. 200 years on, only Fulani with connection to the jihad have occupied the throne of Kano – not a single Hausaman has been deemed fit to occupy Kano throne, whereas Kano is the largest Hausa homeland on this planet. Even as recent as 2014 when Kano's throne became vacant, the stool was available only to a Fulani.¹³²

and thereafter took him to USA where he was refused admission to theological seminaries repeatedly based on the colour of his skin. Blyden thereafter migrated to participate in the building of the Republic of Liberia, where he completed his theological training in Liberia College. He consequently rose to become a professor of Latin and Greek, and even President of the institution. Blyden joined politics and occupied strategic positions in government such as Secretary of State and Minister of the Interior. In 1885, he contested the presidency but lost to the incumbent Hilary Johnson. Lastly, he worked for the British colonial administration in Lagos, Nigeria, as Agent for Native Affairs from 1896 to 1897. During his tenure as Agent, he made sure that the chunk of available funds was ploughed into introducing Western education to Muslims in Lagos. He was the Director of Muslim Education in Sierra Leone from 1901–1906. See, "Edward Wilmot Blyden," in http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Wilmot_Blyden//Early_life_and_education (accessed on 18 June 2013); H. Lynch (ed) *Selected Published Writings of Edward Wilmot Blyden Black Spokesman*, Africana Modern Library No. 14, (London: Frank Cass, 1971), 271

131 E. Blyden "The Koran in Africa," in *Journal of the Royal African Society* Vol. 4. No 14 (Jan. 1905), 169, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/714813> (accessed on 18 May 2013)

132 This criticism is without prejudice to the sterling qualities of the current emir. For example, he (1) believes that sharia is dynamic, (2) hates and fights impoverishment, (3) leads the crusade against girl child marriage, and (4) defies

And it is not enough just to be a Fulani to merit rulership—other considerations matter: most especially one must be of the *Toronke* line. Palmer recalls the consternation of the Sultan of Sokoto of the early 20th century over the appointment of a fellow Fulani as Emir of Katsina because the appointee was of *Mandinke* Fulani descent and not of *Toronke* extraction, like the ruling house in Sokoto.¹³³

Similarly, not just a capable Fulani, but only a direct descendant of Usman dan Fodio can ascend Sokoto throne, 200 years after the eruption of the jihad of 1804. In 1999, the Council of Ulama of Nigeria (COULAMA) vilified the Yoruba, Igbo, Bachama and Tangale as second class Muslims, to whom should not be conceded leadership position in the Nigerian Muslim community. At best, these ethnics are regarded as politico-spiritual saboteurs, a kind of liability who should not be trusted. Included in this purview are the myriads of Muslims in ethnic groups in the Middle Belt and the South. Furthermore, it is alarming to note that as opposed as JN1 and COULAMA are, COULAMA's perception, of those ethnics is not different from those of what Cornerly Casey calls urban ward gang[s] or known locally as '*yandaba* in Kano, and analogous to 'area boys' in Lagos.¹³⁴

This deep-seated Fulani hereditary hegemony within Islam in Nigeria is what critics such as Ibrahim Suleiman, Director, Centre

the rules of orthodox zakat gravity. The underlying leadership values are capable of charting the way forward for Kano. Nevertheless, the extent to which Kano's throne is not within the reach of the Hausa is (1) reflects the barbarity of the current system and (2) the extent of Hausaman's ideological captivity.

133 H. Palmer, "Some Observations on Captain R. S. Rattray's Paper, 'Present Tendencies of African Colonial Government'," in *Journal of the Royal African Society* Vol. 33. No 130 (Jan., 193), 39, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/717110> (accessed 29 August 2013); Palmer was not specific over the emir in question, but it is presumably the emir that succeeded Emir Yaro who Palmer deposed in 1906.

134 For a book on COULAMA, see O. Oluniyi, *The Council of Ulama and Peaceful Co-existence in Nigeria* (Lagos: Frontier Press, 2006), 113–118, 168; cf. C. Casey. "Marginal Muslims: Politics and the Perpetual Bounds of Islamic Authenticity in Northern Nigeria," in *Africa Today*, Vol. 54, No. 3, Muslim in West Africa in the Age of Neoliberalism (Spring, 2008, 67, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27666908> (accessed on 14 November 2013); J. Harnischfeger, "Islamisation and Ethnic Conversion in Nigeria" in *Anthropos*, Bd. 101, H. 1., 2006, 43, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40466619> (accessed on 14 November 2013)

for Islamic Legal Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, have berated as un-Islamic for the past three decades.¹³⁵ From a wider Yoruba perspective, Muslim Rights Concern, a Lagos-based Muslim organisation led by Is-haq Akintola, a Professor of Islamic Eschatology at Lagos State University, condemns the arrangement as an evidence of internal tyranny within the Nigerian Muslim community. He therefore campaigns openly in rallies, press release, and television appearances for democratisation of the office of President of the Nigerian Council for Islamic Affairs.

ISLAM AND ARABISM: A SLEIGHT OF HAND

Elsewhere Blyden avers,

“the religion of Arabia has this feature that it has been preached to, accepted by and become the abiding faith of members of all the known races[-]Caucasian, Mongolian, Negro, Shem, Ham, Japheth[:] all write under its banner and speak its language.”¹³⁶

What Blyden sees as the strength in the above is indeed its weakness because it is a form of imperialist pedagogy which harnesses Islam and Arabism as two sides of the same coin. It is bare-faced cultural imperialism.

BRAINWASHING

Blyden further extols the virtues of Islam as follows:

“Islam is the most effective educational force throughout Negroland. A system of common schools prevails throughout Islamic Africa by which every child is taught to read the Koran in the original and to commit to memory what has been taught. Thousands learn the Koran in this way and thus acquire

135 I. Sulaiman, *The Islamic State and the Challenge of History* (New York: Mansell Publishing Ltd, 1987, 96–97

136 E. Blyden, “Islam in Western Soudan,” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 2, No. 5 October 1902, 24

a familiarity with an immense number of Arabic words, which serve as a bond of union and produce solidarity of views and of interest which extends from the Atlantic to the Red Sea, and from the Mediterranean to the Equator.”¹³⁷

Rote learning – memorisation by repetition – in order to enable remembrance verbatim for children in their first year of formal education – has been defended as having some advantages. Rote learning in a second language for children in their first year of formal education is something else. Critics point out that it is one step away from brainwashing. Babatunde Fafunwa, a Lagosian, Muslim, second or third generation beneficiary of Blyden’s education policy, professor of education, and a one-time Nigerian Minister of Education was at the vanguard of the struggle against this form of education because it amounts to cultural imperialism.¹³⁸ At the risk of making undue comparison, it is perhaps helpful to recall that Christian missionary schools across board in Nigeria adopted a child’s first language for instruction in the first two years of formal education. That was up till 1972 when the missions were disinherited of their schools nation-wide.

THE LIQUOR WAR: THE CHRISTIAN FIGHT

Blyden observed that “the African Muhammadans object to the countenance given by Christians to the liquor traffic and liquor drinking, which is producing such great havoc on some parts of the West Coast.”¹³⁹ There are a number of issues which are rolled up into one in this observation which need to be disentangled.

First, Blyden deserves commendation for his courage in bringing up an embarrassing subject: the liquor traffic at the end of the 19th century and the early decades of the 20th century. In perspective, liquor as it is commonly called, should not be understood in the narrow

137 *ibid.*, 28

138 See T. Aladejana and K. Alao, *Aliu Babatunde Fafunwa: His Educational Philosophy and Contributions to Nigerian Education*, (The authors: 1993), 26, 27, 56, 57, 70; Mission societies working in the Northern Protectorate hold the same view; See Graham, 136

139 Blyden, “The Koran in Africa,” 169

sense as merely a personal intoxicant: (1) it had assumed the role of a currency in some riverine communities of the Niger Delta by the end of the 19th century.¹⁴⁰ (2) It had become a medium of unequal trade in particular – as Europeans exchanged numerous products they took away for their factories for one article: alcohol. In particular, when George Goldie successfully formed the United Africa Company (UAC) in 1879 by amalgamating most of the companies that were involved in trade up the Niger and the Benue, thereby creating a monopoly, “the company’s main exports to Nigeria were firearms and liquor”.¹⁴¹

Secondly, although officially no liquor was sold in Muslim polities, smuggling and consumption, was alive and well in the Muslim areas from pre-colonial times right up till when it did not raise an eye-brow.¹⁴² Precisely, there was demand for liquor in both the non-Muslim and the Muslim controlled districts so much so that by 1894, “half the revenue and 94.8 per cent of the customs of the Niger Coast Protectorate were derived from spirits, and in 1895 *The Times* observed that half the produce exported from West Africa was purchased with spirits”.¹⁴³ Similarly throughout the first decade of the 20th century, “liquor was Nigeria’s greatest import in terms of volume and retail values.”¹⁴⁴ In the light of these, liquor was a powerful tool for socio-economic oppression and impoverishment.

Nevertheless, Blyden conflated European traders, Christian missions, the so-called Christian countries, and the colonial government as if they all were one and the same entity, were acting in concert

140 G. Jones, “Native and Trade Currencies in Southern Nigeria during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in *Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan 1958), 52–53, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1156573> (accessed 26 July 2013)

141 Boer, 51

142 S. Heap, “‘We Think Prohibition Is a Farce’: Drinking in the Alcohol-Prohibited Zone of Colonial Northern Nigeria,” in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 42ff, No. 1 (1998), 27, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/220883>, (accessed on 18 August 2011); A. Olukoju, “Prohibition and Paternalism: The State and the Clandestine Liquor Traffic in Northern Nigeria, c. 1898–1918,” in *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1991), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/219794> (accessed on 28 March 2013)

143 Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 598

144 Heap, 25

or were maintaining the same interest, whereas he was well aware that they were different actors. Even from personal experience and testimony, Blyden was aware that Christian missions were opposed to the liquor traffic.¹⁴⁵ Flint highlights the principle clamour by Christian missionaries against the gin trade as follows:

“Except for some Manchester cottons, and a little Birmingham hardware, the traders, after eighty years of ‘legitimate commerce’, had brought little to West Africa of an ‘improving’ kind. The bulk of imports were still gin, rum, power, firearms, and mere trifles and amusing toys. In the 1890s the missionaries began to organize a clamour against the traders, seizing on the liquor traffic as the basis for their complaints. The Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee, under the Presidency of the Duke of Westminster, supported by the Aborigines Protection Society, Sir Charles Dilke, and other Radicals in Parliament, began to bombard the Colonial and Foreign Offices with correspondence and questions.”¹⁴⁶

In the light of the above, it would seem strange that Blyden was not aware that no interest group fought the gin trade as hard as the Christian missions.¹⁴⁷ So principled and consistent was their position that it came to a point when Bishop Tugwell of Lagos warned the Christian constituency to be “prepared for violent and organised opposition.”¹⁴⁸ It is against this background of protracted and bitter struggle between Christian missions on the one hand and government and commerce on the other that an article in the weekly *West Africa* magazine credited the missionary movement as having won the battle against the two powerful actors.¹⁴⁹

MUSLIM OPPOSITION TO PROHIBITION

In the light of the above, Blyden must have been ultra-selective in

145 Blyden, “Islam in Western Soudan,” 33

146 Flint, 97

147 Boer, 187–188

148 *ibid.*, 187

149 *ibid.*, 269

where he looked and what he chose to see in this matter of liquor traffic because while the missions were busy waging the war against the gin trade because of its impact on African economies and its effect on generations of Africans, Muslims inclusive, “Muslim communities of Southern Nigeria traded in spirits, and were averse to prohibition.”¹⁵⁰

It should be noted perhaps, that the colonial regime had the executive advantage to do something about it, if the will was there; but there was no will to stop it. Rather, the regime found a scapegoat in the Dutch and the Germans, later exceeded by the Americans. Presumably, because it was the Nigerian economy that was hit hard and not that of the United Kingdom, that there was no will to act. If it were the UK economy that was directly hit hard, there would have been a solution just as when the British naval squadron took action against the Portuguese in Nigerian waters in the first half of the 19th century.

WHO IS MORE GENEROUS?

Lastly, “African Muslims live only for Islam. The wealthy ones – and there are seldom any paupers among them – use their means for the promotion of intellectual and spiritual education.”¹⁵¹ Anyone familiar with the habit of generosity of some Muslim worshipers after Friday prayers and on religious festival days would agree with Blyden that some wealthy Muslims are mindful of the needs of the poor in their community. Development experts insist, however, that while it is helpful to place a fish in the hands of the hungry, it is better to teach the recipient of favour how to fish so that he can cater for himself and his family in the future and henceforth stand on his feet to participate in the life of the community on an equal footing with others.

As noted earlier, Blyden was hyper-selective in where he looked and what he chose to see. In particular, the disparity between the rich and the poor is most glaring in centres of Muslim concentration in the Far North with the chronic *almajiri* phenomenon, which is to a much lesser extent in the Middle Belt and virtually non-existent

150 Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 604

151 Blyden, “Islam in Western Soudan,” 29

in the southern communities. It is in this context therefore that a recent observation by the Conference of Teachers in Arabic and Islamic Schools in Arewa (COTAISA) assumes significance as it is a world away from that of Edward Blyden.

One recalls the Conference of Teachers in Arabic and Islamic Schools in Arewa (COTAISA) which accused Far North and the Middle Belt elders, traditional rulers, retired top military officers and government functionaries of using religion only to exploit their people rather than eradicate illiteracy, unemployment and poverty among children and the youth. They contrasted the habit of wealthy Muslims in the south who offered scholarships to indigent students, established schools, and build hospitals and other community amenities. Given the fact that this group of professionals is a close observer of the *almajiri* phenomenon, COTAISA noted that

“traditional rulers in Southern Nigeria are busy mobilising the rich to invest in rural development, education, health, etc., while on the other hand, traditional rulers in Northern Nigeria are only busy selling chieftaincy titles to the rich who can afford to buy them costly cars or provide them financial and material rewards. The wealthy Moslems in the North have woefully failed to emulate the rich in Southern Nigeria who assist their poor and communities in all developments.”¹⁵²

Besides, some Far North-based analysts such as M. Yusha’u and El-Rufai see a direct link between the emergence of Boko Haram, glorified criminals who began their career as Al Qaeda’s apprentices, and the largest ISIS affiliates by 2015 on the one hand, and the corruption, affluence, and impunity on the part of Muslim leadership, and elite failure in the region on the other.¹⁵³

152 I. Abdulsalami, and S. Adeoye, “Islamic Groups, Others Urge Restraint over Adoption of Sharia,” in *Guardian*, 3 March 2000, 4

153 Yusha’u is a PhD student at Sheffield University, England. See M. Yusha’u, “Muslim Leadership, Elite Failure and Boko Haram,” in <http://www.gamji.com/article8000/NEWS8703.html> (accessed on 26 June 2013); Nasiru El-Rufai, “A North without People,” in <http://m.facebook.com/nasiruelrufai/posts/10151714121950128> (accessed on 26 June 2013); N. El-Rufai was a cabinet minister in the 4th Republic. He became the Governor of Kaduna State on 19 May 2015.

REGRET AND DEMOLITION

Nevertheless, despite all the arguments in favour of Islam above, Blyden demolished his positive portrayal of Islam in his mature and more reflective years when he realised more fully the inhumanity that Islam had inflicted in and on Africa. With a trace of bitterness, Blyden exploded,

The oppression of this race [i.e. the black race] have been men with religion ... And now the last of her oppressors, tearing from her bosom annually half a million of her children, are nations with the Koran. All travellers tell us that when the Arab traders in East Africa are suppressed the work will be done.¹⁵⁴

Apparently Blyden was rather myopic in his earlier observation and assessment of Islam and therefore, not quite informed of the Arab slave trade across the Sahara desert especially through the Tripoli route. His hasty overrating of Islam early in life may have been over-reaction to the racial inhumanity he suffered his youth in America.

SUMMARY

In one sweep, Blyden (1) romanticises Islam as a magnet that brings races together but ignores the gross tribalism in the Fulani camp, (2) conflates Islam and Arabism as a positive force in Africa while ignoring the cultural imperialism it engenders and (3) silent on the corrosive brainwashing it unleashes on African children. (4) The ambiguity on alcohol, and (5) the half-truth on generosity are telling. Blyden's eagerness to see Africa unite cut and paste after the word exploitation against Western exploitation may have been largely responsible for what he looked for and what he chose to see in Islam.

In any case, the implication of his mature reflection is that Lugard erected his opportunistic edifice of social injustice in Northern Nigeria, on quicksand.

¹⁵⁴ cited in Akinola, 6

THE *DEFENSOR FIDEI* ARGUMENT

Even though Lugard's justification of his policies had become cobwebby by 1960, the colonial government nonetheless found an ally over its exclusion of missionaries from certain areas of Northern Nigeria. Precisely, Dr. Chinedu Ubah, a historian at the Department of African Studies, University of Nsukka, justifies Lugard's policy of inevitable encouragement to the spread of Islam and opposition to Christian missions. His logic is, however, different from that of Lugard.

According to Ubah,

Each emir was the *defensor fidei* within the area of authority. He could not willingly welcome the missionaries and by so doing sponsor proselytization. This was absolutely inconsistent with his position, at any rate so long as he could not plead a *force majeure*.¹⁵⁵

He reiterates as follows,

the simple truth was that the emirs could not of their own volition let in the missionaries without abdicating their solemn responsibilities as Muslim rulers, without antagonising their subjects and in particular the Muslim intelligentsia.¹⁵⁶

Although Ubah is logical in the abstract, his proposition lacks historical integrity considering emir-missionary interaction especially in the second half of the 19th century. In what follows, evidence is adduced to show that Muslim leaders and their Christian counterparts in Northern Nigeria cooperated to one another's advantage in the second half of the 19th century.

BISHOP CROWTHER AND ETSU MALIKI

As a background to this era, it is a matter of historical pride to state that Crowther began translating the Bible into the Yoruba language and compiling a Yoruba dictionary. In 1843, a grammar book which

155 C. Ubah, "Problems of Christian Missionaries in the Muslim Emirates of Nigeria, 1900–1928," in *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1976, 353

156 *ibid.*, 354

he started working on during the Niger expedition was published; and a Yoruba version of the Anglican Book of Common Prayer followed later. Crowther also compiled *A Vocabulary of the Yoruba Language*, including a large number of local proverbs, published in London in 1852. He also began codifying other languages. Following the British Niger Expeditions of 1854 and 1857, Crowther produced a primer for the Igbo language in 1857, another for the Nupe language in 1860, and a full grammar and vocabulary of Nupe in 1864.¹⁵⁷




Fig. 12
Bishop Crowther

By 1857, Bishop Samuel Ajayi Crowther moved his seat to Lokoja from where he laboured, with his missionary diocese covering a large area from the Niger Delta to the regions deep in the Middle Belt, with an all-black staff from Sierra Leone. He was consecrated bishop Western Equatorial Africa beyond the Queen's Dominions¹⁵⁸ on 29 June 1864. In the same year, Oxford University broke ranks with conservatism and conferred on him an honorary Doctor of Divinity degree.

As Ayandele perceptively notes, Crowther

made friendliness with the Etsu of Nupe an essential strand of his policy. Consequently he became, perhaps, the most powerful external influence on the Muslim rulers of the Nupe country between 1869 and 1888. In fact the Emir allowed him to draw up the constitution by which Jacob Meheux Musa a liberated

¹⁵⁷ "Samuel Ajayi Crowther" in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samuel_Ajayi_Crowther (accessed 1 December 2014)

¹⁵⁸ Some racist English missionaries in Abeokuta and Lagos, one of whom considered himself more suitable than Crowther for the post of bishop, and could not address Crowther, 'my Lord Bishop' on account of the colour of Crowther's skin and because Crowther was a former slave boy ensured his move away from Yorubaland. Therefore, a new diocese excluding Yorubaland, where the English were entrenched, had to be created for him outside "the Queen's dominions" Cf. Anonymous, "Anglican Church Sorry for 'Betrayal' of Samuel Ajayi Crowther" in *Thisday*, 3 August 2015, 7

Muslim African, administered Lokoja until the days of Goldie's Royal Company.¹⁵⁹

In particular, Crowther paid Etsu Nupe annual visit with presents and frequently offered political advice. As a result of the confidence the emir reposed in him, the emir became disposed to consider Crowther's missionary programme for the Nupe kingdom. In fact, the Etsu did not dictate to Crowther where to go but gave him a free hand. As a result of this, several mission stations grew up, such as Egga and Kippo Hills.¹⁶⁰ "Shortly thereafter, Bida, Ilorin, and Gwandu granted permission for stations to be opened in their territories. The Fulani rulers did not merely tolerate these stations; they welcomed them."¹⁶¹ Not least is the fact that Gwandu was the capital of the eastern flank of the Sokoto Empire.

To illustrate the extent of Crowther's esteem among some emirs, it is important to quote from a letter written by Maliki, the Etsu Nupe at that time, dictated to one Rev. C. Paul, one of the missionaries on ground for onward transmission to the bishop. The letter was not dated but it is safe to assume that it must have been written after 1884 when Crowther stopped paying him visits; otherwise he would have waited for the next visit to lay his complaint to Crowther in person.

Maliki dictated,

Salute Crowther, the great Christian minister. After salutation, please tell him he is a father to us in this land; anything he sees will injure us in all this land, he would not like it. This we know perfectly well.

159 E. Ayandele, "The Missionary Factor in Northern Nigeria," in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* Vol. 3, No. 3, December 1966, 505

160 *ibid.*, 506

161 F. Salamone, "Early Expatriate Society in Northern Nigeria: Contributions to a Refinement of a Theory of Pluralism," in *African Studies Review*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Sep., 1978), 46, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/563660> (accessed on 28 March 2013). Actually, Thomas Bowen was granted permission to establish a mission station in Ilorin in the early 1850s – before Crowther started his ministry in Lokoja, 1857. The offer was however downplayed later on, and advised to go to Ogbomosho instead, due to intrigue. See Bowen, 202–204. Ogbomosho was later to benefit immensely from the short-sighted piece of advice.

The matter which I am speaking with my mouth, write it; it is about Barasa (rum or gin). Barasa, Barasa, Barasa! My God, it has ruined our country, it has ruined our people very much, it has made our people become mad. I have given a law that no one dares buy or sell it; and anyone who is found selling it, his house is to be eaten up (plundered); any one found drunk will be killed. I have told all the Christian traders that I agree to anything for trade except Barasa. I have told Mr. McIntosh's people today, the Barasa remaining with them must be returned down the river. Tell Crowther, the great Christian minister, that he is our father. I beg you, Malam Kipo (Rev. C. Paul, native missionary), don't forget this writing because we all beg that he (Bishop Crowther) should beg the great priests (Committee C.M.S.) that they should beg the English Queen to prevent bringing Barasa to this land.

For God and the prophet's sake, and the prophet His messenger's sake, he (Crowther) must help us in this matter, that of Barasa. We all have confidence in him, he must not leave our country to become spoiled by Barasa. Tell him may God bless him in his work. This is the mouth-word from Maliki, the Emir of Nupe.¹⁶²

Several points are worth noting in this passionate letter. Firstly, the phrase "Christian traders" is a case of wrong identification. The so-called Christian traders were European traders which Etsu Maliki, in his context, presumed to be Christians.

Secondly, the following statements are very revealing and therefore should not be glossed over: (1) "please tell him he is a father to us"; (2) "we all have confidence in him" and (3) "anything he sees will injure us in all this land, he would not like it. This we know perfectly well." The first and second statements are typically African expressions of respect for someone who is placed in high esteem in any community; in this case among the Nupe. It is analogous to what the title "Madiba" is to Nelson Mandela in South Africa. The third is an indication of personal disposition: he was somebody known for his preoccupation with the welfare of the Nupe people

162 J. Page, *Samuel Crowther: The Slave Boy Who Became Bishop of the Niger* 3rd edition, (New York: Fleming. H. Revell Company) n.d.; 154

who were predominantly Muslim and traditionalists in the second half of the 19th century.

Why did Maliki consider Bishop Crowther the right person to appeal to for help in stemming the rum and gun tide? It is because the missions were the only organised agency that saw the evil in the primacy of rum and gun trade by which European nations and traders exported to Europe about 26 types of raw products from Africa and imported two types of materials to Africa: rum and gun. The emirs were aware of the principled battle the missions were waging against the trade imbalance and the scandal.¹⁶³

The missions took the fight of the Colonial Office with correspondence by the Native Races and Liquor Traffic United Committee and the Parliament by the Aborigines Protection Society and the other Radicals. They took the fight to North America as well. As Blyden himself recalls,

At the Ecumenical Conference in New York [in 1900] to which reference has been made above, numerous and earnest complaints were made by missionaries of the demoralisation brought among their converts by civilization [commerce]. Rev, John G. Paton, D.D., New Hebrides, Presbyterian missionary, said: "After we give the Gospel to the heathen, and life and property are safe, trade follows us, not to uphold the work of God, but to give the natives rum and brandy, which ruin both their bodies and souls."¹⁶⁴

Blyden continues, "Everyone will remember the fervent appeals of the Bishop of Western Equatorial Africa against the liquor traffic."¹⁶⁵ And when the major wine traders notably Germans, British and American merchants would not listen, it came to a point that Selwyn Tugwell, the CMS Bishop in Lagos alerted the churches to be

163 J. Flint, "Mary Kingsley – A Reassessment," in *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1963), 96–97, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/179615> (accessed 18 October 2013)

164 Blyden. "Islam in Western Soudan," 33

165 *ibid.*, 33; interestingly, Bishop Crowther's name reverberated at the New York conference 12 years after his death.

“prepared for violent and organised opposition”¹⁶⁶ whereas as stated earlier, there was considerable Muslim opposition to prohibition.

The anti-beer war was raging when Lugard proclaimed the protectorate of Northern Nigeria, and it will be recalled that he promised in the proclamation to “put final stop to the manipulation of slavery and of liquor traffic among the natives.” Nevertheless, his regime had a half-hearted approach to it.

Interestingly, the emirs and the commoners were working at cross purposes on the liquor issue, because “there was a lucrative market in the North”¹⁶⁷ as a result of smuggling. Indeed, there were two major routes: the first was overland from Lagos through Ikirun to Ilorin with Ikirun (in present-day Oshun State) and Ilorin (in present-day Kwara State) serving as loading depots.¹⁶⁸ Thereafter, brandy bottles in kolanut baskets were offloaded in Kano.¹⁶⁹ The second route was from the Niger Delta creeks through Asaba-Onitsha to Lokoja in the first leg.¹⁷⁰ Smuggling on this route was more flagrant given the added dimension of duplicity on the part of police and customs officials.¹⁷¹

There is no doubt that the missions were the ones fighting the emirs’ cause – way beyond the latter’s landlocked enclaves. For this, the emirs respected and cooperated with western missionaries who they saw as the only parties fighting the gin scourge. It would be intriguing to know whether any of the high profile Muslim conferences of the period offered any opportunity for participants to advocate any cause that was particularly of concern to Christians.

Therefore, contrary to the impression created by Ubah, Christian missionaries and Muslim leaders were not sworn enemies. The mutual suspicion that ensued and progressively degenerated in the post-colonial era between Muslims and Christians began with the carefully cultivated crop by the colonial regime, with fruitage of violence in the post-colonial era.

166 Boer, 187

167 Heap, 45

168 *ibid.*, 42, 43

169 *ibid.*, 44, 49

170 *ibid.*, 42ff

171 *ibid.*, 42

PRINCE SAUDA'S DARING INITIATIVE

The Emir of Bida, Emir of Nasarawa, and Prince Mizinyamba of Kontagora were well aware of their respective roles as *defensor fidei* [defender of Islamic faith] when they initiated contact with Christian missionary bodies by writing letters urging them to come and start work in their respective domains. And the request for missionaries was not a matter of a fleeting moment – it went on for 18 years. In the hope that missionaries were forthcoming at a point, the Emir of Bida went further to write to the Emir of Yola urging him to allow missionary activities in his domain. Not the least is the bold initiative taken by one Sauda, son of the Sultan of Sokoto, who offered to assist missionary tour of Zaria, Sokoto, and Adamawa domains. The point here is that initiative for missionary work, without inhibition to proselytization, in the Far North and Middle Belt came from Muslim leaders.¹⁷²

“the Emir of Bida, Emir of Nasarawa, and Prince Mizinyamba of Kontagora were well aware of their respective roles as *defensor fidei* [defender of Islamic faith] when they initiated contact with Christian missionary bodies by writing letters urging them to come and start work in their respective domains”

ZARIA'S INVITATION TO MILLER

The Emir of Zaria urged the Hausa (missionary) Party on its way to Kano, early 1900, not to bother continuing their journey to Kano. Rather, they should settle in Zaria. The Party, nonetheless, insisted on reaching their destination. Their mission was, however, not as successful as they had hoped. The Emir re-issued the invitation for return to Zaria two years later with Dr. Walter Miller arriving in 1904 to set up a hospital, a school, and a house of worship.¹⁷³ The

172 Ayandele, “The Missionary Factor”, 506

173 E. Ayandele, *The Missionary Impact on Northern Nigeria: 1842–1914: A Political and Social Analysis*, (Ibadan: Longman Group, 1966), 132ff

scenario herein is not that of a hostile Muslim posture to Christian advance but of cooperation for mutual benefit.

KANO'S OVERTURES TO ROBINSON

The rough handling meted out to the Hausa Party in Kano in 1900¹⁷⁴ was not because they were Christians per se, but largely because they disregarded protocol. After all, Canon Robinson, a minister of the Church of England lived in Kano city for three months in 1895 in order to improve his proficiency in Hausa language. Indeed, the rapport between Robinson vis-à-vis Kano authorities was such that when the former indicated interest in translating the Bible into Hausa, Kano authorities assembled language experts to assist him.¹⁷⁵ Obviously, the authorities that wished to facilitate Bible translation knew that the ultimate aim of Bible translation into Hausa was proselytization; but translation per se was for the Kano liberal mentality, principally a matter of scholarship and not proselytization. Therefore, the report that the missionary party of March 1900, led by Bishop Tugwell of Lagos, narrowly escaped death when they came face-to-face with the emir of Kano to request permission to carry out missionary work in Kano, must have been an exaggeration for two reasons: (1) to stone, hang, impale, behead or shoot unarmed English missionaries – four young graduates – and their bishop go against the liberal spirit of the people of Kano. (2) Every Kano emir, past and present, knows that stoning, hanging, impaling, beheading, or shooting unarmed English missionaries – four young graduates – and their bishop – on a visit to Kano in broad day light, could not possibly have ended there and then.¹⁷⁶

DISTRIBUTION OF BIBLE AND KORAN

It is perhaps important to note that during this period of emir-

174 *ibid.*, 134

175 It should be noted that the Koran was not yet translated into Hausa.

176 Herbert Tugwell who led the missionary journey to Kano was the CMS bishop in Lagos.

missionary mutual disposition towards one another, the headquarters of the CMS sent a leather-bound Bible to each of the following: Sultan of Sokoto,¹⁷⁷ Emir of Gwandu,¹⁷⁸ Emir of Ilorin, and Emir of Bida.¹⁷⁹ It is noteworthy that the recipients did not find the Bibles objectionable.

Besides these high profile emirs, Bishop Crowther states categorically that other Muslim kings

were very glad to receive Arabic Bibles from me; so much are they valued, that one of them was very reluctant to part with his copy, to gratify the request of his master the Sultan of Sokoto, till I had promised to bring him another copy at my return next season.¹⁸⁰

Initially, Crowther was not keen on distributing copies of the Bible in Arabic to some Muslim kings for fear that they might use them for prophylactic purposes. However, a particular experience made him change his mind,

An old Mohammedan priest had asked for a copy of an Arabic Bible for a long time, but it was not given him from fear that he would make a bad use of it, making charms [prophylactics against disease or bad luck] from it as they did from the Koran. However after many years' urgent request with faithful promise that he would not make a bad use of it, a copy was given him which he received upon his knees in the presence of his sons and pupils, who accompanied him, as a token of gratitude for the possession of the precious book, not to be otherwise used than for instruction.¹⁸¹

No, Muslim potentates were not opposed to Christian missionaries. They regarded them as agents of light and therefore with much

177 Sokoto was the capital of the western half of the Caliphate although Sokoto doubled as the capital of the overall empire

178 Gwandu was the capital of the eastern part of the empire.

179 Ayandele, "The Missionary Factor", 506

180 S. Crowther, *Experiences with Heathens and Mohammedans in West Africa*, (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1892, 24

181 *ibid.*, 24

respect. The unease of the 20th century was planted and tended by the British colonial regime.

ROUSING WELCOME TO MISSIONARIES

Prof E. Ayandele, who has done much work on emir-missionary interaction in the second half of the 19th century, speaks on the one hand, of an “injunction by the Sultan of Turkey to the Emirs to oppose the British”.¹⁸² He does not, however, say which Sultan of Turkey issued the order to the emirs. Ayça Atay, both a Research Assistant and Ph.D. Candidate in Communication and Media Studies, Eastern Mediterranean University, Famagusta-North Cyprus, is of the opinion that the sultan in question “seems to be Sultan Abdulhamid II [1876–1909] because he is the sultan who pursued pan-Islamist policies in that century, connecting with the Muslims outside the Ottoman Empire.”¹⁸³

Contrary to the injunction of the strongman of the Ottoman Empire, Ayandele testifies to

the rousing welcome accorded them [Bishop Tugwell of Lagos and his Hausa (missionary) Party on their way to Kano in February 1900] everywhere by the common people – such that the missionaries felt that they could go anywhere.¹⁸⁴

Furthermore, “even so feared a man as the Nagwamanchi of the Sudan, the slave-raiding Emir of Kontagora, gave instruction throughout his territory that no one must offer opposition to the [missionaries].”¹⁸⁵ In particular, Ayandele continues, “the point must be made that the rousing welcome given by the masses to the missionaries from Jebba to Zaria was genuine.”¹⁸⁶

182 Ayandele, *The Missionary Impact*, 134

183 In a private email message to me on 31 August 2014

184 Ayandele, *The Missionary Impact*, 131

185 *ibid.*, 132

186 *ibid.*, 131

Prof. Ayandele's testimony to the rousing welcome by the masses to the missionaries from Ilorin¹⁸⁷ through Jebba to Zaria is so significant that it should not be passed over lightly, given that the stretch cuts across several emirates – with all of them cooperating with the missionaries who in this case were all British – in fact all English.

How far was Ilorin from Zaria in 1900? Going by Governor Hesketh Bell's estimate that it "would take a man, doing on horseback the ordinary journey of 20 miles a day, at least three weeks to travel from any point on the southern boundary to the border line on the north",¹⁸⁸ in 1911, it is safe to deduce that it could have taken at least two and a half weeks from Ilorin to Zaria in 1900, considering the fact that the routes were less secure in 1900 than in February 1911. The way and manner the masses all across what is now the Middle Belt region and right into the Far North, regardless of religious affiliation, including emirs who were the acknowledged *defensor fidei* received the missionaries, is yet evidence why Ubah's *defensor fidei* thesis is misleading.

TURKEY AND NORTHERN NIGERIA: ASYMMETRIES

Ubah cites a situation in the Turkey of 1864 to buttress his argument for colonial administration's opposition to missionary advance. According to him,

The crisis which faced the Nigerian emirs consequently on the missionary agitation early in the colonial period was exactly the same as that which had confronted the rulers of Turkey several decades earlier. Here as in Northern Nigeria, Christian missionaries wanted freedom to proselytise, and so great were the feelings in Turkey against the incessant demands that the prime minister, Ali Pasha, in 1864 sent a strongly worded letter to the British government to the effect that the Ottoman government could not tolerate proselytization.¹⁸⁹

187 *ibid.*, 131

188 H. Bell, "Recent Progress in Northern Nigeria," in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 10, No. 10 (July 1911), 378, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/714737> (accessed on 17 March 2013)

189 Ubah, 354

The situation the emirs in Northern Nigeria faced is different from what Ubah describes of Turkey. The following are few examples. (1) After a fruitful dialogue between Bishop Ajayi Crowther and the emir of Ilorin in the latter's court in 1872, the latter asked the former to pray for him. Bishop Crowther easily substituted the phrase, Emir of Ilorin, for "our most gracious Sovereign Lady, Queen Victoria" in the Anglican prayer book, and prayed accordingly, with an immense impression on the latter and his court officials.¹⁹⁰ (2) "in point of fact, often unknown to the administration [but not unknown to the emirs on ground] [Dr] Miller preached openly in most of the large cities in the territory between 1900 and 1912."¹⁹¹ (3) Contrary to official cover-up,

the Emir of Katsina reiterated his desire to have missionaries from time to time and invited Mallam Fati, an educated Christian convert, to his palace, introducing him to the mallams whom he invited to listen to the Christian teacher's preaching.¹⁹²

(4) In Bida, "the CMS mission was by Emir's desire close to the palace and the Emir provided the ridiculously cheap labour with which the buildings were erected; the emir and the chiefs gratefully sending their children to school."¹⁹³ (5) The Emir of Zaria patronised Miller's co-educational school in Zaria by being the first to register his children.

"Bishop Crowther easily substituted the phrase, Emir of Ilorin, for "our most gracious Sovereign Lady, Queen Victoria" in the Anglican prayer book, and prayed accordingly, with an immense impression on the latter and his court officials."

190 A. Walls, "Africa as the Theatre of Christian Engagement with Islam in the Nineteenth Century" in *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 29, Fasc. 2, (May, 1999), 163, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1581870> (accessed on 1 August 2011)

191 Ayandele, *The Missionary Impact*, 133

192 *ibid.*, 133

193 *ibid.*, 142

In all, what Ubah describes as happening in Turkey and what was actually happening in Northern Nigeria is a case of asymmetry, and it is sad that both are portrayed as the same thing. The played-up ill-will between emirs and missionaries was a conscious handiwork of British administrators. This is further illustrated by an incident in Rumaisha, narrated by Jan Boer below.

In the course of grassroots interactions, regardless of religious affiliation that go on, on a daily basis, throughout the length and breadth of Northern Nigeria, a judge made his house available to Christians to hold their worship services, pending the time they would be numerically and financially strong enough to erect their own place of worship. On hearing of this gesture, the colonial officer was livid with anger that “a Muslim judge” would be that cooperative with local Christians. Obviously, what he wanted and anticipated was a report of aggravated conflict between Muslims and Christians in his district so that he could be more draconian in implementing existing edicts. Instead, he received a report of cooperation. However, it turned out that the man in question was a traditionalist judge.¹⁹⁴

THE GOSPELS AS TEXTBOOKS

Lastly, and perhaps the strongest evidence in support of the antithesis to Ubah’s position is the fact that Emir Aliyu dan Sidi of Zaria used the Gospel according to Mark and the Gospel according to John as his textbooks in his study of Hausa in *boko* (Roman script). He sponsored a slave in school at day and took private lessons from him at night in order to overcome illiteracy, in order to offer better leadership with greater prospect for the people of Zaria. His effort has paid off because throughout the 20th century, Zaria was always one step ahead of the other communities in terms of the siting of educational institutions. It is a far cry from the contemporary furore over whether Boko Haram has any legitimacy vis-à-vis *boko*.

“Emir Aliyu dan Sidi of Zaria used the Gospel according to Mark and the Gospel according to John as his textbooks in his study of Hausa in *boko*”

194 Boer, 160

In the light of the above, why would emirs, *defensores fidei*, who Ubah suggests could not possibly condone missionary presence and activities in their respective domains, openly disregard their overlord in Sokoto and invite Christian missionary enterprise in their respective domains? Why was a Sokoto prince consciously abetting missionary incursion into Muslim emirates of Sokoto, Zaria, and Adamawa? Why was a copy of the Bible not an objectionable present from a missionary agency to the emirs aforementioned and their overlord –the Sultan of Sokoto?

The answer is unmistakable. Those emirs could no longer deny the positive socio-economic and cultural impact that missionary presence and enterprise was making in the southern protectorates in the second half of the 19th century, driven by the ‘Bible and the Plough’ campaign.¹⁹⁵

It is the harnessing of the Bible and the Plough that gave rise to the introduction of rubber, cotton, coffee, maize, cocoa, sugar cane and palm oil plantations for export with indigenous Christian entrepreneurs. In turn, internal market for vegetables, pineapples, oranges, lime, and kola expanded. In their wake came industrial skills such as carpentry, building construction, machine repair, operation of palm crushing machine, sugar making, and industrial farming.¹⁹⁶

“Those emirs could no longer deny the positive socio-economic and cultural impact that missionary presence and enterprise was making in southern protectorates in the second half of the 19th century”

Journalism and newspaper publishing began with a bilingual newspaper, *Iwe-Irohin*, in Abeokuta in 1859. The aim of the publishers was to make the Christian converts of the day more socially

195 For an introductory reading on the impact of Christian presence in southern Nigeria in this period, see J. Webster, “The Bible and the Plough,” in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1963), supra, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856670> (accessed on 28 September 2013); S. Berry, Christianity and the Rise of Cocoa-Growing in Ibadan and Ondo, in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (December 1968), 439–451, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856765> accessed on 2 October 2013)

196 Webster, 422ff

aware and responsible. Known for its hard-hitting editorials, the paper was critical of both the British Consul-General in Lagos as well as the British merchants, for whom it was business as usual without consideration for what was happening around them, especially the impact of the incendiary war going on among the Yoruba.¹⁹⁷ The example of *Iwe-Irohin* led the nationalists to launch newspapers by the 1880s, with the people of the southern protectorates regardless of religious affiliation increasingly becoming more socially aware and emboldened to participate in the life of community.

Secondary school education gradually gained ground.¹⁹⁸ But the missions did more than the Bible and the Plough. They did not neglect the sporting or recreation dimension of life. The Presbyterians added football through Calabar. Not only was it well received, it became a nationwide sport in the 20th century, so much so that it is being debated whether there is any other force that brings Nigerians together like football.

The above were the socio-economic and cultural realities that accompanied Christian presence, and the emirs could not feign ignorance of them. In their estimation, feigning ignorance would have been an equivalent of doctrinal unorthodoxy on their part, placing them in jeopardy, in the eyes of the Muslim intelligentsia.

DEFENSOR FIDEI STAYING POWER

Even though the view propounded by Ubah has no basis in fact, it was widely believed because of the lie that (1) Frederick Lugard entered into an agreement with the Fulani rulers not to impose Christianity on the conquered emirates and that (2) Lugard was bound by his word. These two claims need to be examined because of the power they exercised ever since they went viral.

197 See my PhD thesis, H. Awoniyi, [O. Oluniyi] “An Assessment of the *Nigerian Christian Magazine’s* Response to Oppression in Nigeria as an Advocacy Journal, 1967–1987”, Ph.D. Thesis, Faculty of Arts and Divinity, University of Aberdeen, 1995

198 See J. Ade Ajayi, “The Development of Secondary Grammar School in Nigeria,” in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1963, 523, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856676> (accessed on 2 October 2013

The standard Muslim demand that Muslim armies make of conquered peoples is to change their religion to Islam. Therefore, Sokoto expected Lugard, supposing he was Christian, to make the same demand of them to convert to Christianity – and they would have obliged. But Lugard rightly would not have resorted to anything of the sort. Rather, he assured the conquered of their freedom to practice their religion – which was right.

However, if Lugard had any inkling of justice, which it later became clear was not his favoured virtue, he would have made it clear in the same breath that whereas the victors were not interested in imposing a religion on the vanquished, the vanquished had no right to inhibit others from practicing theirs, or to hinder any persons from exercising their inalienable right to change their religion. Given their circumstance, the Sokoto authorities would have accepted it as a fair deal indeed, and that would have paved the way for a win-win scenario for the future of Northern Nigeria.

Why was Lugard not interested in clarifying his position on 21 March 1903? Ubah puts it down to timidity.

In the wake of their military defeat, Muslim rulers probably would all have made substantial concessions on the missionary issue if British officials had applied strong pressures on them, but the administration itself was timid, and the emirs did not hesitate to exploit this timidity.¹⁹⁹

Once again, Ubah has to be contradicted on this point because Lugard was a man of war who had fought in the Afghan War, the Sudan campaign, the Third Burmese War, and in British Nyasaland, for the Imperial British East Africa Company, and for the Royal Niger Company. Warfare was the only training he had, and he was used to accepting surrender, the latest being in Yola, Bida, Kontagora, Bornu and Kano. Indeed, there was no sign of timidity on the day he installed Muhammadu Attahiru II, on 21 March 1903 as the new helmsman in Sokoto. Declared Lugard:

The old treaties are dead, you have killed them. Now these are the words which I, the High Commissioner, have to say for the

199 Ubah, 362

future. The Fulani in old times under dan Fodio conquered this country. They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose kings and to create kings. They in turn have by defeat lost their rule which have come into the hands of the British. All these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took the right to do now pass to the British.²⁰⁰

There is no echo of timidity in the foregoing! Additionally, Lugard demoted Attahiru II to his face from the status of sultan to that of emir at his installation and Lugard told Attahiru that his authority did not extend beyond Sokoto Emirate. That was a power on display!

Lugard's problem was likely an admixture of guilt and something else, for the amount of bloodshed in the process of occupation and therefore a felt need to impress his critics. And it should be stressed that an action to install religious tolerance would not have been a special favour or some kind of partiality towards Christianity or other religions; indeed, advancement of tolerance was consistent with his agnostic conviction. Had he been guided by his conviction, the political football between British officers and Muslim potentates which his action turned the missionary agencies into, would not have arisen.

REFLECTION

Ubah's defensor fidei argument is misleading. Christian missions and Muslim leaders in the 19th century and in the early years of the colonial era worked for mutual interest, whether it was in the case of (1) Bishop Crowther and Etsu Maliki, (2) Prince Sauda's daring initiative, (3) Zaria's overtures to Miller, (4) Kano's overture to Robinson, (5) in the distribution of copies of the Bible and of the Koran, (6) rousing welcome to missionaries in the Middle Belt on their way to Kano, (7) in the asymmetry in the attitude to and treatment of missionaries in Turkey and Northern Nigeria in the 19th century and in (8) the adoption of the Gospels as textbooks

200 P. Tibenderana, "The Irony of Indirect Rule in Sokoto Emirate, Nigeria, 1903–1944," in *African Studies Review*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Apr., 1988), 69, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/524584> (accessed on 27 February 2012)

in his determination to study boko, there was no friction between Muslims and Christians in Northern Nigerian in the 19th century and early 20th century. The latter unease between the two communities was a deliberate cultivation of mutual suspicion, tension, and violence between them by the British colonial government. To the extent that Ubah creates a different impression, to the same extent is his argument reckless.

Ubah's argument has an addition potential damage. In particular, Ubah taught history as Associate Professor and later Professor at the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, since the mid-1980s. One only hopes that his thought on the subject matter matured in his professorial chair as did those of Dr. Blyden. If, however, it remained fossilised, then one can safely assume that a generation of Nigerian military cadets, most of whom have advanced to senior ranks, may have been fed with a distortion of an important aspect of Nigerian history, with grave consequences beyond the obvious.

SEEDS OF MUSLIM-TRADITIONALIST TENSION

The colonial administration planted seeds of violence in small and large traditionalist pre-colonial polities. Karekare is representative of the smaller polities while Borgu is cited as an illustration of what the larger polities suffered in the hands of the Residents and their District Officers.

KAREKARE, YAUURI, AND OTHERS

The Chibok community examined earlier share some commonality with the Karekare, who numbered about 40,000 people by 1936, were a good example of traditionalist polities that did not give in to the jihad invasion of their territory throughout the 100 years rule of the Sokoto Empire. With the advent of colonial rule, the colonial authorities subjugated them to Muslim leaders. As Crocker notes,

When we drew boundaries, not only at the inception of our regime in Lugard's day, but also again at the several rectifications which were made in these parts in 1915, 1924, and 1928,

we cut the tribe up amongst two Provinces and three different Emirates (Missau, Katagum, and Fika) within those Provinces sharing them amongst the Emirates concerned, despite the fact that they had never been subjugated by the Moslems. The boundary-making was done in an arbitrary way and with indifference to the Karekare: villages were actually split in halves (Biramu, Kwobkwop, Kobe, Zaura, etc.)²⁰¹

The method of splitting up the Karekare is just part of the story because having split the people up, the process of forced absorption was such that within three decades, “there is not a Karekare living today [1936] who cannot speak Hausa”.²⁰² Hausa language was foisted over Karekare largely because it had the effect of a proselytizing force for Islam.²⁰³ More specifically, “the destiny of the Karekare, as of most Pagan groups in the Moslem North, is to become Moslem just as their language will become Hausa.”²⁰⁴

The situation in Yauri district in Kebbi State, south of Sokoto, and homeland to indigenous peoples such as Gungu, Kamberi, Dukawa, Shangawa which were never conquered²⁰⁵ by the jihadists of 1804, corroborates the ploy in Karekare vis-à-vis the Hausa language, as Salamone notes,

All schools in Yauri have served to transmit religion. Formal and informal education is heavily Islamic. The fact that the majority of education is carried on in Hausa, a language permeated with Islamic ideas, is an aid to Islamization. The Qur’anic schools are openly institutions of Islamic training, but even the modern schools require education in Qur’anic knowledge.²⁰⁶

The situation in Tivland was hardly different. As noted in Chapter One, Fraser was commissioned to study the Department of Education in the Northern Protectorate in 1927. Among other things Fraser

201 *ibid.*, 178

202 *ibid.*, 178

203 Adamu, 43

204 Nicolson, 178

205 Salamone, “Becoming Hausa,” 413; the names Gungawa and Shagawa ending in “wa” are the Hausa versions of what the people call themselves.

206 *ibid.*, 419

charged the Northern Nigerian government of seeking to spread Islam with its education programme. For example, “Fraser relates how students from the Tiv (Munshi) ethnic group in attendance at the Abinsi Pagan School were still forced to wear clothing ‘akin to Hausa dress’.”²⁰⁷ It is noteworthy in this case, that Tiv pupils protested repeatedly the imposition of Hausa dress – supposedly kaftan – on them, let alone “the presence of mosques on the campuses of government elementary schools [in Tivland.]”²⁰⁸ Fraser’s analogy of tying the Pagan education to Muslim educational system is ying the former’s prospect to a corpse.²⁰⁹

Kona, Wurkum, and Mumuye are just few examples of the other traditionalist areas that were placed under Muslim rulers and made to suffer the same fate as the Karekare and the Yauri. In the case of Kona, Wurkum, and Mumuye like many others, they were specifically placed out of bounds of missionary reach.²¹⁰ Even after several reorganisations, “dozens of Gwari communities stayed in Zaria Province, some of them continuing under officials of Zaria Emirate”²¹¹ as well as the Jaba placed under Zaria Emirate.²¹²

BORGU

The old Borgu kingdom was enclosed by the ninth and twelfth parallels of longitude and the first and fourth meridians of east longitude, bounded by Yoruba neighbours to the south, Hausa to the north, and Nupe to the east, and the Atakaro mountain range to the west, covering approximately 70,000 square kilometres. Borgu is the territory which Frederick Lugard was most familiar with in the Northern Protectorate, having been the mercenary who led the British expedition to Borgu in 1894 in competition with the French. Borgu was finally partitioned between the French and the British in

207 Barnes, “Some Fire Behind the Smoke”: The Fraser Report and Its Aftermath in Colonial Northern Nigeria,” 203

208 *ibid.*, 203

209 *ibid.*, 204

210 Boer, 206

211 Heussler, 79

212 *ibid.*, 79

1898 with, Nikki, the ancestral capital falling to the French but the greater part of Borguland falling to the British.²¹³

In pre-colonial times, the Borgu were known by their neighbours as a people who defined their mission in history in terms of opposition to Islam. But why was there such opposition to Islam in Borguland?

The Borgu population consisted of aborigines and migrant groups from different directions and times. According to one theory, to which this author subscribes,²¹⁴ but at which Flora Lugard scoffs,²¹⁵ the earliest migrant group were Berber Christians who fled Islamic compulsion in North Africa in the last three centuries of the first millennium. These Christians were classified as heretics by the dominant Roman Church of the day, because of their Donatist beliefs. So they did not enjoy the protection of the Pope. While those that were acceptable to the Roman Church could escape to Europe, the heretics fled southwards across the Sahara, initially to assemble in Kanem before Kanem diversified to Borno. From there they made their way south-westward to the land of Borgu where they perfected defensive warfare. They are most likely to be the bearers of the Christian sign (see p.183), which in Northern Nigeria is called *dagin Arewa*. For the avoidance of doubt, however, the origin and genius of the sign has nothing to do with Northern Nigeria or North Africa, contrary to what Labelle Prussin postulates,²¹⁶ even though the sign was already very popular in North African Christian community as early as the 4th century AD. Given their experiences of Islam in North Africa, it is logical that, with the aborigines of Borguland, the migrants and the aborigines made opposition to Islam their mission in history, as stated in Chapter One.²¹⁷

213 Borgu Kingdom, "About the Borgu Kingdom," <http://borgukingdom.com/about.html> (25 July 2011); Borgu Kingdom, "Frequently Asked Questions," <http://www.borgukingdomng.com/faqs.html>, (accessed 25 July 2011)

214 A. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*, London: George. Philip & Son, 1892), 144; J. Baur, *2000 Years of Christianity in Africa* (Nairobi: Pauline Publications Africa, 1994), 30


215 Shaw, 235

216 L. Prussin, "Fulani-Hausa Architecture" in *African Arts*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Oct., 1976), pp. 8-19+97-98, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3335251> (accessed on 11 July 2011)

217 It should be clarified that Adekunle's attestation to Borgu's mission in history is not necessarily an attestation to the strand of Christian element in Borgu's migrant population.

Fig. 13

WAVES OF CHRISTIAN MIGRATION FROM NORTH AND NORTH EAST AFRICA TO CENTRAL SOUDAN (NIGERIA) AROUND 1000 AD AND 1500 AD RESPECTIVELY



The idea of Christian migration from North Africa to Borgu and some other parts of Africa is balderdash to Daniel McCall of Columbia University, New York. Considering the condition of the people of Borgu at the end of the 19th century, he assesses as follows:

“If a people was ever Christianized there are certain remaining *attributes* we would expect to find, as there is a basic pattern to the expansion of Christianity. *Despite local variations*, there are at least the categories of *liturgy*, sacraments, *clerical vestments*, *church architecture*, *sacral music and hymns*, *monasticism*, *literacy*, and the *symbolism of the cross*.”²¹⁸

218 D. McCall, “Review: Kisra, Chosroes, Christ, etc” in *African Historical*

As logical as this may appear, there are several strikes against his objection. First, who are the “we” who are responsible for determining the basic pattern to the expansion of Christianity? Whatever the answer might be, it cannot deny the trappings of a school of thought, which sees in Africa a dark continent to be guided by self-appointed guardians in the West. The “we” are those who perpetuate the view that Christianity was wiped out North Africa by Islam; whereas the perpetrators’ agenda is to obliterate the history of Christianity in parts of Africa, thereby deny that African Church history is integral to the history of the church universal. Their ultimate objective is to create Christianity in Africa in their own image. As a hypothesis, this “we” is the hydra-headed racism marauding under the guise of scholarship. Contrary to McCall’s condescending redaction, Christian advance, past and present, (Borgu scenario inclusive) is governed by translatability.²¹⁹

Secondly, McCall canonises church architecture as an attribute of Christianity. On the contrary, Jesus Christ relativizes architecture to a weightier matter that can be restated as an attribute of Christianity. On a day His disciples could not take their eyes off the adornment (which cannot be separated from the architecture) of the temple in Jerusalem, Jesus used the occasion to direct them to an attribute of Christianity, worship in spirit and in truth (Lk. 21: 5–6 cf. Jn. 4: 23–24).

Thirdly, some so-called attributes on his list can be grouped together and disposed together: liturgy, sacral music and hymns. Again these are developments that are not fixated but translatable. What was to McCall hymns, music, and liturgy in the 1960s, is described by Bowen in 1856 as follows:

The sober [Anglican] converts are greatly delighted with the ‘service.’ To kneel a little, and to stand a little, by turns, to [chant] the doxology, and to repeat the Lord’s prayer in concert, to bow

Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1968), 255–277, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/216399> (accessed on 30 August 2011), 273

219 L. Sanneh, *Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Culture*, American Society of Missiology Series, No. 13, (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1989), 4, 6, 30; P. Satari, “Translatability in the Missional of Lamin Sanneh” in G. Hunsberger and C. Belger (eds), *The Church between Gospel and Culture: the Emerging Mission in North America* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 270–284

the knee mechanically, whenever they repeat the name of Jesus in the creed, to exclaim 'Good Lord deliver us,' in solemn set tones, twenty times successfully, in the responses of the litany."²²⁰

This liturgy was predominant in Nigerian churches before Nigerian converts took over the mantle of leadership from Western missionaries. Indeed, since the 1980s, the liturgy, sacral music and hymns had fused together as sing-s-inspiration and dance-giving, in Nigerian churches – across board. Therefore, since McCall was absolutely fixated on a particular kind of liturgy, sacral music and hymns – characterised by 'kneel a little, stand up a little' – he may as well conclude that there is no evidence of Christianity in the Nigeria of the 21st century, when people dance their way to the altar especially in songs and choruses that are not copyrighted. It is no surprise that he dismissed the factuality of Christianity in the history of the people of Borgu.

Fourthly, McCall has clerical vestments on his list of attributes. However, neither Peter nor Paul who were renowned Christian leaders was aware of such a requirement for Christians, let alone they being an attribute of Christianity.

Fifthly, Monasticism makes it to the list of attributes. As with the preceding rebuttal, it has to be said that Jesus did not operate a monastery and did not make a *modus operandi* for his followers. For the avoidance of doubt, however, it is important to recall that Jesus neither condemned nor promoted it. Monasticism arose during the Diocletian persecution of Christians in Egypt in the 3rd and 4th centuries. It served its purpose when certain situations called for it. Since then, some Christians have opted for it as a ministry; but monasticism is not an attribute of Christianity.

Sixthly, McCall did not see observance of sacraments when he carried out his observation in the 1960s. Admittedly, the problem of syncretism is never far off but it is equally important to state categorically that the problem is not peculiar let alone unique to the Christian migrants to Borgu. Nevertheless, Mockler-Ferryman noted in 1892 that sacraments were neither alien in theory nor in practice to the Christian migrants to Borgu. According to him, "missionaries who are acquainted with the people have told me that they have found

among the Borgus a faint knowledge of Christianity, and their principal annual festival appears to be in commemoration of certain events in the life of Kisra (our Christ?), which, however, they mix up with many heathen rites”²²¹. The real question is whether McCall would recognise what he was looking for were he to come face to face with it.

On literacy, McCall avers:

Christian missionaries have always taught some of their converts to read and write. In Ireland the Latin alphabet was adapted to Erse and the Ogham letters became obsolete; Ulfilas spread the Latin alphabet to the Germans and runes were abandoned; in eastern Europe the Greek alphabet was adapted for the Slavic languages, which had previously been unwritten; the Armenians under the stimulus of conversion created their own script on the basis of those of their neighbors. Copitc, i.e. Egyptian in Greek letters, developed as a vehicle for Christian scriptures; Nubian became a written language when Christianity was introduced; and in modern times missionaries have ‘reduced to writing’ many hundreds of previously unwritten languages. Christianity without Scripture, prayer books, and episcopal letters is hard to imagine.²²²

As stated under an earlier sub-heading, Christian missions taught Europe to read and write. McCall agrees herein with specific reference to Germany, Ireland, Slovakia and Armenia. These people-nations were assisted by outsiders (Christian missions). Conversely, none of these people-nations developed in isolation or by their sole ingenuity. But McCall expects descendants of Christian fugitive-migrants in Borguland, in isolation, to accomplish what Christianity in Europe did not attempt. If blames are to be apportioned for the development or lack of it in Borguland, the blame belongs to the missionary arm of the church universal – not to Borgu.

McCall ridicules Christianity without Bibles and prayer books. This raises the question of how many Bibles were available in Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, the whole of England, and Christian centres at about 1000 AD? How much less the number of Bibles

221 A. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger Up the Niger*, 144, footnote; Mockler-Ferryman’s racist underskirt shows in his “our Christ”.

222 McCall, 274

that would have been available for migrant-fugitive-refugees from North Africa going across the Sahara in 1000 AD? Hardly any. And, as it was with Bibles, so it was with prayer books.

Leo Frobenius, a German explorer in early 20th century lends some sympathy to the Borgu migrants. According to him, the migrants were literate and actually kept records but that their records and their scriptures were buried in due course, in order to prevent their falling into the hands of the Fulbe (Fulani).²²³ McCall does not hesitate in pointing out that the writing material that the migrants supposedly used was anachronistic with the writing material in use at the fleeing period.²²⁴ Firstly, this author agrees with McCall on this point. Secondly, Frobenius is wrong to suggest that the Borgu were afraid of the Fulani (a synonym for Muslims in Borgu's context) to the extent of burying their scriptures, because the evidence of 1820 suggests the opposite: the Fulani were afraid of the Borgu.

McCall was critical of Christianity in Borgu on the ground that the so-called migrants did not obtain a letter of reference from the bishop from whom they were fleeing. On a serious note, does anybody expect forced migrants on their way to a place they were not certain to obtain letters of reference from opponents who regarded them as heretics who may as well die of starvation or by the sword? This is an ultra-sadistic expectation!

The accusation that Christianity in Borgu lacks the symbolism of the cross, brings McCall's objections to a head. By choosing the cross as if it is a litmus test, McCall rules out all others symbols. He was so pessimistic of finding a suitable symbol that should anybody come up with any crucifix, he was prepared to argue that, "the cross is not [an] exclusively Christian symbol"²²⁵ and that such a cross may not be more than "a purely geometric design without any symbolic intent."²²⁶ Furthermore, McCall is so sure there his opponents cannot match his rhetoric that he goes as far as refering the problem to archeology.²²⁷

223 Cited by McCall, 274

224 *ibid.*, 274

225 *ibid.*, 274

226 *ibid.*, 274

227 *ibid.*, 274

The two-fold good news is that, first, a crucifix is not a requirement for authentication of the Christian migration under review, just as bowing at the altar of archaeology on this matter is uncalled for, because in the matter of Africa, Islam, and slavery as with many other issues, archeologists themselves are running back to historians for a way forward.²²⁸

Secondly, the *dagin arewa* symbol, which has been a very popular Christian symbol in North Africa, and which most likely came with the migrants is most visible in Northern Nigeria. It can be found on official and private buildings, roundabouts, gates, textile materials, etc. Lastly, it is noteworthy that *gamji* has attested to the fact that *dagin arewa* is of Christian origin.

Fig. 14.



Photo credit: the author (17 July 2014)

Dagin arewa, an adaptation of a 3rd century AD Christian sign²²⁹, otherwise known as northern knot in Northern Nigeria, is the insignia of Arewa House, Kaduna, a current northern Nigeria socio-cultural rallying point and a repository of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Given that the symbol did find a home in Northern Nigeria since approximately 1000 AD, and whereas the northern establishment appropriated this Christian symbol as far back as scholars are yet to determined, the motivation for the erection of barriers against Christianity in Northern Nigeria in the first half of the 20th century by British officials did not arise from civilisation; it was rented from hell.

228 See J. Alexander, "Islam, Archaeology and Slavery in Africa" in *World Archaeology*, Vol. 33, No. 1, Jun., 2001, 56ff, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/827888>, (accessed on 7 March 2013)

229 cf. J. Kenny. "The Gospel across the Sahara and from Nubia" in <http://www.dhspriory.org/kenny/ccta/CCTA5.htm> (accessed on 22 August 2016)

Not least is the name Kisra, which is unique to Borgu in Nigeria. This is a name that has been interpreted as a alternative Persian titles,²³⁰ a movement,²³¹ and Christ by collective memory in Borgu-land.²³²

In a letter to His Excellency, Peter Kisra, Deputy Governor, Kwara State, dated 25 April 2012, this author sought for an interview with him, in an attempt to get him to join the conversation on his surname, and to garner his view on the probable route of the Christian migrants to Borgu-land. One of the questions to be put to His Excellency is whether he thought some of the migrants might have taken a more direct route through Gobir since the people of Bussa call Gobir their brothers.

He did acknowledge receipt of the letter verbally, through a proxy, but an interview was not forthcoming. An interview should still be helpful.

Webster does not deny the waves of migration from North Africa to West Africa at the time of the Donatist Berber migration, however, he is cautious to label it a Christian-Donatist migration for two reasons. First, they see it a pastoralist migration. However, the term pastoralist and peasant were interchangeable in the first millennium North Africa, especially when Roman officers spoke of this “stubborn resistance of the peasant population”²³³ during the Diocletian persecution of Christians in Egypt in the fourth century, when twenty, thirty, or even more Christians were executed daily.

Secondly, Webster rightly maintains a southward migration view but sorts the Christians to the Christian kingdom of Makuria and pecks “the Pagans” to Central Sudan (present-day Nigeria and its neighbours).²³⁴ It is rather simplistic, however, to sort people the

230 McCall, 261ff; but historians with a focus on West Africa are not aware of a Persian warlord who smashed his way through Arab lands, overwhelmed Sudan, and tip-toed his way to West Africa, especially Borgu-land.

231 Webster, 21ff

232 Mockler-Ferryman, 144

233 J. Baur, *2000 Years of Christianity in Africa: An African Church History* (Nairobi: Paulines Publication Africa), 2005, 24

234 J. Webster, “Shaking the Foundations of the Muslim World,” in A. Nwauwa and J. Webster, eds., *Fundamentals of African History*, Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1993, 21

way Webster does, because the interconnectedness of the human family does not permit such a radically homogeneous migration. Fleeing religious or ethnic violence usually if not always ends up as a movement of mixed groups. For example, the well-known migration of the Hebrews from Egypt to Canaan, which was meant to be an exclusively Hebrew affair, was a migration of mixed groups from the onset as “many other people went up with them” (Ex. 12:38, NIV). In other words, just as some Christian migrants may have found refuge in Makuria, so also some adherents of primal religions must also have found refuge in Makuria. Similarly, Christians, some of whom were misrepresented as pastoralists, found refuge in Borgu.

Flora Lugard characteristically dabbles into what she does not know and pontificates on what she is least competent to do. With reference to the history of Christianity in Borguland, she avers: “some Borgu natives have recently asserted that their prophet is not Mohammed but Kisra, a Jew who died for the sins of men”²³⁵ and opines, “it must be admitted that the Christianity of this province, schismatic to begin with, has wandered now from the established path as to be scarcely recognisable”.²³⁶ Schism is the fourth nature of Christian groups; so creating the impression that it is peculiar to Borgu is to say virtually nothing. What is worth pursuing is her pronouncement on “the established path” especially from the perception of a Victorian-era promoter of British imperialism, whose enduring delight was abuse of Africans? Whatever her articulation on her chosen topic might be, it certainly cannot have validity for the church universal because of the inherent un-Christlikeness, and hence cannot be a fair standard for assessing Christianity in Borguland. That is why Mockler-Ferryman has to be taken seriously:

The Borgus are decidedly the most interesting people of the Middle Niger, being the sole pagan tribe which has successfully resisted Mahomedan invasion. For years did the fula[ni]s of Sokot[o] and G[w]andu attempt to conquer the country desisting, however, in the firm belief that the blessing of their prophet was not with them in fighting against this strange people. They

235 Shaw, 235

236 *ibid.*, 235

themselves ascribe their invincibility not so much to their powers as to their religion, which they affirm is that of 'Kisra, a Jew, who gave his life for the sins of mankind.' They are most indignant, and perhaps justly so, at being called pagans, considering themselves in every way far superior to the Mahommedans. They say that their fore-fathers were originally settled in the north of Africa, and were driven thence about the 8th or 9th century by the Mahommedans conquerors. They claim his connection with Bornu, and it is to be remarked that, as Bariba is the native name for Borgu, so also the native name for Bornu is Berebere or Baribari. The two tribes, therefore, before they were driven south, possibly formed part of the Barbary States. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that Borgu and Bornu established order and a regular form of government in their present provinces ages before any other tribe of these parts dreamt of such things, and to this day both have remained unfettered by the Fula[ni] yoke.²³⁷

Although the focus has been on Borgu, it is worth pointing out that the renewed persecution of Coptic Christians in Egypt by Caliph el-Hakim at the end of the 10th century²³⁸ thereby triggering Coptic migration to Gobir, coincided with the land-grabbing phase in the Islamic compulsion against Berber Christians in other North African communities resulting in the southward migration to Borgu. In other words, the Gobir were most likely co-bearers of *dagin arewa* to West Africa.

As stated earlier, the migrants and the indigenes cooperated and virtually perfected defensive warfare in their domicile. When the jihad army from Sokoto led by Sultan Bello invaded Borguland, as stated earlier, the invasion ended in futility in 1820, with the invaders conceding that the invasion did not enjoy the blessing of Mohammed, the prophet of Islam.

Well aware of Borgu's stiff opposition to Islam, whereas it was the colonial government's avowed policy to spread Islam as a tool

237 Mockler-Ferryman, 144

238 T. Oden, *How Africa Shaped the Christian Mind*, (Downers Grove: IVP), 2006, 196

for social control, Zungeru “arbitrarily decided to transfer Illo”²³⁹ and Kaoje, “some of the most thickly populated and fertile areas in Borgu to the Sultan of Gwandu, leader of the eastern sphere of the Sokoto caliphate; a move which was calculated to please the Sokoto caliphate, which had tried unsuccessfully to annex Borgu throughout the 19th century, whereas Borgu people protested vehemently on the ground that they had never been defeated by the jihadist forces. Admittedly, Borgu made a tactical withdrawal when Gwandu attacked in 1830, but came back to reclaim its land.”²⁴⁰

As if the placing of Illo under Gwandu in 1905 was not enough insult and provocation, Zungeru accomplished a number of feats in 1907. First, the whole of Borguland was brought under Kontagora Province and administered from Yelwa, with the Kisra relics transferred to Yelwa. Secondly, politico-Islamist Fulani agents were unleashed on Borgu, with Bussa subordinated to Yelwa. To show how anxious the colonial regime was to effect Islamic conversion in Borguland, Kitoro, the Bussa king, was addressed as and accorded the trappings of an emir even though he was not a Muslim!

Thirdly, the transfer of Illo to an emirate, the administration of Borgu from Yelwa and the imposition of hand-picked Fulani agents to run the affairs of Borgu came to a head in a rebellion in Bussa in 1915.²⁴¹ The colonial regime, crushed the uprising. Nevertheless, by 1920, the Islamisation policy of the colonial administration in Borgu whereby the “Muslim chiefs [were] to keep 70% [of the] revenue [collected], while pagan chiefs could only keep 30%”,²⁴² was enforced to the letter.

239 J. Anene, “The Eclipse of the Borgawa,” *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1965, 215

240 *ibid.*, 219

241 See M. Crowder, *Revolt in Bussa* (London: Faber and Faber) 1973 for details.

242 Anonymous, “Borgu History”, <http://members.optusnet.com.au/~rossjones12/pdfs/History%20of%20Borgu.PDF> (accessed on 9 August 2011); see also H. Stewart, “The Borgu People of Nigeria and Benin: The Disruptive Effect of Partition on Traditional Political and Economic Relations” in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. XII, Nos. 3 & 4, Dec. 1984-June 1985, 100 Turaki notes that “for over 20 years, the Colonial Administration used punitive patrols and tax assessments as major administrative policies towards the non-Muslim areas” in the Middle Belt and the Far North generally; Y. Turaki, *The British Colonial Legacy in Northern Nigeria: A Social Ethical Analysis of the Colonial*

In contrast with what obtained in other parts of the Protectorate, “a proportion of 50 per cent, in the Muslim Emirates, and from 60 per cent to 50 per cent in the pagan district, is paid into the Government treasury, and the remainder into the native treasuries.”²⁴³

By 1920, two Borgu chiefs buckled and declared for Islam “officially”.²⁴⁴ In real terms however, they were as traditionalist as ever in private! This publicised conversion empowered the colonial government to further split Borgu to domesticate its people under Ilorin Province in 1923.

Increasingly aware and concerned that the impact of colonial policies on Borgu, in the first three decades,²⁴⁵ may have sown ethno-religious wind with a prospect of ethno-religious whirlwind in the future, some colonial officers on ground in Borgu took the initiative and made a strong case to the regional government in Kaduna in 1927 for the restoration of Illo, Kaoje, and Koenji to Borgu, but the plea fell on deaf ears.²⁴⁶ In 1950, ten years before independence, an Emir of Borgu emerged, with a befitting Borgu Emirate to match in 1955! The colonial Islamisation project in Borguland was accomplished by 1960.

What the British did in Karekare, Kona, Wurkum, Mumuye and Borgu in varying degrees was repeated in different districts in Northern Nigeria. It was seed sowing – seeds of ethno-religious violence for post-colonial harvest.

and Post-colonial Society and Politics in Nigeria, 1993, 62. The enforcement of 70% for Muslims and 30% for non-Muslim peoples in Borgu was the peculiar way of political control, and institutionalization of inferior status in Borgu.

243 Temple, “Northern Nigeria”, 160

244 Anonymous, “Borgu History”

245 The period 1907–1930 is widely known to be the most punitive and oppressive period of the sixty-year colonial administration of the Northern Protectorate.

246 Stewart, 53; Palmer was at the helms of affairs in Kaduna, the regional capital at that time. Although he championed the Hausa cause (including the traditionalist cause) in the early years of colonial rule, he seemed to have softened up and become more bellicose towards traditionalist areas. Whether his indifference to the Borgu situation particularly, was shaped by the claim of Christian element in Borgu history, is not clear given the fact that Palmer was an anti-Christian mission militant.

MIDDLE BELT IDEOLOGICAL CAPTIVITY

It has been shown earlier in this chapter that even from colonial records, the traditionalist peoples of Northern Nigeria added together constituted the majority of the population of Nigeria. It is also a historical fact as shown in greater detail in Chapter Three that there has been a great demographic shift, in favour of Christianity in the 20th century especially in the Middle Belt, which constitutes the centre of gravity of the traditionalists. In an attempt to organise for a majority voice in the run up to flag independence in 1960, the colonial authorities focused on their individual groups to categorise and convince them that they were minorities. This categorization of the peoples as minorities has a lasting impact on the people till the 21st as there has not been a major political outing from the Middle Belt since the categorisation.²⁴⁷

This is a case of ideological captivity, the mind-set by which the oppressed has been so brainwashed as it were that he accepts his oppressor's word on the prospect of his independence as final. In contrast, the peoples that were categorized as minorities in Western Region rejected the 'minorities' mantra mindset and went ahead to earn their Mid-West Region in 1962.

Why is the colonial record in traditionalist areas a matter of violence seed-sowing, and even a major cause for concern? Several thoughts come to the mind.

First, an indefinite period of exploitation of one ethnic or economic group by another has never occurred in human history. Therefore, there is no permanence to the British experiment-experience of propping up the Fulani Empire-Sokoto Caliphate indefinitely or that the historical process will make an exception for the colonial Fulani concession in Northern Nigeria. The structure put in place by the British is unsustainable. The fact that the British Empire

247 cf. A. Barnes. "The Middle Belt Movement and the Formation of Christian Consciousness in Colonial Northern Nigeria," *Church History*, Vol. 76, No. 3 (Sep.), 2007, 594–596, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27645035> (accessed on 28 October 2014)

could not violate the historical process but necessarily succumb to it after World War II is a major case in point. Therefore, if it could not sustain itself, its surrogates are in jeopardy.

Secondly, by the same token, the exploitation of the Hausa language for colonial expediency while at the same time subverting Hausaman's interest vis-à-vis the Fulaniman will give at some point. Nevertheless, the Hausaman is well positioned for better days ahead, especially when the Hausa sit down to compile an inventory of their friends.

Thirdly, the covenant-fate-prophecy over the 100-year dominance of the Fulani jihad over other polities and their host communities is a recurring decimal. It will not go away. That is why the militarised cattle rusting which is currently a 21st century expression of the 19th jihad in benevolent and tolerant host communities whether in Imo, Ogun, Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa, Edo or the raids of hundreds of teenage high school girls in their hostels at night in Chibok will not prosper but end in a cul-de-sac. Indeed, the historical process ensures that the oppressed traditionalist polities will examine their respective historiographies, and a 'Fulani go home' ethno-religious campaign may erupt. This is the danger.

SEEDS OF MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN CONFLICT

The seeds of Muslim-Christian violence sown by the colonial administration can be classified into three broad categories consisting in (1) six inhibiting edicts, (2) persecution of indigenous Christians, and (3) several regulations which were not in black and white but which were nonetheless just as binding as the written edicts. The edicts were promulgated as if in instalments, to slow down missionary advance or to halt it completely. Owing to local peculiarities, however, the soil in some districts was more suitable for germination of these seeds than in other districts.

SIX EDICTS – SIX SEEDS

Fig. 15

Anti-Missionary Edicts, Policies and Proposal
• The Prohibition of Preaching in Muslim Communities Edict • The Restriction against Working in Unsettled Areas Edict • The Land and Native Rights Ordinance, 1910 • The 440-yard Rule, 1928 • The Location of Women Missionaries Rule • The 18-year Rule • Persecution of Indigenous Christians § Traditionalist conversion to Islam was rewarded. § Traditionalist conversion to Christianity was punished. • A Last Minute Arbitrary but Abortive Visa Proposal

Lugard's open support for Islam in governance was not mere partiality against primordial Nigerian religions; it was an active opposition to Christian advance concretised in different ways, especially with restrictions placed on western missionary activities in the new territory throughout the 60-year rule. The restrictions include in chronological order (1) the edict Prohibiting Preaching in Muslim Communities, (2) Restriction on Working in Unsettled Areas, (3) Land and Native Rights Ordinance (1910), (4) the 400-yard Rule, (5) Location of Women Missionary Rule, and (6) the 18-year Rule.

THE PROHIBITION OF PREACHING IN MUSLIM COMMUNITIES RULE

The Prohibition of Preaching in Muslim Communities Rule, which is so well known that it is hardly worth belabouring herein. What is important herein is the official explanation for the restriction: the ostensible protection of Western (usually rendered European) missionaries from Muslim fanatics.

Admittedly, it was not a total ban – in theory. As explained under the *defensor fidei* syndrome, Lugard would allow missions to operate in Muslim areas on condition that the local emir concerned agreed to an application for work in his district.²⁴⁸ For example, in paragraph 226 in his 1905 Annual Report, Lugard states,

The Hausa Mission, hitherto stationed in the Ghirku district, 40 miles south of Zaria, transferred its headquarters to the latter city in March, 1905, with my consent, on the invitation of the Emir, and they have it in contemplation to open a mission next year at Kano, with the consent of the Emir and chiefs, and also perhaps at Kontagora, where the Emir seems quite anxious to allow them to come.²⁴⁹

In reality, however, the Residents on ground were anti-missionary because they saw missionary presence as counterproductive to the colonial exploitative agenda to which the administrators were committed. Consequently, they either spoke upfront for the emirs in their provinces, since the emirs were not in a position to realistically contradict their overlords.

Lugard's imputation of anxiety on the part of the Emir of Kontagora has a tinge of misinformation for two reasons: (1) it is recalled that the Emir of Kontagora had issued a decree in early 1900 that nobody should impede the passage of Bishop Tugwell and his missionary team throughout his domain. Secondly, the interest and initiative for mission presence came from Kontagora.

In the case of Kano particularly when the application was made formally, the application for Kano missionary presence was very promising since all the conditions were met by the CMS. Nevertheless, H. Richmond Palmer, the acting Resident, injected the flimsy race card in the last minute: Rev Alexander, in Zaria, who was proposed to pioneer the work in Kano, was a black man. In the light of the evidence, the ensuing misunderstanding between Muslims and Christians in Northern Nigeria is a weapon that the British colonial administration knowingly fabricated.

²⁴⁸ Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 592–595

²⁴⁹ Colonial Reports – “Annual No. 516 Northern Nigeria Report for 1905–1906”, 118

THE RESTRICTION AGAINST WORKING IN UNSETTLED AREAS

The Restriction against Working in Unsettled Areas – pertained to areas where British authority was still challenged by the local people. This is perhaps the most ridiculous red herring because globally, Christian missionaries have carried out their work in a variety of situations without the protection of any troops, let alone British troops. They are known for negotiating their paths successfully and amicably with peoples of diverse backgrounds. Cases abound in the Southern Protectorate – and even in areas of the Northern Protectorate from 1857 with Bishop Crowther at the helms of affairs.²⁵⁰ The case of Bishop Crowther's 19th century pre-colonial Niger mission, as in many other missions, perhaps illustrates this point best. In brief, this rule cannot be separated from Lugard's obsession to propagate and entrench his so called 'European prestige'.

Even in situations where the people, especially traditionalists had come to terms with British occupation and offered no opposition to British rule, but where the colonial authorities had not succeeded in imposing a Muslim ruler over the people, the colonial authorities broke every rule in the book in order to make missionary presence or enterprise more cumbersome. Zuru's case is a vivid example. The scene is set forth as follows by Heussler:

Over a fifteen-year period, beginning in the mid-twenties, there was constant correspondence between Kaduna and Sokoto Province, and within the Province, regarding the status of Dabai-Zuru, a pagan area lying some 150 miles south of Sokoto. In 1924 the area was transferred from Kontagora to Sokoto N.A.; in 1927 it became a separate division under Sokoto; in 1930 it was attached to Gwandu, but as a separate N.A.; in 1931 it was part of the Southern Division of Sokoto Province; in 1933, on the abolition of this division, it was attached again to the Sokoto Division; in 1934 it was transferred once more to Gwandu; and in 1937 it returned to Kontagora but as a separate N.A. Throughout the correspondence on these changes, Kaduna's

250 For an authoritative digest on Bishop Ajayi Crowther, see Ade-Ajayi, *A Patriot to the Core* supra

main concern, not unnaturally, were with the lines of authority and with the traditions of the area viewed historically.²⁵¹

The background of the foregoing scenario is however crucial, in order to minimise the distortion the story portends. The following are the basic relevant facts regarding Zuru.

(1) the Canadian-based United Missionary Church for Africa (UMCA), an evangelical non-denominational missionary body had identified the Zuru people and shown their interest in missionary work among them early in the 1920s; (2) Palmer, the Resident who did not disguise his stiff opposition to missionary advance²⁵² was the acting Lieutenant Governor in 1921 and 1924 respectively; (3) Palmer was confirmed substantive Lieutenant Governor in 1925;²⁵³ (4) Palmer was removed to Gambia in 1930; (5) the flurry of correspondence on Zuru was virtually over with Palmer's departure in 1930.

The motive for the extraordinary flurry of correspondence between Sokoto, the provincial capital and epicentre of Muslim authority in the region, and Kaduna, the regional capital may now be deduced from the aforementioned facts. First, as acting Lieutenant Governor in 1921, Palmer must have been aware of UMCA's application to work among the Zuru, whereas he could not unilaterally refuse the application outright, in his acting capacity. Secondly, permission for UMCA presence in Zuru had been given before Palmer had a second opportunity in an acting position in 1924. Thirdly, it was not until 1925 when, in a substantive capacity, he had the power to meddle at will in Zuru's matter. Fourthly, provocation reached the nth power

251 Heussler, 87

252 He stood in the way of the CMS occupying Kano and Katsina in 1905 by playing the racial card in Kano's case. Similarly, he was at the helm of affairs during Ethel Miller's case, as will be shown elsewhere in this chapter.

253 The title, Lieutenant Governor was used for the ruler of the Northern Provinces after the amalgamation of 1914, with Governor reserved for the administrator in Lagos. It should be noted, however, that the Lieutenant Governor wielded as much power as the Governor he succeeded in Kaduna, as the administration of the Northern Provinces and the Southern Provinces were kept separate. The power of the Governor in Lagos was of little consequence to the goings on in the north.

as from 1925. So palpable was the plot against Zuru that Sokoto was made and accepted willingly to report on a people outside its provincial boundary, contrary to Lugard's order of March 1903 that the Emir of Sokoto's authority did not go beyond Sokoto Province. At other times, Kaduna would have incriminated such an intrusion of Sokoto's meddlesomeness in Zuru. However, since it was a matter that could constitute an obstruction to both the traditionalist and the missionary, in the interest of Islam, neither Sokoto nor Kaduna saw any wrongdoing in it. In the light of these considerations, the motive for the flurry of correspondence between Sokoto and Kaduna was to roil Zuru into some expression of discontent which Palmer could then seize upon as a pretext for declaring Zuru an Unsettled Area – unsuitable for missionary presence. In closing, Zuru was not an isolated case but a sufficient ground for declaring that there were other districts all over the Far North and the Middle Belt that were declared unsafe for missionary presence for flimsy excuses that Palmer and likeminded Residents precipitated.

THE LAND AND NATIVE ORDINANCE

The Land and Native Rights Ordinance, 1910, was promulgated retroactively by Governor Percy Girourad, to take effect in 1900, in anticipation of a significant increase of inflow of missionaries and Christians from southern Nigeria, following the completion of the railway leading to Kano. Among other things, the ordinance stipulated that no title to the occupation and use of any native land was to be valid without a written consent of the governor. The retrospective ordinance was directed at controlling the activities of southern Nigerians, foreign businessmen, especially of lawyers

and missionaries who, if permitted full scope to practise their egalitarian and libertarian beliefs in Northern Nigeria, were believed to be capable of quickly undermining the authority of the African rulers and so, of destroying that understanding and cooperation between the British and the Fulani ruling class.”²⁵⁴

254 Okonjo, 52; Lugard seems to have admitted the error of this ordinance by blaming it on ignorance; see Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 304

This edict has been a thorn in the flesh of every attempt at national integration, the significance of the edict being that although the letter of this edict is dead in some parts of the Middle Belt, its spirit lives on in other parts and especially in the Far North. For example, in the concluding decades of the 20th century,

“there has even been a trend to return to the strict prohibitions of the early colonial period. The authorities in Kano, the metropolis of the North, have refused to allocate plots for new churches since the early 1980s. Christian residents ignored these orders and erected new buildings in their quarters, but in 1999 they received official letters that 54 churches should be demolished.”²⁵⁵

THE 440-YARD RULE

The 440-yard Rule, 1928, prohibited missionary residence closer than 440 yards from a Nigerian community.²⁵⁶ Suddenly Palmer discovered a disease which could differentiate between a local man and a Western missionary in the Northern Protectorate! And strangely, the disease knew the line of demarcation between Northern Protectorate and Southern Protectorate and would dare not cross the boundary to the South as the disease was unknown in the South!

As with the preceding edicts, this edict is baseless because it is a globally attested fact that missionaries have a track record of living among the people to whom they bear witness, in order to facilitate better communication and mutual knowledge. This obnoxious edict was aimed at frustrating communication on the one hand and at promoting racism, segregation, phobia, wilful ignorance, and retardation on the other.

THE LOCATION OF WOMEN MISSIONARIS RULE

There was the Location of Women Missionaries Rule, which forbade single female missionaries from staying alone, whereas the government

²⁵⁵ Harnischfeger, 43

²⁵⁶ Boer, *Missionary Messengers*, 159

employed and posted single female nurses to random stations.²⁵⁷ What may have prompted the promulgation of this edict? First and strangely, there was no official explanation of it. Secondly, there was a surge of female missionaries from North America after the 1920s. Given that men and women missionaries were cherished members of their respective host communities, whereas there was no love lost between British officials in similar circumstances, the reason can be put down to envy, and a calculated response to frustrate Christian advance.

THE 18-YEAR RULE

The 18-year Rule, prohibited the teaching of Christianity to Muslim minors whether in an evangelistic station, medical establishment or school.²⁵⁸ This edict which was aimed at crippling missionary work succeeded; but it had an unintended consequence: it atrophied the inquisitive spirit of Muslim youths and retarded their questioning ability, both of which are basic and inalienable. It presupposes the teenage population in a territory as vast as France and Belgium combined will not ask questions about Christianity from its bearers, given the fact that Jesus is accounted for in the Koran. It is grossly dehumanising; and one would have expected God-fearing Muslims to detect the far-reaching consequences of this rule.

Worthy of note is the fact that any of the rules could be evoked and interpreted in a variety of ways favourable to the colonial officers and their native agents wherever and whenever an opportunity presented itself. All of them were combined to prohibit missions from building schools, which was one of the major instruments of Christian advance.

It is pertinent to mention that several of the foregoing edicts remain in the statute books as punitive moves against Christian advance, despite several regime changes and endless rounds of fruitless dialogues. They constitute an affront to the National Law Reform Commission.

257 *ibid.*, 158–159

258 For the various rules, see Boer, *Missionary Messengers*, 397

PERSECUTION OF INDIGENOUS CHRISTIANS

Apart from subversion of western missionary presence and ministry in the colony, there was heightened harassment and stiff opposition by colonial administrators to two other categories of Christians in the colony.

Traditionalist Conversion to Christianity

The first category is that of notable traditionalists – in traditionalist provinces – who converted to Christianity. Given the circumstances in which the earliest converts found themselves, they usually took to radical discipleship by rejecting post-conversion participation in ritual sacrifices and ceremonies that appeared questionable to them or incompatible with their new found faith. Whereas chiefs and elders were numbered among the early converts, the colonial authorities regarded this category of converts as undesirable because they posed real challenge to local custom and tradition, which the colonial authorities manipulated and wished to perpetuate in order to foster docility on the part of the populace.

Besides, the colonial authorities regarded them as constituting the loci of potential rebellion to colonial authority; especially on the issue of forced labour which from the perspective of their new found faith is exploitative. Chiefs were usually deposed for exercising their fundamental human right to change their religion.²⁵⁹ Interestingly, colonial masters had no problem with Christians converting to Islam. What they dreaded like plague was a Muslim or traditionalist converting to the Christian faith.

“Interestingly, colonial masters had no problem with Christians converting to Islam. What they dreaded like plague was a Muslim or traditionalist converting to the Christian faith.”

259 *ibid.*, 416; Graham, 124

Christians from Southern Nigeria

The second category comprises of converts from the southern protectorates, who moved northwards, following the construction of the northern railway. Some in this category of Christians came as civil servants while others came as traders and artisans, whereas nothing stopped western missionaries from working with those new arrivals to extend their work in both urban and rural areas in Muslim-majority districts as well as in traditionalist areas.²⁶⁰ Pastors and itinerant evangelists were of special concern to the administration. In order to forestall the influx of southerner clerks and artisans, the northern government early in the life of the administration went to the extent of asking the Colonial Office for permission to bring in Indian soldiers, clerks, artisans and donkeys – a request the Colonial Office peremptorily turned down in favour of more cost effective contribution that Nigerians of southern origin were capable of making, just as they were already making in the Southern Protectorate.²⁶¹

“In order to forestall the influx of southerner clerks and artisans, the northern government early in the life of the administration went to the extent of asking the Colonial Office for permission to bring in Indian soldiers, clerks, artisans and donkeys”

In order to frustrate Christians from the south, they were stigmatised as aliens, a euphemism for the landless, or someone who does not truly belong as the meaning is elastic. This ties in with the Native Rights Ordinance promulgated just as the northern railway was about to be completed. Using the rubric of educated elite to refer to this class, Prof A. Murray noted,

These educated people are almost all Christian and even though the best of them will have a real sympathy with their pagan fellows, they are thankful for their own spiritual deliverance from paganism. The dislike of many ‘indirect rule’ administrators for

260 cf. *ibid.*, 415ff

261 See Okonjo, 29–30

this class of men often passes all bounds, but they cannot be ignored. They have to be fitted in somehow.²⁶²

Geary shares a similar opinion:

I have heard many attacks on the educated native; I have also been in friendly association with many of this class. Does it lie in our mouths, who have created the educated African, to first ridicule, and then abuse him? How would the Government, and how would the trader get on without the educated African? Suppose, however, the educated African does use his education and cleverness and knowledge to acquire land, so as to profit thereby, surely he has a better right to make money out of Africa than the gentlemen on the Stock Exchange. But in truth there are very, very few rich Africans. I know these people, and I do not imagine there are a dozen natives who are worth £20,000 each in West Africa. Without doubt a certain class of wealthy black men might be a useful aid to the Government and contribute an important factor in development.²⁶³

“Does it lie in our mouths, who have created the educated African, to first ridicule, and then abuse him? How would the Government, and how would the trader get on without the educated African?”

Why did the administrators dislike this category of Nigerian Christians? First, as Barnes succinctly notes, the dislike “cannot be separated from the racism of the administrators.”²⁶⁴ Secondly, given the fact that, in the administration of the protectorate, the villages were neglected,²⁶⁵ the administrators were worried about southern converts out manoeuvring local Muslim officials and gaining control of northern cities and towns by raising the level of socio-political and economic awareness.²⁶⁶

262 Murray, 229

263 Geary, “Land Tenure”, 245

264 Barnes, “‘Evangelization Where It Is Not Wanted’,” 422

265 Crocker, 215

266 Barnes, 436–437

“Without doubt a certain class of wealthy black men might be a useful aid to the Government and contribute an important factor in development.”

The solution to the southern Christian threat, therefore, was to increase emir authority, just as the emirs demonstrated their increasing loyalty to the colonial agenda. And it got progressively worse. As Crocker noted earlier, “the tenacity shown by those in power in Northern Nigeria in refusing to remove higher chiefs was remarkable. It required spectacular criminality to induce Kaduna to move against them ...”.²⁶⁷ It paid off when the motion for independence was moved in the Constituent Assembly in Lagos, 1954: delegates from the emirate stables voted against – a demonstration of their loyalty to the British.

“The solution to the southern Christian threat, therefore, was to increase emir authority, just as the emirs demonstrated their increasing loyalty to the colonial agenda.”

A LAST MINUTE VISA PROPOSAL

In the closing years of colonial rule, 1955 to be precise, the colonial government proposed five restrictions on Christian missionaries coming to Northern Nigeria.²⁶⁸ This rather sudden proposed measure by the colonial authorities in the Northern Region is rather over-protective for the emerging local regional administration. On the other hand, it may be interpreted as an attempt to portray the new indigenous regional administration as a hawkish Islamic formation against missionary advance in Northern Nigeria. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the Sardauna, the new helmsman in Kaduna, had any personal knowledge of missionary misbehaviour.

While the missions may have preferred to handle the matter in a hush-hush diplomatic manner, the Sardauna seemed to have

²⁶⁷ Crocker, 217

²⁶⁸ Boer, *Missionary Messengers*, 398

perceived it as a diversionary tactic on the part of the outgoing colonial administration. Therefore, rather than get embroiled in a fruitless controversy, Premier Bello paid a special word of “*gratitude to all the Christian missions*”²⁶⁹ – a laudable decision attributable to the premier’s personal political perspicacity.

This author is not aware of any firm-level evidence to suggest that Premier Bello varied his respect for the missions from what it was before national independence on 1 October 1960 to something worse after 1960. He did not stand in their way like his colonial predecessors might have hoped, given what looked like they set him up.

“rather than get embroiled in a fruitless controversy, Premier Bello paid a special word of “gratitude to all the Christian missions” – a laudable decision attributable to the premier’s personal political perspicacity.”

Rather, he regarded the missions as bearers of godliness and partners in development. Therefore, rather than subvert the missions, he cooperated with them, as fresh mission applications for establishment of new secondary schools that came before his Ministry of Education were approved with dispatch. Examples in Kabba Division²⁷⁰ include St. Barnabas Secondary School, Kabba, (Anglican) 1961; Mopa Secondary School, Mopa (ECWA) 1963; St. Monica’s College (for girls), Kabba (Catholic) 1964. Oke-Oyi Secondary School, Ponyan, (Roman Catholic) and Egbe Girls College, Egbe, (Catholic) were in the pipeline before his assassination on 15 January 1966.

269 For the full text of the Christmas message, see Paden, 305

270 Kabba Division is coterminous with present-day Kogi West Senatorial District.

WHY THE CAT AND MOUSE?

Why did the cat and mouse situation arise and persist between the British administrative officers and the Christian missionaries? The colonialist agenda of perpetuating ignorance in the Protectorate generally, to some extent, provides the background to the question, but it needs to be answered in greater detail below. Precisely, the ugly situation which arose and lasted throughout the 60-year rule is basically threefold: (1) the difference in the messages to Africa; (2) two different interpretations of mission work, (3) the higher liberation quotient that communities with missions had.



Fig. 16
Bettye McQueen and
Mojisola Olaniyan

IRRECONCILIABLE MESSAGES TO AFRICA

First, on the one hand, the British colonial regime was committed to disseminating as widely as possible to Africans a distinct message: Europeans are superior to Africans. So determined was the regime in beefing up European prestige that it was a condition for granting application for missionary work in traditionalist areas.²⁷¹ There was no such condition for Muslim-majority districts because of an unmistakable presumption of rejection. The condition in Muslim-majority districts was eased slightly, after the first two decades. On the other hand the Christian message to Africa remained: Europeans and Africans are equal. These two messages are irreconcilable. Herein lay the cause of

271 Boer, *Missionary Messengers*, 70

the conflict. And it needs to be stressed that missionaries on ground, whose responsibility it was to witness to the equality of Africans and Europeans, were ahead of the churches in the Europe and North America that sent them to Africa.

“These two messages are irreconcilable. Herein
lay the cause of the conflict.”

It should perhaps be stressed that whether in Southern Nigeria or Northern Nigeria, the requirement for missionaries to stand for human dignity was the same. For example, the work and view of Thomas Bowen in the mid-19th century Yorubaland was way ahead of that of the Southern Baptist Convention that sponsored him. Similarly, Miss Bettye Ann McQueen, a Southern Baptist Convention missionary in Nigeria from 1964–1995 discharged her missionary mandate in Ibadan, Zaria, and Oshogbo without a tinge of racism or aloofness. Although she was conscious of her Baptist identity, nevertheless, she did not convert her Baptist identity into a religion for herself or for others. Rather, she was accessible to other Christians of other traditions, and indeed became “all things to all” (1 Cor. 9:22) that crossed her path.

It should be emphasised that the western churches that dispatched missionaries to African in the 19th and the 20th centuries have taken significant strides to close the gap between them and their emissaries on the field. For example, the Southern Baptist Convention, having confronted its racist past in May 1995, took bold steps which paved the way for the election of an African-American as its President in 2012.

DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF CHRISTIAN RESPONSIBILITY

The second area of friction had to do with different interpretations of Christian responsibility. On the one hand, Western missionaries regarded it as a part and parcel of their Christian duty to report acts of oppression, wherever it occurred especially in their areas of assignment, whether the actors were colonial officers or local potentates. For example, despite the fact that he appreciated the role of the Emir

of Zaria for bringing Christianity to Zaria, Dr. Miller facilitated his removal when he became tyrannical over his people. Similarly, even though the Royal Niger Company had subdued the Nupe army from 1897–1899, the residue of Nupe power over Yagba existed at Pategi from the days of Maliki. With the embrace of Christianity by Yagba from 1908 and its entrenchment thereof, the people of Yagba were able to organise a peaceful march to Pategi in 1936 and secured their freedom from Nupe rule, a feat they attributed to Christianity through mission presence in their midst.²⁷²

As part of what they considered to be their duty, missionaries informed their supporters in their home countries or constituencies. For example, the Church of the Brethren Mission working in the Northeast of Nigeria petitioned London, in addition to the information wired to their home constituencies in North America.²⁷³ Sadly, British colonial officers regarded these missionary activities as sheer meddlesomeness; and the predictable reaction was administrative vindictiveness. And when that method was not as effective as expected because of the local acceptance and respect that missionaries enjoyed among the people to whom they bore witness, administrators resorted to blackmail and bravado.

THE HIGHER LIBERATIVE QUOTIENT FACTOR

The third area of friction is closely related to the second above. Some might even regard the third as a restatement of the second. Communities with mission presence in their midst had a higher quotient of liberation from harassment and roughshod riding on the part of local potentates and colonial officials.

There is a particular strand of history of conflicting interpretations of missionary duty in southern Nigeria which the northern government was determined not to repeat. As it may be recalled, Christian

272 The revolt was not violent as Ade Obayemi suggests, A. Obayemi, "The Sokoto Jihad and the Okun Yoruba: A Review," in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol 8, No. 2 (June 1978), 86, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41857062> (accessed on 12 December 2014)

273 Salimone, "Early Expatriate Society in Northern Nigeria: Contributions to a Refinement of a Theory of Pluralism," 52

missionary presence had become entrenched in the coastal areas, beginning in 1842 – Wesleyans, Anglicans, Baptists, Presbyterians and the Roman Catholics. Their ministry was proselytization, but it took diverse forms, including socio-economic, cultural, educational, and medical dimensions.

In 1859, the Anglicans in Abeokuta added newspaper publishing, with a bilingual bi-weekly newspaper for the thousands of Christian converts.²⁷⁴ Among other things, the newspaper emboldened the readership to take interest in matters of public interest and created the awareness that the powerful were not above criticism. Venerable Henry Townsend, the editor, took delight in speaking to the English merchant class in Lagos as well as the British Consul-General repeatedly, whereas the power to censor the paper was neither here nor there. Even after the British Consul-General reported the matter to the Foreign Office and the latter took it up with the CMS authorities in London, Townsend took no notice of it because his felt allegiance was to his congregation in Abeokuta and not to any authority in Lagos. In any case, the CMS authorities did not find Townsend contravening any church or moral teaching. Therefore the need to censor or withdraw him did not arise.

In due course, the influence generated in the Christian community impacted and partly ignited nationalist feelings so much so that when the movement began newspaper publishing in the 1880s, its editorial style was a clone of the missionary newspaper. As far as the northern government was concerned, the southern press lowered the prestige of the European in African esteem. Since the superiority of the European is what the northern government was determined to ingrain, there was that imperative to curtail or even eliminate the

274 For the history and editorial style of the newspaper, see Chapter Two of my PhD thesis, Awoniyi [Oluniyi], "An Assessment of the *Nigerian Christian Magazine's* Response to Oppression in Nigeria as an Advocacy Journal 1967–1987," an Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1995. I edited my name to the present form in 2005. See also F. Omu, "Journalism and the Rise of Nigerian Nationalism: John Payne Jackson, 1848–1915," in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* Vol. 7, No. 3 (December 1974), 521, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41857035> (accessed on 7 October 2013)

source of the trouble. This explains the stiff opposition to missionary advance in Northern Nigeria.

AN EXCURSUS ON ETHEL MILLER

Lastly, just as the colonial administrators regarded it as their administrative duty to censor missionaries, so did some missionaries refuse to be intimidated on the proper duty of colonial government. Ethel Paddy Miller is a good example of a missionary who called the bluff of the colonial officials and remained in the colony to chart a personal course of ministry.

Ethel Miller, sister of Dr. Walter Miller in Zaria, was accepted by the Church Missionary Society in 1907 and she arrived in Nigeria in 1908. She taught in Ibadan Girls School till 1910. Then she moved to Zaria to help her brother, Dr. Miller, to run the co-educational school there. She, however, became increasingly disenchanted by the misrule of the British Residents and its negative impact on the people and on missionary advance. To her, the administrators were betrayers of British trusteeship and English ideals. She was equally disenchanted by the apparent docility on the part of British missionaries on ground.

Therefore, she resigned from the CMS and went solo in 1917. She left for Egypt the same year but returned in 1920 preaching in urban and rural areas in Zaria. She relocated to Challawa near Kano in 1933 and carried on with missionary and social work. In Kano, she found an ally in the person of Mrs. Cotton, wife of the Kano branch manager of the CMS bookshop. Together, they talked freely with men and women in and out of Kano city, which was off limit to missionary witness.

Her presence in Kano, however, did not cause a stir among the locals. In addition to verbal articulation of the gospel message to Hausa commoners, she compiled a grammar of Hausa and translated *Pilgrim's Progress* into Hausa. Not least is a number of tracts she wrote, two of which are critical of Muhammad the prophet of Islam, but which were directed at the colonial administrators.

Richmond Palmer, the Lt. Governor at that time, who all along must have found opposition to Christian presence in Muslim

emirates his mission in history, suddenly found an irrefutable evidence for justifying the policy of exclusion of missionaries from the Muslim emirates!²⁷⁵ Threats of arrest, prosecution, rough handling, and deportation rent the colonial air.

Rather than retreat, Ethel did not appear ruffled. Equipped with a degree in English from the University of London, and apparently with a good working knowledge of her rights and privileges wherever the Union Jack was flown, she must have rested assured that a case of libel instituted against her would have failed in any Common Law



Fig. 17
Ethel Miller

court because the government would not have been able to field a plaintiff. Palmer, with a law degree in addition to a classics degree, both from Cambridge University, wanted Ethel Miller prosecuted under Section 58 (2) of the Nigerian Criminal Code, which made it an offence to publish seditious writings. The Crown Counsel, however, counselled otherwise making it clear that not only could the administration not produce evidence, prosecution could actually backfire as public opinion in England, as well as in North America from where most of the missionaries in the Far North and the Middle Belt came, could swing in favour of the missionaries. In what way is a single lady riding her bicycle from Challawa to Kano a threat to the government of Northern Nigeria? Richmond Palmer

²⁷⁵ Barnes, "Religious Insults," 67; other anti-missionary administrators were Temple, Hewby, Arnett and Gowers. See Graham, 121; Ruxton was to a lesser extent, 113.

could not find a convincing answer for right thinking people, not least North American missionary supporters.

An option for Palmer was to charge Miller under section 204 of the Criminal Code, which made it an offence to insult a religion. The officials, however, saw in this option a cul-de-sac, as they could not produce a single Muslim from Ilorin to Maiduguri and Sokoto to Gboko, to testify that their religion was insulted by Ethel Miller.

After years of much ado about a non-issue, there were series of high level consultations in Kano, Kaduna, and Lagos, on the part of the colonial overlords. The legal option was dropped in favour of blackmail. Ethel Miller was, therefore, verbally warned at a meeting of colonial dignitaries during which Miller rejected every innuendo and intimidation.²⁷⁶ The ensuing blackmail and arm-twisting resulted in turning down a pending application by the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) to begin work in Abuja in Niger Province, because Ethel Miller's pamphlet was printed by SIM's Niger Press in Minna.

Was Ethel Miller a failure? Margery Perham, Frederick Lugard's biographer, portrayed her as such.²⁷⁷ Perham's assessment, which is based on a solitary interview with Ethel in Kano, perhaps around lunch table in 1932, and which probably did not last an hour, is understandably that of the establishment.

In perspective, it is important to recall that Ethel Miller relocated from Ibadan to Zaria in 1910 and except for the two years she spent in Egypt, remained in Hausaland until when she voluntarily left for England in 1960. Therefore, a fairer assessment of her life and achievement is better gauged based on the 50-year experience in her land of adoption. It can be affirmed that in her 50-year domicile in Northern Nigeria, she bore witness in urban and rural settings, interacted with men and women, and travelled widely in Northern Nigeria. To her credit, no northerner, man or woman, pointed at her for any wrongdoing. Rather, her principled qualities provided an inspiration and a lifelong manual for a watchful young man, just as her mentoring skills found fulfilment in him so much so that, by

²⁷⁶ *ibid.*, 71–73

²⁷⁷ M. Perham, *West African Passage: A Journey through Nigeria, Chad and the Cameroons, 1931–1932* (London: Peter Own Publishers), 1983, 88, cited by Barnes, "Religious Insults," 64

the time Ethel left Nigeria finally in 1960, Mallam Aminu Kano had gathered momentum and was well on his way to stardom as the greatest politician in Hausaland in the 20th century.²⁷⁸

“her mentoring skills found fulfilment in him”

*CENTENARY AWARD: MRS. FLORA LUGARD AND
MISS ETHEL MILLER*

In 2014, Frederick Lugard and his wife were recipients of Nigeria's centenary awards. While that of Frederick Lugard is more difficult to argue against, given that he presided over the amalgamation of Southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria in 1914,²⁷⁹ that of his wife reflects an element of poor judgment, for the following reasons.

First, apart from juggling with the words, Negretia, Nigeria, and Goldesia to pick the one which suited her imperial fancy,²⁸⁰ it is hard to point to any contribution to Nigeria that Flora Lugard made.

Secondly and admittedly, Flora Shaw was an acknowledged journalist before her marriage to Frederick Lugard in 1902,²⁸¹ however, she did not contribute to the development of journalism in Nigeria, despite the fact that there were several flourishing newspapers in Lagos throughout her husband's tenure as the helmsman in Northern Nigeria 1900–1906, Governor of Northern Nigeria 1912–1913, and as Governor-General of Nigeria from 1914–1919. Mention has been made in passing of the pathological dislike Lugard had for the ownership and control of the black press especially in colonial Africa;²⁸² so his imperial soul mate would not touch the black press with a

278 A. Feinstein, *African Revolutionary: The Life and Times of Aminu Kano*, (Wiltshire: Davidson Publishing Ltd, 1973), 144

279 The amalgamation was in effect the amalgamation of the Southern Railways and Northern Railways. Lugard, however, drove a wedge between the two colonies thereby making national cohesion and collective goal much harder to achieve.

280 Perham, “Lugard: The Years of Authority,” 10

281 For example, she was the only female journalist to cover the Anti-Slavery Conference in Brussels, 1886, for the *Manchester Guardian*.

282 See Lugard, *Dual Mandate*, 80

ten foot pole. Rather than write in Nigerian newspapers to educate Southern Nigerians on Northern Nigeria, she wrote everything for British newspapers where the average readership in Kent, York, or Suffolk, could not be bothered whether Damaturu was halfway between Togoland and Calabar or Cape Town.

Thirdly, by concentrating on the British press, the Lugards established themselves, in some circles as some kind of authority on “African history, government, economics, slavery questions, labour questions, trade – everything Africa.”²⁸³ However, her tendentious propaganda especially against Southern Nigeria was little more than a wasteful project of storing water on the back of a duck.

Fourthly, Lady Flora Lugard’s article appeared in the 1911 edition of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*²⁸⁴ when she was still in Hong Kong or alternatively in London. Gaining entry into the pages of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, which was known for high scholarly standard in the English-speaking world, warrants some questions. For example, on what ground was entry granted to Flora Lugard on Nigeria? Is it because she was the daughter of a Major-General and wife of a ‘Major-General’? Was it because she was the only woman reporter to cover the Anti-Slavery Conference in Brussels in 1886? Was it because she wrote the history of Australia for children? Was it because she travelled to South Africa and Australia? Was it because she wrote four novels for children and one for adults? Was it because of her vision of the British Empire which had little thought of freedom for the colonised? Was it because of her position as Colonial Editor for *The Times* of London which allowed her to travel throughout the British Empire? Was it because while living with her husband in Hong Kong, she helped her husband to establish the University of Hong Kong? Was it because of her role which is thought to have facilitated events that led to the South African war? Was it because she wrote on Northern Nigeria?²⁸⁵ Admittedly, the article in question may have been suitable for the pages of *The Times* of London, because of the ‘dead-in-a-day news’ culture of newspapers, but

283 Nicolson, 170

284 *ibid.*, 171

285 cf. Wikipedia, “Flora Shaw” in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flora_Shaw (accessed 24 April 2011)

knowing the standard which contributors to encyclopaedias have to conform, Flora Lugard did not qualify for an entry on Nigeria in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* by 1911.

Fifthly and admittedly, it is conceivable that the ship which conveyed her from England to Zungeru through Burutu in 1902 had a stop-over in Lagos for discharging cargo and for picking up passengers. A stop-over in Lagos, for picking up England-bound passengers, on her return journey, is equally conceivable. Apart from these two probable instances, did Flora Lugard live in Lagos? If yes, for how long? Did she cross Lagos lagoon northwards? If yes, how far did she go? Did Flora Lugard live in Southern Nigeria? If yes, where did she live, when and for how long?

These questions are meant to suggest that (1) Flora Lugard's entry is at best a redaction by an ignoramus, and an exhibit of fake intellectual authority. Admittedly academic degrees are not everything. After all, there are experiences and expertise that can make other professionals contribute to a reference work such as an encyclopaedia. This realisation forces critics to speculate on probable experiences and expertise of hers, which are not disclosed in her biography, which could commend her to be listed among respectable authorities since there were British nationals,²⁸⁶ other Europeans, North Americans – and Nigerians – who were eminently informed, to enlighten the world on Nigeria. Sadly, those probable experiences remain a matter of speculation as at press time. (2) Flora Lugard's article in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* erodes the integrity of *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

Lady Flora Lugard had a wonderful opportunity twice, 1902–1906 and 1914–1919 to make a mark, if the will was there, but she was consumed by racism. Perham put it down to ill health, but the argument for lack of will rather than ill health²⁸⁷ is based on her extraordinary performance during the brief tenure of her husband as Governor of Hong Kong, 1907–1912 – “while they lived in Hong Kong she helped her husband to establish the University of Hong

286 *ibid.*, 166

287 *ibid.*, 86–87

Kong.”²⁸⁸ Because of their racist rating of Africans, however, she did not help her husband to establish even a primary school in Nigeria, in more than twice the length of service in Hong Kong. No, Flora Lugard does not deserve Nigeria’s Centenary Award.

In comparison, Ethel Miller made purposeful contributions to the lives of Nigerians especially in the area of girls’ education, whereas some states in Northern Nigeria are still undecided whether girls’ education has value, one century after her work in Zaria.²⁸⁹ As stated earlier, she was itinerant in both urban and rural settings, raising the awareness of Hausa women in particular. In the area of political education and mentoring, albeit without orchestration, Malam Aminu Kano was a legacy. Miss Miller left Nigeria in 1960 after Malam Aminu Kano had gathered his own momentum on his way to stardom as the greatest politician in Hausaland in the 20th century.

In an environment where merit is the dominant factor for selection for such awards, such an award would have gone to the likes of Miss Ethel Miller. It remains difficult to fathom why the award should have gone to Flora Lugard. Maybe the selection committee were swayed by her title, Dame, which is a synonym for the contemporaneous First Lady, whereas the Office of the First Lady both at the federal level, as well as at state level is widely believed to be a veritable floodgate for embezzlement and money laundering.

Lastly, the question of comparison of the two characters has to be addressed. Is it fair to compare Mrs. Lugard and Miss Miller? Is it not a case of comparing an orange and an apple given the fact that the two manifestly came to Nigeria for different purposes? Admittedly, on the surface, it might seem like a comparison of an orange and an apple.

288 Wikipedia, “Flora Shaw.” in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flora_Shaw (accessed 24 April 2011)

289 It is sad to note that racist revisionists attempt to obscure the fact that Bishop Crowther’s men founded a cosmopolitan congregation in Gbebe – a mile below the Niger-Benue confluence in 1858, established a boys school in Gbebe in 1860 and a co-educational school in Lokoja in September 1865, about half a century earlier. See F. Kolapo, “CMS Missionaries of African Origin and Extra-Religious Encounters at the Niger-Benue Confluence, 1858–1880,” in *African Studies Review*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Sept., 2000), 90–95, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/524986> (accessed on 28 December 2013)

However, Christian missionaries accomplished more than they set out to do, as current research shows.²⁹⁰ The four-fold unanimity that is emerging is that wherever missionaries went, (1) they laid the foundation of modern democracy. Furthermore, they were (2) catalysts for the spread of religious liberty, mass education, newspapers and voluntary associations etc, (3) they undermined colonial abuses, thereby (4) creating or facilitating conditions, skills and experiences necessary for democracy which cannot be rightly reduced only to the hoopla of elections.

Fig. 18

COMPARISON OF FLORA LUGARD’S AND ETHEL MILLER’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO NIGERIA’S SOCIO-POLITICAL AND LITERARY DEVELOPMENT		
Field of Contribution	Flora Lugard	Ethel Miller
Educational background	Nobody has reportedly sighted her secondary school certificate.	Bachelor of Arts degree, University of London, 1906
Literary contribution	No trace	Compiler of Hausa grammar, translation of English books to Hausa; author of <i>Women Matter</i>
Development of Journalism	nothing	nothing

290 Notably R. Woodberry, “The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy” in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 106, No.2, May 2012, supra, <http://www.hillcountryinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/missionaryrootsofliberaldemocracy.pdf> (accessed 3 September 2015), R. Grin, “Seven Ways Religious Freedom Contributes to Sustainable Development” in <http://berkeleycenter.georgetown.edu/cornerstone/seven-ways-religious-freedom-contributes-to-sustainable-development> (accessed on 3 September 2015); G. Scandlen, “Christian Missions and the Spread of Democracy” in <http://thefederalist.com/2015/08/21/christian-missions-and-the-spread-of-democracy/> (accessed on 16 September 2015); A. Dilley, “The Surprising Discovery About Those Colonialist, Proselytizing Missionaries” in <http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2014/january-february/world-missionaries-made.html> (accessed on 16 September 2015)

Girls Education	nothing	10 years (2 years in Ibadan (1908–1910); 8 years in Zaria)1910–1918) – one of the pioneers in Hausaland
Women Development in both Urban and Rural Settings	nothing	Awareness raising in urban and rural areas in Hausaland
Political Education	nobody	mentoring of Malam Aminu Kano
Operative Value	racist invectives	belief in the dignity of Nigerians
Residency	5 months in Zungeru and Lokoja, an experience she termed solitary confinement ²⁶⁹	50 years after her university education

CONCLUSION

In Chapter One, the structures of *masu sarauta*, inequitable judiciary and apartheid education system were imposed on Northern Nigeria. Those structures were shown to be tantamount to ploughing for violence in the future. Chapter Two is a continuation of the unveiling of the structures of inequality especially in the religion sector.

First, whereas there was the colonial tendentious propaganda that the (1) Fulani jihadist rulers were more endowed with capacity for organisation in the area of administration; (2) that Islam was social cement for political unity, and (3) that these two ostensible assets were worthy of harnessing for British colonial administration. On scrutiny, it came to light that what was orchestrated as an asset was the extreme oppression that had prowled in Northern Nigeria for 100 years. In the same vein, the campaign of considerable capacity and of Islam as social cement is a part of the red herring pursuit for making the jihadist apparatus a junior partner in colonial rule.

²⁹¹ Interestingly, Mrs. Lugard described her experience of Zungeru and Lokoja as solitary confinement suggesting that her personal experience of Northern Nigeria was much limited, let alone her experience of Southern Nigeria; see Nicolson, 160

Secondly, it was necessary to counter the propaganda by reconstructing the religious map of the pre-colonial era. By so doing, it becomes clear that (1) Islamic rule was not as widespread as colonial historiography made it, (2) the 100-year jihad rule was marked by internal religious, political and social rebellion throughout, (3) there were many traditionalist polities that were never defeated by any Islamic force prior to the British incursion, (4) non-Muslims were more in number than Muslims in Northern Nigeria before the advent of British colonial rule. Copious references from the series of Annual Report of Northern Nigeria substantiate the claim. Lastly, (5) the accelerated conversion of the Hausa to Islam occurred under the British because the Hausa understood that course of action to be in line with British preference. In any case, conversion to Islam was good for tax purposes.

Lugard was desperate to find a philosophical, historical, scientific, and especially the so-called African nature as a firm basis for his pernicious policy for backing Islam officially. Not only did he not find a haven for his policy, it exposes the scientism in his scheme. Further analysis necessitated the juxtaposition of Lugard's view of the African and that of Bowen who are compared because of their similar professional military experiences, thereby rendering damnable the ranking of Nigerian peoples as done in Chapter One.

Lugard realised the danger of making his policy look absolutely colonial and foreign. He therefore relied on Dr. Edward Blyden, to make a case for Islam, as a suitable force for social control in Northern Nigeria. In order to make his case, however, Dr. Blyden had to turn a blind eye to (1) the tribalism in the Fulani camp when it comes to sharing of territorial booty and appointment of emirs over conquered peoples; (2) the cultural imperialism that is implicit in the dishonest conflation of Islam and Arabism on the one hand, and the brainwashing of children that goes virtually unchallenged on the other; (3) the lack of cooperation between the commoners and Muslim rulers over the gin trade, the smuggling of alcoholic beverages into Muslim enclaves in Nigeria's geographical north, and the reluctance of some Muslim communities in the south to prohibit the wine trade; and (4) the half-truth on generosity. (5) On the question of whether African traditions and Islam are compatible, there are some who affirm the phenomenon while others deny their

compatibility. What emerges is a pattern whereby the dos and don'ts of culture vis-à-vis Islam are invoked to keep the poor from social mobility while the rich and powerful get on with their unregulated day and night parties.

It is recognised, of course, that turning a blind eye was not unconnected with the inhumanity Dr. Blyden suffered in America in his youth. It is equally noted that he demolished his hastily formed image of Islam, in his twilight years, as he came face to face with irrefutable evidence of manifest barbarity that the bearers of Islam committed in East Africa. In a nutshell, therefore, Lugard's policy of official backing for Islam, and the injustices it imposed on the non-Muslim polities and populations, was based on quicksand. It is an additional damnation of Lugard's ranking of the religions in Northern Nigeria.

Dr. Chinedu Ubah's argument to justify colonial preclusion of Christian missionary work in Muslim-majority districts in Northern Nigeria was shown to hang in the air because his argument had no historical support, given the relationship between Muslim leaders and Christian leaders in Northern Nigerian 19th century. Whether it was (1) the candour and mutual respect with which Bishop Crowther and the Emir of Ilorin dialogued, (2) the regular visits by Bishop Crowther to Etsu Maliki, and political counsel that ensued, the lack of suspicion of ill-will on the part of Maliki which enabled Crowther to place Christian missionaries anywhere of his choice in Nupe territory, the mutual canvassing of each other's interest on one's area of influence whether locally or internationally, (3) the distribution of copies of the Bible to emirs as far as Sokoto with appreciation from the recipients, (4) the eagerness of Kano authorities to contribute to Bible translation into Hausa, (5) the rousing welcome Christian missionaries received in their tours, etc., Muslim and Christian leaders had a half-century of groundwork for fruitful engagement between the two faith communities before the British colonial incursion. It is, therefore, strongly suggested that the (1) tension between Christians and Muslims in post-independence Northern Nigeria is an outcome of a deliberate unwritten policy - just as the British constitution is unwritten - of the British administration. So long as Christian missionaries and emirs worked in harmony, the colonial project was in jeopardy, hence the strenuous effort to insulate the two.

Another task in this chapter was to exhibit the seeds of Muslim-Traditionalist tension sown in small traditionalist communities such as Karekare and major traditionalist communities such as Borgu. This display is important because of its potential for and indeed remote cause of Muslim-Traditionalist tension in post-colonial era.

It is undisputable that Northern Nigeria has been a habitation of Muslim-Christian violence since 1987. Considerable space is allotted to the linkage of (1) the six edicts against missionary work in Northern Nigeria and (2) the persecution of indigenous Christians and (3) the obstacles that were placed in the way of indigenous Christians from southern Nigeria. These deliberate instances of hideous injustices are identified as major contributory factors to the violence that erupted in 1987.

Lastly, an attempt is made at unravelling the recurring decimal of cat and mouse between British colonial officers and Christian missionaries throughout the 60-year colonial rule. The analysis exposes (1) the British imperial message to Africa: Europeans are superior to Africans and the Christian message to Africa: Europeans and Africans are equal are irreconcilable; (2) the different interpretations of Christian responsibility; and (3) the higher liberative quotient of missionary presence in communities that welcomed them.

In conclusion, with the colonial sowing seeds of intolerance and violence for post-colonial Northern Nigeria specifically and Nigeria generally, the United Kingdom government cannot rightly wash its hands of the harvest of Muslim-Christian violence that erupted in the last quarter of the 20th century. The reason is not far-fetched: the policies of the colonial government were formulated on behalf of the British government to which it was responsible. Therefore, considering the debt of apology established in Chapter One, the onus of public apology looms larger as a result of this chapter.

On the question of who is worthy of Nigeria's centenary award, Nigeria so far has failed to even acknowledge, let alone celebrate the contribution of the Christian missionary institution to the spiritual, educational, medical, social, economic, socio-political, record keeping, sporting activities, etc. of Southern Nigeria and Northern Nigeria. Premier Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, did not miss his opportunity to call a spade a spade on this matter, regarding the Northern Nigeria of his day. In as much as ability to say 'thank you'

is integral to greatness, the earlier Nigeria pays this debt, the better. If on the other hand the temerity is to ignore the axiom, so long will Nigeria wallow in stunted and uneven development.

3

POST-COLONIAL FRUITAGE OF FERTILISER APPLICATION AND VIOLENCE

While the preceding chapter outlines the planting of the seeds of Muslim-Christian violence, it is delimited to the planting during the 60-year colonial era. The end of the colonial era was by no means the end of the planting season. This chapter therefore begins with the post-independence continuation of planting of the seeds of violence generally, and Muslim-Christian violence specifically.

This chapter reviews the second stage of planting, focusing on some policies and programmes in the First Republic (1960–1966) when Premier Ahmadu Bello was at the helm of affairs in Northern Nigeria. There was a lull during the military incursion into governance. However, overt politicisation of religion which further fanned the embers of intolerance on not just the people of Northern Nigeria but Nigeria as a whole ensued in the military era beginning in the mid-1980s.

In a sense, the planting in the colonial era and the post-colonial era was a continuum. The seeds germinated and were growing virtually unnoticed as most plants do; however, the growth did not escape monitoring by a class of visionless leaders, with a stake in religion as a weapon of violence. Fertiliser was applied twice in 1986, which hastened the harvest of violence so much so that the whirlwind of violence was upon Northern Nigeria by March 1987.

The fact that the Northern Nigerian colonial government was not accountable to the people of Northern Nigeria needs no further elaboration. The post-colonial government was however an elected

government of a plural society. Therefore, it is held accountable for observation of certain principles of governance applicable to plural societies, one of which is termed herein the 'redline principle', for want of a better term. It is defined herein as the safety limit beyond which a government or public officer should not trespass.

REDLINE CROSSING

At the end of the colonial era, Premier Ahmadu Bello of Northern Nigeria, popularly known by his Sokoto title, Sardauna, to whom the British handed the mantle of executive governance summarised as follows in the last chapter of his autobiography, two years after the attainment of flag independence:

I think that it is fitting to bring my narrative to an end with the grant to us of our long-sought self-government. It might be called the restoration of the pre-1900 era, modernised, polished, democratised, refined, but not out of recognition; reconstructed, but still within the same framework and on the same foundations; comprehensible by all and appreciated by all. The train, the car, the lorry, the aeroplane, the telephone, the hospital, the dispensary, the school, the college, the fertiliser, the hypodermic syringe have transformed the Othman dan Fodio's world, but the basis is still there. The old loyalties, the old decencies, the old beliefs still hold the people of this varied Region together.¹



Fig. 19
Premier Ahmadu Bello

1 Bello, 227

The purpose of drawing attention to the foregoing is not to debate its veracity or otherwise as such, but to register the fact that this is what Sardauna thought of his colonial benefactors and predecessors in office. In his view, the colonial era was characterised by cosmetic governance² while leaving intact the essence of what they met on ground: the crusading jihad dynamics of dan Fodio, the agenda setting values of the caliphate in the region, and the old fears which held the people in bondage. The significance of Sardauna's perception is important because it formed the basis of his own governance model and shaped his policies in the ten-year period he was ruler of Northern Region; 1955 to January 1966.

WASTEFUL PILGRIMAGE

With the position taken by the Americans, at the end of World War II, it became clear that the British Empire was no more sustainable. As part of the measures to dismantle colonial rule in Nigeria, a number of administrative changes occurred in Northern Nigeria. Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, found favour in the eyes of the British and he rose quickly in the scheme of things from 1952 when he was made Minister of Works and Communications. On October 1, 1954, he became the first Premier of Northern Region and, in due course, he began to flaunt himself as the bearer of the jihad heritage of dan Fodio – the alpha of the 19th century *jihad* as well as Sultan Bello, his son, successor and builder of the Sokoto Caliphate.

In 1955, he undertook his first pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. In earlier times, the colonial authorities discouraged the pilgrimage partly because of logistical problems³ but much more because of the reluctance of the colonial authorities to expose Northern Nigerian Muslims to Muslims in other parts of the world for fear that the latter might instigate the former against colonial rule. From 1956

2 It is cosmetic because there were other reformist alternatives to what Lugard implemented which are less bloody and more transformative than what ensued.

3 Millions of northern Nigerians who began the pilgrimage on foot ended up as labourers in the Sudan

onward, he performed the pilgrimage every year, with an ever increasing retinue of cronies, civil servants, chiefs and cabinet ministers both at the regional and at the federal level.⁴ As John Paden, his posthumous biographer, notes,

“during the early independence period, the Sardauna continues to go on pilgrimages twice each year, for *umra* and during *hajj*. He continues to be accompanied by a large entourage of northern leaders and friends.⁵ By 1965, he was going to Saudi Arabia several times a year.”⁶

In contradistinction to Sardauna’s increasing addiction to the pilgrimage, neither dan Fodio nor Mohammed Bello his son touched the pilgrimage with a ten-foot pole, despite the fact that they had abundant resources for pilgrimage, as builders of an Islamic empire. Significantly, not only did they not perform the pilgrimage, they developed an apologetic against it. As Yamba notes, they

tried to redefine [pilgrimage’s] relative merit in the range of activities demanded of believers. Consequently, they argued in some of their written works that remaining behind to fight local unbelievers was to be regarded at least as meritorious as, if not more than, going to Mecca⁷

It is equally noteworthy that contrary to Sardauna’s excesses, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, from 1959 to 1966, was widely believed to have saved money from his personal earning for up to two years in order to buy a ticket to perform the pilgrimage.

DIVISIVE SECTARIAN AGENDA

Premier Bello’s pilgrimage of 1957 was epoch-making in several

4 Paden, 281, 282, 286

5 *ibid.*, 530

6 *ibid.*, 561

7 C. Yamba, *Permanent Pilgrims: The Role of Pilgrims in the Lives of West African Muslims in the Sudan* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1995), 41, 4

“Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, from 1959 to 1966, was widely believed to have saved money from his personal earning for up to two years in order to buy a ticket to perform the pilgrimage.”

ways. The commitment of public funds, the wastage and the impunity with which it was pursued was unprecedented. Secondly, the premier began to cast himself in the role of a bearer, representative or spokesman of the jihad heritage of dan Fodio, the alpha of the jihad and Sultan Bello, his son and builder of the Sokoto Caliphate, to the point that by 1965, he was more interested and inclined to this role than the role for which he was elected.⁸

While the premier's fundamental human rights need be upheld, it should be equally stressed that he sought for the peoples' mandate on political grounds, and within certain parameters, for political leadership and not for something different. Furthermore and admittedly, it is only human that in the course of one's duties, one's priority changes. This is conceded to Premier Bello. Equally important, however, is his obligation to abdicate his position when it became unworkable for him to keep faith with the people. For using public office and all its apparatuses to execute a divisive sectarian agenda, Premier Ahmadu Bello crossed the red line.

“he sought for the peoples' mandate on political grounds, and within certain parameters”

SECTARIAN CLEANSING

Another high point of the 1957 pilgrimage was a radical change of attitude towards religious plurality. While he professed a level of tolerance towards Christianity, he could not see “why any group would want to remain ‘pagan’, when they could be Muslim or Christian”⁹ and he therefore made “up his mind to convert pagans in

8 Paden, 310, 537, 311, 561

9 *ibid.*, 306, 569

Nigeria.”¹⁰ For the avoidance of doubt, Premier Bello made it clear in an address he delivered as Vice President of the World Muslim League (Congress) in November 1964, as follows:

I have earlier spoken of conversion of non-Muslims to Islam. I would like to say that this is only the beginning as there are other areas we have not yet tapped. I hope when we clean Nigeria we will go further afield in Africa.¹¹

Again, it is essential to uphold the premier's right to propagate his religion. However, any plan to clean Nigeria of 'pagans' is a plan to commit genocide. Recent examples in Rwanda and Bosnia, albeit of the ethnic cleansing variety, are reminders of the horror of cleansing. His determination in this regard, despite the fact that he could not execute a thorough going nationwide cleansing in Nigeria in the 14 months between his declaration and his assassination, is nonetheless an example of red line crossing.

“clean Nigeria of 'pagans' is a plan to
commit genocide”

CONVERSION CAMPAIGNS

In his address to the World Muslim League (Congress) in November 1964, Premier Bello boasted as follows,

I have personally devoted my life to the cause of Islam and because of that I am prepared to sacrifice, and I am sacrificing already, all that I possess towards that cause. It will please you, dear brothers, to hear that in my endeavour to expand the religion of Islam I have, by the Grace of Allah, been able to convert some 60,000 non-Muslims in my region to Islam within a period of five months, i.e. from November 1963 to March 1964.¹²

10 *ibid.*, 280

11 *ibid.*, 541

12 *ibid.*, 540

The example of what happened in Yauri, north of Borguland, was the experience of many traditionalist areas. As Salamone observes, “under the late Northern Premier, Ahmadu Bello, conversion pressure became almost unbearable. It was then that waves of *mallamai* (Islamic teachers) were sent from village to village to see conversions.”¹³

What Premier Bello refused to declare to the World Muslim League (Congress) is the fact that, firstly, the claim of 60,000 converts to Islam was not as a result of solo effort as he mobilised hangers-on, coerced community leaders, civil servants, provincial commissioners, and harnessed political party machine, etc., to participate in mass conversion.¹⁴ Apart from the high profile civil servants, there were, as Salamone records in the Yauri case, waves of Islamic teachers that went from village to village – paid presumably from government’s public purse.

Secondly, many of the conversions were spurious because they were products of sustained pressure. As Salamone notes in the case of Yauri, “conversion pressure became almost unbearable.”¹⁵ What Salamone recorded in Yauri applied in other parts of Northern Nigeria. It is no wonder, therefore, that as soon as he was assassinated 14 months later, some of the people he supposedly converted renounced Islam.

Thirdly, Premier Bello was accused by fellow Muslims of usurping the role of the sultan in the campaign. Having positioned himself as the bearer, representative and spokesman of the jihad tradition, he presumably saw the line of demarcation between his duty as an elected ruler of a plural society and his role as a sectarian leader virtually erased.¹⁶

Fourthly, Kashim Ibrahim, the regional ceremonial governor, did not regard the campaign as compatible with his office.¹⁷ And for this reason, the Premier kept clear of Bornu – and traditionalist Adamawa, his maternal root – despite his rampaging in Hausaland and the Middle Belt. Another reason for avoiding Borno is his fear of Kanuri

13 Salamone, “Religion as Play,” 209

14 *ibid.*, 574

15 Salamone, 209

16 Strictly speaking, this is an intra-Muslim affair; it is mentioned herein only in passing.

17 In the First Republic, the Premier exercised the gubernatorial functions while the Governor was a ceremonial figure.

people¹⁸ as there was no love lost between the Kanuri and the Sokoto Fulani.¹⁹ His conversion campaign was a clear case of red line crossing.

REACHING FOR SHARIA

While working as a Native Authority staff in Gusau, in 1943, young Ahmadu Bello was charged for corruption. As a result the Sultan's court convicted him and sentenced him to a one-year prison term. Rather than acquiesce to what he considered unfair judgement handed down by his rival to the throne of sultan a few years earlier, he made a direct appeal to the provincial court with the help of barrister Bode Thomas, a Lagos-based Christian lawyer. And the sultan's judgement was overruled by the provincial court sitting in Zaria. By so doing, Ahmadu Bello made history as the first direct descendant of dan Fodio to appeal the judgement of the Sultan to a British 'infidel' court.²⁰ Indeed, it is this overturn of the Sultan's sharia court judgement by a British court that launched Ahmadu Bello into an unstoppable career that led to the highest political office in Northern Region.

Having attained the highest political office in Northern Region, and having been pre-assured by the colonial authorities of his party's victory in the federal election scheduled even before the party was formed, the Premier as party leader must have seen the opportunity for absolute power at the end of the tunnel. At this point, Premier Bello sought to introduce sharia law, aspects of which the colonial authorities had curtailed at the onset of colonial rule.

The colonial authorities' modified promise was that introduction of sharia in a plural polity is not peace productive and that if he dropped the idea, they would frustrate the southern based parties

“Ahmadu Bello made history as the first direct descendant
of dan Fodio to appeal the judgement of the Sultan to
a British 'infidel' court.”

18 Bello, 191

19 This is the unstated reason why General Sani Abacha, a Kanuri, did not hesitate to depose Sultan Ibrahim Dasuki as soon as he had a handle on power. It was Kanuri's pound of flesh for the disgrace the Sokoto Fulani jihad army meted to the head of the Kanuri in Borno in 1808.

20 Loimeier, *Islamic Reform*, 106–107

from forming a coalition and thereby ensure his party formed the government at the centre. His attempt at introducing the sharia legal system in Northern Region failed, but it was nonetheless an attempted crossing of the red line.

NORTHERNISATION POLICY

Among the Regions, there was competition, some aspects of which were healthy, and some aspects of which made observers wonder. One of the measures taken by the northern Premier was known as the northernisation policy. Broadly interpreted, it meant Northern Region first, especially in terms of recruitment for and promotion within the northern civil service. This is a sound policy on the surface.

The incongruity was the requirement of competence in Hausa language as a prerequisite for promotion in the civil service. For Hausa speakers, the majority of whom were Muslims, that was no problem. For a physics teacher from Kabba Division, where Hausa and Mandarin have equal value, who was not taught Hausa all along but was suddenly required of him to demonstrate proficiency, nothing could be more unjust and demoralising. Much more worrisome for Christians was the fact that the teaching of Hausa language had been used to introduce Islam to the unsuspecting multitudes. It was widely believed among observers that the northernisation policy was a means of advancing Islam through the back door.

Ironically, raising the bar for non-Hausa speakers (who were mostly Christians) was *ipso facto* increasing access for Arabic teachers from Sudan to flock to Northern Nigeria for employment.²¹

On the whole, it is the foregoing ways of crossing the line that did generate anxiety on the part of Christians whose number, especially in the Middle Belt, had grown exponentially throughout the colonial period and especially after. Nevertheless, tension between the two groups did not reach boiling point, owing to the overwhelming presence of *Pax Britannia* in Nigeria as a whole, and especially the traditional community spirit of give and take.

21 It will be recalled that millions of failed pilgrims to and from Mecca, originating from northern Nigeria were trapped in Sudan. Northernisation policy was their opportunity – unofficially.

UNMONITORED GROWTH

On 15 January 1966, the military took over the administration nationwide, and that went on for fourteen years. To the credit of the military, despite their imperfections, none of the first four successive military regimes of General Aguiyi Ironsi, General Yakubu Gowon, General Murtala Mohammed, General Olusegun Obasanjo, sought to divide Nigeria along religious lines. Rather, they were as professional as possible with reference to the religion sector.

In 1975, the military announced a four-year transition period to civilian rule. A Constitution Drafting Committee made of 49 civilians was inaugurated to fashion a new constitution for Nigeria as all previous constitutions were virtually imposed by colonial masters. Memoranda were canvassed from Nigerian groups, organisations, regions and individuals from all walks of life. Being the first time such an opportunity was extended to ordinary Nigerians, the response to it was initially cautious, even dismissive. Nevertheless, awareness rose and Nigerians responded accordingly in due course.

Following the drafting stage, a Constituent Assembly was inaugurated in 1976 to streamline the draft, for the Supreme Military Council to promulgate by decree to a new constitution of Nigeria by 1 October 1979. It was at this stage that the seeds of Muslim-Christian violence which had been planted in the colonial era and in the First Republic by Premier Ahmadu Bello really grew into public view. Apparently, the *masu sarauta* which had been the beneficiary of undue advantages of colonial lop-sidedness, reinforced by Premier Ahmadu Bello in the First Republic, which had to go virtually underground in the early stages of military rule, had been monitoring the germination and growth of the seeds of violence all along, whereas the majority of Nigerians were unaware and virtually unconcerned with what was going on all the time.

By the end of the 30-month civil war, the *masu sarauta* which was somehow confused and diffident as a result of the first military coup that claimed the life of Premier Ahmadu Bello, became increasingly vociferous and assertive in national politics at the end of the civil war. They increasingly saw themselves as the fourth branch of government. Regrouping in Kaduna metropolis where many of them were building mansions, courtesy of the post-civil war oil boom.

In response, socialist intellectuals from the Middle Belt, who were equally discovering their voice nicknamed the *masu sarauta* the Mafia and disseminated the nickname widely in a book by the same name by the second half of the 1980s. Incidentally, it was around this time that General Babangida's exploits began to portray him as an agent of *masu sarauta*.²²

At this period, Middle Belt elites especially the Marx-imbued academic class stigmatised *masu sarauta* by exposing and disseminating their intra *masu sarauta* code *gamji* in order to expose their vocabulary of socio-political and economic exploitation. Nevertheless, *gamji* was able to manipulate several fronts for a call for the introduction in the Nigerian national constitution of Islamic sharia legal system; aspects of which were imposed by the British in the Northern Protectorate after some of the barbaric elements were curtailed. Consequently, provision was made for a Sharia Court of Appeal in the main draft in 1976. There was also a minority draft, however, which was not made public.

In brief, while the advocates of sharia stressed the narrow interest for a particular religion, most Nigerians, however, voiced the concern, first, for the principle of equality before the law. The argument was that the Nigerian positive law was already inclusive borrowing from English law, native laws and Islamic law and above all was evolving.

Secondly, there was the concern for a common cause, which hitherto the British colonial authorities and neo-colonial forces had worked assiduously to sabotage, but which a nation emerging from the throes of civil war, needed to forge. Not least, the oil boom presented unprecedented opportunities to maximise collective development.

The constitution-making process and experience provided the first gauge of how tall the weeds of Muslim-Christian violence had grown by April 1978. In the course of the democratic process in the Constituent Assembly, the provision for Sharia Appeal Court was defeated, and references to sharia in the draft constitution were to be expunged. In a dramatic turn of events, some members of the Constituent Assembly, mainly from the Far North staged a walk out in protest. The Supreme Military Council then stepped in with

22 Takaya and Tyoden, *supra*

a compromise for making provision for states in the Federation, which so wished to adopt a parallel sharia legal system, to do so. Sadly, this provision, by allowing a two-tier legal system, legalised inequality before the law in Nigeria.

FERTILISER APPLICATION

The draft constitution was further amended by the Supreme Military Council and decreed into effect on 1 October 1979 at the onset of the Second Republic. It functioned for only four years and three months before it was suspended by a military coup led by General Mohammadu Buhari on 31 December 1983; corruption and mismanagement being the justification for the second military incursion into governance in Nigeria. Buhari's dictatorship which concentrated on curtailing wastage and instilling discipline in national psyche both at the corporate and individual levels had little to do with religiosity. Instead, he saw excesses in the performance of religious pilgrimage and sought to curtail them.

His dictatorship lasted for one year and eight months before he was replaced by General Ibrahim Babangida on 27 August 1985. Going by Babangida's maiden broadcast, Nigerians were to believe that he came to stop human rights abuses for which his predecessor was deemed notorious, and to put the economy on a sound footing.

NIGERIA'S MEMBERSHIP OF OIC

Early in his dictatorship, Babangida asked his Supreme Military Council for emergency powers to turn round the economy; and he got it on a platter. Thereafter, from October 1985 till December 1985, he got Nigerians to debate the merits or otherwise of taking a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), ending with the populist verdict that taking an IMF to boost the economy was a bad idea. His decision not to go to IMF met with a soaring approval rating nation-wide.

Then came 2 February 1986 when the news circulated quickly that Babangida's dictatorship had registered Nigeria as a full member

of the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC).²³ Except perhaps the *masu sarauta*, which was presumably behind the registration, the nation was stunned. The visible actor was a General.²⁴ For months, calls for the General to confirm or deny the press report proved fruitless. Instead, Babangida set up an investigation committee to establish the veracity or otherwise of the story; and the panel found that the registration was established.²⁵ Actually, his endorsement of the registration was covered by the emergency power that the Supreme Military Council conferred on him. This was for reasons of the economy and not for sectarian pursuits; he could have defended the fiat on OIC. But admitting authorisation of the registration would have given him away as an autocrat, whereas the public relations strategy was to present him to the world, especially the West, as a liberal rather than that of an autocrat, which his predecessor was presented to be. For this reason, therefore, his answer to the question of whether Nigeria is a member of the OIC was kept to his chest. One can only hope that he will address this matter in his memoir.

Arguments for and against membership of an Islamic organisation by a pluralist nation raged in the media, but the registration was not withdrawn. The effect was that the General was perceived as untrustworthy throughout the eight years of his dictatorship.²⁶ Indeed, the mistrust outlived his tenure in office.

General Babangida's action on OIC is analogous to the application of fertiliser to a plant for hastening fruit bearing and harvest – in this case, the harvest of Muslim-Christian violence. So deep is the mistrust his action has caused to Christian-Muslim relations that three decades later the nation has not fully recovered from it. In the matter of Christian-Muslim relations, Babangida will go down as the most divisive in Nigerian history.

23 It is currently Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

24 It will be discussed for some time to come whether General Babangida had a personal interest in this divisive move or whether it was a case of manipulation by the *masu sarauta* (gamji).

25 For the surreptitious way in which the registration was acted out, see Appendix I and Appendix II.

26 There were beer-parlour or suya joints aliases such as Maradona, and others in private conversations.

“General Babangida’s action on OIC is analogous to the application of a fertiliser to a plant for hastening fruit bearing and harvest – in this case, a harvest of Muslim-Christian violence.”

DECREE 26 OF 1986

Some observers who claim to know General Babangida closely claim in private conversation that he is personally a good man who cannot hurt a fly; that he must have been used by *masu sarauta* who portrayed him as an unserious Muslim, and that he needed to prove his commitment to Islam by registering Nigeria as a member of an Islamic club. Evidence is thin on the ground for contesting the first claim that Babangida is a good man. The claim that he was used by *masu sarauta* without a personal interest is contestable in the light of Decree 26 of 1986 which he signed even when the OIC dust was yet to settle.

In the second half of 1986, while the Nigerian public was busy tongue-lashing the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for working hands-in-glove with Babangida’s dictatorship, for the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), General Babangida’s dictatorship made a unilateral and fundamental amendment to the constitution, which was already suspended but which would be restored into operation at the end of military rule. By his Decree 26 Constitution (Suspension and Modification Amendment), Babangida amended sections 217, 223 (1), 226 (a), 141 (3), and 242 of the 1979 Constitution, stipulating that the word “personal” should be deleted wherever it occurred after the word Islamic, to which the constitution had limited it for northern states. Thus he paved the way for atavistic sharia, to find its way back in practice.

Indeed, that amendment was unusual in several respects. First of all, it occurred while public attention was sufficiently diverted. Secondly, it was not announced by the media as was the practice with military decrees. Thirdly and strangely enough, the entire newspaper industry did not take note of it! Fourthly, Nigerian Muslims were not clamouring for sharia in 1986. Rather, the clamour was for Nigeria’s membership of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as stated in the preceding section.²⁷

27 For further reflection, see Appendix II

By the time news of this decree started trickling out, mistrust between Christians and Muslims had got worse, but it hardly meant anything to the man at the centre of the issue.

CONSTITUTIONAL BLUDGEONING OF 1989

On 11 May 1988, General Babangida inaugurated a 567-member Constituent Assembly, ostensibly to prepare a new constitution for the post military era. As events unfolded, it was part of the deceit for Babangida's self-perpetuation in power. In that Assembly, Committee 16 was charged with examining the Federal High Court, the High Court of a State, the Sharia Court of Appeal of a State, the Customary Court of a State, and the Election Tribunals.

When the sharia was considered in March 1989, the Committee put the matter to voting, and the result of the vote favoured expunging the Sharia Courts from the Constitution, just as it was in 1978. When word filtered to the general's ears, he interrupted the democratic process with a message to the Assembly through his deputy, declaring the sharia an area beyond the Constituent Assembly's competence.²⁸ Although General Babangida was not short on clichés such as federalism, presidential system, the non-adoption of any religion as state religion, and the respect for fundamental human rights as his reasons for declaring the sharia a 'no-go' area, others saw in it, a way of protecting his radical alteration of the constitution in November 1986, in which "sharia [is] mentioned 73 times, Grand Khadi 54 times, Islam 28 times, [and] Muslims 10 times."²⁹ It is noteworthy that this decree more than anything is the enablement, the backbone, the fertiliser for the sharia campaign that began at the end of military rule in 1999.

ISLAM IN AFRICA ORGANISATION 1989

Three years after Nigeria's membership of OIC, African member

28 For a fuller coverage of the Constituent Assembly, see F. Ajayi, "Religious Intolerance: Where Is Nigeria Heading?," in <http://nigeriaworld.com/columnist/ajayi/100401.html> (accessed 26 August 2014)

29 "Confab: Delegates Clash over Religion" in *Punch* 2 April 2014

countries of OIC met in Abuja November 1989, in which Islam in Africa Organisation, the African wing of OIC was founded in Nigeria, with a goal to win the whole of Africa for Islam. The strategy for this objective includes election of only Muslims to all political posts of member nations; eradication in all its forms and ramifications all non-Muslim religions in member nations; replacement of all western forms of legal and judicial systems with the sharia in all member nations; and the appointment of only Muslims into strategic national and international posts of member nations.

Islam in Africa Organisation has a right to propagate Islam in Africa and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the strategy to eradicate other religions is a terrorist register; it is the language and early warning signal of genocide. This notwithstanding, General Babangida's government allegedly donated the sum of \$21 billion US dollars to the initiative.³⁰

1991 CENSUS EXERCISE

By the time preparation for the 1991 population census got underway, Gamji's intelligence may have come to terms with the demographic changes especially in the Middle Belt and its tipping effect on population demographics nationwide. What seemed unacceptable to them was the public acknowledgement that the Christian population had overtaken the Muslim population nationally. Therefore, a strong opposition to the inclusion of the question on religious affiliation in the census questionnaire arose from northern Muslim quarters. Sadly, the National Population Commission, under General Ibrahim Babangida, bowed to the pressure, thereby denying the nation an attempt to get at least a "guesstimate" of how many Muslims and Christians there were in Nigeria.

Admittedly, a concern was expressed from a professional viewpoint that religion and ethnicity were emotive issues and that their removal from the census questionnaire would not necessarily affect ability to use the census figures for effective national planning. However, the

30 Eminike, "Abuja Declaration of the OIC," Nairaland Forum, <http://www.nairaland.com/1840446/abuja-declaration-oic-1989> 2 August 1990, (accessed on 31 August 2014) The initial website containing the verbatim communiqué of the Abuja conference has since been decommissioned.

recommendation, which the leaders supposedly accepted, has been flouted repeatedly by the same leaders who created the impression initially that the recommendation was tantamount to a doctrine. Since then, projections based on outdated counts are recycled for planning, just as the Muslim-majority assumption continues to be used as the cornerstone of public policy. For example, it was on the basis of the so-called Muslim-majority that General Sani Abacha registered Nigeria as the 9th member of D-8 Countries. Similarly, the failed attempt to impose sharia legal system on the whole of Kaduna State in 2000 was not unconnected with the Muslim-majority syndrome. On 21 February 2000, unprecedented violence broke out whereby “over 1,950 buildings, 746 vehicles, 55 mosques and 123 churches were razed. It was an ethno-religious conflict where sophisticated weapons like military rocket launchers, bombs, pistols were freely used.”³¹ On 22 May 2000, the second phase of the violence ensued. When the dust settled,

the CAN (Christian Association of Nigeria) and JNI (Jamatul Nasrir Islam) conducted a house to house count in the areas most affected. They arrived at 721 lives lost for Muslims, 1,034 for Christians. Another independent research by an NGO arrived at 5000 lives lost during the conflict.³²

Sooner than later, Nigeria will have to face the need for accurate census figures, figures on religion inclusive.

MEMBERSHIP OF D-8 COUNTRIES

To prove the point that the registration of Nigeria as a member of OIC by General Ibrahim Babangida in February 1986 was not a flash in the pan, General Sani Abacha unilaterally registered Nigeria as a member of the D[eveloping]-8 “cooperation among major Muslim developing countries.” The other members include Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey. General Abacha’s unilateral registration of Nigeria as the 9th member did not result in a general show-down by non-Muslim majority because

³¹ Sani, 108

³² *ibid.*, 108

of the general apathy and resignation to government in the latter years of military rule under General Abacha.

SARDAUNA AND BABANGIDA: COMPARISON AND CONTRAST

Based on the foregoing, two major precipitating agents of Muslim-Christian violence emerge: Premier Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and General Ibrahim Babangida. Hence, it is not unreasonable to inquire into who, between the two, was the greater precipitator of religion-related violence.

Several considerations force themselves to the fore. Sardauna and Babangida were comparable in two respects but they can be reduced to two for comparison. First, there is ample evidence to assert that both of them were passionate about the spread of Islam. Secondly, the two of them pursued their respective agendas with public funds – a reckless misuse of power and privilege.

Sardauna and Babangida were, however, different in a number of ways. First of all, Sardauna's activities were delimited to Northern Region. He never really felt at home outside Northern Nigeria; so he kept his activities to Northern Region. On the other hand, Babangida's purview and scope of manipulation was nationwide. Secondly, Sardauna used only available administrative leverages; he did not resort to constitutional fiddling for his exploits. On the other hand, Babangida made a fundamental fiddling with the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, with Decree 26 of 1986, in order to give Islam undue advantage over other religions in Nigeria. Thirdly, on the one hand, Sardauna was confident, upfront and sincere in what he did – although he was sincerely wrong. Expending public funds on pilgrimage for himself and an increasing number of cronies gave him away as someone who rated Islam as more important than the other religions in Nigeria.

On the other hand, it is clear from the record that there was not a Nigerian Prime Minister, President, Head of State, before and after Babangida whose aggregate of meddling in religious affairs is as high as that of General Babangida. This raises the question: Was General Babangida used, say, by *masu sarauta*, which became increasingly emboldened during his dictatorship or did he pursue a personal, albeit hidden, agenda? Was he equally interested or otherwise in all

the five issues of comparison and contrast? Was the external pressure (outside the military) equally applied on him on all the five issues? Admittedly, it is hard to determine where external pressure ends and where personal interest takes over. What one can say is that personal interest and external pressure seem to have worked in varying degrees. For example, in the case of OIC and Decree 26 of 1986, personal ingenuity (or evil genius as he once remarked) received great expression.³³ Furthermore, while the issue of motive on the five issues discussed may not be dogmatically resolved, widespread impression in Nigeria was that General Ibrahim Babangida was subterranean, surreptitious, sneaky, snaky and smiling in the process. Consequently, the injection of this admixture into the national psyche has a continuing toxic effect on the religion sector of Nigerian society, specifically by raising mutual suspicion between Muslims and Christians to the nth power.

“widespread impression in Nigeria was that General Ibrahim Babangida was subterranean, surreptitious, sneaky, snaky and smiling”

The question has been raised in private conversations: “Was Babangida’s actions to promote Islam or to entrench his position and tenure through conflicts?” The answer overlaps with the preceding paragraph. There are indicators such as the banning and unbanning of who may contest election, annulment, etc., to show that Babangida was determined to perpetuate himself in his dictatorship as long as possible. Therefore, the emphasis is justified that his activities on religion was not accidental. Furthermore, the fact that the balance was in favour of Islam, on all five counts, makes the case that Babangida was determined if surreptitiously, to advance Islam to the disadvantage of the other religions.

In the case of Sardauna, he was basking in the doubtful knowledge that the Muslim population was in the majority in his Northern Region. In General Babangida’s case, he seized the leadership of a nation whose Muslim-majority status had just slipped away, because in fact as at 1983 or thereabout, the Muslim population and the Christian population nationwide were at parity, and the

33 See Appendix I and Appendix II which suggest a level of personal interest.

Christian-majority had just taken the lead in the demographic map of the country. This development, which is the subject of the next heading, was not good news in *gamji's* reckoning. This is the reason for the desperate attempts, from 1986 to 1991, for revamping a Muslim-majority nation image at all cost.

“as at 1983 or thereabout, the Muslim population and the Christian population nationwide were at parity, and the Christian-majority had just taken the lead in the demographic map of the country”

Fig. 20
SARDAUNA AND BABANGIDA: CHARACTER MAPS

PERSONALITY	SARDAUNA	BABANGIDA
COMPARISON		
Motivation	Craving to demonstrate commitment to Islam	Wish to demonstrate commitment to Islam
Tool	Paraphernalia of office; use of public funds	Paraphernalia of office; use of public funds
CONTRAST		
Constituency	Regional	Nationwide
Method	Populist projects	Assorted tactics and constitutional amendment
Milieu	Muslim-majority country	Christian-majority country
Widespread perception of character	Sincere, bold but blind to the error of his governance style	Deceitful, hence untrustworthy
Long term impact	Remote contribution to the genesis of violence between Muslims and Christians in Northern Nigeria beginning in 1987	Penultimate cause of the genesis of violence between Muslims and Christians in Northern Nigeria i beginning n 1987

NIGERIA – A CHRISTIAN-MAJORITY COUNTRY

Christianity is not a new religion in Nigeria. The first wave of Christians to reach Nigeria is believed to be that of the Donatist Berber

Christians who fled southwards from Islamic compulsion in North Africa into the Sahara and beyond, gradually from the 7th to the 10th century AD. Initially they regrouped in Kanem (north of Bornu) which was not a Muslim territory at that time, and later moved southwest into what is currently known as Borguland. Secondly, Charles Meek, the official ethnographer of the 1925 Northern Provinces Census speaks of the Gobir as a people with a Christian presence in the 13th Century. Thirdly, in the early 18th century, two Bornu princes spoke of a group within the Kwararafa confederation who “venerate the cross and erect it over their houses and churches and that their king acts among them as high priest.”³⁴



Fig. 21
President Goodluck Jonathan

Portuguese missions to Benin beginning in 1486 and to Warri beginning in 1571 were promising initially but despite the welcoming of the faith by the people, the Portuguese were unable to keep faith with the people.³⁵ The most visible and common surviving reminder of Christian presence in the region is the adapted Portuguese priest cassock of the era, which has since become the male traditional dress in the Niger-Delta. The Itshekiri call it *kemije*. The hat used to be the Portuguese solution to the equatorial sun.

34 R. Gray, “Christian Traces and a Franciscan Mission in the Central Sudan, 1700–1711” in *Journal of African History*, Vol. viii, No. 3, 1967, 383. These claims still suffer from neglect.

35 See J. Kenny, *The Catholic Church in Tropical Africa 1445–1850* (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press & Dominican Publications), 1982; A. Ryder, “An Early Portuguese Trading Voyage To The Forcados River,” in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1959), 294–321, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41970640> (accessed on 30 August 2014); A. Ryder, “Missionary Activity in the Kingdom of Warri to the Early Nineteenth Century,” *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (December 1960), 1–26, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41970817> (accessed on 30 August 2014)

Unbroken Christian presence in Nigeria began at Badagry on 24 September, 1842. It was pioneered by Western denominational missions such as the Methodist, Church Missionary Society (Anglican-Episcopalian), Presbyterian, and the (Southern) Baptist.³⁶ They arrived during the abolitionist era, and there was a wave of acceptance by the coastal peoples among whom the work was self-restricted. Churches were built, schools were established and hospitals were built. Other socio-cultural services include printing presses, with the CMS press in Abeokuta, diversifying into bilingual bi-weekly newspaper publishing to cater for literate converts to Christianity by 1859, before the advent of colonial rule in Lagos.

The second wave of Christian advance was undertaken by Western interdenominational missions notably the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) and the Sudan United Mission (SUM); the latter being a fellowship of eight smaller missions. Rather than compete with the denominational mission organisations in the southerly regions, these interdenominational missions aimed at the Far North regions, but Frederick Lugard restricted them mainly to the Middle Belt. Similar to the pattern of the coastal missions, Middle Belt missions built churches, pastor training institutions, schools, hospitals and dispensaries, radio broadcast programmes for export for broadcast to target peoples in the Middle Belt and the Far North,³⁷ and aviation services for taking medical supplies to remote stations. It is important to state that the denominational missions with a centre of gravity in the southern regions were not lacking in the push northward.

The third wave of acceptance of Christianity began in the 1960s and the 1970s. Notably, it coincides with Nigeria's attainment of flag independence from Britain, with developments in the political sector impacting on developments in the religion sector. In particular, leadership of the churches passed from Western personnel to indigenous leadership.

In addition to the churches formed by both denominational and inter-denominational missionary agencies, there was first, an unprecedented and unplanned growth of independent churches. Secondly,

36 P. Johnstone, *Operation World* (Carlisle: OM Publishing, 1994), 421–427

37 The Nigerian government did not allow religious radio and television stations.

with the growth came developments in the mode of worship. More and more traditional musical instruments, which the Western missionaries had banned as pagan instruments, found their way into Christian worship services. Similarly, indigenous choruses and compositions, which are treated as an asset of collective Christian ownership,³⁸ took over from the hymn book, which strictly speaking, has been a status symbol of the literate. In this period, 'praise worship'³⁹ and dance-giving, took the centre stage while, the 'stand up a little, sit down a little' of the colonial era were merely tolerated. As a matter of fact, this shift in liturgy, which started from the independent churches and their charismatic counterparts, was considered an enrichment of Christian worship, and was embraced across board from the Jehovah Witnesses through the Seventh Day Adventists to the Catholic Church. No Christian establishment was immune from the phenomenon. Moreover, the situation persists with no sign of reversal or abating.

Fourthly, advancing simultaneously with renewed vigour in evangelisation was an intensification of Bible translation into Nigerian languages, with increasing participation from the local communities in the vetting process. As at the end of the 20th century, 96 Nigerian languages had the Bible partially or wholly.

The fifth major factor which aided Christian advance in the post-independence era is the awakening on evangelisation by International Lausanne Conference of 1974 and the National Congress on Evangelisation, Ife, in 1975. Churches that took up the challenge include notably the Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA),⁴⁰ the outgrowth of the Sudan Interior Mission, the target being the 'unreached' peoples, both within Nigeria and abroad. In due course, especially on the part of ECWA, it soon became the largest indigenous cross-cultural missionary agency in Africa. In this connection, interdenominational student ministries in the

38 This is unlike what obtains in the West where people establish ownership and copyright of Christian songs.

39 properly praise in worship

40 It is currently Evangelical Church Winning All.

secondary schools, especially the Scripture Union,⁴¹ and tertiary institutions refocused for effective delivery.

Prayer vigils came into existence in the 1980s. Initially associated with Pentecostal churches, these periodic night prayer meetings, usually once in a month, spread gradually to the other churches. The people prayed for themselves and for the country. It was in prayer vigils for the nation that the phrase “divine intervention” gained currency.

Finally, an unintended factor which affected the third wave of Christian advance in the post-independence era is the establishment of the National Youth Service Corp (NYSC), a scheme created after the civil war in a bid to integrate and promote national unity.⁴² Decree 24 of 22 May 1973 states that the NYSC is established “with a view to the proper encouragement and development of common ties among the youths of Nigeria and the promotion of national unity.”⁴³ Among other things, the scheme was aimed at inculcating in Nigerian youths the spirit of selfless service to the community, and to emphasize the spirit of oneness and brotherhood of all Nigerians, irrespective of cultural or social background. The target youths were the fresh graduates of the existing six Nigerian universities.


For the purpose of national integration, graduates from northern states were assigned to the coastal areas while graduates from the coastal states were flung to states bordering the desert. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the number of corps members from southern states (largely Christian) assigned to the northern states, where religion had been politicised, far outnumbered the graduates from the northern states that were posted to southern communities (where religion was a non-issue).

41 The same ministry is named Fellowship of Christian Students in the Far North and the Middle Belt.

42 See National Youth Service Corps, “About the Scheme” <http://nysc.gov.ng/about/about.php> (accessed on 1 September 2014)

43 *ibid.*

Fig. 22
DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS IN THE
RELIGION SECTOR FROM 1900–1990



Legend

M Muslim

A Animist (Traditionalist)

P Protestant (the three shades in this group refer to different groups (denominations) within the Christian fold. The internal partitioning is however not sacrosanct.)

In uniform, conscious of the backing of Federal might, and rightly perceiving themselves as agents of change in their host communities, corps members went about in the northernmost states stout-heartedly, professing their faith and emboldening others, especially high school students within their circles of influence. Typically, they argued their way in conservative enclaves, emphasising citizen's fundamental human rights wherever they went. They consciously trampled upon the 18-year rule, one of the colonial seeds of violence, which should have been expunged from statute books but which sprung from time to time to thwart the efforts of change agents. Indeed, the unintended effect of the NYSC was a factor in the opening up of hitherto closed Muslim enclaves to Christian advance.

In brief, the three waves of Christian advance in Nigeria were such that by 1983, the Christian population rose to equalise the Muslim population nationwide, as Fig. 22 above shows. Furthermore, the population has steadily increased: thereby, making Nigeria a Christian-majority nation and has remained so right into the 21st century.

The time scale on the bottom vertical line of the foregoing graph is 1900 – 2000. It should be noted that 1990 is the year for which the statistics above are valid. The portion 1990–2000 represents projections through the period. At the regional level, the South is represented by 73% Christian, 17% Traditionalist, and 10% Muslim.⁴⁴ The Middle Belt is made up of 60% Christian, 20% Traditionalist, and 20% Muslim.⁴⁵ Lastly, the Far North is made up of 8% Christian, 15% Traditionalist, and 77% Muslim.⁴⁶ Regrettably, most Nigerians were oblivious of this fact.

This sheds light on Babangida's desperate attempts to foist a Muslim-majority image on Nigeria. Despite general ignorance of the major demographic changes that were already in the air, not everybody was disinterested in the development. Particularly, given *masu sarauta-gamji's* interest in religion as a platform and leverage for undue advantage, it is reasonable to the discerning that they were aware. This further explains General Babangida's desperate attempt to institutionalise Islamic dominance through membership in an asymmetric organisation and through constitutional fiat from 1986 through 1991. Despite these desperate measures, there was no assurance, expectedly, that the centre will hold. Therefore, the most desperate action was taken in 1991 by expunging the column for religion from the 1991 census questionnaire, so that an accurate census would not reveal the fact that Nigeria was already a Christian-majority country. The official explanation for deleting the column was that there was a need to deemphasise religious consciousness in the country.


44 The South accounts for Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Anambra, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Enugu, Imo, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo and Rivers State in this study.

45 The Middle Belt consists of Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Niger, Plateau, Taraba and Abuja (Federal Capital Territory), southern part of Kaduna, Bauchi, and Adamawa are culturally part of the Middle Belt; see M. Adamu, *The Hausa Factor in West African History*, op. cit. Chapter Two

46 The Far North consists of Sokoto, Kano, Bauchi, Katsina, Kebbi, Adamawa, and Yobe.

The diagram for the year 2010 is presented below.

Fig. 23
POPULATION PERCENTAGES AS AT 2010⁴⁷



Legend

M Muslim; E Ethnic traditional; U Unaffiliated; C Catholic;
A Anglican; I Independent; P Protestant

“This further explains General Babangida’s desperate efforts
to institutionalise Islamic dominance”

METHOD OF STUDY

The foregoing graph is balderdash to *masu sarauta* which prefers the continuing projections of discredited census figures, since there is no reliable official census statistics on Northern Nigeria since 1911

⁴⁷ J. Mandryk, *Operation World*, (2010 ed) 642; the authors of this graph note on the same page that claims and counter-claims by Muslims and Christians and individual denominations are impossible to verify and are often inflated. Estimates for Muslims vary between 30% and 55% and for Christians between 40% and 65%. Eight states appear to be overwhelmingly Muslim, 18 are overwhelmingly Christian and 10 are split around 50% of each.

when the first head count was claimed to have been conducted. As Mansell Prothero notes,

the first decennial census of Northern Nigeria was taken in 1911 but no special arrangements were made for it. The returns made by the Resident of each Province contained only a rough estimate of the population by sex, and were forwarded to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on a single sheet of paper.⁴⁸

This census exercise was a piece of monumental fraud; and the trick – projection – was not lost on *masu sarauta* which was groomed to take over from the colonial authorities at independence. Prothero observes, however, that the 1921 census marked a great advance in the collection of demographic information, but equally notes that what was gained in 1921 witnessed no improvement by 1931.⁴⁹ Furthermore, “the war [II World War] prevented the taking of decennial census in 1941 and after the war, the available estimates of population were known to be of exceedingly dubious accuracy.”⁵⁰ Therefore, throughout the 60 years of colonial rule, “the 1952 census presents the most accurate demographic information to date [1956] for the Northern Region of Nigeria.”⁵¹ Given all the riders and cautions raised by Prothero, it is fair to state that in 60 years, the colonial authorities worked with estimates only and not accurate census figures. In as much as their objective was to promote the spread of Islam, in order to use Islam as a means of social control, accuracy of Christian and traditionalist populations was not a priority.

The first post-independence census exercise was conducted by the federal government in 1962. The result was however rejected because of gross irregularity as the three unequal regions inflated their respective figures. There was a second exercise in 1963 which was not as blatantly erroneous as the previous one. The first post-civil war census exercise took place in 1973 but the result was cancelled

48 R. Prothero “The Population Census of Northern Nigeria 1952: Problems and Results,” in *Population Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Nov., 1956), 167, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2172324> (accessed on 28 December 2013)

49 *ibid.*, 167

50 *ibid.*, 168

51 *ibid.*, 168

as it was in 1962 because of gross irregularities. Thereafter, Nigerian official population estimates were based on projections from the 1963 figures.

In contrast to the distortions on the Christian population in Nigeria, Operation World project, which also is the title of the book which came out of the project, shows that Nigeria is a Christian-majority nation. An independent worldwide study, without any special interest in Nigeria, was based on numerous sources of data over a 20-year period – 1974⁵² to 1994. The sources include data assembled by Dr. David Barret, founder-editor of the *World Christian Encyclopedia* and the World Christian Database with some modification of its approach, denominations database, making it to capture the number of congregations, adult membership affiliated membership inclusive, and church attendance.⁵³

Sources of statistics include denominational handbooks and reports, questionnaires, national surveys, Christian handbooks, voluminous official and personal correspondences, culling of magazines and circulars, growth curves for both interpolations and extrapolations of data where exact figures were not available, and use of ratios for each denomination.⁵⁴ The purpose of the methodology used is to ensure transparency. Indeed, the study from which the graphs publicised above are derived is as credible as that of internationally acclaimed studies by United Nations agencies such as UNESCO, UNDP and UNICEF.

Is it not possible that the graphs on Nigeria were based on falsified figures? In an environment where census figures are always politicised, where electoral fraud is routine and where driver's license is forged on a daily basis, the question makes a lot of sense. Equally germane is, why would non-Nigerians, who compile the statistics, single out Nigeria out of 240 countries studied for falsification of data entry? Furthermore, *Operation World* is updated annually for prayer, whereas basic to Christian belief is the fact that the Christians' God does not listen to prayers padded with lies. For the authors, knowingly falsifying data is *ipso facto* diametrically opposed to their objective.

52 Johnstone, 8

53 *ibid.*, 656

54 *ibid.*, 657; other numerous sources of statistics are listed on 658

Getting down to specifics, first, there can be no earth-shaking challenge to the graphs above from the Nigerian government because it has no alternative firm-level figures to tender having shot itself on the foot in 1991 by deleting the religion question from the census questionnaire in 1991. Admittedly, projections are not in short supply from official sources, but forty projections are not equal to one firm-level figure.

In contrast to this self-imposed impoverishment, the churches in Nigeria have been counting the number of men, women and children in their worship services and documenting them since 1842 as hinted earlier. Indeed, the number of worshippers in Nigerian churches in the past seven days can be computed. And this practice is across board – Catholic Church, Seventh-day Adventists, Pentecostals, etc., from Sokoto to Calabar, from Maiduguri to Badagry, from Atakura mountains in Borgu-land in the west to Takum in Jukun country in the east. It is these figures that are updated annually and converted to a database since 1974 for computation of Christian population in Nigeria.

Secondly, there cannot be a serious challenge to Operation World's graphs from the Muslim community because the community lacks comparable internally generated figures on the faithful who congregate to pray on Fridays nationwide. The claim is easily debunked by making available verifiable data for example the past 100 years.

The usual argument that Muslims marry four wives without any regulation of the number of children one can have ends in projection, whereas ten projections are not as strong as one firm-level figure. Even with the argument, it should be brought to the fore that there are committed Muslims who are not persuaded to take more than a wife. Isa Wali of Kano went as far as argue, in 1956, that the Koran does not teach polygamy.⁵⁵

Is monogamy among Nigerian Muslims a flash in the pan? Is the number of monogamous Muslim men increasing or decreasing? Beer-parlour answers are predictable. But these are questions that a nation in pursuit of development would press, but which permanent projectionists would evade, will not go away. That is why the manipulation and perpetuation of projections as more appropriate

55 More on Isa Wali in Chapter Five

than actual figures, since 1911, needs to be brought to the attention of the whole world.

Thirdly, are primordial religions in Nigeria likely to seriously challenge Operation World graphs? No, because Ifa priests, dibia, okija and yanbori operatives regard annual statistics on their devotees as an abomination.

Interestingly, in October 2015, Aid to the Church in Need (ACN), a Pontifical Foundation, released its global study on 22 countries of concern entitled “Persecuted and Forgotten?: A Report on Christians Oppressed for their Faith 2013–2015.”⁵⁶ The main objective of the report is to highlight the trend of persecution of Christians globally. Interestingly, ACN’s finding on Nigeria’s religious demography corroborates the Christian majority claim earlier in the narrative; ACN’s figures being “Christians 49.3% Muslims 48.8% Traditional 1.4% Others 0.5%”.⁵⁷ What is more significant in the ACN study is the pin-pointedness of its figures. Similarly, it is note-worthy that while *Operation World* is an evangelical think-tank, Aid to the Church in Need is a Roman Catholic Church initiative.

“Interestingly, ACN’s finding on Nigeria’s religious demography corroborates the Christian majority claim earlier in the narrative; ACN’s figures being “Christians 49.3% Muslims 48.8% Traditional 1.4% Others 0.5%”.”

Given that the two organisations that have produced firm-level figures on Christian majority in Nigeria are Christian organisations, can the likelihood of bias and connivance on the issue be ruled out? While such a thought can readily flash through the populist mind, entertainment of the thought is unsustainable because of (1) the integrity of the two organisations and (2) their track records, let alone the fact that the reports were not generated solely on Nigeria.

56 Aid to the Church in Need, “Persecuted and Forgotten?,” in <http://www.acnuk.org/persecuted> (accessed on 16 October 2015)

57 *ibid.*; although the method of study is not stated as explicit as that of Operation World which by 2014 has a history of 40 years of data collection and analysis, nonetheless, the reliability of the result is one that I do not doubt given the credibility of the compilers.

Indeed, the real question is: why would the two organisations fabricate findings on Nigeria – and Nigeria only – out of all the countries on earth? Indeed, the probability of connivance is infinitesimal. Nigeria is a Christian-majority country.

“Nigeria is a Christian-majority country.”

FRUITAGE OF MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE

As noted earlier, there was a sharp point of inflection in the graph of mutual distrust which began in 1986 when the OIC membership was reported in the media. Although Decree 26 of November 1986 was of greater significance and lasting consequence, it did not heighten mutual distrust further, because most people were unaware of it. Nevertheless, the level of mistrust starting in February 1986 was the precursor of the spiral of violence waiting to happen. By March 1987, a misunderstanding among students of a teacher training college in Kafanchan, Southern Kaduna State, where the majority of people had converted to Christianity in the 20th century, spread to major cities in the state resulting in the burning of churches, mosques and personal property.

By the time the riot was brought under control, 25 people had died, 6 injured, over 6000 persons arrested and property valued at N75 million (1987 prices) had been damaged. Between 40 to 47 churches, 3 mosques, 46 private houses, 19 vehicles and 30 hotels were destroyed. Goods, shops, workshops, offices, and petrol (fuel) stations were also destroyed.⁵⁸

Yet, the event of March 1987 is comparable to a trickle. Muslim-Christian violence soon became a veritable flood greater than politically, communally, ethnically, and industrially motivated forms of violence combined.⁵⁹ High profile incidents include the capture of hundreds of high school girls, most of them from Christian parents, for sale in a slave market.

⁵⁸ Sani, 100

⁵⁹ See instances and patterns, in Sani, Chapter Five.

This is the outcome of the ploughing and planting by the British colonial authorities for 60 years. It is the harvest of the watering by Premier Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto for 10 years, which General Ibrahim Babangida fertilised to bear fruit as from 1987. It is the downward spiral which Northern Nigeria and indeed Nigeria descended and from which Nigeria has not recovered since 1987 when the harvest began.

A comprehensive analysis from the late 1970s to 2006 based on Shehu Sani's *The Killing Fields: Religious Violence in Northern Nigeria* is provided below.⁶⁰ Yinka Olomojobi's lists of incidents of violence,⁶¹ though more current,⁶² especially with reference to the *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'AwatiWal-Jihad* (People Committed to the Prophet's Teachings for Propagation and Jihad), popularly known as Boko Haram violent activities, are selective. In as much as Sani's compilation is comprehensive and hence determinative, whereas Olomojobi's lists are selective hence impressionistic, Olomojobi's lists are left out in calculating the percentages in the following relational diagram despite the other strengths of the book.

The analysis is as follows. First, out of the 179 cases of violence from the late 1970s to 2006, 100 (55.8%) of them were religion-related. In other words, religion-related violence occurred more than politically, communally, ethnically, and industrially motivated violence combined. Secondly, out of the 100 cases of religion-related violence, 20 (20%) of them were intra-religious, 45 (45%) inter-religious, 12 (12%) ethno-religious, and 23 (23%) religio-state – (vandalisation of public buildings, setting of police stations ablaze, putting a court in session to flight, and forceful abduction from prison custody for decapitation. Thirdly, out of the 45 inter-religious clashes, 44 or 97.8% of them were Muslim-Christian, 1 or 2.2% Muslim-traditionalist, and 0 or 0% Christian-traditionalist. Fourthly, out of the 20 intra-religious clashes, 19 (95%) of them were intra-Muslim, 1 (5%) was intra-Christian. Lastly, out of the 23 incidents of vandalisation of public property, police stations, courts, and prisons, 23 (100%) were carried out by mobs made up of Muslims.


60 *ibid.*, Chapter 5

61 Y. Olomojobi, *Islam and Conflict in Northern Nigeria*, (Lagos: Malthouse), 2013, 163–172; 230–241

62 They include incidents as recent as 2012.

Fig. 24

BREAKDOWN OF 179 CASES OF VIOLENCE FROM
LATE 1970S TO 2006



The none-inclusion of the most recent incidents of violence in the relational diagram above is not a weakness or defect for establishing the onus for public apology, which is a major task of this book. Indeed, the foregoing facts and figures up to 2006 are quite adequate for making the case.

SUMMARY

Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto was Premier of Northern Nigeria in the pre-independence Northern Nigeria, 1955–1960 and

post-independence Northern Nigeria 1960–1966. Under his leadership, he perpetuated the undue advantage that the colonial government gave Islam in the region. In particular, he crossed the red line which an elected political ruler imbued with justice in a plural state in a plural state would not cross. His policies and practices which flew in the face of justice including (1) wasting public funds on hajj for himself and his cronies; (2) casting himself increasingly in the image of dan Fodio, the alpha of the 19th century *jihad*, thereby heightening religious tension in Northern Nigeria and beyond; (3) entertainment of genocide against ‘pagans’ in Nigeria to the extent of putting it in writing. It was significant enough that he made the declaration to the World Muslim League; (4) using public funds and apparatus for conversionary campaigns. As a young man, Sardauna appealed the judgement of the Sultan of Sokoto to a British ‘infidel’ court and got it overturned. Having become power-drunk as it were, (5) he reached for the same legal system he earlier railed against for a plural Northern Nigeria. Although there was some merit in his Northernisation policy, in implementation Northernisation favoured Hausa speakers while discriminating against non-Hausa speaking groups, such as Kabba Division, and many Northern Christians.

The military regimes of 1966–1979 and 1984–1985 acted professionally regarding religious neutrality. Therefore, there was some sort of decorum in the Nigerian population, and violence was virtually unknown between Muslims and Christians. Mutual suspicion, however, became widespread as a result of General Babangida’s policies and practices which related of the religion sector.

Beginning with (1) Nigeria’s controversial membership of the Organisation of Islamic State, which Babangida authorised with military fiat, whereas by 1986 Nigeria was a Christian majority country, and worst still (2) the unprecedented and surreptitious Decree 26 of 1986 which widened the application of sharia in the affected northern states, (3) the constitutional bludgeoning of 1989, (4) the alleged donation of \$21 billion US dollars to the Islam in Africa Organisation in 1989, and (5) the withdrawal of the religion question from the National Population Commission questionnaire in 1991. General Abacha’s registration of Nigeria as a member of D-8 Countries, even though Nigeria was not a Muslim-majority

country by 1997, is regarded as a last minute attempt of a drowning man to grab a straw of relevance.

The policies and practices of Premier Ahmadu Bello and General Ibrahim Babangida are named fertiliser application because they hastened the fruitage of violence between Muslims and Christians in post-independence Nigeria. Although Premier Bello and General Babangida are portrayed as major fertiliser users, the character maps of the two actors reveal significant similarities and differences. It should be highlighted that although Premier Bello was zealous in his Islamic campaign, he was neither hawkish towards the Christian missions in Northern Nigeria nor stand in their way – even when the colonial government backstabbed him to Western observers as pro-Islam and hawkish, and that the people of Northern Nigeria were violence-prone occasioned by the failed proposal to impose more visa restrictions on intended missionaries to Northern Nigeria. His attitude towards the mission is explained by his passion for education in Northern Nigeria to which the missions were committed.

In closing, three points need to be highlighted: (1) the growth of Christianity especially in the Middle Belt in the 20th century, despite the obstacles in the way of the Christian missions especially in the first three decades of the colonial regime was such that the Christian population nationwide was at par with the Muslim population nationwide around 1983–1984; (2) the ploughing and sowing by the British colonial regime from 1900–1960 and the post-independence fertiliser application produced the fruit of violence between Muslims and Christians by 1987; and (3) incidents of violence emanating from the Muslim camp which outnumber the number of times that Christians took the fight to Muslims.

DIALOGUE IS NOT ENOUGH

While the first three Chapters concentrate on the factors that ignited Muslim-Christian violence in Northern Nigeria in contemporary history, the last two chapters concentrate on (1) what has been done to solve the problem and (2) what needs to be done. This chapter is on Christian-Muslim dialogue which is widely acknowledged as the deliberate, structured, communications between Christians and Muslims, whereby participants express their views without distortion, and listen respectfully as those on the other side make their case without distortion. It sorts the history of dialogue from the 19th century to the 21st century into three stages: (1) the era of spontaneity; (2) the era of reflection; and (3) the era of the shambolic – characterised by deceit and mess.

This approach led to a research finding in the course of this study: Yorubaland in southwest Nigeria is the cradle of Christian-Muslim dialogue globally, with continuation in Nupeland and Hausaland, Northern Nigeria generally throughout the colonial era and lastly in Sierra Leone from the turn of the 19th century. Key actors in the early history of the phenomenon, notably Bishop Ajayi Crowther, Dr. Edward Blyden, Alhaji Idris Animashaun, Rev. A. F. Forster, Canon M. S. Cole, etc. are introduced.

Thereafter, the chapter engages in brainstorming in order to expose some skeletons whose spirits nonetheless roam freely in the fringes of the desert and the savannah, fanning the embers of deadly Muslim-Christian violence. The objective is to recover and fine-tune genuine Christian-Muslim dialogue for peace in Nigeria and beyond.

ERA OF SPONTANEITY

How, when, and where did Christian-Muslim dialogue originate? Following the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, New York, 11 September 2001, and the concerted effort on the part of peace-loving advocates of dialogue to build bridges between the Muslim community and the Christian community in America and elsewhere, Christian-Muslim advocates dug into history to find a long history of dialogue among the two communities. This led to a renewal of interest in the meeting between St. Francis of Assisi and Sultan Malik of the 12th century. While there might have been isolated and unrecorded cases of dialogue between Christians and Muslims over the centuries, historians caution that little is known with certainty of the exchange between St. Francis and Sultan Malik when they met. Indeed, Prof John Tolan, University of Nantes, France, goes as far as suggesting that what the enthusiasts label as dialogue may have been the enthusiasts' projection rather than that of trustworthy historical truth.¹

In the same vein, some have combed for evidence of Christian-Muslim dialogue, in what some observers identify as a melting pot of religions comprising of Catholics, Druids, Protestants, Sunnis, Shi'ites, Copts, etc., in what is sometimes called the Lebanese mountains, in the Middle Ages right through the 19th century. Archbishop Paul Sayah, Eparch of the Maronite Church and Curia Bishop of the Maronite Patriarchate of Antioch, has however not found any evidence of Christian-Muslim dialogue in the Middle East earlier than 1954.²

In the last chapter of his *A History of Christian-Muslim Relations*, published in 2000, Hugh Goddard, a professor of religious studies at the University of Birmingham, England, asserts:

One of the results of the fresh thinking which Christians and Muslims have been doing about each other in the twentieth/

1 N. Schneider, "St. Francis, the Sultan, and the Promise of Peace," in <http://blogs.ssrc.org/tiff/2010/02/18/st-francis-the-sultan-and-the-promise-of-peace/> (accessed on 25 April 2015)

2 P. Sayah, "Christian-Muslim Relations in the Middle East," in <http://www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=503> (accessed on 28 April 2015)

fourteenth century has been the emergence of a significant move towards dialogue between the two communities. This is not a completely new development, as in earlier centuries we have seen that there have been both disputations and debates between Christians and Muslims, but dialogue is rather different from both of those activities, involving as it does both a greater philosophical sophistication, which has become easier with the growth of modern critical study of religion, and a greater willingness to listen as well as to assert.

The Second Vatican Council was an important landmark in this development, since as well as significantly moving Christian thinking on from its traditional 'exclusivism' towards Islam and other religious traditions, it also called on Christians and Muslims to forget the past and strive sincerely for mutual understanding. This call had already been given an institutional form even before the Council's statement by the establishment in 1964/1384 of the Secretariat for non-Christians, which in 1989/1409 was renamed the Pontifical Council for Inter-Religious Dialogue. A parallel shift in opinion was beginning to take place among other Christians at roughly the same time, though it took slightly longer to develop any institutional form: only in 1971/1391 did the World Council of Churches set up a sub-Unit for Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies, but this was the focus of some discord between Protestant member churches, some of whom entertained some suspicions of the whole idea of dialogue, and some of the Orthodox churches, which were generally much more positive. In 1991/1411, as part of a major shake-up of its structure, the WCC (World Council of Churches) disbanded the Sub-Unit, and its responsibilities were taken over by the Office on Inter-Religious Relations within the General Secretariat.³

The strength of Goddard construction of the history of Christian-Muslim dialogue lies in his differentiation between disputations and debates, which has been going on between Christians and Muslims for centuries, and dialogue which is more recent in religious history. The weakness lies in his utter silence on (1) West Africa generally,

3 H. Goddard, *A History of Christian-Muslim Relations* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 177

(2) Yorubaland specifically as the cradle of Christian-Muslim dialogue. Nor does he mention (3) the 19th century as the period when Christian-Muslim dialogue began. Rather, much is made of the 20th century developments, especially beginning from Vatican II, 1962–1965.

YORUBALAND

Contrary to his version, Christian-Muslim dialogue originated among the Yoruba of southwest Nigeria in the 19th century and spread to other parts of West Africa. The central figure was Samuel Ajayi Crowther, the first indigenous Church Missionary Society (CMS) bishop in what is now Nigeria. As Prof Andrew Walls, founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Christianity in the non-Western World, University of Edinburgh, notes, “Crowther’s early experience as a teacher and evangelist in Sierra Leone had taught him that confrontation where one party cries ‘Jesus is the Son of God’ and the other ‘No, he is not,’ was useless.”⁴ One of his most memorable and fruitful experiences was his encounter with the Emir of Ilorin in 1872.⁵ Given the significance of this particular encounter, it is perhaps important to highlight some of its features as it is instructive in several ways.




Fig. 25
Bishop Ajayi Crowther

“Christian-Muslim dialogue originated among the Yoruba of southwest Nigeria in the 19th century”

⁴ Walls, 161; for his personal account, see Crowther, 7–11, 28

⁵ Walls, 161–163

Unlike many impromptu or spontaneous encounters between Christians and Muslims on innumerable occasions in Yorubaland in the 19th century, that of Crowther and the Emir was (1) arranged – at the invitation of the Emir.⁶ (2) It was verbal and characterised by exchange of theological ideas. (3) Both sides recognised the benefit of starting dialogue from common grounds rather than from proofs.⁷ (4) It ended with the Emir requesting the bishop for a prayer with (5) the bishop praying contextually and innovatively thereby substituting the name of the Emir for that of Queen Victoria in the Anglican prayer book. (6) It was a win-win encounter, as “we parted with good feeling on both sides.”⁸

Presbyterian Edward Blyden, a pan-Africanist introduced in Chapter Two, was a passionate practitioner of Christian-Muslim dialogue. As with many of his contemporaries, dialogue was not a disembodied affair, but an engagement which went hand in hand with or in the midst of social action. So passionate was he that, in his capacity as Agent of Native Affairs in Lagos Colony, 1896–1897, he discriminated against the children of his fellow Christians to offer western education to Muslim children in Lagos, to enable them partake in the life of the community on an equal footing with Christian children who had an advantage by virtue of Christian missionary initiatives. He pursued the same policy in Sierra Leone, in his capacity as Director of Muslim Education, 1901–1906.



Fig. 26
Dr. Edward Blyden

6 Not having a copy of Bishop Crowther's itinerary, it is not clear when in 1872 this dialogue took place. One can only speculate that it may have been one of those occasions when he overstayd in his annual visit to Etsu Mailiki and a tour of his mission stations in Upper Niger as a consequence of which he chose to travel overland to Lagos through Ilorin, hence an invitation by the Emir when the bishop was within the formers's emirate.

7 Crowther, 17

8 *ibid.*, 21

“It was a win-win encounter, as “we parted with good feeling on both sides”.”

While introducing Dr. Blyden, it is perhaps important to usher into limelight Alhaji Idris Animashaun,⁹ who worked for and worked with Blyden. Animashaun's role seems to have contributed to the promotion of Western education among Lagos Muslims in such a way that awareness-raising led to the dislodgement from populist mind of the notion that to embrace Western education was *ipso facto* to embrace Christianity. In any case, his activities strictly are more of intra-Muslim dialogue. Nevertheless, his life and times is worth studying for a reconstruction of a buoyant history of Christian-Muslim dialogue in Nigeria.

Another practitioner of dialogue was Rev A. F. Forster a Christian missionary stationed in Iseyin for many years.¹⁰ He was so immersed in dialogue with the community that Prof. Gbadamosi says of him,

there was hardly any Muslim communal gathering he did not attend: prayer and religious meetings at the mosque and at the Court of the Aseyin; and even secular gatherings to arrange for the rebuilding of a burnt-down mosque.¹¹

Christian-Muslim dialogue not only took place in numerous Yoruba towns and villages in the 19th century,¹² it took several forms including controversies and theological disputations¹³ on questions such as (1) whether the Bible or the Koran is the word of God, (2) polygamy, and (3) the history of Islam and its role in world affairs.¹⁴ Besides, the settings for these conversations include private homes, “fixed open disputations”,¹⁵ mosques,¹⁶ and palaces.¹⁷ In fact, Christians

9 Gbadamosi, 169–170, 176

10 Attempts at getting more information on this have been tortuous. Research into his times and works suffer from neglect.

11 Gbadamosi, 131

12 *ibid.*, 131

13 not in a combative sense

14 *ibid.*, 130–131

15 *ibid.*, 132

16 *ibid.*, 131

17 *ibid.*, 132

freely took Arabic lessons from Muslim instructors,¹⁸ and there was the translation of Christian writings into Yoruba to widen the readership among Christians and Muslims.

But “certainly the most notable literary production was the Yoruba translation of the Qur’an by the Rev M. S. Cole, which was indeed a feat.”¹⁹ That was in 1906. The translation of the Koran into Yoruba and the translation of several Christian writings into Yoruba for ease of dialogue between Christians and Muslims were both a cause and effect of dialogue. Indeed, so genuine was the give-and-take that there was no hint of the fear of an infidel touching a holy book. Rev. M. S. Cole, who later rose to the rank of Canon and ministered in Christ Church, Marina, Lagos, from 1920–1931,²⁰ certainly deserves a conspicuous space in the Hall of Fame of Christian-Muslim dialogue.

It is gratifying to note that the Centre for Translation of the Holy Qur’an, Qom, Iran has acknowledged Cole’s feat.²¹ Nevertheless, it is sad to note that the authorities of the Centre de-coupled his title “Rev” from his name, presumably so as not to publicise his Christian identity, thereby distorting his image. Admittedly, the titles of most of the translators are omitted; the problem is that the omission is not applicable to all. For example, the titles of the translators of the Koran into Tukmen, (1990), Somali, (1991–92), and Uyghur, (1992–3) are retained. This observation needs to be looked into in order for the authorities to successfully deflect the charge of not just that of intellectual discourtesy but that of harbouring a hawkish spirit against dialogue.




Fig. 27
Rev M. S. Cole

18 *ibid.*, 129

19 *ibid.*, 130

20 *Souvenir Brochure, Christ Church Centenary Celebration*, 1967, 26

21 Imam Reza (A.S) Network, “The Centre for Translation of the Holy Qur’an,” in <http://www.imamreza.net/eng/imamreza.php?id=1390> (accessed 14 December 2014)

In 19th century Yorubaland, Christian-Muslim dialogue generated much public interest²² and was generally warm,²³ so much so that by and large, Christian-Muslim dialogue was “courteous and cordial. There were incidents of intolerance, which can be attributed to some outbursts of ardour and passion on both sides. But these were rare.”²⁴ Furthermore,

this general absence of rancour ... was due in part to the courtesy and a sense of moderation displayed by both sides; but it was due in greater measure, to the restraint imposed by Yoruba culture, which not only discountenances extremism but smugly allows what can be called religious co-fraternity ... it also explains some peculiar Yoruba religious traits: the religious co-existence of Muslims, Christians (and ‘pagans’) within the same family and lineage and some spirit of co-operation observable not only between the Muslims and Christians but even also between the Muslims and ‘pagans’.²⁵

In brief, Christian-Muslim dialogue in 19th century Yorubaland was spontaneous, give-and-take, non-hierarchical, un-orchestrated enlightening, and even entertaining. Indeed, it can be said that while to some people dialogue is a course of study, or even a set of techniques, it is a second nature among the Yoruba. And as it was in the beginning, 19th century, so it has remained right up till the 21st century. It worked; and it is working.

In the light of the above, why is there no mention of Yorubaland or 19th century in Prof. Goddard’s construction of the history of Christian-Muslim dialogue? Could he have been absolutely unaware of this strand of history in data collection for a book-length study of the history of Christian-Muslim relations? It is hard to imagine that a man in such a high position in a major British university that has additionally a Centre for West African Studies, and with the Selly Oak College’s Library at arms-length, could have fallen into a

22 *ibid.*, 130

23 *ibid.*, 130

24 *ibid.*, 146

25 *ibid.*, 146–147; the situation remains the same among the Yoruba right into the 21st century.

state of coma on the matter, given the fact that some of the relevant literature, such as Crowther's book, was published as early as 1892. Blyden's pandering as it were to Islam was not as widely known as early as Crowther's explorations, but literature on Blyden, apart from his prolific writings, was not in short supply at the end of the 19th century. That is clearly 100 years before Goddard's book appeared. Besides, Gbadamosi's book, which is probably the most extensive on Christian-Muslim interaction²⁶ in Yorubaland, was published in 1978. There is more than sufficient time for Goddard to get familiar with at least the literature. Lastly, Prof Walls' take-it-or-leave-it article appeared a year before Goddard released his book. Nothing in Walls' article should be news to Goddard, given the position the latter occupies. Alas, as the evidence suggests, one would not be surprised to learn that it was news to Goddard that West Africa was the cradle of Christian-Muslim dialogue.

Why is there ignorance on the part of Goddard? The hypothesis herein is that Prof Goddard's construction is an example of a school of thought which harps on some of the customs of the West African

as the most interesting of him, and a great injustice has in consequence in many cases been done to him. He is credited with all the hastiness common in reality to all mankind, and the good in him is not looked for. And if any kind of higher religion or philosophy is discovered, the conclusion is at once jumped to that it must have been imported.²⁷

It is the characteristic of the school which is determined to deny the black man every accomplishment or of any worthwhile contribution to learning or civilisation. It is the firm belief of this school that the black man cannot pioneer anything worth emulating: he must be taught and he must be led as he is presumably incapable of leading others. Apparently, Goddard and Lugard drank from the same well.

²⁶ It is synonymous with dialogue in this context.

²⁷ R. Dennette, "A Common Basis of Religion: Or, the Order of Genesis One with the Order in the Categories in West Africa," in *Journal of the Royal African Society* Vol. 12. No. 47 (Apr., 1913 256, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/715886> (accessed on 15 May 2013))

Somehow, Goddard slept through the inchoate years of Christian-Muslim dialogue, but suddenly woke up when dialogue metamorphosed into big time, high profile seminars and workshops – when Christian-Muslim dialogue became marketable and export oriented. It was the timing for packaging dialogue into courses leading to university degrees.

Another probable reason for the omission of Yorubaland and 19th century West Africa in Prof Goddard's construction of Christian-Muslim history could be that, although he was looking in the right place, he was chasing the word 'dialogue' and not the concept *per se*, thereby overlooking dialogue's dynamic equivalents and even synonyms. In such a scenario, he was bound to miss important materials. Again, revisionism fits this scenario. In conclusion, although Prof Goddard's account is clothed with intellectual respectability, the racist underskirt shows. To the perplexity of revisionism, the evidence forces this declaration: Christian-Muslim dialogue is of Nigerian origin, and pin-pointedly south-western. It is a Nigerian contribution to global peace.

In summary and in any case, it should be noted that what evolved in Yorubaland in the 19th century was not mere "Christian-Muslim dialogue" but "Christian-Muslim dialogues."²⁸ It was not disembodied exchange of words; it was principally a situation which did not recognise a dichotomy between dialogue in word and dialogue in deed.

NUPELAND

There is little evidence, if any, of verbal articulation of doctrinal fine points between Bishop Crwother and Etsu Maliki who were at the centre of Christian-Muslim dialogue in Nupeland in the 19th century. Rather, the model adopted in Nupeland was more of a practical nature, as it was in the context of community development which dialogue evolved. Based on trust, Etsu Maliki gave Bishop Crowther a free hand to open mission stations wherever he wished and to carry on with his evangelisation programme unhindered. As revealed in

28 Gbadamosi, 132

Chapter Two, not only did Maliki make his domain accessible to Crowther, he took it upon himself to facilitate the opening up of neighbouring emirates and even distant emirates, deep in the defunct Kwararafa confederation, for Christian missionary work.

Several points are worth noting at this juncture. (1) Maliki carried out his campaign for missionary advance without a show of displeasure by his overlord, the Sultan of Sokoto. (2) In the same vein, Crowther took it upon himself to advocate the cause of Muslim leaders in international ecumenical conferences. (3) It is significant that Crowther was the only Christian leader boldly advancing on this route and charting this new frontier in the 19th century – as attested to by Blyden. (4) This Crowther committed himself to doing without been pushed or coerced. Neither Maliki nor Crowther stood in each other's way; its outcome was peace and development, or what in some circles would be described as a win-win situation. In brief, what went on between Crowther and Maliki is an example of genuine Christian-Muslim dialogue.

“Maliki carried out his campaign for missionary
advance without a show of displeasure by his overlord,
the Sultan of Sokoto.”

The foregoing is a far cry from the recurring scenario in contemporary Northern Nigeria, especially since 1986, whereby renegades would rise from so-called dialogue seminars and conferences, paid for by third parties, and facilitate the burning of churches²⁹ or invoke colonial edicts for standing in the way of Christians from owning land for places of worship and enterprise. And it makes no difference whether such conferences are decked with impeccable communiqués, principally because of the underlying distrust.

“Crowther took it upon himself to advocate the cause of
Muslim leaders in international ecumenical conferences”

29 Sometimes it is a question of feigning ignorance of what is going on while arson is in progress or uttering some clichés after much damage has been done.

“It is significant that Crowther was the only Christian leader boldly advancing on this route and charting this new frontier in the 19th century – as attested to by Blyden.”

HAUSALAND

Christian-Muslim dialogue was enacted in Hausaland in the 19th century, albeit not orchestrated. Precisely, when Canon Robinson, a lecturer in Hausa at Cambridge University went to Kano for enhanced language proficiency in 1895,³⁰ the reality of Christian-Muslim dialogue on ground must have been what made it possible for Kano authorities to commit themselves to providing local linguistic experts and support for the Bible translation project



Fig. 28
Dr. Walter Miller

which Robinson broached. Similarly, the Emir of Katsina who in the earliest years of colonial rule invited a Christian to his palace to preach to his Muslim staff, must have internalised dialogue and was eager to promote same, for him to take such a step. Neither of those leaders was apprehensive that Christianity might overrun Islam and vice versa. As development-imbued leaders, they were not afraid of exposing their people to new ideas. Rather, they were keen for cross fertilisation of those ideas, which were capable of raising the level of human capital and development of the people. These leaders in Hausaland were on the path of development and liberation. This is precisely what the colonial government in Northern Nigeria considered radical and therefore did everything to smash. Stated

30 See Chapter Two

differently, the colonial government was opposed to Christian-Muslim dialogue because of its unifying and liberational potential.

Bible translation is arguably the most cross-cultural and dialogic literary enterprise globally.³¹ Although it is not obvious to a lot of people, the Bible is a corpus of literature integrating at least 66 works in different languages, by at least 36 contributors over a time-frame of approximately 1,500 years. The setting of the Hausa experience was in Zaria and Kano from 1904 to 1946. This is where the work of Walter Miller, a medical practitioner, who translated the Bible into Hausa, comes in: he re-enacted in Zaria in 1904 what failed to take off in Kano in 1895. In the light of this contemporary, verifiable, historical fact, any strand of history of Christian-Muslim dialogue, which feigns ignorance of Walter Miller's pioneering dialogic role must be a huge joke.

It is important to comment further on the Bible translation vocation in which a countless number of people have taken part unnoticed. By the last count in December 2013, the orthography of not less than 150 Nigerian languages has been established – not by the colonial governments and their post-colonial successors. Rather, the task was undertaken wholly by the Bible translation enterprise in Nigeria. Admittedly, the primary aim of the enterprise is to make the Bible available in indigenous languages. Its effects include empowerment of people who in times past were thought of only in terms of slave raiding, restoration of the peoples' human dignity, and integrating them into the mainstream of society. Bible translation in Nigeria has been a nation-building pursuit.

Hence, just as advocated in Chapter Two, that in an environment where merit counts, the Bible translation institution in Nigeria would have been a centenary merit award winner because in climes where merit counts, awards are given not only to individuals; they have been awarded to institutions and initiatives as well.

There is a story about Walter Miller that is worth re-telling³² because it illustrates the point that dialogue is not all about words,

31 The Bible is also acclaimed to be the best-selling book of all time.

32 "Walter Richard Samuel Miller," in *Dictionary of African Christian Biography*, http://www.dacb.org/stories/nigeria/miller_wr-samuel.html (accessed 20 November 2013)

as some in present day Nigeria seem to have misconstrued it. In readiness for his quest for missionary work in Hausaland, Miller went to Tripoli to study Hausa.³³ While in Tripoli, Miller noticed a stranded lad who had accompanied his father on a journey for pilgrimage but had lost his father to death in the desert. His condition was similar to that of millions of Muslims who left their homelands for Mecca and Medina but could neither complete the journey nor return home. Others reached Mecca but were unable to cross the desert on the way back home. Literally, millions of such intending pilgrims were trapped in the Sudan.³⁴ This sad episode went on for centuries, right into the period of the colonial era. As Premier Bello later confirmed, it became

necessary sometimes for pilgrims to work on their homeward journeys. This has, oddly enough, operated in favour of the Sudan. Thousands of ex-pilgrims have worked, and are still working, on the great Gezira cotton scheme – the Sudan Government's most successful project – indeed, it is at least questionable whether the scheme could have been developed as it has without Nigeria labour.³⁵

Miller helped Abdul to continue his journey to Mecca, and back to Katsina in due course. For some reason, Alhaji Abdul Tafida converted to Christianity after his *hajj* experience. The point herein is that (1) Miller did not dissuade Abdul from going to Mecca but rather (2) assisted him to enable him reach Mecca and fulfil the

33 For centuries, Tripoli was the first destination of slaves from Kano meant for the Arab market. For centuries, Catholic missionaries clerked Hausa slaves for their language. Tripoli gradually became the place for the study of Hausa language for intending missionaries, Catholic or otherwise. In the second half of the 17th century, the number of slaves of Kwararafa origin outnumbered the number of Hausa slaves. Just as the Hausa merchants parcelled Kwararafa captives for the Arab markets, Kwararafa parcelled many more Hausa captives for Aro Chukwu in exchange for western arms. In turn, Aro Chukwu re-parcelled Hausa slaves and fellow Igbo – captured or lured – for markets in the western hemisphere. Many Igbo slaves ended up in Haiti where Igbo is still spoken in the 21st century in some parts of Haiti..

34 Yamba, *supra*

35 Bello, 192

desire of his heart. (3) The dialogue going on between them was such that Abdul converted to Christianity without pressure from Miller. It was his decision to perform the pilgrimage; and he took responsibility for conversion from Islam even after his Mecca experience.

Fig. 29

MILLER-TAFIDA MODEL OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM DIALOGUE		
Interlocutor	Walter Miller	Abdul Tafida
Faith commitment	Conversionary Christian missionary	Alhaji (post-pilgrimage Muslim)
Mode of dialogue	Verbal, non-verbal; mutual respect, kindness	
Outcome	Christian faith waxed stronger	Muslim faith revised; unintended conversion

For Miss Ethel Miller and Malam Aminu Kano, two people who were different in race, in education, in religion, and in gender, nevertheless, Christian-Muslim dialogue was a life-long experience. Indeed, it was not and could not be anything otherwise as they were both opposed to foreign colonialism on the one hand, and internal colonialism masquerading on the platform of religion on the other.³⁶ Theirs was genuine Christian-Muslim dialogue and the model for the future.

“Theirs was genuine Christian-Muslim dialogue and the model for the future.”

36 Ethel Miller was an English woman; and she took on British administrators. Aminu Kano was a Fulani man; and he took on Fulani imposition. Apart from the forms of colonialism that they were more familiar with, Ethel was opposed to the jihadist subjugation of the peoples of Northern Nigeria, just as Aminu was opposed to British oppression and Fulani imposition on Hausa people.

Fig. 30

MILLER-KANO MODEL OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM DIALOGUE IN DEED		
Interlocutor	Ethel Miller	Aminu Kano
CONTRAST		
Faith commitment	Conversionary ³⁷ Christian missionary	Koranic Scholar
Ethnicity	English	Fulani
Gender	Woman	Man
COMPARISON		
Cross-cultural experience	Among the Hausa	Among the Hausa
Attitude to jihadist colonialism	Opposition	Attack on the emirate system
Attitude to British colonialism	A betrayal of English ideal; does not deserve cooperation	Opposition to unfair subjugation
Ideological posture	Solidarity with Hausa women	Solidarity with the talakawa – the downtrodden
Effect on community	Peaceful co-existence and community well-being	

Apart from the foregoing high profile Christian-Muslim dialogue, actors from the CMS stables, western Christian missionaries in other missions were engaged in dialogue to the same extent as CMS missionaries. Notable examples include missionaries of the Catholic Church, the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) in the Middle Belt and the northwest, and Sudan United Mission (SUM) – a group of missions – in the Middle Belt and the northeast. Besides, innumerable Nigerian Christians in cross-cultural situations in the Far North and the Middle Belt combined adaption, enculturation, assimilation and contextualisation, all in one feat as they negotiated their way in

³⁷ I am indebted to Robert Woodberry for this term.

search of their daily bread, right from the era of Bishop Crowther to the end of the colonial era in 1960.³⁸ Furthermore, it should be noted that their activities were not orchestrated partly because (1) that was the nature of their engagement and partly because (2) they did not want to invite unnecessary persecution of Christian participants who were frequently the targets of spirited intolerance. Lastly, what indigenous Christians were doing was also the practice of innumerable ordinary Muslims, mostly from the northern part of Nigeria, who found themselves in cross-cultural settings as they peacefully negotiated their way in search of their daily bread in different parts of Nigeria and West Africa.

There is an aspect of the Ethel Miller-Aminu Kano dialogue that should perhaps be brought to the fore. Barbara Callaway perceptively notes,

a consistent theme of NEPU-PRP politics was an ideological attack on the entire emirate structure, including the political position (or non-position) of women. Reiterating and expanding upon the Islamic concepts of “freedom,” “jihad,” and “justice,” Aminu Kano, the leader of both NEPU and PRP, made the position of women an early and basic concern of his political party. While in the 1950s and the 1960s he and his colleague, Isa Wali, were virtually alone in addressing this issue, by the late 1970s and 1980s this subject had become a part of the party platform of the PRP and was advocated by a wide spectrum of the party. The PRP was the only Nigerian party to address the issue.³⁹

Given the commitment of Ethel Miller to the emancipation of rural and urban women in Hausaland, to what extent was the Ethel Miller factor in Aminu Kano’s life and career contributory to the evolution of a policy on women in the political parties that Aminu Kano founded and led? Was Ethel Miller a precursor of women

38 The literature is bound to grow as research focuses on this area.

39 B. Callaway, “Women and Political Participation in Kano City,” in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Jul., 1987), 380, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/421813> (accessed on 25 September 2014)

participation in party politics in Hausaland?⁴⁰ If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, then it (1) vindicates Christian-Muslim dialogue in deed, and not only in words, (2) corroborates the growing literature on Christian missionary contribution to liberal democracy globally,⁴¹ and (3) compels analysts to stand Margery Perham's characterisation of Miss Miller as "a tragic-comic figure"⁴² on its head.

“Was Ethel Miller a precursor of women participation
in party politics in Hausaland?”

SUMMARY

It is important to recall Gbadamosi's observations of "dialogues" in Christian-Muslim relations in Yorubaland in the 19th stage of the phenomenon. Notably, utter verbiage was strange to 19th century Christian-Muslim dialogue in Yorubaland. The Crowther-Emir of Ilorin experience took the form of exchange of theological points, it was only but one incident, as important and instructive as it was. Elements of several models of dialogue are discernible in the Yoruba experience such as educative, infrastructural, community building and even entertainment. In terms of approach, it may be termed the educative model. In any case, they were never dull moments but exciting and educative community encounters set in the context of community uplift.

If the model in Yorubaland is educative, Christian-Muslim dialogue in Nupe country was of a practical nature. The two actors did not engage in exchange of theological fine points; rather community development was the focus. It is doubtful whether Crowther attempted the conversion of Maliki as an individual. Rather, he was concerned about the Nupe people as a people. And although Maliki did not see much future in Crowther's prodding on Western

40 The impact of her pamphlet, *Women Matter*, should not be overlooked because although it was not addressed to Hausa women, it contains emancipatory ideas for them.

41 See Woodberry, et al., p. 188.

42 cited in Barnes, "Religious Insults," 64

education, nevertheless, the former did not stand in the way of the latter from advancing the latter's interest to the best of his resources. And although Maliki gave Crowther one of his sons to train in the western way, Crowther was more interested in the future of the thousands of sons in Nupeland who had no royal connection. His quest is not hard to presume given the fact that he was a slave boy who had an opportunity to become a bishop and a holder of an honorary doctorate degree from Oxford University. Finally, whatever was the shift in the model from Yorubaland to Nupeland, mutual trust was basic to the two approaches.

For want of a better phrase for the Hausaland unfolding, the approach may be termed infrastructural: (1) Bible translation by Dr. Miller and (2) the planting of an emancipatory seed for Hausa women by Ethel Miller, in the way the latter related with Aminu Kano. In brief, Christian-Muslim dialogue in Hausaland in late 19th century and early 20th century was not preoccupation with verbiage as there was a particular focus on the practical matters of freedom and justice rather than sheer preoccupation with doctrinal shibboleth as smoke screen for obscuring lethargy and moral nudity.

ERA OF REFLECTION

While Goddard is misleading on the origin of Christian-Muslim dialogue, as noted earlier, he is instructive on the point that Christian-Muslim dialogue snowballed into a movement, beginning with the interest shown in it by Vatican II, the World Council of Churches and some major Muslim organisations across the world. Muslim organisations which were first to embrace dialogue includes World Muslim Congress based in Karachi, World Muslim League based in Mecca, World Islamic Call Society based in Tripoli, Libya, Jam'yyat al-da'wa al-islamiyya al-'alamiyya, Arab Socialist Union of Libya, and the Jama'at al-akha'al-dini Foundation. Others include the High Council for Islamic Affairs in Cairo, and the Al al-bayt of Jordan.⁴³

43 Goddard, 177–185n

With interest in and involvement by intellectual centres such as Belamend in Lebanon, the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations at Selly Oak College in Birmingham, England, the Centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding, Georgetown University, and the Islam Foundation in Leicester, England, conferences, seminars, and meetings, sprang up internationally, regionally and nationally. With summer schools running and journal publishing⁴⁴ attaining something of regular practice, dialogue transformed into a movement in the second half of the 20th century. The release of the “A Common Word” (a statement by 138 Muslim scholars and leaders) was done on 13 October 2007.⁴⁵ It continues to generate comments mostly favourable from individual Christians and organisations from different traditions. Indeed, a Christian-Muslim Forum was formed in the Vatican in 2008.

It is herein stressed that Goddard’s construction is limited to the period when Christian-Muslim dialogue entered the phase of studying rather than enacting dialogue; when dialogue became an academic subject and a matter of award of university degrees.

DOMINO EFFECT ON NIGERIA

Perhaps partly because it was the cradle of Christian-Muslim dialogue and perhaps because of the rising profile of Nigeria in world affairs, Nigeria was not left out of the 20th century dialogue movement. The first encounter took place between Muslim youths and Christian youths in Kano at the Fegge section of the city in 1962.⁴⁶ Months after, undergraduate students of Ahmadu Bello University organised a forum on “Christian-Muslim Dialogue and the Undergraduate” in the early days of the institution.⁴⁷ In any case, clerics and academics took up the refrain with meetings in Ibadan, Kano, and Ilorin, and

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 184

⁴⁵ The Official Website of A Common Word, “Introduction to a Common Word between You and Us,” in www.acommonword.com (accessed 23 September 2010)

⁴⁶ V. Chukwulozie, *Muslim-Christian Dialogue in Nigeria*, (Ibadan: Daystar Press, 1986), 70

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, 71

Nsukka.⁴⁸ On the whole, this era was characterised by reflection and mutual respect.

SEASON OF BOYCOTT

A point of inflection in the dialogue graph set in when a dialogue organised under the auspices of the Episcopal Conference of Nigeria scheduled to take place in December 1978 did not hold because Muslims in the northern parts of the country “who were invited to the Jos seminar in 1978 did not attend the meeting, despite the fact that most of them at first accepted the invitation.”⁴⁹ This meeting was convened in the same spirit as earlier ones, where reflection and mutual respect ruled.

What might have been responsible for the apparent sudden boycott? Two probable factors come to mind. First, it may be recalled that the sharia cause suffered a setback in the Constituent Assembly in April 1978, although it was later resolved by making sharia law optional for the states. Despite the concession, the controversy over the sharia had generated palpable mutual suspicion between Christians and Muslims nation-wide. Indeed, the mutual suspicion survived December 1978. Secondly, the rejection of participation in dialogue occurred after the formation of the Council of Ulama of Nigeria (COULAMA), and the determination of the new aspiring Hausa mouthpiece to rally Muslim notables especially in the Far North, around itself.⁵⁰ The COULAMA factor might have been a sheer coincidence, as there is no firm-level evidence to link the two.

The boycott of the Jos seminar lasted for almost a decade. Yet, given the fact that dialogue goes on at different levels, it is reasonable to believe that dialogue went on at interpersonal levels, even when meetings at Episcopal levels were snubbed.

“the rejection of participation in dialogue occurred
after the formation of the Council of Ulama of
Nigeria (COULAMA)”

48 *ibid.*, 71–76

49 *ibid.*, 74

50 See Oluniyi, Chapter Two

ERA OF THE SHAMBOLIC – 1986ff

Formal dialogues found their way back with government sponsorship of the Meeting of Distinguished Elders and Religious Leaders on Promoting Peace and Security in Nigeria in 1991.⁵¹ With government sponsorship also came imperceptive participation in Christian-Muslim dialogue: the pious and not-so-pious; dignitaries ‘to grace the occasion’; academicians who care more for papers-and-promotion prospect than for peace in Nigeria; the political class, hangers-on; proxies; State Security Services; contractors; chaplains, genuine sponsors; and dubious sponsors and collaborators locally and internationally. The outcome has not been dialogue but obtuse-logue, coined herein⁵² to refer to an activity which is defused in thought, and lacking direction in expression or output.

“With government sponsorship also came
imperceptive participation in Christian-Muslim
dialogue”

Even in the religious class, there is currently a paradigm shift occasioned by a sleight of hand, whereby emirs (political actors on a sectarian platform) displace imams (Muslim clerical personnel). The Christian side does not perform such a feat, but deploy only their clerical class. There is therefore a fundamental mismatch in the dialogue project. It is a monumental mismanagement waiting to manifest!

There have been dialogue forums which create the impression that piety is measured by the weight of turbans; just as some self-styled bishops and some others are so clad as to make it hard to differentiate them from Calabar masquerades. And there is a pecking order.

“The outcome has not been dialogue but obtuse-logue”

51 Anonymous, “Meeting of Distinguished Elders and Religious Leaders on Promoting Peace and Security in Nigeria 1991” in *PROCMURA*, vol., 3., No. 5, September–October 1994, 4

52 For want of a better term

On the one hand, the obtuse-logue of this era is protocol perfect and photogenic with impeccable communiqués. On the other hand, the dialogue is unfeeling, orchestrated and elitist. There is that belief in some quarters, as betrayed by their body language, that dialogue is such a specialised discipline or enterprise that the youths cannot get a handle on it, and such a sensitive issue that they cannot manage it. This is an irony because these mis-leaders as it were, forget that the movement for Christian-Muslim dialogue in Nigeria in the early 1960s, was spearheaded successfully by Christian and Muslim youths in Kano and Zaria respectively – in the Far North, where Islam has a large following.

Following incessant ethno-religious crises in 1999, there emerged an association of 25 Christians and 25 Muslims known as the Nigerian Inter-religious Council (NIREC), and with the assistance of President Olusegun Obasanjo, with Muslim-Christian dialogue as one of its core aims. Its meetings from 1999 to 2007 were held in Abuja but the meetings were rotated within what has come to be known as the six-geopolitical zones. While the aims of the initiative may have been noble, it is doubtful whether some participants in the meetings realise that genuine dialogue and integrity are two sides of the same coin. While some participants were impeccable in terms of their integrity, some participants could not express themselves freely.

For example, there is the story of a dialogue session when the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) operatives were waiting for the session to end in order for them to pick up a participant for questioning over what he did with some money when he was the national president of his denomination. Indeed, it is no more a secret that NIREC is weighed down by the (im)moral liability of some of its members.

Nevertheless, some exceptions need to be pointed out. For example, some Christian-Muslim initiatives have emerged in Kaduna, a war front of sorts, which make Christian-Muslim dialogue more egalitarian and fruitful. Moving away from the high clerical-giraffe zone to where millions of ordinary God-fearing Nigerians live, it easily strikes the observer to see how ordinary Nigerians combine acculturation, contextualisation and synthesis, as they negotiate their way with others, regardless of religious affiliation, in pursuit

of their daily bread. They do this peacefully as an expression of their respective faiths.

BRAINSTORMING

With the foregoing panoramic view of dialogue in the second half of the 20th century in Nigeria, an assessment of the experience is in order. In March 2012, George Ehusani, a Catholic priest and a foremost socio-cultural analyst, observed as follows.

“Existing platforms for communication between religious groups are often government initiatives whose approach is often not bottom up, hence the lack of ownership by the people in the grassroots. Furthermore, the confidentiality needed for frank discussions are often not there. Added to this is that the composition of the membership of these government initiatives are sometimes not reflective of their real (theological/ideological) influences at the grassroots. Traditional rulers without any religious constituencies are often nominated as representatives of religious interest[s]. Like everything that is government, the toxic influence of politics cannot be totally ruled out in the proceedings of such bodies[;] hence[,] the question about their credibility. Perhaps most instructive is that the existence of bodies like National Inter Religious Committee (NIREC) has not played any appreciable calming role in the current [Boko Haram] crisis.⁵³

Obviously, one paragraph can hardly capture the entire dynamics and impact of a movement from the 1960s up to 2012. Nevertheless, a people in search of peace can only ignore Ehusani’s observation at their peril. While not a critique of the dialogue principle, his point exposes what has really been going on in the name of dialogue.

The quality of dialogue has suffered in the shambolic era when dignitaries have been routinely invited ‘to grace the occasion’ and politicians in all kinds of garbs [since no garb ever seems to embarrass

53 G. Ehusani, “Concept Note”, mimeographed, n.d., exploring ways and means towards genuine and impactful dialogue.

them], contractors, funders, and security operatives have routinely found their way into Christian-Muslim meetings. In contrast, prior to 1978, dialogue was an experience among peers: Christian youths and Muslim youths; Christian clerics and Muslim clerics; Christian intellectuals and their Muslim counterparts. It was frank, low-key, hardly photogenic and fruitful. Although organisers and participants were not media-shy, nevertheless, there was less of currying media attention. This is not to downplay the value the media and the constructive role it can play in advancing dialogue. Nevertheless, while mega-media might raise the profile of an event, the cocktail of its organisers, funders, media hype and volume of reportage do not necessarily reflect or raise the quality of dialogue that transpires in a given Christian-Muslim conference.

Whether it is a matter of cursory perusal or in-depth analysis, it is clear to observers that there is no correlation between orchestration of dialogue since the late 1980s and the rise in the incidents of violence between Christians and Muslims in the Far North and the Middle Belt of Nigeria. Overhauling Christian-Muslim dialogue in Nigeria will not achieve the desired peace if the response is merely putting old wine in new bottles or new wine in old bottles, without addressing three dialogue-related factors herein identified as: (1) dialogue in word and deed; (2) one word – two realities, and (3) Option 3.

DIALOGUE IN WORD AND DEED

Bishop Crowther, Rev. Forster, Dr. Blyden, etc, were some of the 19th century participants of Christian-Muslim dialogue. For them, dialogue was not merely exchange of words or ideas in isolation; it was reasoning together backed by or in the context of social activities that were beneficial to the community. While research may want to address the dearth of relevant literature, the present reality places a burden on dialogue participants in the Far North and the Middle Belt, and a particular onus on contemporary Muslims in the two regions, who are passionate about peace, to embark on massive programmes across board to make their dialogue efforts more understandable to their interlocutors and observers.

TERMINOLOGY: ONE WORD – TWO REALITIES

Given the spectrum of backgrounds of participants in Christian-Muslim dialogue forums in the Far North and the Middle Belt in the present shambolic era, both by their utterances and body language, it is obvious to the perceptive that participants are not all equally informed of the dynamics of what unfortunately operates under the rubric of one word but which exists in two realities. The problem is compounded when peace researchers and well-meaning peace activities seem to have overlooked this point in their analyses and actions. The following diagrams are meant to analyse what has been going on and how future forums may be more fruitful.

First of all, there is the issue of site. On the one hand, dialogue is used for what goes on in interfaith rooms, and on the other hand, it is equally used for the horse trading that goes on between two warring parties for example in a civil war scenario, on the other. The realities are different. As long as the term dialogue is used for what goes on in both sites, confusion will continue to reign thereby making reconciliation and lasting peace unachievable.

Secondly, there is the question of method that governs the activities in the two sites. In interfaith convocations, openness is a key factor: it is hoped that it will lead to mutual understanding and respect. In this setting, a participant is not expected to shift ground in his faith; the other party is to understand and respect the opposing position. On the other hand, compromise is the cardinal virtue in political dialogue. Unless and until this distinction is respected, reconciliation and lasting peace will remain elusive.


Thirdly, the immediate aims of the two types of activities in the two sites are different. While interfaith dialogue focuses on understanding, political dialogue is about distribution of burdens and benefits. This point is just as crucial in as the first two above in peace pursuit.

Lastly, peace is the objective of both types of dialogue, even though their sites, methods and aims may differ. It goes without saying therefore, that if dialogue keeps faith with the natural flow of each stage in the process, peace will be the outcome.

In the light of the above, the problem of Christian-Muslim dialogue begins in the second stage of the dialogue process, when participants subtly or even openly employ tactics as *modus operandi* in

Christian-Muslim dialogue instead of the traditional and time-tested rigour of openness. It should be noted, first, that while interfaith forum is not averse to equitability as a principle, it is understood that it is not the immediate aim of an interfaith forum. When equitable distribution of burdens and benefits is the immediate aim of an interfaith meeting, such an aim is made clear to stakeholders and is understood as such. In other words, such a forum is political even though the participants wear cassocks and turbans. For some reason, scholars and practitioners are shy to make the distinction; but peace-imbued researchers, practitioners, educationists, etc. are under obligation to make this point clear for more effective dialogue.

Fig. 31



Secondly, there is the problem of mismatch. When religious leaders are called upon to dialogue over a problem that is not strictly parochial in nature, mismatch do occur when religious leaders such as pastors, whose offices are not necessarily territorial and emirs who double as religious leaders and political office holders are lumped together. They may employ pious vocabulary in their deliberations, but horse-trading is what goes on in such encounters whereas genuine dialogue is usually the first casualty in such encounters.

In summary, failure or refusal to recognise the two realities and confront the dysfunction it causes to genuine dialogue between Christians and Muslims, especially in the habitation of violence in the Far North and the Middle Belt, will continue to yield violence.

OPTION 3: DECEIT

There is the problem of deceit, especially as it has unfolded since the second half of the 1980s, when orchestrated dialogue began. For the avoidance of doubt, this problem is not Northern Nigeria-specific.⁵⁴ However its manifestation in Northern Nigeria warrants looking into it historically, because it seems to have an antecedent in the response of the Waziri of Sokoto to the occupation of Sokoto by Lugard's troops in 1903.

In the commotion, quandary and throes of defeat, the Waziri of Sokoto recommended to Sokoto Muslim citizenry what may be termed Category Three Friendship or Option 3 which in essence is co-existence with Christians by loving them with the tongue but not with the heart until such a time that Muslims are strong enough to throw off infidel rule, consensus [*Ijma*] being the justification.⁵⁵

It is clear, of course, from the context of the day that *by Christians* Waziri meant Lugard's West African Frontier Force, which he wrongly identified as Christian, whereas Lugard's West African Frontier Force, which he used to subdue the territory, was anything but truly Christian. Nevertheless, there is no known credible exegetical method

⁵⁴ cf. J. Carman, "Missions and the Translatable Gospel," religion-online.org, <http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=884> (accessed 25 September 2011)

⁵⁵ Adeleye, "The Dilemma of the Wazir", 298, 230, 307, 309

that allows observers and interpreters to deny that the Christian body, as widely understood, was and is the ultimate object of Option 3.

Despite the case of misidentification, the Waziri soon discovered that Lugard had no plan to impose Christianity on anybody, least the people of Sokoto. In fact, unknown to the “pathetic figure of the blind old Waziri”,⁵⁶ Lugard was determined to achieve two things. First, Lugard was determined to preserve and protect Islam by warding off its competitors. This includes elevating Qadiriyya sect above the others in furtherance of colonial expediency. Secondly, Lugard came determined to use Islam as a ruthless means of social control throughout the length and breadth of Northern Nigeria.

Admittedly, a lot of bridge building has taken place between Christians and Muslims so much so that the dynamics of March 1903 cannot be made to walk on all four a century later. Nevertheless, it helps to concede the fact that (1) participants in dialogue forums since the second half of the 1980s have arisen from the Christian and Muslim communities that have inflicted violence on each other and therefore (2) no participant can rightly claim to be totally objective. In the light of these factors, and Ehusani’s veiled frustration, it is pertinent to pose the following questions: In the situations of intermittent Muslim-Christian violence since 1987, has Option 3 seeped into dialogue unconsciously at any level? If no, how can the other party be convinced? If yes, what can be done to restore mutual confidence?

Elements of Christian Suspicion

First, there is the hyena-like Option 3: “you” do not know when next it will strike, and what form it will take. More concretely and secondly, in 1972, many state governments in the Far North and the Middle Belt usurped Christian educational institutions and medical facilities without explanation, let alone compensation. In less than two decades, those institutions were run down beyond recognition. Admittedly, it can be argued that these Christian assets were taken over, not explicitly by Muslim organisations, but by state

⁵⁶ Lugard, “Northern Nigeria,” 24

governments; nevertheless, it is widely believed, rightly or wrongly, that Muslim functionaries pulled the strings for their confiscation. The impunity with which the assets were ruined does not remove the suspicion that Christians have not seen the last of confiscation. This explains the hesitation to invest meaningfully on certain occasions. Indeed, many Christians refer to the take-over of 1972 as a slap on one cheek. And yet, Christians are expected to come to the dialogue table with a straight face. And they do.

“there is the hyena-like Option 3”

Thirdly, Babangida's behaviour on the OIC question coupled with the fiddling with the constitution constitutes another cause of suspicion in dealing with Muslims. For example, while the OIC question was not resolved, General Sani Abacha's registration of Nigeria as the 9th member of the D8 group of nations can only compound and worsen the state of existing suspicion on the part of Christians.

Fourthly, compounded with the Babangida phenomenon is the intermittent violence unleashed against the churches since 1987. This is interpreted by many Christians as a slap on the second cheek. On the one hand, they concede and are committed to the teaching of Jesus Christ, “to turn the other cheek” (Mt. 5:39). On the other hand, Christians have only two cheeks; hence there is not the third cheek to turn to Muslims for another slap.

This author has interacted on numerous occasions with Christians who have been targets and victims of violence, and has found out that Christians under unprovoked attack distinguish between (1) the commands of Jesus such as in Mt. 18:21 and Lk. 22:35 and (2) Muslim pedagogy on Bible verses. At an existential moment, they embrace the first and reject the second.

“Christians under unprovoked attack distinguish between (1) the commands of Jesus such as in Mt. 18:21 and Lk. 22:35 and (2) Muslim pedagogy on Bible verses. At an existential moment, they embrace the first and reject the second.”

At this juncture, it is perhaps important to disclose that Christians encounter intra-Christian problems on the dialogue table. Mention has been made earlier of a dialogue participant that the EFCC was waiting to pick up. It later came to light that his referee was a Muslim state governor. This casts doubt on the quality of his exchange in a dialogue session.

Elements of Muslim Suspicion

What are Muslims afraid of, or what militates against genuine dialogue with Christians? In the course of his interview of Ambassador Mohahammadu Rafindadi in Katsina in February 2005, this author is aware of an intra-Muslim drawback in Muslim-Christian dialogue. Basically, the Council of Ulama is unimpressed by Jamatul Nasril Islam members; the grouse being that during dialogue JNI participants do not generally match their Christian counterparts in intellectual sophistication.

But this is as far as an outsider can go. It takes a God-fearing, patriotic, and peace-loving person in the Muslim community to step forward and disclose the substance of Muslim suspicion of Christians that throw spanners into dialogue.

“It takes a God-fearing, patriotic, and
peace-loving person in the Muslim community
to step forward”

WHY NOT MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE?

Dialogue between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria from the 19th century to the 21st century has been evidently and grossly lopsided. It has been a Christian initiative and project all along, without discounting the role and cooperation of peace-loving Muslims all along. If dialogue has become recognised as helpful, it stands to reason to suggest that Muslims should take bold initiatives for dialogue from their end.

Pursuant to this line of reasoning, it is important to recall a point made earlier – that it is defeatist to limit dialogue only to the verbal dimension. If religious dialogue in Northern Nigeria specifically and in Nigeria generally is to advance, extra effort has to be made to invest in the non-verbal aspect of it, in order to rescue dialogue from veering into verbiage.

As a hint of the challenge ahead, the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) and the Sudan United Mission (SUM) took over leprosy work throughout Northern Nigeria in 1936, because they could render and indeed rendered a better service to the people of the protectorate, than the British colonial government. Similarly, Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) took a bold step in 1941, to build a state of the art Christian Eye Hospital in Kano. Admittedly, it had a proselytising factor in it; no sane observer had any doubt that the direct beneficiaries were the millions of vision-weary Muslims of Kano and elsewhere in the region. Among other things, in essence, the hospital was a dialogue bridge-building factor.

Right from its inception and through many decades of service, Kano Eye Hospital was the undisputed leading ophthalmic hospital throughout West Africa. For example, when the University College Hospital (UCH), Ibadan, was rated at par with the University Teaching Hospital, London, in 1964, the Department of Ophthalmology, UCH, was not a referral clinic for Kano Eye Hospital. A further confirmation of the importance of the hospital to the people of Kano was implicit in the way the Kano State Government steered clear of the hospital when other state governments were busy taking over mission institutions in 1972, at the onset of the oil boom era.

In aid of and as a demonstration of its commitment to Muslim-Christian dialogue, it is feasible for the spokespersons in the Muslim community to build a massive ultra-modern Islamic bank in Owerri, a dense Christian population, with a presumption to providing interest-free loans as start-up capitals to Igbo business aspirants in the 21st century given the fact that business is the Igbo man's area of comparative advantage. If the foregoing path is taken, it should be possible to rescue the state of the obtuse-logue in Northern Nigeria from one step away from manifest disgrace, and the probability of genuine dialogue and peace will rise. If, on the other hand, the determination is to

invest in façades, boring etiquettes, political correctness and pecking orders, while thousands of lives are cut short in the Far North and the Middle Belt, it may well be that dialogue has gone to the dogs.

STOP PRESS

There is a relatively new phrase, interfaith dialogue, in religious dialogue circle in Nigeria. The strength of the concept lies in its inclusiveness, instead of limiting the interaction to what has happened between Christians and Muslims since the 19th century. This is a welcome development.

However, there is a fanatical tone in its dissemination as if to suggest that the phrase, Christian-Muslim dialogue is wrong, when interaction is specifically between the two faiths. This approach courts revisionism.

Besides, the body language gives away an assiduous attempt to deny or hide the incriminating statistics of carnage between the two faith communities in Northern Nigeria, from public view especially the international community. To the extent that the dissemination is largely about image laundering, screaming interfaith dialogue by day and stoking impunity by night is irreligious despite decking it with phenomenal religiosity.

PUBLIC APOLOGY FOR RECONCILIATION

This chapter is the heart of this book. It unfolds with (1) a definition of public apology, (2) sources of materials for the chapter, (3) a history of public apology, (4) selected issues in which public apology has been found to be efficacious and (5) the forms that public apology has taken. Having laid out the factual concerns, the chapter progresses into (6) the theoretical presentation of public apology; following which objections to it are refuted.

The next in the sequence is (7) an analysis of the public apology actors in the religion sector, with particular reference to the two religions that are implicated in the violence in Northern Nigeria particularly, and in Nigeria generally. With the discovery of an apology deficit, (8) six probable reasons for the deficit are examined and faulted. Borrowing a leaf from South Africa, the author (9) articulates an onus and offers supporting arguments why Nigerians, and indeed the human family, should expect an apology revolution to begin in the northern parts of Nigeria.

DEFINITION

Public apology is herein broadly defined as a conscious admission of wrong-doing leading to a statement of regret or an equivalent action by a corporate entity such as a government, business, religious organisation, media, and other civil society organisations for its action(s) that have harmed an identifiable group.

A close look at the foregoing shows that public apology has several

characteristics. First, it is characterised by a process, beginning with an acknowledgement – conscious admission of wrong-doing – and ending in a statement or an action. Therefore, it is not a flippant “sorry.” Secondly, it is characterised by a purging of toxic corporate mind-set and a replacement with a humane belief system as a way of moving beyond a bitter legacy. Thirdly, it is characterised by a courageous attempt at initiating a new beginning and new standards with relevant stakeholders. Fourthly, it is a moral transaction, which summons the public as a witness. Fifthly, it functions as an insurance against relapse or recurrence. Sixthly, it motivates and paves a corridor for an aggressor to make peace. Lastly, public apology is thoroughly attitudinal.

“it is a moral transaction, which summons the
public as a witness”

In the light of the above characteristics, it is important to emphasise that the word “public” does not necessitate buying air time over BBC World Service or CNN, or on national news networks, to wash all imaginable linens in the name of public apology. Rather, it requires unambiguous acceptance of wrongdoing and the readiness for a new beginning for mutual advantage.

“the word “public” does not necessitate buying air time
over BBC World Service or CNN, or on national news networks,
to wash all imaginable linens in the name of public apology”

This definition overlaps the definition by the Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann Canada Research Chair in International Human Rights at Wilfrid Laurier University (RHHC), Canada in the aspect of “events that have harmed identifiable groups”.¹ However, while the Chair stresses the political dimension of apology, this author highlights the

1 See the Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann Canada Research Chair in International Human Rights at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada, <http://political-apologies.wlu.ca/about.php> (accessed 20 March 2012)

public-ness of apology as a moral transaction with the public for ensuring that the hurtful event(s) in question will not be repeated.²

SOURCES

The data for this chapter cut across nations. They include (1) the list compiled by Graham Dodds for the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania (DPSUP);³ (2) the Friends Committee on National Legislation: A Quaker Lobby in the Public Interest;⁴ (3) the Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann Canada Research Chair in International Human Rights at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada;⁵ and (4) additional cases personally documented by this author. Apologies cited and discussed up till the 1980s are from the University of Pennsylvania Department of Political Science list. Therefore, since they have been accounted for in the list herein, in Appendix III whereas they have the same reference, references are not provided for individual cases discussed, in order to minimise repetition. The remaining cases of apology from 2002 to 2010 are from the Rhoda Howard-Hassmann Centre list, also in Appendix III and the other assorted sources. Similarly, references are not provided for individual cases.

The scope of this survey spans from 1077 AD to 2010. It is important to note that the figure for any given year from 1077–2010 is subject to update⁶ although it is equally important to stress that

2 cf. R. Weyeneth, "The Power of Apology and the Process of Historical Reconciliation," in *The Public Historian*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 2001), 17, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/>, (accessed: 14 May 2012)

3 See G. Dodds, "Political Apologies: Chronological List," <http://reserve.mg2.org/apologies.htm>, (accessed 5 December 2010)

4 Friends Committee on National Legislation: A Quaker Lobby in the Public Interest, "History Shows Apology Helps Heal; Georgia Legislature Considers 'Contrition' for Slavery", http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=2625&issue_id=131 (accessed 24 October 2010)

5 Howard-Hassmann, "Political Apologies and Reparations," op. cit

6 For example, the 2003 list at the Howard-Rhoda Center was updated in December 2012 with an entry entitled, "Inspector General Apologises to Journalists," submitted by me. Similarly, the entry of the Governor Babatunde Fashola's apology to the Igbo community in 2013 was forwarded by me.

the trickles for any given year is not likely to alter significantly the overall figure for the given year.

HISTORY

The first public apology on record occurred in 1077, following a bitter power struggle between Henry IV, the Holy Roman Emperor and Pope Gregory VII which led to the emperor's excommunication. Following a change of heart, Henry stood in the snow outside the gates of Canossa Castle from 25 January to 27 January 1077, pleading with the pope to rescind the sentence.

Between February 1692 and May 1693, there were a series of hearings and prosecutions of people accused of witchcraft in colonial Massachusetts, whereas their alleged offences were little more than non-compliance with Puritan wishes. While the trials lasted, various accounts and opinions about the proceedings began to appear in print in 1692, with public opinion questioning the procedure and methods of establishing the truth. Consequently, in 1697, one judge and 12 jurors apologised for the injustices they had foisted on the victims and families of the Salem witch trials; and 14 years later, 1711, the State of Massachusetts tendered public apology and compensated the families of the victims of the Salem witch prosecutions.

The fourth public apology came from the proclamation of Abraham Lincoln, the Civil War time American president, in 1863. In this proclamation, he enjoined the nation to repent for its "national perverseness and disobedience" to God and asked for forgiveness for the civil war that led to so many deaths.

In July 1894, *KowShing*, a British steamship flying the British flag, was leased by China to transport troops to Korea. It was attacked and sunk by the Japanese navy whereas the Japanese government claimed it was unaware that the ship was a British vessel until after the incident took place. On 2 August, 1894, Japan apologised and offered to pay compensation to Great Britain. Japanese diplomats in London, however, denied reports that Japan offered an apology to Great Britain for sinking the *KowShing*. In all, there were five known public apologies throughout the first 900 years of the second millennium.

Public apology in the 20th century began with Germany signing the Treaty of Versailles, 1919, admitting it was responsible for World War I and agreeing to pay reparations. Five years later, 22 July 1924,⁷ the Persian government apologised for the death of America's Vice Consul, Major Robert Imbrie, who was beaten to death by a mob in Teheran, while the police turned a blind eye. In 1927, Henry Ford, a famous American car manufacturer, retracted a statement and apologised for anti-Jewish campaign in his newspaper *The Dearborn Independent*. His action was in response to complaints from Jewish leaders. The following year, 19 July 1928, the American government apologised to Great Britain for violating the sovereignty of the Bahamas, when the Coast Guard seized a ship suspected of smuggling liquor.

Two apologies were tendered in 1937. On 1 September 1937, the Chinese government apologised to America for bombing the American ship, President Hoover, and offered to pay reparations. Three months later, 15 December 1937, Japan apologised for sinking Panay, an American gunboat.

On 26 October 1948, the United States apologised to Mexico for allowing thousands of Mexican farm labourers to cross the Texas border, in violation of an agreement between the two countries. On 26 May 1950, Israel agreed to apologise to the United Nations for the murder of Palestinian mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, in Jerusalem in 1948. Five years later, 18 August 1955, Indian Prime Minister Nehru apologised and expressed deep regret to foreign missions and consulates in New Delhi who were attacked by Indian demonstrators, and offered to pay full compensation.

On 4 October 1960, at the United Nations, Soviet Premier Khrushchev demanded that the U.S.A. apologise for recent spying activity, which he termed "unprecedented treacherous acts", before there can be any improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations. On 9 May 1964, South Vietnam apologised for its troops' "unintentionally straying" into Cambodian territory the previous day during military action against the Communist forces.

7 There is a dating error here. Whereas Dodds of the Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania dates it as 22 July 1924, Rhoda Howard-Hassmann Center, Wilfrid University Canada dates it 12 July 1922.

There were three apologies in 1965. First, the sheriff of Montgomery County in Alabama apologised on 18 March 1965 for routing 600 civil rights demonstrators with horses and clubs the previous day. Secondly, the Second Vatican Council in a declaration entitled “*Nostra Aetate*” reversed the traditional condemnation of Jews as the murderers of Jesus. Thirdly, a joint statement issued by the foreign ministers of Japan and South Korea included words of apology for Japan’s 36-year colonial rule. There were no apologies in 1966 and 1967.

The last apology in the 1960s occurred in 1968. On 23 October 1968, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Riad, demanded an apology from Israel to Arab states for her “aggression” in 1967. Also in the same year, the United States signed an apology prepared by North Korea, admitting that the U.S.S. *Pueblo* violated North Korean territorial waters.

The apologies of the 1970s began when West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, fell to his knees at a Warsaw ghetto to express the guilt, sorrow and responsibility of Germany for the Holocaust. The second occurred in 1972 when Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka told visiting Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai, that “Japan realizes her heavy responsibility in causing enormous damage to the Chinese people in the past through [World War II].” Four years later, 19 February 1976, U.S. President Ford said that the internment of Japanese Americans [during World War II] was “wrong” and officially revoked President Franklin Roosevelt’s exclusion order. Two years after the death of Gen. Francisco Franco, 1977, Spain granted an amnesty to his collaborators in order to help the divided nation heal its wounds, and to facilitate the transition to democracy.

Public apologies in the 1980s began on 30 October 1981 when the Soviet ambassador to Sweden conveyed “unreserved formal regrets” to the Swedish foreign minister over a Soviet submarine that ran aground in Swedish territorial waters. A month later, 1 November 1981, Sweden declared the Soviet apology regarding the stranded submarine insufficient, but the submarine and its crew were released. There was no apology in 1982.

In June 1983, the U.S. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians recommended that Congress pass legislation providing an official apology and compensation to interned

Japanese Americans. Two months later, August 1983, the United States formally apologized to France for having helped Nazi war criminal, Klaus Barbie, escape to Bolivia to avoid prosecution after World War II. 3 September 1983 is the day South Korea demanded that the Soviet Union apologise and provide reparations for shooting down Korean Air Lines flight 007 on September 1, killing all 240 passengers and 29 crew members on board.

On 17 July 1984, Jesse Jackson, at the Democratic National Convention, asked Jews for forgiveness for insensitive remarks. On 7 September that year, Japanese Emperor Hirohito told the visiting South Korean President that “it is regrettable that there was an unfortunate period in this century”, alluding to World War II.

In a speech to Parliament, 8 May 1985, West German President Richard von Weizsacker stressed the importance of remembering, guilt and reconciliation. Five months later, in an address to the United Nations on 23 October 1985, Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone apologised for Japan’s role in World War II. The following month, 18 November 1985, Philadelphia Mayor, W. Wilson Goode, apologised for the MOVE disaster that left 11 people dead, 61 houses destroyed by fire, and 250 people homeless.

There was one apology in 1986, 17 August, when the United Church of Canada officially apologised to Canada’s native peoples for past wrongs inflicted by the church. There was no apology in 1987.

There were four apologies recorded in 1988, two in 1989, four each in 1990 and 1991 respectively. There were five apologies in 1992 which have since been updated to seven. Similarly, there were nine in 1993, and six in 1994. The figures for 1995 have since been updated to 19. Similarly, those of the following years have been updated according as follows: 1996 from four to nine; 1997 from 11 to 23; 1998 from 20 to 29; 1999 from 25 to 48; and 2000 from 33 to 50.

In all, there were

- 5 cases of apology from 1077–1900, making a total of 5 in the first 900 years of the second millennium (RHHC)
- 13 cases from 1901–1950 (RHHC)

- 56 cases from 1951–1990 (RHHC)
- 181 cases from 1991–2000 based on RHHC
- 794 cases from 2001–2010 (RHHC)

The criteria used by RHHC for its revision of DPSUP list is however far from clear, because while the figures as from the last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century are generally and justifiably higher, well established apologies such as (1) the apology by Emperor Henry IV to Pope Gregory VII in 1077 and (2) the public apology tendered and compensation paid by the State of Massachusetts to the families of the victims of the Salem witch prosecutions, were de-listed whereas the two high profile apologies conform to the definition advanced in this book.

There are apologies which were initially listed by RHHC but later withdrawn, for reasons known to the Centre. An example is the apology by the Rotterdam City Council (Netherlands) to Mr. & Mrs. Ripken and the Cinea Noord journalist on 4 November 2004. A table showing the two lists are presented in Appendix III.

Fig. 32

NUMBER OF PUBLIC APOLOGIES FROM 1077 AD TO 1990

Howard Hassmann Centre at Wilfrid Laurier University update
Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania list





Fig. 33

NUMBER OF PUBLIC APOLOGIES FROM 1991 TO 2010

Howard Hassmann Centre at Wilfrid Laurier University update
Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania list



Moreover, out of the 1044 cases of apology in approximately a thousand years, 794 or 76% occurred in the first decade of the 21st century with the number of cases in 2005 accounting for approximately 17.1% of all time. In the light of the above, to declare the significant rise in public apology in the 21st century is to understate the obvious.

ISSUES

The sheer number of issues over which apology has been found efficacious should not be glossed over. They range from stigmatisation of innocent and defenceless people as witches to the inhumanity of the slave trade, the Russian internment of 600,000 Japanese troops, the deliberate infection of African-Americans with syphilis and their reduction to mere laboratory specimens while making them believe they were undergoing medical care from their government; military rule in Nigeria, the Holocaust, the execution of Galileo, discrimination against women and AIDS victims. Others include attacks on foreign missions and consulates in New Delhi by Indian

demonstrators, the degrading use of Korean women as comfort women by Japanese troops during World War II; apartheid, the condemnation of Jews as the murderers of Jesus; the Crusades, land grabbing, forced labour, dispossession, expulsion, arson, 'the Stolen Generation', military coups, Jim Crow, derogatory and demeaning personal remarks by public figures, etc.

The media is a category in this regard. For example, *The Hartford Courant* newspaper published an apology on 4 July 2000 for publication of advertisements for the sale of slaves in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Public apologies that have been tendered include (1) the one for the murder of the U.S. Vice Consul in Tehran, and (2) the Reconciliation Walk by Christians from 25 Western countries who walked from the Rhine Valley in Germany to Jerusalem, apologising to Muslims, Jews and Eastern Orthodox Christians along the route from 15 July 1996 to 15 July 1999 for the crusades of 900 years before.

FORMS OF APOLOGY

In an attempt to make amends for various forms of inhumanity through apology, expression of apology has taken wide ranging forms. Most of them are symbolic but some have legal teeth, while some are material in form of reparation. Indeed, one can only imagine that other creative ways will emerge, as awareness rises globally. In order to illustrate the power of apology for peace, the following fourteen methods are randomly selected.

First of all, political leaders did issue widely publicised public statements, understood to mean public apology for past wrongs or injustice that the government or country they led had perpetrated. For example, on the 50th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II, in 1995, the Japanese Prime Minister admitted the brutalities Japan had caused, especially to the people of Asian nations, and therefore offered his heartfelt apology. The significance lies in the fact that this was an outright unambiguous admission of responsibility for heinous wrongs, in contrast to previous Japanese government, which hitherto had refused to offer an unambiguous apology for Japan's wartime atrocities.⁸

8 Weyeneth, 12

In the same year, rather than blame the Nazi occupiers as his predecessors did, for the deportation of tens of thousands of Jews to German death camps during World War II, President Jacques Chirac laid the blame squarely on France calling it a collective error by the French state – an error which must be admitted and dealt with.⁹ Two years later, President Bill Clinton issued a formal apology to African-American citizens for the inhumanity of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.¹⁰

Secondly, Presidents, prime ministers and potentates are not the only mouthpieces of government apology. Sometimes expression of national misdeed and apology do come through high ranking state officials such as cabinet ministers. For example, Jane Stewart apologised on behalf of the Canadian government to the indigenous Canadians for the racist policies and other derogatory practices meted out to them beginning in the 19th century.¹¹ Similarly, Bill Richardson, the American Secretary for Energy, offered an official apology to workers at a nuclear plant where the dangerous level of radiation to which they were exposed was hitherto hidden from them.¹²

Thirdly, sometimes government apology takes the form of legislative act. For example, in 1993, American Congress issued a formal apology to native Hawaiians for toppling the peaceful Kingdom of Hawaii in 1893, thereby paving the way for its annexation as an integral part of United States of America.¹³

The fourth method is a joint admission of wrong exemplified in what the leaders of both Germany and the Czech Republic did by signing a declaration, in 1997, admitting the horrific suffering each unleashed on the other during the Nazi era. In particular, Germany apologised for Hitler's invasion in 1938 while the current Czech Republic apologized for expulsion of millions of Germans living in the disputed Sudetenland in 1945 and 1946 respectively. This is dual apology.¹⁴

9 *ibid.*, 12

10 *ibid.*, 12

11 *Ibid.*, 13

12 *ibid.*, 13; compensation to approximately 3000 Americans were then proposed; 38

13 *ibid.*, 3

14 *ibid.*, 14

Fifthly, apology has been expressed by setting a day apart for contemplation. A case in point is the Sorry Day in Australia, which has become an annual event, for the atrocity of rupturing First Australian families and placing the children affected in White families or orphanages as the case may be, from the 1910s to the 1970s, under the pretext that their culture (and hence their future) was doomed.

The Sixth way in which apology was demonstrated lies in a historic and remarkable Reconciliation Walk mentioned earlier, or what in some traditions might be termed penance, organised by 500 Western Christians in 25 countries to express their regret over the Crusades of the 11th century. Beginning on 15 July 1996, with the hope of completing the walk at Jerusalem on 15 July 1999, the 900 anniversary of the pogrom in Jerusalem, these Christians apologised to Muslims, Jews and Eastern Orthodox Christians along their route for what their fellow Christians did in the name of their faith. They did make it to Jerusalem and assembled on 15 July 1999 for the finale, but the symbolism did not meet with global acceptance. Nevertheless, the symbolism was not lost on the intended apology recipients.¹⁵ Apart from being a novel walk, there was no inkling of a political leadership as it was all a grassroots phenomenon.¹⁶ Despite the attempt in some circles to demean the walk, this author rates it awesome and worthy of emulation.

Seventh, the dedication of a monument to the Tuskegee Airmen in Walterboro, South Carolina in 1997 was an expression of apology to African-American pilots who had trained there under racist conditions during World War II. In another occurrence in 1999, the United Church of Christ dedicated a bell in Providence, which was once one of the epicentres of the slave trade in America. The dedication was intended to communicate a change of heart on the part of some constituent churches that traded in slaves. African-Americans were the intended recipients of the apology.¹⁷

Eighth, names of historical landmarks have been changed as a means of apology to the victims of centuries of degradation and other forms of psychological torment. The renaming of the Botany

15 *ibid.*, 14

16 *ibid.*, 14

17 *ibid.*, 15

Bay national park in Australia, and the Custer Battlefield National Monument in the United States of America readily come to mind.¹⁸

Ninth, request for forgiveness has served as a veritable form of apology, especially when the recipient of the request is satisfied of the genuineness of the request. A celebrated case is that of George Wallace, what some would call the arch-segregationist Governor of Alabama, who changed his heart regarding racism and asked for forgiveness from African-Americans. In Wallace's case, the request for forgiveness was initially viewed with suspicion, but it proved efficacious in due course.¹⁹

The tenth example is repentance, an explicit religious language, which has been resorted to in order to make amends for the past. Pope John Paul II personifies this approach, going by a 1998 report, "We remember: A Reflection on the Shoah" in which the pontiff tongue-lashed the silence of his fellow Roman Catholics who knew the plight of their Jewish neighbours but kept mute during World War II.²⁰

Eleventh, lest we forget, Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV apologized to Pope Gregory VII for church-state conflicts by standing in the snow for three days. Similarly, West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, at the site of the Warsaw ghetto, fell on his knees in 1970 to express the guilt, sorrow, and responsibility of Germany for the Holocaust.

Twelfth, while still largely symbolic, apology did take the use of legal teeth in its expression. For example, in 1999, apology found legal teeth when New York judges started experimenting with apology rituals in the criminal justice system. In fact, it was a requirement for miscreants who defaced memorials at Civil War battlefields to write letters of apology to the National Park Service and the families of the defaced soldiers regardless of the side they fought during the war. In neighbouring Maryland, young people convicted of minor offences were required to go on their knees to apologise to the victims of their crimes as long as necessary.²¹ This is the thirteenth creative way in which apology has been expressed successfully.

18 *ibid.*, 15

19 *ibid.*, 16

20 *ibid.*, 17

21 *ibid.*, 16

Fourteenth, reinstatement has functioned as an apology.²² In particular, Lt. Henry Flipper, the first African-American graduate of West Point, who was later wrongfully court-martialled and dishonourably discharged from the army, was later found to be innocent. He was reinstated and re-buried honourably. President Clinton also cleared African-Americans such as Freddie Meeks and Preston King, who were convicted of racially motivated offences.²³

Lastly, in the last quarter of the 20th century, apology took symbolic and more material form as reparation. Well known cases include compensations to families of Japanese Americans interned in camps during World War II. Others are the Remembrance, Responsibility, and Future Fund established by the German government in 1999 to be jointly funded by the government and numerous companies, in order to compensate individuals subjected to force or slave labour by private businesses during the Nazi era. Not the least is the fund set up by the Swedish government to compensate tens of thousands of Swedes who were coerced into sterilization from the 1930s to the 1970s.²⁴ At times, reparation took the more individualist approach in terms of hypothetical wages and the collectivist approach in terms of affirmative action generally.²⁵

WHY APOLOGISE?

Why are nations, civil society organisations, churches,²⁶ businesses,²⁷ thorough-going humanists,²⁸ media organisations,²⁹ and individuals

22 Weyeneth calls it pardon but it seems to be reinstatement since it was a case of exoneration rather than establishment of an earlier guilt.

23 *ibid.*, 16

24 *ibid.*, 17

25 *ibid.*, 20

26 More in a later section

27 For the Colonial Pipeline Company, Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, and Ante insurance company, see Weyeneth, 22

28 The North American Council for Humanism (NACH) shares the position taken by G. Larue, "Human Values for the 21st Century," *file:///C:/Users/csvc/Documents/1%20April%202012/Human%20Values%20for%20the%2021st%20Century%20-%20Humanism%20Today,%20Volume%2012.htm* (accessed 2 April 2012).

29 For example, *The Hartford Courant* newspaper

turning to public apology to resolve age long intractable problems? The answer lies, first, in a growing awareness that there is a limit to the efficacy of power and might in the resolution of conflict in society; that the use of power is impacted upon by competing alternatives in the search for peaceful co-existence; that muscle flexing and bravado will buckle sooner or later. The observation is the same; whether it is Willy Brandt going down on his knees, the British Prime Minister owning up to the English stance during the Irish Potato famine; apology for the degrading treatment of Korean women; renunciation of apartheid, or reparation. It dawned on the powerful that power and undue advantage is not everything. Indeed, an underlying consideration leading to each case of apology was a level of appreciation for the inter-connection and destiny of all nations and groups.

Secondly, public apology, as stated at the beginning of this chapter, is a conscious and frank admission of wrong doing. It needs to be emphasised that apology is not an act laced with political correctness, but a blunt admission of wrong doing. It is explicit. It is undiplomatic since to be economical with acceptance of responsibility for wrong doing is to play on the intelligence of intended recipients of apology, whereas such a play can only aggravate existing resentment and delay genuine reconciliation. The Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan, who was implicated in the burning of an African-American church in North Carolina and who was ordered to pay a \$15 million fine³⁰ but who attempted a substitution of gimmick, must have learnt rather late that public apology and gimmickry are as far from each other as the North Pole is from the South Pole!

Thirdly, apology is a courageous and practical commitment for initiating a collective new beginning; a milestone for fundamental changes for a shared future on an equal footing, based on mutual respect. It is all about collective setting of new standards. This is the bedrock of affirmative action, regardless of its nomenclature around the world.

Fourthly, having purged oneself of the mind-set which had been internalised, in some cases for centuries, the public-ness of an apology is a moral transaction, whereby the public is meant to serve as a

30 See Weyeneth, 17

witness and a stakeholder, as an extra measure against repetition of a particular wrong doing. A change in the belief system of an apologising party is a prerequisite to public apology. This is a fundamental point Ann Calhoun fails to grasp when she says that apology is a self-serving pursuit of the meaningless³¹ or when G. Laue endorses public apology on condition that it is not just an important gesture but a “commitment to compassionate behaviour in the present and in the future”.³² By promoting public apology, one is not naive or denying that apology can be abused; but abuses are not unique to the practice of apology. Every noble cause, policy, and practice has been bastardised in the past.

Fifthly, apology has therapeutic effect. Those who demand apology and get it usually drop the issue in contention, because of the healing they experience. On the other hand, it is a common knowledge that demand for apology and rebuff usually result in hardening of attitudes and even flaring of passions. This goes to show that apology is essential to human wellbeing.

Sixthly, apology is usually invoked in relation to the past and hardly ever recognised for its immediate conflict prevention property. It should be highlighted that the main reason for Tehran’s prompt apology to the U.S. Vice Consul, Major Robert Imbrie, who was beaten to death by a mob in Teheran, was not merely to fulfil all diplomatic righteousness (in Biblical parlance). No, it was to prevent a swift and definite reprisal – war.

Lastly, apology builds trust. This must have been the underlying assumption when, in Belgrade, Zagreb, in July 2002, Bosnian Muslims demanded apology from Serbia, Bosnian Serbs and Croatia as a pre-condition for participation in post-war summit in July 2002.³³

In all, public apology has served a variety of functions: to move a community or nation beyond a bitter legacy; to draw a difficult

31 A. Calhoun, “Hey, I Said I Was Sorry! : Apologias: Mostly they’re self-serving in self-renewing pursuit of the meaningless,” in *Los Angeles Times*, http://articles.latimes.com/1995-07-20/local/me-25819_1_mea-culpa (accessed 4 May 2012)

32 Laue, op. cit

33 Rhoda Howard-Hassmann Centre), 83

chapter in history to a close; to establish accountability and promote peaceful existence; to heal; and to forestall or arrest a downward spiral of reprisal. It is about the past; but ultimately about a peaceful future.

Factors

While apology actors have reasons and motives for the steps taken, some external factors have been advanced as having facilitated the significant increase in apologies in contemporary history. In particular, while apology is not new and is not identifiable with any particular region of the world, it is a verifiable fact that the practice did progressively intensify in the last two decades of the 20th century.

One factor that has been identified generally is Christianity's anticipation of the third millennium after the birth of Christ, and the concomitant introspection and reflection that is associated with its advent.³⁴ It was a pontifical preoccupation of Pope John Paul II, and many Christians, in and outside the Roman Catholic Church. His inspiration equally rubbed on the institutions under the influence of those actors who were inspired by the pontiff. It should be noted however, that while the observation about Christianity's anticipation of the advent of the third millennium is generally accurate, it is interesting that apology practice did not disappear or diminish after 2000 came and went. Rather the graph has been on a rise.

Secondly, a new sense of connectedness on 'spaceship earth' with both global bond and planetary threats did raise awareness of the injustices of the past, with a greater propensity for apology. Weyeneth notes,

"Regular remorse has become an international preoccupation, involving nations in North and South America, Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and Europe. It is the global village ... the new sense of connectedness on "spaceship earth" that has emerged in the last half-century – through the perception of both global

34 Weyeneth, 37

bonds and planetary threats – heightens sensitivity to the wrongs done to nations and to neighbours.”³⁵

The third factor is what some analysts call the Clinton factor – an admixture of his conviction regarding the power of apology, his charisma among his people, and indeed his influence beyond America. As it turned out, no major political leader has offered more apologies or done more for the apology cause than the American president.

Objections

Of course, there are critics of the apology method, ranging from those with slight reservation to those who will not touch apology with a ten-foot pole. They do not see the point in the apology euphoria; at best, it is a gadfly. For this reason, the most frequently advanced objections to the apology method of conflict resolution are examined.

First of all, it goes something like this: “how can you ask us who did no wrong to apologise to those who were not alive when the said wrong was perpetrated?” In other words, there is no justifiable linkage between atrocities of 200 years ago and contemporary realities. For the avoidance of doubt, this objection is not peculiar to beer-parlour regular customers; it is the logic of a one-time Australian Prime Minister who did not see any connection between his administration and the Stolen Generation for which Australia was notorious.

Nevertheless, it is a mistaken belief that people are being asked to assume guilt for something they did not do. On the contrary, “guilt is to be assigned to people who commit evil.”³⁶ For example, “the guilt of the Holocaust belongs on the shoulders of the Nazis ... but [moral] responsibility adheres to people who not only should

35 Weyeneth, 37

36 D. Shriver, cited in Friends Committee on National Legislation: A Quaker Lobby in The Public Interest, “History Shows Apology Helps Heal; Georgia Legislature Considers ‘Contrition’ for Slavery,” http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=2625&issue_id=131 (accessed 24 October 2010)

remember those evils but remember it publicly.”³⁷ With reference to well-known hideous injustices, the objection is the failure to realise the fact that history casts shadows in ways which ensure that descendants of the victims of inhumanity share the legacy of the past.

With reference to Prime Minister Howard, he seemed to have fallen into moral coma so much so that he could not reckon that government is a continuum, the reality that did not allow him to walk away from the debts incurred by his predecessors. In faulting his Prime Minister, Tamara Zutlevics of Flinders University, Australia, distinguished between causal responsibility and moral responsibility, stressing that although Prime Minister Howard’s administration may not assume causal responsibility, his administration was liable for moral responsibility.³⁸ It is gratifying to note that Paul Keating, another Australian Prime Minister, delivered a public apology in 1993 for the many injustices committed by successive Australian governments against aboriginal peoples,³⁹ and Australia has not been the worse for it.

Robert Franklin, the Presidential Distinguished Professor of Social Ethics at the Candler School of Theology, Emory University, states it differently, with a touch of humour, but with an unmistakable import: people “routinely accept their connections to their ancestors when it benefits them [and] gladly accept prosperity passed down from previous family members”.⁴⁰ Similarly and logically, therefore, apology should be a normal part and parcel in the scheme of things. Admittedly, it may not be possible to undo the past; but apology has effected reconciliation and made possible the setting of new beginnings.

37 *ibid.*

38 T. Zutlevics, “Reconciliation, Responsibility, and Apology,” in *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), 66; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40441313> (accessed: 14 May 2012)

39 G. Pettigrove, “Apology, Reparations, and the Question of Inherited Guilt,” in *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Oct., 2003), 319, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40441363> (accessed on 17 May 2012)

40 J. Blake, “History shows apology helps heal; Georgia Legislature considers ‘contrition’ for slavery,” in https://web.archive.org/web/20101008140430/http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=2625&issue_id=131 (accessed 24 October 2010); see also Weyeneth, 30

The second objection to the apology doctrine goes like this: "If you apologise for this one, you will have to apologise for many more because fresh ones will keep emerging." In other words, apology is a cure-all or nothing. It is an over ambition, a distortion of the purpose and limits of apology, and a way of creating inertia or absolute 'do nothing' in human affairs under the pretext that there is no guarantee of achieving perfection. Rather than a cure-all, public apology is a project of limited objective which, nonetheless can impact on society, so much so that others will be motivated to contribute their quotas.

The third objection goes thus, "apology is not important. What is important is the lessons that can be learnt from past wrongs."⁴¹ This view is an expression of fear that raising awareness of the past is potentially dangerous, whereas simply drawing the lessons to be learnt from the past will do. But how is one to know what lessons to draw from a story if the story is not fully told. Furthermore, implicit in the notion of 'lessons to learn' is an admixture of mental acknowledgement of wrong doing and refusal to admit it publicly. This objection is an exposure of a weak character, not a flaw of the apology method.

Fourthly, a popular criticism which this author encountered in his interaction with several interlocutors during the data gathering period is summarised as follows: "That was the prevailing ethics at the time when the alleged wrong was committed. There was no choice. Therefore, there is nothing to apologise for." In this view, again, barbarities of the past such as the Stolen Generation and the Korean comfort women mentioned earlier, are often portrayed as events that are unfairly treated in the sense that contemporary standards are imposed on them, whereas that was the popular or acceptable thing to do at the time.

To all intents and purposes, this view is a beautiful bride at the first glance but a hydra-headed monster on a closer look. What is incontestable is the fact that 'the prevailing ethic' of the Stolen Generation was only one of the views of the time and certainly not the only view at that time. For example, the argument that the slave

41 This is a view a European friend of the author has canvassed to him repeatedly.

trade is an economic matter and not a moral-spiritual matter was popular and prevailing but it was certainly not the only argument. The slaves themselves had their more compelling arguments but because they were usually of the illiterate or disadvantaged category and not as leaders of opinion,⁴² and since having no redress for their viewpoints to be perpetuated, they were silenced with the use of the sword, the gun, bow, arrow and the pen, whereas Hala Gorani, a CNN reporter reminds her listeners daily that it is “when you speak to someone directly affected, that you complete your understanding of the news.”

Admittedly her subject is news not argumentation. Nonetheless, the principle she broaches has wider ramifications, especially for the arguments on the economic theory of slavery. In particular, the views of the slaves and their children were not factored into the supposedly brilliant arguments of the protagonists of economic theory of slavery. Similarly, other views during the Stolen Generation or indeed in every era of any given barbarity were suppressed or silenced to create the impression that the prevailing ethic was the only view of the day. It was then touted as unchallenged, acceptable or right. Similarly, it is not the ethic of the Civil Rights movement that made segregation wrong; it was condemnable by the other standards prior to and contemporaneous with the Segregation period. It is not the campaign of a latter period that made the Stolen Generation wrong; it was condemnable by the standards even before and during the era.

Fifth, some people imply that apology is a hollow rhetoric.⁴³ Many observers of President Clinton’s apology to the White House intern, and the apology offered by the two leaders of the Khmer Rouge who tried to apologise for killing millions of people when they ruled Cambodia in the 1970s came to the same conclusion,

42 Some slaves have been known to exercise considerable influence in palaces; see S. Stilwell, Culture, “Kingship, and Power: The Evolution of Royal Slavery in Nineteenth-Century Kano” in *African Economic History*, No. 27 (1999), supra, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3601661> (accessed on 14 November 2013). However, such slaves were too few and very far in between so much so that they cannot be regarded as representative of the slave population in horizontal history or in timeline.

43 cf. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 30 December 1998, 1 January 1999, and *New York Times*, 5 January 1999, cited in Weyeneth, 34

given the political calculations and opportunism that laced the statements of apology.

First of all, this view is not in short supply because it does not require any particular expertise on the part of any critic to level it. Second, it is foolhardy not to concede that apology is open to abuse. In this connection, however, it is not different from other noble causes every one of which is not only theoretically open to abuse but has been historically abused. Therefore, one cannot because of abuse throw the baby away with the bath water. What it calls for is examination on a case-by-case basis, rather than a blanket foreclosure of public apology as a veritable contribution to the resolution of age-long legacies. It is a historic fact that public apology has been part of the solution to intractable problems for the past one thousand years, and its resurgence in the past two decades should not be wasted. It should be harnessed for greater peace in a world that is badly in need of more.


FINDINGS

A comparative analysis of the apology actors in history may throw up dynamics that may yield more apology dividends – peace. It is widely accepted that any given body of data may be analysed in a variety of ways, depending on the objective of an analyst. So far, the analysis undertaken relates to chronology and frequency (when and how often). In what follows, the focus is on geographical regions and sectors in society.

First of all, based on the most comprehensive list to date, ranging from 1077 to 2010, by far the highest number of apologies in history comes from the West. Indeed, there is even not a close second!

It is, of course, naïve to suggest that apology is everything or that apology accounts for the current state of peace and stability in the West. Nevertheless, the correlation is established: the regions where public apology is at the service of the people is equally the regions where there is the greatest evidence of stability globally. It goes without saying, therefore, that Africa, Asia, Australia-New Zealand, and South America can avail themselves much more of the benefits of public apology.

Fig. 34
RANKING BY REGIONS



As stated earlier, three factors have been advanced for the rise of public apology globally, especially towards the end of the second millennium of the Christian era: (1) Christianity's anticipation of the third millennium after the birth of Christ, and the concomitant introspection and reflection that is associated with its advent, (2) the global bond and planetary threats that raised awareness of the injustices of the past, with a greater propensity for apology, and (3) the Clinton factor. While it is a clue to what happened towards the end of the second millennium, it does not fully answer the question of why public apology is prevalent in the West.

Following the analysis of the regions of the globe, secondly, the religion sector is next in focus. Indeed, the total number of times non-confessional entities, particularly nations and governments, have applied public apology in order to move beyond intractable and age-long legacies far outnumbers the number of times groups in the religion sector have found it necessary. This is an indictment of the religion sector of society, because apology is a religious category. Public apology is admittedly a shared value; it is nonetheless inalienably religious. Therefore the religion sector has a long way to go, and a lot of work to do, in order to earn more apology dividends. Be that as it may, the fact that the actor with the highest personal aggregate since record began – Pope John Paul II – is from the religion sector is a pointer to what may yet await humanity from the sector, particularly when resources in the sector are more creatively utilised to bring public apology to bear on flash points globally.

Just as inter-group analysis is informative, so is intra-group analysis within the religion sector not only possible but desirable for valuable information. On the one hand, sorting apologies under the various religions reveals Christianity as accounting for most of the public apologies in the religion sector, although adoption is not evenly widespread in the faith. For example, while the Catholic Church is implicated in the apologies offered by Pope John Paul II, the World Council of Churches, the formal organisational representation of the Ecumenical Movement, has not touched public apology with a ten-foot pole.⁴⁴ That notwithstanding, member churches, and coalitions within and without are apology actors for reconciliation and peace.

On the other hand, there is yet to be an awakening to public apology in Islam, as no Muslim civil society organisation, mosque, or Muslim cleric such as caliph, imam, sultan, emir, sheikh or ayatollah is known to have issued a public apology for any wrong doing anywhere since record began.⁴⁵ Buddhism and Hinduism are

44 Its quarterly *Ecumenical Review* has not carried a single article since its inception in 1948 just as its *Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement* is blind to apology and its derivatives while devoting four entries spanning 14 pages to dialogue.

45 This conclusion is tentative depending on the clarification I am awaiting from the US Department of Defense, which may necessitate a marginal adjustment of this conclusion. My question to the Department concerns an entry in Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann Canada Research Chair in International Human Rights at Wilfrid Laurier University website, as at 12 May 2012, as follows:

“Protests over alleged Quran abuse in Guantanamo spread to Afghan capital, Pakistan

Donor: Students (Afghanistan)

Recipient: United States

Reparation Date: May 2005”

When I sought for clarification from the Rhoda Center with no success, I emailed the following questions to the US Department of Defense through a Pentagon website:

On 20 December 2014, I updated an earlier question as follows: Which of the following describes best the “students” referred to above?

(1) a mob of students in a given locality

(2) an ad-hoc or hurriedly organised body of students that represents a national student body without a religious identity – a civil organisation in a Muslim-majority environment

not pursued herein because they are virtually negligible in Nigeria. Therefore the focus is henceforth on Christianity and Islam.

Probable Reasons for Muslim Boycott

Given that public apology is a shared value, and noting that Muslim civil society organisations, like other civil society organisations generally, embrace “a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power”,⁴⁶ it is worth probing into why there is such a significant deficit in the Muslim community. Six probable reasons come to mind.

“no Muslim civil society organisation, mosque, or Muslim cleric such as caliph, imam, sultan, emir, sheikh or ayatollah is known to have issued a public apology for any wrong doing anywhere since record began.”

The first probable criticism is to charge that the figures are not accurate. As noted earlier, the list of apologies is subject to update. Therefore, there is a standing invitation to all stakeholders, Muslims inclusive, to contribute updates for the common good. Therefore, merely stating that the list is defective does not invalidate the case for apology. Rather, it places the onus on whoever raises such an objection to provide a more credible list.

Secondly, it is also probable for a critic to aver that Muslim organisations do not need to apologise for anything because Muslims have not committed atrocities in history. Such an objection is likely to infuriate God-fearing and knowledgeable Muslims as they are likely to consider such an objection not only sarcastic, but a veiled insult on the whole Muslim community.

(3) an executive committee of students which represents a larger national body

(4) an executive committee of students that represents a religious group in a given locality in Afghanistan

The clarification was not received before press time.

46 GenderIT.org “Civil Society Organisations,” <http://www.genderit.org/glossary/term/612> (accessed 10 February 2011)

Thirdly, in fact, some have claimed to the hearing of this author that apology is not an Islamic doctrine. If public apology were un-Islamic, Muslim-majority governments, which at one time or the other offered public apology should have been condemned for falling into error or for betraying Islam. For the avoidance of doubt, they are (1) the Persian government on 22 July 1924, (2) The Palestinian Authority 12 November 1999, (3) President Saddam Hussein on October 2002 and 7 December 2002 respectively; and (4) President Muammar Qaddafi on 10 October 2010. Given the fact that all the heads of government were Muslims whose commitment to Islam was public knowledge globally, one would have expected an avalanche of condemnations right across the Muslim world. But there was silence on each occasion. Therefore, observers are left with no other conclusion other than that public apology is not un-Islamic. And this accords with the widely held notion that there are shared values, of which apology is one of them.

In particular, it is hard to ignore the emphasis Prof Is-haq Akintola of the Department of Religions and Peace Studies, Lagos State University places on his exegesis of the Koran 10:34 and 31:16–27. Akintola states,

Apology is taught by Islam. In fact, people who fail to apologise do so out of arrogance, out of pride, and the Koran says arrogance is a quality that Allah hates in man. [Arabic words] Koran 31 verse 16 or 17 says, when you walk on earth, walk simply, humbly, do not walk with pride. And it says [Arabic words] no matter how you try to make your feet stand firm on ground [Arabic words] you can never use your heels to dig the ground – it will not break the ground. [Arabic words] And no matter how much you try not to bow to anybody, your head will never be as high as the mountain. You can see the similitude the Koran is trying to lead us to. Apology is strongly supported by and strongly recommended by the Koran.⁴⁷

“Apology is taught by Islam”

47 See Appendix IV.

Fourthly, a sympathetic non-Muslim European lady, in a non-structured conversation, put it as follows:

“It is a bit difficult to compare the Muslims [with Christians] as the former do not have a central institution. Any head of an institution can take responsibility for the institution. The Pope can say sorry for the deeds of his predecessors, [or] for the Catholic church as such. A head of state can do the same. With Muslims not having something comparable it is a different thing.”

As conciliatory as this perspective may be, it does not absolve Muslims of failure or refusal to acknowledge past wrongs because many Muslim organisations, including student organisations, do not defer to central authority before they lambast whatever they perceive as flying in the face of justice. Similarly, some individuals such as the Deputy Governor of Zamfara State allegedly acted on behalf of 21 Muslim organisations to impose *fatwa* on Isioma Daniel, a female journalist, on 20 November 2002, for an article in which she made a remark some considered ultra-liberal.⁴⁸ Others include the American Muslim Chaplain who demanded that the Pentagon apologise to James Yee. It stands to reason, therefore, to suggest that if individual clerics, politicians, mosques, Muslim brotherhoods, student bodies, organisations, and a variety of structures can act without deferring to central authority, they are well placed for working for public apologies for Muslim wrong doings, as their contribution to local, national, regional and global peace.

Fifthly, there are Muslim society organisations as well as individuals that value the reconciliation effect of apology and demanded it. For example, (1) on 18 February 1989, the Iranian president

48 Two umbrella organisations contradicted the deputy governor partly because the *fatwa* did not emanate from a central authority. In any case, the Federal Government made it clear that *fatwa* has no place under Nigerian law. See Wikipedia, “Isioma Daniel” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isioma_Daniel (accessed 5 July 2011); D. Balint-Kurti, <http://www.religionnewsblog.com/1314/top-nigeria-muslim-body-overturms-miss-world-fatwa> (accessed on 5 July 2011); Islamopedia Online, “Nigerian State Government Issues Fatwa Against Journalist”, <http://www.islamopediaonline.org/news/nigerian-state-government-issues-fatwa-against-journalist> (accessed 5 July 2011)

demanded an apology from Salman Rushdie as a prerequisite for lifting the death threat; (2) On 6 July 1999 Iran asked the U.S. for an official apology to the Iranian government and nation for downing an Iranian passenger jet in July 1988; (3) on 19 March 2001, Kuwait's first deputy prime minister asked Iraq to apologize to Kuwait before the two countries could talk about reconciliation. (4) In May 2005, Afghan students demanded an apology from the US over alleged Quran abuse in Guantanamo. Others include the demand by an American Muslim Chaplain, 13 October 2005, from Pentagon for an apology to James Yee of the US Army, which the US government fulfilled on 13 October 2005. Not least is the demand by Iraqi Sunni Muslims for war reparations from the US, which again was fulfilled on 21 March 2006.

Lastly, there is possibly the morbid fear of confronting the past. However, since religious communities and other ideologies have found resources within their respective systems to confront the past, it is logical to suggest that there are resources within the Islamic faith for public apology. Some stakeholders may however wish to argue otherwise.

PUBLIC APOLOGY OR DIALOGUE?

Is public apology more effective than dialogue or is dialogue more efficacious than public apology? This question is a landmine because there are nuances in both methods that render the empirical method slippery. Nevertheless, the question is unavoidable, if not for activists, then certainly for the academe.

One way forward might be to compare the number of times actors of public apology have gone back on their words and the number of times that dialogues, which were once assumed concluded and sealed, have broken down. This author has not counted either. However, the hypothesis herein is that the number of broken down dialogue far outnumbers the number of withdrawn apology.

Should a traumatised world embrace public apology for some problems that have hitherto defied conventional solutions? Whether in longevity, frequency, the range of issues, spread across geographical zones or sectors in society, businesses, and governments, etc.,

public apology has proved to be a non-violent method of healing wounds and mending the worst of legacies. Sadly, it is not found in the literature of bodies such as the World Council of Churches and many others that have peace as a major pursuit, since the first half of the 20th century. The *International Journal of Peace Studies*, which is gaining visibility in global research and myriads of conflict resolution seminars, is also yet to take note of it. Nevertheless, the evidence empowers this conclusion: public apology has not been found wanting; rather, it has been overlooked, or perhaps consciously evaded.

RELEVANCE TO NORTHERN NIGERIA

Two questions are crucial at this point: (1) where does Northern Nigeria come in? (2) Who is to apologise to whom?

On the first question, an analogy might help. When an everyday Nigerian is not well, he or she consults relatives and trusted neighbours for advice on treatment whereas some of the supposed consultants may not be as knowledgeable as the one seeking advice – all in a bid to save costs. The second stage is to go to the shrine or the prayer house as the case may be. And when the illness shows no sign of abating, a man finally goes to a doctor.

When a man with a severe toothache finally faces a doctor, the unspoken understanding between the doctor and the patient is not to spend time and drugs on the remaining healthy 31 teeth in the false hope that if the 31 teeth are made healthier, they will somehow automatically restore the malfunctioning tooth. Rather, resources are concentrated on the unhealthy tooth, so that it may be treated and wholeness restored to the patient.

Likewise the Northern Nigerian condition is not different. It is a matter of putting the finger on the spot which malfunctions abysmally – Muslim-Christian violence – so that if the will is there, the surgery can begin in earnest, to enable the nation address itself to equally important matters. To treat the Muslim-Christian violence otherwise is to play pranks with peace.

The second question is, who is to apologise where both parties have indulged in violence? Can one rightly apportion greater blame to a party? This is where the South African example comes in handy.

It will be recalled that both the African National Congress (ANC) and the apartheid establishment were guilty of violence. Nevertheless, the apartheid establishment accepted that wrongdoing “weighed heavier on one side than the other.”⁴⁹ Precisely, the apartheid establishment admitted greater wrong than the ANC. It is this historic admission of greater wrong which brought peace to South Africa.

This is where the relational diagram at the end of Chapter Three which establishes the cases of violence and the perpetrators is significant. Even a casual perusal of the diagram shows that wrongdoing weighs heavier on the Muslim side than on the Christian side. Therefore, it is incumbent on the Muslim community in Northern Nigeria to accept greater responsibility for wrongdoing than the Christian community. And it has to be said that the fear of God makes it imperative to accept wrongdoing. This imperative is the onus for public apology. No more, no less.

“More precisely, the moral compass points to *masu sarauta*, its cohorts and surrogates, morphing into the 21st century *gamji*.”

“THEY WILL NOT APOLOGISE”

This author met with scepticism as he shared his findings on public apology in unstructured conversations, with a cross section of Nigerians, as the manuscript drew to a close. Further reflection on the author’s part attributes the scepticism to three erroneous assumptions: (1) the myth of monolithic Islam in Northern Nigeria; (2) ignorance of the history of peaceful movements, and (3) ignorance of an Islamic perspective on apology. Indeed, Muslims can apologise. And Muslims will apologise.

49 G. Youngs, “Feminism and Peace: Towards a New World?” in M. Tehranian and P. Clements (eds) *America & the World: The Double Bind* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers), 2005, 157

“it is incumbent on the Muslim community in Northern Nigeria to accept greater responsibility for wrongdoing than the Christian community.”

EVIDENCE OF MOSAIC PLURALITY

The idea that there will be no public apology from within the Muslim community in Northern Nigeria can only thrive on the myth of a monolithic Islam in Northern Nigeria whereas Islam in Northern Nigeria is of mosaic plurality. The following examples buttress the claim herein that the Muslim community in Northern Nigeria is differentiated.

First of all, for dan Fodio, leader of the 1804 jihad, the position of head of the religious establishment on the one hand and the head of the political establishment on the other – what in the West is commonly referred to as “Church and State” doctrine or separation of powers – was collapsed into one. So adhesive was the cementing substance that the question of separation of the two did not arise.

However, the collapse of the church and state model has not always been the case in Africa. For example, the Ummayyads and the Abbasid Caliphs, of an earlier period in northwest Africa believed that if not in theory, the imperative of accountability in governance necessitates the separation of the two lines of authority.⁵⁰ With specific reference to Nigeria, the Mai of Bornu operated the same system.⁵¹ Similarly, the Hausa kingdoms that the jihadists toppled separated the two positions, since the former regarded themselves as leaders of plural polities. Lastly but perhaps much more importantly, Islam in Yorubaland past and present evidently subscribes to the separation of the two loci of authority – the only exception being Ilorin where the jihad of 1820 had a foothold. In other words, the Yoruba do not confuse and conflate the *Oba* and the *imam*. In the light of this exposé, therefore, the Sokoto model is an aberration in

50 H. Palmer, “An Early Fulani Concept of Islam,” in *Journal of the Royal African Society*, Vol. 13. No. 52 (Jul., 1914), 410, <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/715847>> (accessed on 15 May 2013)

51 *ibid.*, 410

the history of Islam in modern Nigeria. Nevertheless, it illustrates the point at issue: plurality of leadership model exists in Islam in Nigeria.

Secondly, even among the ruling elite of the jihad of 1804 there were sharp disagreements over differing visions of Islam to such an extent that some princes riverted from Sokoto to Gobir.⁵² Furthermore, the acclaimed accelerated spread of Islam to Adamawa owes the speed to dissent from the Sokoto authorities. The Tijaniyya sect dissenters wanted to distance themselves as much as possible from the Qadiriyya sect which Sokoto favoured: hence the gravitation towards Adamawa.⁵³ It is therefore not surprising that it was here in Adamawa that Hayatu b. Sa'id, a great-grandson of Uthman dan Fodio, laid "claim to ultimate authority over the [Sokoto] Caliphate as a whole."⁵⁴ Claim to the throne was neither neatly settled nor a forgone conclusion at any given time.⁵⁵

Thirdly, there is no universally accepted definition of who a Muslim is in Northern Nigeria. This was the bone of contention when the Sokoto jihadists were looking for a justification for a planned invasion of Borno in 1808. At last, they accused El-Kanemi, the ruler of the Borno Empire, of being an infidel and not a Muslim. In a series of written exchanges, the question, who is a Muslim, was addressed, with El-Kanemi displaying shophistry in the art of argumentation.⁵⁶ Sadly, the jihadists, suggesting that might is right, threw argumentation to the wind and resolved the matter on the battlefield.

52 M. Last, "Aspects of Administration and Dissent in Hausaland, 1800–1968," in *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct., 1970), 350, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1159470> (accessed on 24 July 2013)

53 *ibid.*, 351

54 A. Kanya-Forstner and P. Lovejoy, "The Sokoto Caliphate and the European Powers, 1890–1907," in *Paideuma*, Bd. 40. (1994), 9, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40341673> (accessed on 18 October 2013); R. Adeleye, "Rabih Fadlallah 1879–1893: Exploits and Impact on Political Relations in Central Sudan," in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 1970), 236, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856843> (accessed 7 October 2013)

55 Bello, 12

56 See D. Last, and M. Al-Hajj, "Attempts at Defining a Muslim in the 19th Century in Hausaland and Borno," in *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1965, 231–240; for the arguments, see Hodgkin, T. (ed.) *Nigerian Perspectives*, London: (Oxford University Press) 1960.

The issue of who a Muslim is reared its head again when Premier Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, was rampaging the region for mass conversion to Islam. Ceremonial Governor Kashim Ibrahim told the Sardauna that there was no pagan in Borno for him to convert – a veiled warning – which the Premier understood and thereafter kept his distance from Borno.

Furthermore, the issue of who is a Muslim cannot be divorced from the central concern of the Maitatsine uprising in the 1980s, which in one instance required air bombardment and ground offensive in Kano metropolis to douse the Mahdist fire. So appalled by the Maitatsine murderous stance in Kano was Prof Nurudeen Alao, University of Lagos, that he declared that members of Maitatsine were not Muslims.⁵⁷ Not unaware of the pains felt by Muslims such as Prof Alao, the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, conducted a study when Buhari was a military dictator and concluded that, “it cannot be denied that they [Maitatsine] have their roots in Islam. At the worst, they are probably a new religion spawned by Islam.”⁵⁸

Is Boko Haram a Muslim sect? Members of the sect maintain that they are actually the true Muslims. However, many Muslims in Northern Nigeria declare them non-Muslims. Many more outside Northern Nigeria declare them non-Muslim.⁵⁹ Not the least is the declaration by President Mohammadu Buhari at his inauguration as President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at the Eagle Square on 29 May 2015.

57 N. Alao, “*Maitatsine* Men Are non-Muslims – Don,” in *Punch* 9 April 1984, 1–2

58 Cited in J. Boer, *Nigeria's Decade of Blood: Studies in Christian & Muslims Relation* (Jos: Stream Christian Publishers), 2003, 39

59 For example, see the statement credited to A. Muhammed-Lawal, the Chief Imam of Lead University, Ibadan, “Stop Calling Boko Haram Islamic Group, Cleric Urges Media,” in <http://www.punchng.com/news/stop-calling-boko-haram-islamic-group-cleric-urges-medial/> (accessed on 18 May 2014). Muhammed-Lawal's argument is that (1) Islam is not a religion that encourages force but a religion of peace, (2) the attitude and actions of Boko Haram contradict the teachings of Islam, and that 3) anybody who truly understands the principle of Islam would not kill a fellow human being.

In the first two of the three paragraphs allotted to the sect, he recounted some of Boko Haram's cataclysm of barbarity. At the beginning of the third, Buhari avered: "Boko Haram is a mindless, godless group who are as far away from Islam as one can think of." On the point of mindlessness, very few keen observers of Boko Haram's spate of barbarity would disagree with the President. The claim of godlessness and of considerable distance from Islam, however, is not substantiated in the light of the following observations. First, the 1984 analysis of Maitatsine by the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies applies to Boko Haram. Secondly, rather than insist that Boko Haram is "as far away from Islam as one can think of", President Buhari is better informed and equipped to serve Nigeria by taking heed to the advice by Harith Bin Ramli, Research Fellow, Cambridge Muslim College and Teaching Fellow, SOAS, University of London, in his advice to fellow Muslims on IS (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh), to which Boko Haram is currently affiliated as follows:

Instead of labelling IS [ISIS/ISIL] un-Islamic, the global Muslim community would do better to reaffirm its commitment to its culture of pluralism. This approach may also open up a crucial conversation that must take place about [the article] 'the relationship between state and religion' in contemporary Muslim societies.⁶⁰

Thirdly," Barbara Kay, a columnist for Canada's *National Post*, observes that, "there can be an Islam without Islamism, but [there can be] no Islamism without Islam."⁶¹ A sober reflection leads to the conclusion that her point has universal validity.

“there can be an Islam without Islamism, but [there can be]
no Islamism without Islam.”

60 H. Ramli, "ISIS Turns Muslim Theological Tradition on its Head" in <http://www.mercatornet.com/above/view/isis-turns-muslim-theological-tradition-on-its-head/17628> (accessed on 17 February 2016)

61 B. Kay, "Most Muslims aren't jihadists, of course. But some of them are" in <http://www.mercatornet.com/articles/view/most-muslims-arent-jihadists-of-course-but-some-of-them-are/17538> (accessed on 2 February 2016)

Therefore, in the Nigerian case, Boko Haram is a part and parcel of the household of Islam, despite the disclaimer by President Buhari. This clarification has become imperative because of the rising and shameful pitch of pillory in some circles in Nigeria at the mere mention of Islam. Nevertheless, in as much as there are different views on Boko Haram's identity by Muslims across the spectrum, there is a mosaic plurality on the issue under examination.

“Boko Haram is a part and parcel of the household of Islam”

Fourthly, there is the conventional declaration that there are five pillars of Islam. Dan Fodio and his early successors, whose claim to Islamic orthodoxy is well known, developed a view of the *hajj* in which they

tried to redefine its relative merit in the range of activities demanded of believers. Consequently, they argued in some of their written works that remaining behind to fight local unbelievers was to be regarded at least as meritorious as, if not more, than going to Mecca.⁶²

Fifthly, the question of the leadership of Muslims in Nigeria yield a plurality of answers. For some, it should be conceded to the throne of Sokoto. For others, the leadership of the Muslim community should not be ceded to any bloodline but should be accessible to the most suitable in terms of integrity and godliness. In as much as this question affects Muslims in other parts of Nigeria, notably in the southwest, the doctrine of leadership by bloodline has been contested for decades by Muslim Rights Concern, under the leadership of Prof Is-haq Akintola of the Lagos State University.

Sixth, the sharp division across sectarian line of the Qadiriyya sect, to which most of the Fulani belonged, on the one hand, and the other sects, especially the Tijaniyya and to a less extent, Sanusiyya, to which most of the Hausa population (Kano, Katsina, and Zaria) belong, is a case in point. It should be noted that the Qadiriyya

62 Yamba, 41, 4

sect was the most prominent brotherhood at the service of the jihad of the early 19th century, with the backing of Sokoto. Argungu the Kebbi stronghold was a 'no-go' area for Qadiriyya until well into the 20th century. Most especially, the on-going cut-throat rivalry between the Fulani-centric Jamatul Nasril Islam (JNI) and the Hausa-centric Council of Ulama of Nigeria,⁶³ which emerged in 1978, over which of them is the rightful mouthpiece of Islam in Northern Nigeria, is in some ways a refurbishment of the rivalry of the older sects.

Seventh, persistent advocacy for women's rights came from Muslim scholars, namely Isa Wali and Aminu Kano in the 1950s through to the 1970s, so much so that it became a political party issue of the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP).⁶⁴ Other political parties, especially the NPN, with a Fulani-centric centre of gravity did not see women's rights as an issue.

Eighth, how many wives is a Muslim entitled to marry – one; four; or 91? Isa Wali argues in favour of one-man-one wife, stating that the Koran does not teach polygamy. In fact, the Tunisian government was so persuaded of this reasoning that it went as far as outlaw polygamy in 1956. Generally speaking, Muslim scholars uphold four wives under certain conditions. Bello Abubakar Masaba, a Muslim philanthropist and occult healer in Bida does not recognise the upper limit set by the scholars, thereby taking the 91st wife in 2008.⁶⁵ He was reported to have later divorced 21 of them but went ahead to increase the number of wives to 97 by June 2012.⁶⁶ At the end of the day, each of them, the Muslim public on the one hand and Masaba on the other were entrenched in their respective positions thereby illustrating the plurality at issue.

63 For the emergence and development of the latter, see Oluniyi, *The Council of Ulama of Nigeria and Peaceful Co-existence in Nigeria*, supra

64 B. Callaway, "Women and Political Participation in Kano City," in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Jul., 1987), 380, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/421813> (accessed on 25 September 2014)

65 "Bello Abubakar Masaba, famous polygamist, marries 91st wife, divorces 21," in *Punch*, <http://news2.onlinenigeria.com/news/top-stories/106167-bello-abubakar-masaba-famous-polygamist-marries-91st-wife-divorces-21.html> (accessed on 25 May 2015)

66 Wikipedia, "Mohammed Bello Abubakar," in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_Bello_Abubakar (accessed on 27 May 2015)

Ninth, closely related to the number of wives is the vexed question of divorce. At the last count, there was a spectrum of 22 positions taken by Muslims in a total of 22 countries on the issue.⁶⁷

Tenth, when Abubakar Gumi released his Saudi-backed translation of the Koran into Hausa in 1979, Nasiru Kabara of Kano fingered alleged mistakes in it and released an alternative translation backed by Libyan petro-dollar in 1988. Dissatisfied with both, three lecturers in Bayero University, Kano, released a third translation in 1993 locally financed by Aminu Dantata, a Kano-based tycoon.⁶⁸ Therefore, it is a case of plurality of translations in a differentiated society.

Eleventh, how to inculcate moral values in children remains a contentious issue. In Chapter Two, the method of rote learning that is prevalent in the Far North, much less so in the Middle Belt, and virtually non-existent in Nigeria's geographical south, is broached. Despite its entrenchment in the *almajirai* region, rote learning in a second language for children in their first year of formal education is a step away from brainwashing. As noted in Chapter Two, Prof Babatunde Fafunwa, a Muslim, a Lagosian, a professor of education, and a one-time Nigerian Minister of Education was at the vanguard of the struggle against this form of education because to him, it is cultural imperialism.⁶⁹

Twelfth, the sharia legal system was presented to Nigerians as a divine law which has to be administered in Nigeria, in order to mitigate the ills of the country. Ogechi Anyanwu, Assistant Professor of History at Eastern Kentucky University, goes as far as claiming that the proposition of sharia law in Nigeria united Nigeria Muslims.⁷⁰ On

67 C. Balchin, "Having Our Cake and Eating It: British Muslim Women," in Women and Law Research Programme, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/cassandra-balchin/having-our-cake-and-eating-it-british-muslim-women> (accessed 2 February 2011)

68 A. Brigaglia, "Two Published Hausa Translations of the Qur'an and Their Doctrinal Background," in *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol. 35, Fasc. 4 (Nov., 2005), 4, 24–449, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27594352> (accessed on 10 July 2011)

69 See Aladejana and Alao, 26, 27, 56, 57, 70; Mission societies working in the Northern Protectorate hold the same view; See S. Graham op. cit. 136

70 O. Anyanwu, "Crime and Justice in Postcolonial Nigeria: The Justifications and Challenges of Islamic Law on Shari'ah," in *Journal of Law and Religion*, Inc., 315–347, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040588> (accessed 28 April 2015)

the contrary, this author catalogues 34 views canvassed by Muslims in their rejection of the sharia proposition. Sharia did not unite Nigerian Muslims; it divided the *ummah*.⁷¹ Notable rejections from Islamic organisations in Northern Nigeria include those from the Muslim Committee for Progressive Nigeria (MCPN), the Conference of Teachers in Arabic and Islamic Schools in Arewa (COTAISA), and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama'at of Nigeria (AMJN).

The thirteenth evidence of mosaic plurality of Islam in Northern Nigeria better than the tussle between two single-issue, pro-sharia groups in northern Nigeria, namely the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria (SCSN) and the Supreme League for Sharia Consciousness (SLSC), in 2005. The controversy arose in connection with a National Reform Conference that President Olusegun Obasanjo convened that year.

When the list of the delegates to the National Reform Conference was published, an organization calling itself the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria (SCSN) published a statement denouncing the selection of delegates alleging religious inequality in the selection and threatening Muslim *jihad* (holy war). On 4 April 2005, it published a two-page advertorial on what it called "the full statistics of the extent of Muslim marginalisation".⁷² Additionally, it addressed a press conference in Kaduna the same day, threatening the withdrawal of all Muslim delegates to the conference.⁷³ In a swift reaction, another organization known as Supreme League for Sharia Consciousness (SLSC), Sokoto, published a one-page advertorial⁷⁴ denouncing SCSN and dissociating itself from the views and assertions of SCSN

71 Oluniyi, *The Council of Ulama and Peaceful Co-existence in Nigeria*, Chapter Three

72 See Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria, Advertorial, in *Daily Trust*, 4 April 2005, 14–15

73 A. Haruna, "Confab: Sharia Body Threatens to Withdraw Muslim Delegates" in *Daily Trust*, 5 April 2005, 3

74 Supreme League for Sharia Consciousness (SLSC) Sokoto, "Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria Is not Speaking for Us" Advertorial, in *Thisday*, 8 April 2005, 46; for the avoidance of repetition, all subsequent quotations attributed to SLSC are from p.46

In one page, SLSC describes SCSN variously as an “inconsequential group [that is] deliberately enamoured with arguments laced with *faux pas* and polemic”; “a relative handful of outfits”; “a befuddled group that is intent in misrepresenting the facts at all times”; a group that does not meet “regularly to discuss issues of concern to the community or nation”; and “these evil advocates of subterfuge.” It describes SCSN advertorial and other press releases variously as “various negative outpourings”; “the deliberate advocacy of misconstrued logic and consistent lies”; “tell tale”; characterized by “the usual deliberate distortion of facts and systemic exhibition of shallowness in most presentations”; “extreme[,] given the level of emptiness as intertwined in its implausible arguments”; “propagation of falsehood” devoid of “foundational reasoning” and of exhibiting “its usual nudity of haste.” It accused SCSN of promoting “the ember of Islamic violence and Jihad” and “political befuddlement” stating that the real purpose of SCSN, was to cause “disaffection among Muslim brothers [with] the greater tendency of destabilizing the entire country.”

SLSC went on,

“we disassociate ourselves from the views and assertions of the SCSN on the grounds of the following:”

1. The call for Islamic jihad is tragic in the sense that the President Obasanjo and his administration that would face such an attack is part and parcel of Nigeria since 1999. After an election, there is no more South, East, West or North; there is only a single Nigeria; once after elections, parties no longer matter in a presidential system. It is just Nigeria. So calling for a jihad, is like calling for a jihad against one's-self. It is like a declaration of civil war and this cannot be in the nation's interest.
2. Rather than talk on marginalization, Northern Muslims should emulate their southern and Middle Belt kith and kin that have strenuously distanced themselves from mentioning religion at the confab. Our resolve here, is hinged on the grounds that using religion to cause crisis in the country would only boomerang. It is rather unfortunate that the North is reducing itself to a minority status by

taking religion to the front burner unlike the East, West and South people that are presenting agenda on the welfare of their people.

3. With this call by the SCSN, it would seem to have disclaimed the Middle Belt Christians.
4. When the president chaired the occasion of the National Mosque Rehabilitation Appeal Fund Launching and donation generously, he was commended then but strangely not identified as anti-Islam.
5. Then threat of a jihad is a ploy to incite gullible Muslims in the North into causing sectarian violence. This is a height of irresponsibility and recklessness on these proponents of religious war. There is rule of law and no one is above the law. Those promoting embers of violence as a means of redressing alleged marginalization of Muslim should be totally condemned and be made to refrain from further acts of incitement.
6. Northern Muslims should be appreciative of Mr. President's gesture in increasing the number of presiding offices at the national conference from four to six with Muslims and Christians having three slots each. This was in deference to Northern Muslims' complaint on the lopsidedness in the composition of the delegates at the National Conference and imbalance in the political appointments.
7. It is only vital for all to note that Obasanjo administration and the on-going conference offer us a veritable window of opportunity to redeem ourselves from a looming catastrophe. It should be taken as a serious business that has the capacity of rendering to our disheartened people some reason of hope that they can belong to a country of hope. We quite agree with the fact that the confab and its outcome would nurture a new Nigeria where all would be proud to call their own; a nation that would give its citizens a sense of belonging and evoke a sense of patriotism and Nationalism.

8. We wholly support the Obasanjo administration in its proven determination at all times in proffering workable solutions to the problems confronting the growth of this great nation. We hereby call on Government to be determined in tearing down all preconceived notions and confront all issues frontally and deservedly, including the tyranny of religious sentiments. Government would therefore not shy from and would not be less altruistic in its focus in working for the enhancement of the nation.
9. From the foregoing, those who promote the ember of Islamic violence and Jihad like the SCSN should [learn] to avoid stirring up matters that aim to solicit responses that are liable to inflame passions. Recognizing that Nigeria is still undergoing a process, we restate the fact that SCSN is not speaking for the entire Muslims in Nigeria and therefore warn these evil advocates of subterfuge to walk this tight rope cautiously, remembering always to enforce a moral judgment in tackling topical issues that are potentially explosive and also have the potential to wreak lasting damage in the Nigerian polity.
10. We hereby call all our Muslim brothers to unite against violence, to seek with common voice solutions to the serious social, economic and political reasons that have caused some of the problems we have seen across the country. It is time we seek ways to unify our people and to instil confidence in them.

Furthermore, criticism of SCSN was not limited to SLSC and possibly editorial sanction by *Daily Trust* management. For example, Prof. Is-haq Oloyede, Co-secretary, National Political Reform Conference, publicly called the bluff of SCSN to recall Muslims from the conference, while addressing newsmen at the International Conference Centre, Abuja, on 7 April 2005.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ H. Pindiga, "Only NSCIA Can Recall Muslim Delegates," in *Daily Trust*, 8 April 2005, 1–2

Oloyede's disclaimer is particularly significant because his participation at the conference was a manifest concession to the Nigerian Muslim community.⁷⁶ Therefore, when he addressed newsmen on 7 April 2005, on that vital matter of Muslim interest, he spoke unequivocally for the Nigerian Muslim community whose interest he represented – and thereafter, SCSN did not issue a rebuttal.

Lastly, with the commencement of the current Islamic Year which began on 1 October 2016, the Kano State Government in Nigeria, earmarked 5 October 2016 for a holiday as part of the activities to mark the year. Simultaneously, the government of Saudi Arabia, regarded as the epicenter of Islam,⁷⁷ dropped the Islamic Calendar for the Christian calendar for the sake of financial expediency.⁷⁸

The abundant evidence of plurality on (1) the issue of separation of powers in a caliphate, (2) conflicting of visions of an Islamic state, (3) lack of a universally accepted definition of who a Muslim is, (4) ditto on hajj, (5) the controversy over leadership vis-a-vis bloodline, (6) proliferation of sects some of which are at each others throat, (7) denial of women's rights on the one hand and advocacy of women's rights on the other, (8) the issue of one wife, four wives, or 91 wives, (9) 22 views on divorce, (10) several versions of the Koran in Hausa language, (11) embrace of rote learning in *almajiri* zone and the rejection of rote learning by others, (12) the bitter tussle between SCSN and SLSC over sharia and (13) the gap in the evaluations of how significant the Islamic Calendar actually is – all of these constitute a prospect for public apology within such a differentiated and diverse Muslim community across hundreds of ethnic groups and languages in Northern Nigeria.

76 See V. Egunyanga, "Reconstitute Membership, NSCIA Tells Obasanjo," in *Daily Trust*, 1 March 2005, 6; A. Abuah, "Kano Muslims Plan Protest against Confab," in *Guardian*, 12 March 2005; "Muslims Hail Oloyede's Appointment," in *Punch*, 17 March 2005, 12; "Muslim Leaders Meet," in *Punch*, 25 March 2005, 9; J. Shiklam, "Confab: Muslim Leaders Issue Ultimatum" in *Daily Champion* 29 March 2005, 1, 3; M. Kazaure, "Obasanjo Meets Northern Govs Tomorrow: Aftermath of Emir Bayero's Visit to President," in *Daily Trust*, 4 April 2005, 1–2; A. Yusuf, "Still on Obasanjo's All-Christian Confab," in *Daily Trust*, 4 April 2005, 10.

77 Iran does not necessarily share this view.

78 Saudi Arabia Dumps Islamic Calendar" in <https://tribuneonline.ng.com/saudi-arabia-dumps-islamic-calendar/> (accessed on 2 October 2016)

HISTORY OF PEACEFUL MOVEMENTS

“They will not apologise” is also largely a product of ignorance of the history of peaceful social movements. Three noble causes are cited below.

First, when in 1789 William Wilberforce, using his seat in the British Parliament to bring up the unacceptability of slavery in, and urging legislation against the slave trade, his proposition was laughable in the Parliament and in the wider English society. Nevertheless, the bill was re-presented repeatedly until 1807 when the bill was passed.⁷⁹ Similarly, it does not really matter whether the call for public apology sounds crazy or hilarious to the Sokoto establishment in 2016 to the various Muslim organisations jostling for the role of mouthpiece of the Muslim community in the Far North and the Middle Belt, or indeed on the streets of northern urban areas. The real question is whether public apology has a strong moral and historical basis. Since it has a strong moral basis, as amply demonstrated in history as illustrated in this chapter, the rest is a matter of time.

Secondly, when in June 1952, the African National Congress started a defiant campaign and volunteers began a peaceful resistance, for example by sitting on benches marked for white people only and being out in the city after the curfew set for blacks, to many observers, it seemed the prospect of change was going to take forever. To make matters worse, when 69 people were massacred in Sharpeville, 1960, the prospect of freedom for South Africa must have looked like a mirage for many observers. But all of that came

79 P. Falk, *The Growth of the Church in Africa* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan), 1979, 99; it should be stressed however that although William Wilberforce and his colleagues who worked persistently until the bill was passed were motivated by their Christian faith, the British Parliament was motivated by economic consideration – precisely the impact of the Industrial Revolution by which Britain was able to produce more goods than its European competitors. Importation of more slaves became unnecessary and indeed potentially harmful to social life. Similarly, the fact that Britain became a crusader against the slave trade in the 1830s should be understood against the background of the attempt to make other European countries which were not industrialised less competitive against Britain. Consideration for the innate dignity of the African has never been the sole concern of the British Parliament.

to an end in February 1990. Apartheid, though heavily armed, had little moral basis and therefore crumbled in time. Conversely, principled resistance against apartheid had less material and military resources. Nevertheless, it prevailed owing largely to its moral clout.

Lastly, the economic, social, political, military and cultural clout of segregationist America is well known. In fact, by the time President Barrack Obama was born, the segregationist power was so considerable that many doubted whether there would ever be change. By 2009, an African-American family moved into the White House.

It is common knowledge that awareness-raising played a significant role for freedom and justice to prevail in each of the foregoing examples. In the same vein, rolling back Muslim-Christian violence in Northern Nigeria with public apology has a good prospect. And its time has come.

IS-HAQ AKINTOLA ON APOLOGY

“They will not apologise” is evidence of ignorance of what this author is led to believe Islam teaches on public apology. Since this author is not competent to exegete Koranic texts, he rightly sought the expertise of a competent authority on the matter. The interview granted by Prof Is-haq Akintola, Department of Religions and Peace Studies, Lagos State University, Appendix IV, is a conversation starter for relevant stakeholders.



Fig. 35
Prof Is-haq Akintola

INCENTIVES

Is there any incentive for the public apology move? Several seem self-evident. First of all, it is the way out of the habitation of violence, with all the peace dividends. Secondly, it is imbued with image-laundering properties, which the Far North needs badly. After all, it is not a secret that the Far North is not as attractive to investors nationally and internationally as other parts of Nigeria because of the perpetual pariah-of-violence image which it has acquired hitherto, and which has currently been heightened by Boko Haram whose rabidity compels it to destroy everything along its path.

Thirdly, an act of apology as advocated herein has a revolution-blazing potential for peace in the Muslim world. Indeed, the Far North stands to become a birthplace of a peaceful revolution in the Muslim world, with positive implications for the global village. For those who see nothing good coming from Africa, it should perhaps be re-stated that Christian-Muslim dialogue which has been exported around the world is an invention of the Yoruba of south-western Nigeria. Likewise, northern Nigeria can become the birthplace of public apology with domino effect on the whole world.

Should the *masu sarauta* make it a condition for other stakeholders to apologise as a precondition for apologies forthcoming from the Muslim fold? Such a posture will only end up playing on the intelligence of the other stakeholders, and delaying genuine peace. Furthermore, such a precondition will render Muslim apology a travesty.

What is the alternative to acceptance of wrong doing and apology? Locally, the historical burden on Muslim leadership in the Far North will increase, and the pressure for leadership to emerge from other loci among God-fearing Middle Belt Muslims will mount increasingly. What if the Middle Belt Muslims fail to recognise a historical moment for kick-starting a peace revolution globally? It will pave the way for the traditionally peace-prone Muslims in southwest Nigeria to seize the historical moment.

It is also hoped that other citizens of British colonies, where religion was used as a tool for setting the people against themselves and thereby thwarting the forging of a common goal will reflect on the relevance of public apology, and how to forge peace in their

traumatised societies. Also of course, peace-loving Muslims in other climes, who are looking for ways of making a significant contribution to global peace, beginning in their localities, may seize the opportunity, should the southwest fail to show significant interest.

In the unlikely event that the foregoing opportunity will simply slip by unnoticed in the Muslim community globally, it will position the community for forfeiture of the moral high ground from where accusation of Christians and the West over the Crusades of the 11th century is a routine. Admittedly, the systemic and incremental nature of the persecution against those Christians in Northern Nigerian communities may not have been as dramatic as the Crusades; nevertheless, the cumulative effect is comparable.

Northern Nigeria as the birthplace of public apology in the Muslim world has a global export potential. The deficit in the global house of Islam is a challenge; the challenge unveils an imperative; and the imperative places the onus on northern Nigeria.

“the challenge unveils an imperative; and the imperative places the onus on northern Nigeria”

CONCLUSION

In Chapter One, the task was to outline some of the policies and programmes of the colonial regime which were tantamount to ploughing for religion-related violence in future Northern Nigeria: (1) restoration of oppressive Muslim rulers to their pre-colonial status, (2) institutionalisation of a judicial system that favoured Islam and (3) the foisting of an educational system that was skewed against non-Muslims. Furthermore, by denying the people of Northern Nigeria Western education for as long as it could sustain the denial, the colonial government differs from *Boko Haram* not in intended dehumanisation; the difference lies in the weapon adopted and in *modus operandi*. Despite an attempt to exonerate Britain for the inhumanity in the above, on the ground that it is typical of colonial regimes to oppress, evidence was tendered to show that the colonial regime in Northern Nigeria was not fated and that there were voices

from within the British society that condemned the ignominy that was unfolding.

Chapter Two, continues the unveiling of the barbarities in Chapter One with a focus on the policy on religion, seed-sowing for violence being the analogy. Significant in this task is the unveiling of the fact that there was no historical, philosophical, religious, racial, demographic or structural basis for the colonial policy of official backing for Islam or why traditionalist religion and Christianity should be subordinated to Islamic interests. This is more so since, there was no conflict between Muslim leaders and Christian missionaries in Northern Nigeria before the advent of colonial rule. Indeed, ample evidence was provided to show that the colonial administrators installed insulation between the Muslim rulers and the missionaries for fear that the latter could induce rebellion against oppression. For fear of friendship between emirs and missionaries, British colonial administration in Northern Nigeria employed shameful tactics to frustrate Christian advance in the colony. For example, it will be recalled that the colonial regime imposed assent to the British imperial message to Africa – a dogma from hell – that Europeans are superior to Africans – a message that the administration knew to be incompatible with the Christian message – as a condition for granting permission for opening mission stations. To the missions' credit, it will be recalled that Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has since exposed the British imperial message to Africa for what it really is – a white lie.

Chapter Three continues from where the colonialists left off. As if applying fertiliser to germinated seeds for hastening post-colonial Muslim-Christian conflict, the unveiling focused on the roles of Premier Bello and showed that General Ibrahim Babangida's role was most systemic in the precipitation towards post-colonial Muslim-Christian violence, precisely because of the unprecedented and surreptitious amendment to the Nigerian constitution. It was also analysed that his eagerness to give Islam an edge was not unconnected with Babangida's insider knowledge of the demographic shift in the 1980s when Christianity was at par with Islam in the Nigerian population.

Chapter Four introduces Christian-Muslim dialogue, a conflict-prevention *cum* conflict-resolution method, which Nigeria

bequeathed to the human family. Sadly, just when the method was being adopted in different parts of the world, the practice became shambolic in the land of its origin, as from the 1980s. This realisation leads to the caution that, as helpful as dialogue has been, nevertheless, it is not a panacea, as some seem to emphasise. Therefore all conflict prevention and resolution efforts should not be dumped in the dialogue basket, more so since other methods especially public apology has not been examined and applied in the religion sector in Nigeria.

The closing chapter looks at among other things (1) the operative definition of public apology as used in this book, (2) the history of public apology going back to a thousand years, (3) issues in which public apology has been found efficacious and (4) the forms that public apology has taken over the centuries, (5) just as the actors of public apology in different locations and climes globally were identified. (6) The theory of public apology and its objections are given substantial space.

Given the interest in the religion sector, the beam focused on Christianity and Islam – the two religions that are implicated in the violence in Northern Nigeria. To minimise scapegoating and local pillory, the setting is global. The analysis led to the discovery of an apology deficit in the Muslim community – especially among the clerical class. Six probable reasons for the deficit are examined and faulted. Lastly, borrowing a leaf from South Africa vis-à-vis the statistics on violence involving members of the two faith communities in Northern Nigeria, the book places the onus for apology on the Muslim community in Northern Nigeria and offers supporting arguments why Nigerians, and indeed the human family, should expect an apology revolution to begin in the northern parts of Nigeria.

The need for Britain to apologise to the people of Northern Nigeria specifically, and the Nigerian nation generally, for imposition of unjust administrative structures, inequitable judiciary, apartheid education system, and the utterly baseless ranking of Nigerians peoples along a pernicious racial gradient, etc., cannot be overemphasised. Additionally, particular mention of the obstacle the colonial machine erected against Christian advance in the colony is necessary. While there is the traditional pigeonholing of Christian missions as mere conversionary agents, current research highlights additional

four-fold accomplishments of Christian missions in whatever communities they served, albeit imperfectly. They consists of (1) laying the foundation of modern democracy; (2) serving as catalysts for the spread of religious liberty, mass education, newspapers and voluntary associations etc; (3) undermining traditional, religious and colonial abuses; thereby (4) creating or facilitating conditions, skills and experiences for the advancement of human dignity and human wellbeing. These are the services that the British blocked as much as possible. The ostensible official explanation was missionary safety; it is now known to be a ruse. Britain needs to apologise not only to Christian missions in Northern Nigeria; those who commissioned them to the field do not deserve less.

What is the prospect of a British apology to the aforementioned deserving prospective recipients? To his credit, former Prime Minister Tony Blair has a proclivity for public apology for British brutality in Africa. For example, his apologies include, (1) the 11 October 1999 apology for “Britain’s shame,” as Queen Elizabeth II put it, over the Boer War; (2) April 2001 for exploding army shells and deaths in the Maasai and Samburu areas of Kenya; (3) 14 August 2003 for British troops rapes of Kenyan women; 3 March 2005 apology to Kenya over colonial brutality; and PM’s 27 November 2006 Article for the *New Nation* newspaper over victims of slavery. His recent apology in July 2016, over his government’s role in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is fresh in memory. Nevertheless, Britain’s capacity for public apology transcends the Tony Blair factor.

Former Prime Minister, David Cameron, did not hide his feelings from Queen Elizabeth II in May 2016, when he remarked before her that Nigeria is fantastically corrupt. For the avoidance of doubt, there is no denying the fact that Nigeria is fantastically corrupt. However, Cameron’s declaration is only one side of the coin; the flip side is the anatomy of the fantastic corruption in Nigeria – whereas it is important to display the flip side in order to gain a better insight to the fantastic corruption in Nigeria.

First, the Northern Nigeria colonial government ploughed the ground and sowed the seed of corruption by setting up but not auditing the Native Authority books for 32 consecutive years of the 60-year rule in Northern Nigeria. By so doing the colonial government created honeypots for its surrogates and presided over

unregulated depletion of public treasuries throughout Northern Nigeria for over a generation. Following public outcries by stakeholders, after the end of World War I for reform, the Residents insisted that reform was not the way to reward the emirs for their support for the war effort. The fierce resistance to reform may not only have served as protection of the emirs, it may have doubled as veiled shorthand for shielding British officials who may have dipped their fingers in honeypots their respective provinces in that auspicious age of contrived innocence. In brief, corruption became engrained in colonial administration and thereby becoming a monster as long as the colonial regime lasted.

Secondly, burning of official records was official policy, and it went on for years. Given this scenario, it is not difficult to see that (1) unbridled embezzlement and (2) systemic destruction of pertinent records were foundational to the conduct of official business in Northern Nigeria.

Thirdly, by promising the same corrupt Northern class the post-independence leadership of Nigeria, even before the machinery for independence was set in motion, and ensuring that the mantle of leadership passed on to the same class at all cost, Britain strengthened the hands of corruption in Nigeria. On the other hand, by standing in the way of those who fought for independence from exercising power for the common good, Britain bequeathed to Nigeria only a travesty of democracy. It goes without saying, therefore, that wherever and whenever official corruption and a travesty of democracy come together, gargantuan corruption is the inevitable outcome.

It should perhaps be clarified that all the tentacles of corruption in Nigeria cannot be rightly traced to Northern Nigeria. However, in as much as this book is on Northern Nigeria, with a substantial portion of it on the British colonial role in the disorder, the above are recalled to show that the incubation of corruption in modern Nigeria is of British making.

Lastly, and this is the aspect that the likes of David Cameron would like to keep the lid on: Britain is fantastically complicit in hiding the loots from Nigeria in British banks, landed property, other investments, and conduits to other destinations outside Britain. These loots are Nigerian assets that the likes of David Cameron would fight tooth and nail to ensure are not repatriated to Nigeria.

In the light of the above, several questions arise: (1) will the BBC which disseminated Cameron's remark to the Queen, with the same zeal commission periodic documentaries, on the loots from Nigeria that are trapped in the UK on the one hand and Britain's readiness or the lack of it on the other hand to have them repatriated to Nigeria? (2) Will the BBC commission with the same zeal documentaries on destinations for which London banks served as conduits? More importantly, (3) will Prime Minister May and her successors apologise for British barbarities in Northern Nigeria which culminated in fantastic corruption in Nigeria? (4) Will Prime Minister Theresa May and her successors commit themselves to repatriations of fantastic loots from Nigeria which are held up in British banks and by other British instruments?

CLOSING CAVEAT

This closing chapter among other things highlights the Muslim public apology deficit with ways and means for reducing the deficit. It remains to be stressed, however, that neither the apology from Northern Nigeria nor the apology from Britain is contingent on the other. Each stands on its own. Therefore, it will be a major mistake to make the apology by the Muslim community in Northern Nigeria contingent on prospective British apology. Indeed, to make sequence an issue or the issue is to court monumental vacuity.

The ball is in the northern court. Nigerians are awaiting a positive and historic response. The world is watching with keen interest for reconciliation and peace.

“neither the apology from Northern Nigeria nor the apology from Britain is contingent on the other”

“Indeed, to make sequence an issue or the issue is to court monumental vacuity.”

APPENDIX I

Interview with Chief Olusegun Obasanjo

Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was the commander of 3rd Marine Commando Division of the Nigerian Army, 1969–70, when he accepted the Biafran surrender ending the Nigerian Civil War in January 1970. He served in the cabinet of General Yakubu Gowon as the Federal Commissioner for Works and Housing, and became Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, 1975, following the coup that brought in General Murtala Muhammed as Head of State. He succeeded General Murtala Muhammed as Head of State from 1976 to 79 and handed over power to a democratically elected President Shehu Shagari in 1979. Founder of Obasanjo Farms Nigeria Ltd, Otta, Ogun State, he was elected President of Nigeria in 1979. He granted the author the following interview in Abeokuta, Ogun State, on 29 January 2010

OLUNIYI: In democracies all over the world, laws are made by acts of parliament but in a military set up, the authorities rule by decrees. In democracies, people canvass ideas and propose bills which are debated, rejected, amended, or adopted and passed into law. Could you shed light on the practice in military regimes? Are there any processes, procedures or laid down rules that military governments follow in the making of decrees?

OBASANJO: There are procedures, of course, but one thing we have to understand from the onset is the fact that military regimes or juntas have both the executive and the legislative power, and that makes it significantly different from the democratically elected set of people. For example, in the democratic system, they speak of separation of powers: executive, legislative, and the judiciary. It is

a significantly different norm. Even in the parliamentary system which has a little bit of mixture, there is still that distinction. Those who participate in the legislature could also be members of the executive but not the whole legislature. It is completely different in the presidential system because the executive, which is headed by the president, is normally different from the legislative, which is the parliament. A military regime, therefore, has two functions in one body essentially.

Now, what process does a decree go through? A decree could be initiated by the head of government, in which case, a memo can be brought to the council and discussed. After that memo has been passed, it will go to the Attorney-General who will pass it on to draftsmen who will draft it. After that, it will come back to the Executive of the military regime who will look at it, clause by clause, and pass it.

If it is a decree that has to do with other people; for instance, if you are making a law about a particular professional body, the draft will go to that professional body, and the draftsmen will look at their input before they bring it back to the military regime for them to look at again. Once the regime considers it and approves it, it is then printed out and the head of government signs it. It is gazetted; and it becomes law. That is one way.

Another way is as follows. There could be a meeting, conference or seminar and some recommendations are made that should become a law or that needs some law to support it. Such a recommendation is then passed to the relevant ministry. Let's say it is something about children, whereas matters relating to children were handled by the Ministry of Women Affairs, the recommendation would be passed on to the Ministry of Women Affairs. They would have a look at it, and then bring a memo to the regime. That memo would be considered in the Executive Council [not audible enough]. They may pass that memo with amendment or they may pass it as it is or they may reject it. If they pass it as it is or if they pass it with amendment, it goes to the Ministry of Justice for draftsmen to draft the law or legislation. Then it will come back to the regime and be checked clause by clause and passed. Once passed, it is printed out, signed by the head of government, gazetted and it becomes law.

Then of course, there may be an international agreement which needs to be passed into law. Such an agreement will be brought in by the head of government and considered. Since it is the normal obligation of the country to pass such agreed convention, treaty, or whatever it is into law, it is then passed into law. I think these are the three or four ways that decrees were made.

OLUNIYI: In summary, a decree can be initiated by the Head of State, by a ministry or other interest groups.

OBASANJO: That's right; and it could be an international organisation.

OLUNIYI: What of members of the Ruling Council who are not heading any particular ministry? Could they not initiate decrees?

OBASANJO: Yes, they could. When a member of council who was not head of any ministry was strongly concerned about an issue, he would raise a memo through the relevant ministry and it would be tabled for consideration. If it is something that is not of a ministerial nature but he believed that it should be initiated by the head of government, he would make a presentation in writing to the head of government, and the head of government agreeing to it would bring it up. Then, it becomes the memo of the head of government; not the memo of that member. And once it passed the memo stage, it is passed on for drafting in the Ministry of Justice.

OLUNIYI: Presumably, the Head of State was the chairman of the Supreme Military Council. Who was the secretary?

OBASANJO: Secretary to Government.

OLUNIYI: Was the Secretary to Government necessarily a civilian?

OBASANJO: Well, in the Nigerian context, those who have been appointed to that position were not military men but there was no reason why a military person could not perform in that capacity. But throughout military regimes in Nigeria, Secretary to Government was always a civilian; a very senior civil servant.

OLUNIYI: I recall that the first military regime under Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi had a Supreme Military Council. I do not remember right now whether he had in addition a Federal Executive Council made up of ministers.

OBASANJO: Yes, there was the Supreme Military Council made of the military officers, and there was the Federal Executive Council made up of Permanent Secretaries as at that time. They were acting as Federal Executive Council.

OLUNIYI: For clarification, the Secretary to Government was always the secretary to the Supreme Military Council.

OBASANJO: Yes, and where there was Federal Executive Council, he was also the Secretary to the Federal Executive Council.

OLUNIYI: Was the Attorney-General a member of the Supreme Military Council or an observer?

OBASANJO: I don't remember just now what transpired under General Ironsi, but as under General Gowon and from there on, the Attorney General was by right a member of the Executive Council. I doubt it very much if he was not a member of Supreme Military Council.

OLUNIYI: Please pardon me if some of my questions are absolutely elementary. How were the resolutions of the Supreme Military Council which needed to be drafted communicated to the Attorney-General? Did the chairman communicate in writing to the attorney-general instructing to act or the attorney-general simply acted on the basis of what transpired at council meeting without recourse to any further instruction?

OBASANJO: The minutes of all council meetings are kept by the Secretary to Government and are circulated. If there was an action to be taken by the Attorney-General, the minutes would state it.

OLUNIYI: The Buhari-Idiagbon regime rolled out a raft of 21 decrees

in one day, just after three months in office. Could all those decrees have been thoroughly debated in council or was it a case of each regime fashioning out its own process of making a decree or are we to say that it was the same process that all the military regimes followed since the era of General Ironsi in 1966?

OBASANJO: I think 1966 was an aberration. There was the unitary decree. I wouldn't know whether that was discussed extensively at the Supreme Military Council. But I believe that if it had been discussed thoroughly, people would have raised their apprehension which at that time became the alleged reason for the change of government and the upheaval it had. But I know that subsequently all decrees are brought in. Of course, a head of government, if he likes, could just give instruction to the Attorney-General and the Attorney-General could do something and he signs it. Nothing stops him from doing that. But I can say categorically that there was nothing of the sort in my administration and that of Murtala of which I was very much a part. There was nothing like that. I was also part of Gowon's administration later; and there was nothing like that.

OLUNIYI: For the avoidance of doubt, you are saying that a head of state could get his attorney-general to draft him something which he would then sign into law without recourse to any arm or tier of government.

OBASANJO: Yes.

OLUNIYI: Theoretically possible?

OBASANJO: Yes, theoretically possible; but there was no such thing in the regimes in which I was a part.

OLUNIYI: What of the military regimes of the 1980s and the 1990s? Did the heads of state of the period perform such fiats?

OBASANJO: I can't say yes or no because I didn't know the detail of what transpired when I left government.

OLUNIYI: With all of these as background, I am suspicious of Decree 26 of 1986, “Constitution (Suspension and Modification Amendment)”, promulgated on 20 November 1986, which amended sections 217, 223 (1), 226 (a), 141 (3), and 242 of the 1979 Constitution, stipulating that the word “personal” should be deleted wherever it occurred after the word “Islamic.” As you will easily recall, agitation for Sharia died down in 1978 – long before the military under your leadership handed over power to a democratically elected government in October 1979. In fact, politicians were eager to put it behind them in order to launch their electioneering campaigns en route October 1979. It was not an issue in 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. Suddenly, a decree was promulgated in November 1986 by a head of state who declared a state of emergency in the economic sector.

OBASANJO: I remember Sharia was a controversial issue in 1978. How it reared its ugly head again I wouldn’t know.

OLUNIYI: Lastly, I know that government documents are classified, but I don’t remember how many years they have to be kept under lock and key before they are de-classified.

OBASANJO: It is a British system. I think it varies. Some are for 20 years and some are for approximately 25 years. I believe the longest is probably about 30 years. I think the idea is that any issue that could be of sensitive security consideration would have been dealt with within the span of time. However, in some cases, some of the things they classify – well, some of these things are overdone. Every piece of paper is either ‘restricted’ or ‘confidential’.

OLUNIYI: Thank you sir.

APPENDIX II

Interview with Chief Samuel Oluyemisi Falae

Chief Samuel Oluyemisi Falae, simply known as Olu Falae is an alumnus of the University of Ibadan and Yale University, USA. A development economist and top rated technocrat, he was a towering figure in the Federal Budget Office for many years. He retired into banking in 1981 but was recalled by the Ibrahim Babangida regime to serve as Secretary to the Military Government – a duty he discharged from January 1986 to December 1989. He was a prominent member of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) in the struggle for the restoration of democracy in Nigeria. He unsuccessfully contested the 1999 Nigerian presidential elections on the joint platform of Alliance for Democracy Party and the All People's Party (APP) against Olusegun Obasanjo of the People's Democratic Party (PDP).

OLUNIYI: Sir, I don't think it is an exaggeration to say that most Nigerians do not know the job description of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation let alone that of a more specialised Secretary to the Military Government. I suppose such knowledge comes under the rubric of official secret. Could you enlighten me on this point?

FALAE: I can only speak about what my functions were when I was the Secretary to the Military Government from January 1986 to December 1989. Fortunately, a few weeks before my appointment, President Babangida, the then Head of Government, addressed a meeting of senior civil servants in which he defined functions of the Head of Service as consisting in dealing with service matters such as employment, promotion, discipline, etc, and dissolved

the Federal Civil Service Commission, and that of the Secretary to the Military Government as essentially a political appointee, who would help to articulate policies and programmes and help to supervise their implementation in the various ministries and parastatals. In a nutshell, that was his definition of what constitutes the kernel of the function of his Secretary to the Military Government.

Let me add very quickly, that every government defines rules for its functionaries. And you recall that when Henry Kissinger was National Security Adviser in the US, many people thought he was more or less Secretary of State. But when he left the position, Brzezinski took over; many people across the world forgot that there was any such position. The point I am making is that each position comes alive or fades or wanes, depending on what priority the incumbent president wants to give to it. So, in my case, the president said it was essentially to articulate policies and programmes and to help supervise their implementation in the various ministries and parastatals. Now, that was the basic function.

In practice, this meant that submissions by the ministers and heads of department to the president had to be routed through the Secretary to the Military Government so that he would help to vet them and offer his own alternative views, so that the president would have the choice when the paper eventually got to him. What I have just said led to a lot of problems because I, a civilian, was appointed Secretary to the Military Government, and I insisted that if I am to perform my function as defined by the president, if I am to supervise the implementation of government programmes in the ministries by ministers, then those ministers had to report through me to the president, because you don't supervise from below. Most of the ministers at that time were military officers who took part in the coup that brought Babangida to office, so they resented the very idea of a civilian interposing himself between them and their boss. And I must say I had the support of the president because I was able to explain to them that while any of them was free to talk to the president about anything under the sun, anywhere of his choice, as long as the president was not being asked to commit Nigeria to anything, they were free to do so.

But if they were making any formal submissions, formal requests, to commit Nigeria financially or otherwise, then those requests must come through the Secretary to Government who would have a second opinion before Nigeria would be committed. I made that distinction, and after some time I think they accepted it. It was novel: they couldn't imagine it; but gradually they accepted it. And over time, many of them discovered that it was in their own interest to route their request through me because, quite often I was able to help make a more effective presentation to the president, and most of the time they got what they wanted. So, they found it useful to route such requests through a single point or clearing house. Otherwise there would be duplication and confusion in government. Basically, that was the policy and implementation component of my job.

As for the administrative component, I was secretary to the three councils of government: Armed Forces Ruling Council; Council of State; and the Federal Executive Council. I was assisted in carrying out these functions by three Permanent Secretaries, one for each council. They took the minutes and prepared the drafts then I vetted them.

So, I was extremely busy because government, at that time, was battling with the economy; and I was a professional economist. I was Director of Economic Planning for Nigeria for many years before I left the service; I was Managing Director of a bank; so I had adequate exposure to be able to make an input into policy formation, explanation and dissemination. That gave the impression that I was the one making the policies and the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP); that I was the one that invented it. That was of course, not true. The Structural Adjustment Programme was the government policy adopted by the various organs of government. But because of my background, training and exposure, I was in a better position to explain it in terms that the public would understand. All in all, that was the kind of job I was doing when I was in government.

OLUNIYI: How often did the different organs of government meet?

FALAE: The Federal Executive Council met every week.

OLUNIYI: Do you mean the Council of Ministers?

FALAE: Yes, Council of Ministers. The other councils met as and when there was enough business for them to do. The Council of State, with the state governors as members, met roughly once a month or once in two months. The Armed Forces Ruling Council met usually after the Council of State has met, in order to ratify decisions taken by the Council of State. That is the kind of frequency we had, but if there was an emergency, it could meet twice in a week.

OLUNIYI: If I understand it, the work of the Council of Ministers was essentially that of reviewing progress in the implementation of the various government projects, isn't?

FALAE: Well, I must say that the bulk of the work of the Council of Ministers at that time was really approving contracts because the most important way of implementing your programme is awarding contracts to contractors who then physically executed the projects. So, most of the memoranda that went to the Council of Ministers were contract awarding memoranda, which were sent to my office by the various ministers to be vetted and listed. Which one I listed before which one was my prerogative. I will not delve into the politics of listing of cabinet projects.

But also during that time, I was able to get the President to direct that. Once in a quarter, we would have a cabinet meeting that would be devoted exclusively to reviewing achievements in the various ministries and sectors. So, every quarter, every ministry came with its progress report of what it was doing, achievements and problems, etc, in that way everybody in government knew what every other person was doing. That never happened before! It was one of the innovations we brought in and I think it was extremely useful to everybody.

OLUNIYI: Is it correct to say that General Babangida, as military president, was the chairman of the three councils and that you as Secretary to Government was a member or in attendance at the meetings of the three councils?

FALAE: I am the first Secretary to Government that was a member of the three councils. It was not so before my tenure. When I came, the Secretary to Government was secretary to the Federal Executive Council. A different arrangement was made for the Council of State and the Armed Forces Ruling Council – military personnel was doing it. But I told the president that, if you call me from my bank to advise you on the affairs of government, I need to know what is going on so that I can advise you. If I am ignorant of three quarters of what is going on, I will be totally ineffective. He saw the logic in my argument and agreed that I should become the secretary of the three councils. It meant very hard work for me but that was the only way that I could do my job effectively. Yes, I was secretary to all the three councils but I was assisted by Permanent Secretaries in each of the three.

OLUNIYI: Apart from the two of you, Chairman and the Secretary to Government, was there any other government functionary that had to attend the meetings of three councils?

FALAE: Yes, the Attorney-General of the Federation for legal matters and constitutional matters. He and I were the two non-military personnel that had to attend all the three councils.

OLUNIYI: Is it correct to say that the Armed Forces Ruling Council and the Council of State (governors) were made up of military officers and that the Federal Executive Council was a mixed bag of military and civilian members?

FALAE: Yes.

OLUNIYI: How did an idea become a decree during the Babangida era?

FALAE: I would advise that you have a chat with Prince Bola Ajibola, the then Attorney-General, but of course I knew a bit about how things happened. If there was a subject on which a law needed to be made, the matter would be discussed in council and the essential points that needed to be effected in the new law would be

discussed and agreed in the three councils usually. A matter might start from the Federal Executive Council, and the governors would come and discuss it. An example was the abolition of the marketing boards. And then, it would go to the Armed Forces Ruling Council. Once the general principles are approved, then those general conclusions would go to the Ministry of Justice, as what is called drafting instructions to the Attorney-General who would then put the thing together in legal form. Whenever it was ready, it would then come back to the Council of State, sometimes to the Federal Executive Council, to be looked at and then it would go up to the Council of State and finally to the Armed Forces Ruling Council for final consideration and approval. That is the general trend, but the actual putting together of the law was done by the Attorney-General, in his office. It came back as draft before it was signed physically into a decree. I had to make sure the president signed a hard copy before it was printed by the government printer.

OLUNIYI: Was there a possibility that a matter that was not discussed in council could show up as a decree?

FALAE: Of course, yes. When you have a military government, the word of the head of government is that law. That is what the lawyers told us. So, he could on his own call the attorney-general into his office and tell him, "I want a decree on this matter. These are the issues I want to reflect there." The attorney-general would draft it. He might take it to the Armed Forces Ruling Council for approval before signing it into law. If he didn't take it there and it was gazetted, it also became law. Yes. It is not like the civil arrangement where there is a laid down procedure that must be religiously followed at all times; no. The word of the military government is law. Yes, there was room for a decree emerging without going through the usual process. Politically and from the point of security, a wise head of state would carry his colleagues along, but if what he has signed without going through them were to be tested in a court of law, it would be proclaimed to be law.

OLUNIYI: Can you recall whether every decree promulgated during your tenure as SMG went through the normal process, starting

from either the Federal Executive Council or the Council of State and then going up to the Armed Forces Ruling Council?

FALAE: I would say most of them passed through the normal process.

OLUNIYI: I am curious about Decree 26 of 1986, “Constitution (Suspension and Modification Amendment)”, promulgated on 20 November 1986, which amended sections 217, 223 (1), 226 (a), 141 (3), and 242 of the 1979 Constitution, stipulating that the word “personal” should be deleted wherever it occurred after the word “Islamic” thereby making a profound and fundamental constitutional amendment. You will recall that the topical issue in 1986 was the economy and the whipping of the IMF as scapegoat. This amendment was a misnomer because there was no clamour for Sharia in 1986 whereas laws or decree arise out of felt need. Can you recall the discussions (if any) on the desirability or otherwise of the need to widen the application of Sharia, in the three councils before the promulgation of Decree 26?

FALAE: I can’t recall this one that you have just mentioned. You remember there was the OIC debate about the same time. I was appointed just as the thing was boiling over and we were able to persuade government to set up a joint committee of Christians and Muslims to douse the tension and manage the matter. I don’t recall how this one came about. As I said, the word of the head of government was law. He could ask his Attorney General to draft a decree and once it was signed, it was law. I will not be surprised if this falls into that type of category. In fact, I don’t recall any debate on this one in any of the councils.

OLUNIYI: Thank you sir.

APPENDIX III

Fig. 36
Public Apologies Table Generated by the Author

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA http://reserve.mg2.org/apologies.htm (accessed 5 December 2010)		RHODA HOWARD-HASSMANN CENTER, WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY http://political-apologies.wlu.ca/doclist.php?rpp=40&sort=reparation_date&cp=1&gobutton.x=16&gobutton.y=9 (12 May 2012)	
YEAR	INCIDENTS	YEAR	UPDATED AS AT 12 MAY 2012
1077	1		
1691	1	1691	2
1711	1		
1863	1	1863	1
		1865	1
1894	1	1894	1
1919	1	1899	1
		1922	1
1924	1		
1927	1		
1928	1	1928	1
1937	2	1937	4
1948	1	1948	

1950	1	1950	1
		1951	4
		1955	1
		1956	1
1960	1	1960	1
		1963	1
1964	1	1964	1
1965	3	1965	4
1968	2	1968	
1970	1	1970	3
		1971	1
1972	1	1972	1
		1974	1
1976	1	1976	1
1977	1		
1980	1	1980	2
1981	2	1981	2
1983	3	1983	1
1984	2	1984	2
1985	3	1985	1
1986	1	1986	5
		1987	2
1988	4	1988	7
1989	2	1989	4

1990	4	1990	9
1991	4	1991	14
1992	6	1992	7
1993	9	1993	9
1994	6	1994	7
1995	19	1995	17
1996	4	1996	8
1997	11	1997	20
1998	21	1998	26
1999	26	1999	38
2000	36	2000	35
2001	27	2001	47
2002	40	2002	74
		2003	47
		2004	113
		2005	179
		2006	60
		2007	57
		2008	94
		2009	80
		2010	43
TOTAL	255	TOTAL	1044

APPENDIX IV

Interview with Professor Is-haq Akintola

The following are excerpts of an interview granted by Prof Is-haq Akintola, Department of Religions and Peace Studies, Lagos State University, Ojo, and Director, Muslim Rights Concern, a non-governmental organisation also in Lagos. I requested for the interview in September 2013 but I did not follow it up until mid-October 2014. The interview was granted on 22 October 2014.

OLUNIYI: First of all, let's start with what I know you for.

AKINTOLA: Okay

OLUNIYI: For up to 30 years or thereabout, you have been promoting equal access to the leadership positions within the Muslim community in Nigeria. Is the struggle over now?

AKINTOLA: No. None of those struggles is over. They continue. It depends on the angle from which you are looking at them.

OLUNIYI: OKAY. I remember the time you were saying, for example, that the chairmanship or presidency of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs should be such that any Muslim can aspire to it based on integrity or personal merit. This is my understanding of what you were fighting for. Do I get it right?

AKINTOLA: Yes.

OLUNIYI: Is the struggle on-going?

AKINTOLA: (Laughs) Thank you for bringing this up. When the leadership is inept, when there is no performance, when things are going sour, that is when people realise the kind of environment they are in. They realise what is wrong¹ and what is being done. When things straighten up, hardly do you hear similar complaints. In the present circumstance, we are not complaining because our complaint was based on the fact that the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs was not delivering at that time. Those who occupied the post were only armchair traditional rulers and armchair religious rulers. They did not show interest in the affairs of Muslims. The reverse is the case today. So, we don't have a problem.

OLUNIYI: So you are not particularly against leadership according to bloodline or based on hereditary considerations.

AKINTOLA: As far as the situation we are in today, we think we are in good shape. So that issue does not presently arise.

OLUNIYI: We can now go on to my own business of the day. The Meridian-Webster Dictionary in my Samsung tablet defines apology as (1) "a statement saying that you are sorry about something" (2) "an expression of regret for having done or said some wrong" and (3) "an admission of error or discourtesy accompanied by an expression of regret." My question is this: is apology a noble principle?

AKINTOLA: I think it was Alexander Pope who said, 'to err is human; to forgive is divine.' In other words, if a human being makes a mistake, the second party or person is there to readily forgive. The man who made the mistake must chivalrously admit the error and seek forgiveness, and at least show remorse. And that is the way the other man will readily forgive. It means it was not intentional. It takes two to tango. The committer of error must admit to the mistake; the other person probably is the victim who suffered some psychological whatever will be the one to forgive and overlook. And of course my Qur'an teaches clearly in Chapter 10:34 [quotation in Arabic].

1 The audio was not clear, so I printed and made this transcript available to Prof. Akintola for vetting and he said it was OK as it was.

You cannot compare evil and righteousness. But when somebody commits evil, when someone wrongs you, pay him with goodness, that is, don't seek vengeance. Perchance if you do that, that person who wrongs you will see the angelic nature in you and be inclined to think as follows: "Instead of hating this man, it is better I love him. Look at the way he treated me after I wronged him." They can become [quotation in Arabic] the best of friends.

OLUNIYI: Thank you for the exposition. Do you see a religious dimension in apology? You know that my definition of apology is taken from a non-confessional dictionary. Can we say apology has religious content, expression, experience or whatever?

AKINTOLA: Some sociologists speak of man as merely a political animal. I think they forgot something. Every man is a religious person. Everyone has something inherently religious in him. After all, we know we came from somewhere. So, it is not even in apology alone; religion has a dimension in everything we do. You know sometimes we tend to relegate religion to the background; but religion is somewhere there, particularly from the African perspective, in the African setting. I am sure you are familiar with the saying that Africans are the most religious globally; and that Nigerians are the most religious people in Africa. So if we are apologising, we are admitting that we have wronged this fellow. And it is not this person per se that we wrong; we think of his Creator who might punish us for the wrong we did to this man who may be powerless. But of course we know that at the end of the day, there is a day of accountability, or the Day of Judgement when we will be asked how we treated our neighbours, families, and people we ruled over.

Indeed, apology is important especially in a position of leadership. If you are a leader and people are hurt or people think you have done something wrong, or anything you didn't do well, it is important to come back at a point in time and address it – a public apology that will go down, that will douse tension. And of course, it is important for a leader to keep at the back of his mind that he occupies his position in trust. Otherwise, a leader stands to be questioned on the Day of Judgement.

OLUNIYI: Thank you. I know you have already quoted a verse or two from the Koran but I pencilled down a two-fold question which I still want to ask you point blank. Is apology endorsed by Islam?

AKINTOLA: Sure.

OLUNIYI: Is apology taught by Islam?

AKINTOLA: Apology is taught by Islam. In fact, people who fail to apologise do so out of arrogance, out of pride, and the Qur'an says arrogance is a quality that Allah hates in man. [Quotation in Arabic] The Qur'an 31 verse 16 or 17 says, when you walk on earth, walk simply, humbly do not walk with pride. And it says [quotation in Arabic] no matter how you try to make your feet stand firm on ground [quotation in Arabic] you can never use your heels to dig the ground: it will not break the ground. [Quotation in Arabic] And no matter how much you try not to bow to anybody, your head will never be as high as the mountain. You can see the similitude the Qur'an is trying to lead us to. Apology is strongly supported by and strongly recommended in the Qur'an.

OLUNIYI: Does this apply to public apology?

AKINTOLA: Yes.

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